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Abstract
The post-Cold War 1990s were pervaded by a popular sense of pessimism and 
decline. The thesis argues that such sentiments were part of a general mood in 
international relations towards Romanticism. It examines how this Romantic 
sensibility affected interpretations of conflict in Yugoslavia, outlines Romantic 
predictions about post-Cold War conflict, and compares the Romantic view with a 
structural perspective of Yugoslavia’s demise. The thesis uses a variety of methods, 
including a philosophical exploration of Romanticism in the nineteenth century and 
the 1990s, a literary analysis of key texts on conflict, an empirical investigation of 
armed conflict data, and a theoretical treatment of structural factors in conflict.
The thesis historicises nineteenth-century Romanticism as a reaction to the 
uncertainties created by three transformations: political revolution in France, 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, and cultural revolution in Germany. It then examines 
Romanticism through five themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, 
relativism, and nature. It compares the 1990s and its ‘revolutions’—fragmentation 
and globalisation—developing the concept of Postmodern Romanticism within these 
themes and applies them to trends in 1990s international relations.
Further, the thesis examines Romantic interpretations of conflict in the works 
of Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, and Martin van Creveld, specifically 
scrutinising their interpretations of conflict in Yugoslavia. It then empirically 
investigates various Romantic predictions about conflict, providing empirical 
evidence that these predictions are inaccurate.
Building on the empirical analyses that find state creation rather than identity 
differences an important factor in conflict, the thesis develops an alternative 
theoretical framework for assessing state stability based on four structural risk 
factors: colonial legacy, political institutions, economic structure, and demographic 
shifts, introducing agency through the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty. The thesis 
uses this framework to compare Romantic and structural views of conflict in 
Yugoslavia. Finally, it provides some reflections on 1990s Romanticism and conflict.
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Introduction
Introduction. Of Flesh and Blood
‘He is merely flesh and blood. /  Flesh-and-blood is weak and frail, /  
Susceptible to nervous shock’
—T.S. Eliot1
Twenty years ago, if we were to have asked Western policymakers, academics, or 
even informed members of the public about the reasons for state failure and intrastate 
conflict, the conventional wisdom would have encompassed a roster of coldly 
rationalist and bloodlessly structural answers, such as insufficient economic 
development or a lack of democracy. However, after the end of the Cold War 
international relations became about flesh and blood again. The rationalist Cold War 
metaphor of states as billiard balls in international relations made famous by Kenneth 
Waltz and other Realists was challenged, overtaken by events.2 While the 1990s 
seemed to begin promisingly with the fall of communism, the violent collapses of 
Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union showed a global audience ‘what history 
meant in flesh and blood’, one which was ‘weak and frail, susceptible to nervous 
shock’.3 The disintegration of both states, but particularly Yugoslavia, also put paid to 
lifeless Cold War abstractions, like billiard balls, and replaced them with the bloody 
standards of clashing ethnies instead. Rather than speaking of progress through 
rationalism, the 1990s shouted of pessimism and decline in an irrational age.
Although some observers in the 1990s analogised the period to the Middle Ages, it 
may be appropriate to analogise the first decade of the post-Cold War to another 
period: the age of Romanticism.4
(i) Why Romanticism?
Just as significant systemic dislocations at the end of the Cold War—fragmentation 
and globalisation—bred fear and uncertainty in the 1990s, disruptive transformations 
in the nineteenth century rocked the foundations of European societies during the age, 
creating a deep sense of malaise. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars
1 T.S. Eliot, ‘The Hippopotamus’, 14-16 (1920).
2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979).
3 In 1937, Rebecca West famously said that she went to Yugoslavia ‘to see what history meant in flesh 
and blood’.
4 See, for example, Alain Mine, Le nouveau Moyen Age (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1993).
7
Introduction
that followed changed the political map of Europe; the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain introduced enormous economic and social disruptions; and the cultural 
revolution in Germany created far-reaching philosophical and political insights. The 
Romantic ‘movement’, or Romanticism, developed partly as a reaction to these 
troubling uncertainties and the perceived failure of Enlightenment rationalism to 
provide answers in a time of profound turbulence. What defines Romanticism is not a 
set of ideological precepts; instead it can be likened to a ‘mood’, ‘atmosphere’, or 
‘sensibility’ that suggests certain themes, five of which we explore in this thesis: 1) 
anti-rationalism, emotionalism, and spirituality; 2) pessimism and ennui; 3) nostalgia; 
4) relativism and the role of identity; and 5) a focus on nature.
Romanticism’s legacies have a long arm. Despite having its roots in the 
nineteenth century, Isaiah Berlin noted that ‘ [Rjomanticism [...] is the largest recent 
movement to transform the lives and the thought of the Western world’.5 ‘Rather than 
offering a set of logical principles, nineteenth-century Romanticism developed 
several key themes or strands of thought which are loosely tied together, and can 
perhaps be best understood as affective tendencies or sensibilities. These themes 
affected understandings of politics and international relations in the 1990s. In fact, it 
would be difficult to comprehend contemporary society outside the framework of 
these themes, which include a cyclical sense of history; nostalgia; ‘holistic’ or organic 
views of society; the symbiosis of man and nature; the primordial pull of identity and 
cultural determinism; or the essential duality of life. Furthermore, we are all heirs to 
Romanticism’s sense of historicism—the understanding that time has specific 
meanings relative to a certain age forms the basis of modem political thinking. In 
fact, it is difficult to conceive of contemporary scholarship in the social sciences that 
is not rooted in an historic conception of society.
However, perhaps Romanticism’s most enduring legacy is its tragic sense of 
destiny and the fatalistic inevitability of decline. Declinism, often expressed through 
the medical metaphor of health/disease or the biological metaphor of youth/old age, 
has been a recurrent theme for the past 200 years, profoundly affecting perceptions of 
and approaches to politics and international relations. Such perceptions of angst and 
decline were significantly present in international relations in the 1990s. As Charles 
William Maynes put it in 1995, ‘In the last couple of years, as optimism has given
5 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots o f Romanticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 1.
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way to pessimism, hope has given way to resignation. The future seems increasingly 
sombre while the past acquires an artificial glow’.6
Although we aim to restrict our discussion to the 1990s, some would question 
whether this declinist aspect of the Romantic mood remains, particularly in the US, 
where neoconservative triumphalism is seen to reign. Have 9/11 and the US invasion 
of Iraq reversed America’s sense of pessimism and decline? Is the Zeitgeist of 
Romanticism an artefact of the past? We respond to this question with three 
arguments. First, that triumphalism may naturally co-exist with declinism and 
Romanticism in American politics. These moods are not mutually exclusive, and one 
can actually cause the other. Second, even if the waves of American triumphalism, 
specifically with respect to 9/11 and Iraq, are valid arguments against a declinist 
mood in America, the era of ‘good feelings’ about the war against terror is either dead 
or dying while the sense of domestic decline still pervades US public opinion.
Finally, some key Romantic themes, such as anti-rationalism, are not restricted to 
American neoconservatives; they have appeal on the left as well.
First, the declinist aspect of American Romanticism can actually be seen as a 
causal factor in the resurgence of American triumphalism. America is a pluralistic 
society where social and cultural groups are often re-aligning around differing 
political goals. One of the key developments in twentieth-century American politics is 
the awakening of the so-called ‘silent majority’ who view the advances of modem, 
‘permissive’ liberal society—such as gender or race quality—as a giant leap 
backwards for mankind.7 Commonly dismissed simply as ‘religious fundamentalists’, 
this social group has increasingly fostered political change by playing on a 
generalised sense of social and moral decline.8 This same group, however, also breeds 
a strongly nationalist and populist style of politics. While simultaneously bemoaning 
the ‘decline of American society’, this same political force continually trumpets the
6 Charles William Maynes, ‘The New Pessimism’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1995), p. 32.
7 The term ‘silent majority’ was infamously used by Richard Nixon in his successful campaign for the 
US presidency, often seen as the beginning of a national backlash against the liberal and social 
democratic policies begun in the 1930s by President Roosevelt, and continued through the 1960s by 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
8 See, for example, the early work of the self-styled ‘Moral Majority’ political pressure group, which is 
widely acknowledged to have had an influence on the administration of President Ronald Reagan. For 
a discussion of current activism by Christian religious groups, see John Green, Mark Rozell, and 
William Clyde Wilcox, eds. The Christian Right in American Politics: Marching to the Millennium 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003). For a cross-confessional comparison of 
political activism in the US, see William Martin, ‘With God on Their Side’, Georgetown Journal o f  
International Affairs (Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter/Spring 2000).
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natural supremacy of the ‘American system’ of government, free markets, and 
liberty.9 The two observations are logically antagonistic to one another, and yet they 
perfectly reflect the mood of the growing Romantic majority. In fact, for some 
Christian evangelicals, 9/11 was a sign of God’s displeasure at the secularisation of 
society and a clarion call for religious revival in America.10 The sense of societal 
decline and threat from abroad after 9/11 promoted a circling-the-wagons effect 
around ‘tradition’—family and country—and fed Christian nationalism.11 Thus 
American triumphalism may be, if anything, the natural and predictable outgrowth or 
end-product of American Romanticism.12 Indeed, a form of American expansionism 
and triumphalism in the nineteenth century, known as ‘manifest destiny’, was tied to 
Romanticism and Romantic views of America’s national mission as a force for 
good—liberty and democracy—on the continent.13
Second, if 9/11 did bring about an American resurgence, its moment may be 
over. While in 2003 we could have argued that Americans were optimistic and 
determined in their attempt to rid the world of al-Qaida and terrorism more broadly 
speaking, little popular enthusiasm remains in 2005 for the Pentagon’s fledgling 
praetorians in Iraq. Opposition has formed not only on the left, but more importantly 
in the administration’s own conservative ranks. Although the Bush administration has 
confidently asserted America’s ability to project power internationally, its rhetoric 
rings increasingly hollow as a much deeper anxiety hangs over the direction that the 
country is taking, both with respect to Iraq and domestically.
9 See Linda Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market: The Emotions that Matter in Right-Wing America 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 7. Evangelical universities make this 
link between Christianity and the market plain in their mission statements. C f Liberty University, 
‘Purpose/Mission’, which highlights the importance of democracy and free markets to Christians. 
Available at http://www.liberty.edu/index.cfrn?PID=6899
10 Some evangelicals, like Reverend Jerry Falwell, consider 9/11 to be a punishment for America’s 
secular society, wrought by ‘pagans’, ‘abortionists’, ‘feminists’, and ‘gays’. See Common Dreams 
Progressive Newswire, ‘Transcript of Pat Robertson’s Interview with Jerry Falwell, from the 9-13-01 
edition of The 700 Club’. Available at http://www.commondreams.org/news2001/0917-03.htm
11 As an example of this, some evangelical churches changed their services to include a pledge of 
allegiance to the Christian flag and the American flag in their services.
12 A similar argument can be made with respect to the rise of the Populist political movement in early 
twentieth century American politics.
13 ‘Manifest destiny’ refers to a term used in the nineteenth century by American politicians and 
philosophers to express a sense of pre-ordained mission that justified American expansion across the 
continent. As a great nation, America had a clear fate or destiny to colonise the continent. It can 
perhaps be compared to the French idea of a mission civilisatrice, or an imperial ‘white man’s burden’. 
It was particularly used to justify expansion into Spanish-held territories. Manifest destiny is a vast 
subject in US history. For an example of the literature, see Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, 
eds., Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press for University of Texas, 1997).
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Key Republicans are anxious that US policy in Iraq has gone awry and is 
undermining US credibility and leadership in the world. For example, Republican 
Senator Chuck Hagel (Nebraska), who serves on the Senate’s Foreign Relations and 
Select Intelligence Committees, has argued that ‘US leadership is determined as much 
by [America’s] commitment to principle as by [its] exercise of power’, a direct 
counter to the administration’s relentless happy-talk on Iraq.14 More difficult is that 
the American public has yet to be persuaded of the benefits of the war. Public opinion 
polls highlight the growing sense of unease that Americans feel over Iraq. By June 
2005, the majority of Americans (52 per cent) had stated that the war in Iraq would 
not make America safer.15
More recent polls confirm a deepening sense of apprehension over Iraq. 
According to a December 2005 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, 61 per cent of adults 
disapproved of the Bush administration’s handling of Iraq.16 Other polls reflected this 
pessimism: between 53-60 per cent of Americans disapproved of the administration’s
i nhandling of Iraq; steep drop from March 2003, when 74 per cent of Americans
1 ftthought the decision to go to war with Iraq was the right one. Overall, as one scholar 
noted, ‘the Iraq War has become so unpopular that it ranks just above gay 
marriage’.19 These numbers should not be surprising. The American public is 
notoriously fickle about its judgements, especially ones that concern ‘foreign 
entanglements’.20 Political failure is no less an orphan in the US than anywhere else. 
When policies are seen to fail—as Iraq has—public abandonment does not trail too 
far behind. Therefore, despite official crowing about the advent of democracy in Iraq, 
the mood of the American public has been stubbornly more pessimistic. The sense of
14 Chuck Hagel, ‘A Republican Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004).
15 Dana Milbank and Claudia Deane, ‘Poll Finds Dimmer View of Iraq War: 52% Say US Has Not 
Become Safer’, Washington Post (8 June 2005), p. A01.
16 See Polling Report, CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (16-18 December 2005). The report contains a 
listing of several polls. Available at http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm
17 See Polling Report. These polls are ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 53% 
disapproval; Associated Press/Ipsos (5-7 December 2005), 58% disapproval; NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal (9-12 December 2005), 60% disapproval.
18 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, ‘War Concerns Grow, but Support Remains 
Steadfast: 71% Favor Major Post-War Role for US’ (3 April 2003). Available at http://people- 
press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=696
19 John Kenneth White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’, The Polling Report (10 October 2005). 
Available at http://www.pollingreport.com/whitejk.htm
20 President George Washington used this phrase in his farewell speech, urging his successors to 
beware the perils and temptations of adventures abroad. See ‘Washington’s Farewell Address’ [1796]. 
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm
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failure in Iraq is reflected in the way Americans view the Bush presidency overall, 
with a majority perceiving it as a failure.21
This is further reflected in the sense of decline that most Americans have
expressed about their own society. Polls in December 2005 show that 61-64 per cent
00of Americans think that America is ‘on the wrong track’. Zogby International polls 
have shown that Bush is rated as ‘poor’ on a host of bread-and-butter domestic issues 
which conservatives should win hands down: jobs and the economy, taxes, and petrol 
prices 23 Continuing negative assessments about Bush’s helmsmanship could pressure 
Republicans to distance themselves from the White House’s policies in the 2006 
elections.24 As John Kenneth White notes, ‘The remainder of the Bush presidency
Oe
will be more about limits, since his status has suffered a fatal blow’.
Finally, Romantic themes and modes of thought are not restricted to 
conservatives nor to the US; themes such as anti-rationalism, including the role of 
religion in society, have appeal on the left as well. For example, some on the 
American left have argued that religious values should be expressed by progressive 
politicians as a method to connect with the public 26 In Britain, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair has consistently expressed the value he places on his faith, and more recently 
Gordon Brown has begun to do the same, endorsing a new book on the role of faith in 
politics.27
Therefore, Romanticism’s ‘moment’ may not yet be over. The twin genies of 
uncertainty and fear that the end of the Cold War let escape have yet to be put back 
into the bottle. Despite the American asymmetry of power, no perceptibly stable 
framework for international relations exists; even American scenario planners note 
that the ‘architecture issue’—the structure of international relations—remains
21 See Frank Newport, ‘Americans Perceive Bush Presidency More as Failure than Success’, Gallup 
Poll Daily Briefing, audio podcast (31 January 2006).
22 See Polling Report, Gallup poll (19-22 December 2005), 62% ‘dissatisfied’ at direction of country; 
Cook Political Report/RT Strategies (8-11 December 2005), 61% ‘wrong track’; and Associated 
Press/Ipsos (5-7 December 2005), 64% ‘wrong track’. Available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/right.htm
23 White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’.
24 See Vicki Haddock, ‘Running as die UnBush’, San Francisco Chronicle (18 December 2005); Jim 
Lobe, ‘Republicans Cut and Run from Iraq and Bush’, Inter Press Service News Agency (15 
November 2005); and Michael Scherer, ‘Right-wingers Turn Against Bush’, Salon.com (9 February 
2006). Available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/02/09/right_backlash/index.html
25 White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’.
26 See, for example, Amy Sullivan, ‘Getting Religion’, Blueprint Magazine, Democratic Leadership 
Council (7 May 2004).
27 Gaby Hinsliff, ‘Meet Pastor Jim, the Chancellor’s religious guru’, The Observer (5 February 2006), 
p. 3.
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important since it is still in flux.28 It is likely to remain so for some time as whatever 
public consensus that the US neoconservatives had manufactured about the proper 
use of American power erodes with each dip in the opinion polls. Hence we may soon 
find ourselves back at a similar impasse as in the 1990s, at a point of uncertainty and 
instability, valediction and decline.
(ii) Why Yugoslavia?
In the thesis we explore how Romantic themes had an impact on Western thinking 
about international relations in the 1990s, including interpretations of post-Cold War 
conflicts, particularly Yugoslavia. Although other states could have been chosen as a 
case study—for example, the Soviet Union—we have chosen Yugoslavia because, 
while a significant rise in the overall number of conflicts from 1989-1992 generated 
feelings of apprehension in the West, a considerable sense of pessimism in 
international relations began with the break-up and resulting conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia. As Yahya Sadowski remarked,‘the war in Bosnia in particular worked to 
reshape the national mood in America (and elsewhere) into one of pessimism’.29
At the time of its collapse, Yugoslavia was the key issue in international 
relations; as Nicholas Bums noted of the United States, ‘[t]he Balkans were our top 
foreign policy priority [then]-just as Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism are 
today’. In a quantitative sense, it was perhaps the most widely reported and 
discussed conflict of the early 1990s. As one of the first major post-Cold War 
conflicts, Europe’s ‘backyard war’ did not merely become an international media
a  i
story or academic case study, it became much more: a dominant metaphor, a key 
analogy, a popular framework within which current conflicts were judged and future 
conflicts were to be analysed, and a spark for a general discussion about the ‘nature of 
our age and its future’.32 It also became almost apocryphal, helping to generate new
28 See, for example, National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report o f the National 
Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, NIC 2004-13 (Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, 
December 2004). Available at http://www.cia.gOv/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html#contents
29 Yahya Sadowski, The Myth o f Global Chaos (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).
30 R. Nicholas Bums, ‘Ten Years After Dayton: Winning the Peace in The Balkans’, speech at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC (19 May 2005). Bums is US Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs.
31 This phrase is taken from Mark Almond’s Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans 
(London: Mandarin, 1994).
32 Anatol Lieven remarked that the war in Yugoslavia sparked a more general debate on nationalism 
that ‘spread far and fast beyond academic circles to become a central theme of the wider debate on the
13
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pessimistic predictions about the risks and uncertainties facing the post-Cold War 
order more generally. The Yugoslav conflicts gave direction, impetus, and meaning to 
some of the Romantic interpretations and frameworks that have been developed to 
explain subsequent conflicts.
Finally, since the conflicts in Yugoslavia have ended, the case is considered 
‘history’, albeit very recent history. Unlike the war in Iraq, or the ongoing issues over 
the ‘war on terrorism’, the Yugoslav conflicts can be viewed in retrospect.
(iii) Chapter Overview
This thesis argues that within the span of the 1990s several Cold War Establishment 
‘isms’ took a knock in politics and international relations: rationalism and Realism 
seemed passe, overtaken by the popular mood of the post-Cold War era, one filled 
with anti-rationalism (irrationalism or emotionalism), pessimism, relativism, a sense 
of nostalgia, and a greater emphasis on nature, not only of the natural environment, 
but also a critical re-examination of human nature and identity. We argue that such 
sentiments were part of a larger 1990s theme in politics and international relations 
towards various aspects of Romanticism. We examine this topic to see how this 
Romantic sensibility affected common interpretations of the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
and compare this Romantic view with a rationalist structural perspective of 
Yugoslavia’s demise. In order to explore these themes, the thesis is divided into the 
following chapters.
Chapter 1 examines nineteenth-century Romanticism, or perhaps more 
accurately Romanticisms, including the Romantic idea of Zeitgeist—that time has a 
material meaning—to investigate some of the main themes, moods, and key ideas of 
the period. Further, we consider the historical context of the Romantic period 
(broadly defined from about 1780-1900), to argue that Romantic concepts themselves 
were products not only of a philosophical reaction against the Enlightenment, but also 
an historical reaction against the uncertainties of the age, which include the three 
great European transformations of the period: the French Revolution, the Industrial 
Revolution, and the German cultural revolution. We explore the period through five
nature of our age and its future’. See Anatol Lieven, ‘Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation? Scholarly Debate and 
the Realities of Eastern Europe’, The National Interest (Fall 1997), p. 10.
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key Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and a focus 
on nature.
Chapter 2 historicises the 1990s and its ‘revolutions’ which had seemingly 
accelerated the pace of social change globally and ushered in an era of greater public 
uncertainty worldwide. While some scholars and pundits may see the 1990s Zeitgeist 
of Romanticism (which we call Postmodern Romanticism), as a philosophical 
reaction against the rationalism of the Cold War era, we argue that its basis may be 
found in three potentially dislocating social and historical transformations whose 
roots lie in the Cold War, but which flowered in the 1990s: democratisation in former 
communist states leading to the destruction of the bipolar world, economic 
globalisation, and growing cultural homogenisation. These transformations—often 
collectively called fragmentation and globalisation—left uncertainty in their wake, 
one that was followed by a deep sense of pessimism, foreboding, and civilisational 
decline among disenchanted publics, policymakers, and academics, especially in the 
West. These uncertainties added new impetus to those who challenged the Cold War 
predominance of rationalist paradigms and provided ready audiences with greater 
receptivity to Romantic themes and messages. We then develop the concept of 
Postmodern Romanticism within the five key themes outlined in Chapter 1—anti­
rationalism, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and a focus on nature—and apply them 
to diverse trends (both popular and scholarly) in 1990s politics and international 
relations.
Chapter 3 scrutinises the works of three writers who have influenced the 
Romantic themes and tone of post-Cold War international relations, particularly with 
regards to interpretations of post-Cold War conflict: Robert Kaplan, Samuel 
Huntington, and Martin van Creveld.33 Their works are prominent among those who 
foretold (and continue to foretell) of an apocalyptic era of chaos and conflict in 
international relations. We have chosen these three for a variety of reasons: they are 
recognised experts in their fields; they reach different influential audiences; they 
answer different and complimentary questions about past conflicts and potential 
conflicts; and their work has been important in moulding interpretations about the 
conflict in former Yugoslavia.
33 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams o f the Post Cold War (New York, 
NY: Vintage Books, 2001); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f  
World Order (London: Touchstone Books, 1998); and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation o f War 
(New York, NY: Free Press, 1991).
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The chapter also discusses the creation of metaphors and analogies in 
policymaking, including the importance of heuristic devices (and biases) in the 
selection of cognitive analytical frameworks. One reason these authors have gained 
influence in international relations is through their use of vivid analogies and 
metaphors, some of which have achieved interpretive ascendancy in international 
relations during the post-Cold War period. After this discussion, we specifically 
examine how some of their Romantic interpretations of conflict in the 1990s, 
especially the war in Yugoslavia, inform their writings in light of the five categories 
that define the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism. We also examine how various 
heuristic biases operate in these works. These Romantic interpretations generate a 
series of predictions about conflict—for example, that identity conflicts are more 
intractable or deadly, or that the conflicts seen in the 1990s will continue to increase, 
creating the conditions for a ‘coming anarchy’—that we examine in the following 
chapter.
Chapter 4 investigates Romantic claims and predictions about the trajectory of 
armed conflict. We examine the empirical evidence on armed conflicts, comparing 
the post-Cold War era with that of the Cold War. We find that Romantic 
pronouncements of a ‘coming anarchy’ or ‘clash of civilisations’ may have been due 
to the disproportionate effects that the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
had on conflict levels. Indeed, using three databases, two which define conflict from a 
quantitative perspective (Singer & Small and SIPRI) and a third which uses a 
qualitative definition (Kosimo),we find that the disintegration of these two states into 
conflict accounted for approximately 70-80 per cent of excess conflicts (those above 
expected Cold War levels).34 Had these two states not collapsed, there would have 
been no spike in 1990s conflict levels. Hence Romantics’ pessimism about a ‘coming 
anarchy’ is based partly on the widely-reported conflicts in these two states.
The empirical data show that while the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold 
War era (1989-1992) did see a significant rise in new conflicts, from 1993-1999 the 
number of new conflicts declined and conflict levels returned to at or below Cold War
34 The Singer and Small data are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates O f War Project: 
International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993). The Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) database on Major Armed Conflicts is compiled by researchers for the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Project (UCDP) in Uppsala University, Sweden, and is published annually in the Journal 
o f Peace Research. See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ The Kosimo data was developed by the 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. See http://www.hiik.de
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rates of conflict. Additionally, post-2000 levels of conflict have fallen further. The 
rate of new conflicts is about half of the expected rate during the Cold War and the 
total number of ongoing conflicts in 2004 was at a level not seen since the 1970s.
These empirical results confirm the work of some other scholars in the field. 
Indeed, we find that a variety of conflict trends belie the Romantic ‘coming anarchy’,
Of
‘civilisational clash’, and ‘neo-medieval’ interpretations of conflict. First, conflict 
termination was a significant, if under-reported, trend in post-Cold War international 
relations. Therefore, contrary to the 1990s being a period of greater anarchy, for some 
places, like Mozambique, it meant the end of longstanding conflicts. Second, the 
Kosimo data show that state creation rather than culture or identity clash per se has 
been a driving issue in conflict since the end of World War II, particularly during the 
period of intense decolonisation in the 1960s, as well as during the post-Cold War 
era. Third, the Kosimo data show that identity conflicts are neither more deadly nor 
more intractable than other kinds: during the Cold War, some of the longest and 
deadliest conflicts were proxy wars, with an important component of ideological 
struggle.
Since our empirical analyses in Chapter 4 highlight the significant role that 
state creation and national power contention played in Cold War conflicts, Chapter 5 
develops a framework of analysis for assessing state stability based partly on a 
streamlined version of the results of the State Failure Task Force at the University of 
Maryland. Our framework examines state stability through four structural risk factors: 
colonial legacy, political institutions, economic structure, and demographic shifts. 
While structural factors may be necessary to create the underlying conditions for 
conflict, they may not be sufficient. Therefore, we introduce the concept of agency in 
a narrow and limited way, through Albert Hirschman’s concepts of exit, voice, and 
loyalty.36 Hirschman’s concepts mimic the interplay between politics and economics 
within organisations, including states. Under conditions of institutional deterioration, 
and faced with dissatisfaction over declining performance, Hirschman argues that 
individuals or groups have two main options in any institution, including a state: exit 
(leaving) and voice (open dissent), which are mediated through a concept of loyalty,
35 These are terms used to describe the theories of Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld, respectively.
36 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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which Hirschman sees as rational and interest-based. This alternative framework 
provides a structural perspective within which to examine state instability, 
breakdown, and conflict that acts as a contrast to the Romantic vision of state break 
up as one fundamentally based on differences in primordial identity, culture, or 
civilisation. We develop this structural perspective in order to compare and contrast 
this view with the competing Romantic interpretation of Yugoslavia’s disintegration 
into conflict.
Building on the five thematic elements of post-Cold War Romanticism 
developed in Chapters 1 and 2, and following the structural framework of analysis 
created in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 compares and contrasts the Romantic and structural 
views of conflict with respect to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. First, the chapter 
examines the Yugoslav conflict through the eyes of the Postmodern Romantic 
Zeitgeist, exploring elements of anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, 
and the focus on nature extant in some common public, policymaking, and academic 
interpretations of the Yugoslav conflict. The chapter then considers how the Yugoslav 
conflict could be interpreted through the four structural criteria and the exit-voice- 
loyalty framework we develop in Chapter 5. In particular, it analyses the differing 
choices between exit and voice made by the various groups based on their perceived 
loyalty to the state.
Lastly, rather than summarising the arguments, Chapter 7 provides some final 
reflections on the Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism and conflict, focusing on the 
sense of pessimism and decline that pervaded international relations in the 1990s.
(iv) Methodology
Finally, the careful reader of the previous section will note that we do not outline a 
specific methodology or school of thought that is to be carried through the thesis.
This is because, quite simply, there is no single methodological approach used.
Rather, we use a variety of methodological tools to look at various issues.
We set forward not to argue the superiority of one school or another, or one 
methodological approach. Unfortunately, in some ways, methodology imputes 
ideology, so those who examine a particular issue using particular tools are labelled 
as belonging to a particular ideological school. For example, those using the rational
37 Hirschman, p. 79.
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choice approach may be considered neo-liberals, while those who consider the 
importance of language in politics may be considered poststructuralists or 
Postmodernists. We broach the issue of methodological approach less as philosophers 
than as tradesmen, asking rather pragmatically about which tool seems most fit to do 
a certain job, rather than using the tool to advance a particular standpoint.
In this vein, we develop various pieces of our argument differently. Chapter 1, 
which sets out our understanding of Romanticism and Zeitgeist, provides a 
philosophical underpinning to these topics. We offer both a literary analysis of the 
five Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a 
focus on nature—as well as a theoretical analysis of how these themes reflected a 
reaction to the uncertainties of the social transformations of the nineteenth century. 
Similarly, we do this in Chapter 2 to the 1990s, examining more generally how the 
concept of Romanticism can be applied to another age of transformation: 
international relations during the post-Cold War period. We examine how the broad 
themes present in nineteenth-century Romanticism were more specifically re-defined 
in the 1990s. In both chapters, the evidence we marshal is anecdotal; a series of 
thematic strands which are woven to create an impressionistic whole.
Chapter 3 builds on the philosophical discussions of Romanticism in the two 
previous chapters, but focuses specifically on how Romantic ideas were reflected in 
analyses of 1990s conflict. It mixes a textual analysis with the social science approach 
of cognitive psychology. The chapter examines the work of three influential observers 
who wrote on conflict in the 1990s—Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld—and 
provides a close textual analysis of some of their key writings, particularly with an 
eye to Yugoslavia. Additionally, it dissects, from the perspective of cognitive 
psychology, why their works are persuasive.
Chapter 4 examines the Romantic predictions that Kaplan, Huntington, and 
van Creveld outline about the future of conflict generally, which they significantly 
based on their analyses of the conflict in Yugoslavia. The most objective method to 
examine their claims is through numerical analysis. Chapter 4 uses an empirical 
approach to investigate their various hypotheses: data is generated using three armed 
conflict databases, and then analysed numerically. Based on this analysis, the data 
indicate that key claims about the increasing growth of conflict generally, and 
especially ethnic conflict, in the 1990s were inaccurate, especially since they seemed
19
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to be based more specifically on the unexpected conflicts in Yugoslavia, which 
contributed disproportionately to the perception of a post-Cold War conflict spike.
Chapter 5 builds on the analyses in Chapter 4, which show that state creation 
has been an important factor in conflict since the 1950s. This chapter develops an 
alternative framework for examining conflict through an empirical analysis of 
structural factors and conflict, and combining this approach with Hirschman’s 
interest-based theoretical framework: exit, voice, and loyalty.
Finally, putting the various pieces types of analyses together, Chapter 6 
provides a case study on Yugoslavia, comparing Romantic and structural views of 
conflict. It uses both a literary analysis to discuss Romantic perspectives, and an 
empirically-based structural factors approach.
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Chapter 1. Nineteenth-Century Romanticism and Zeitgeist: 
Defining an Age
‘Abandon All Hope, Ye Who Enter Here ’
—Dante Alighieri1
While nearly 700 years ago Dante imagined that these words were carved above the 
gates of Hell, they capture the deeply pessimistic tenor of recent political times, in the 
domestic sphere, as well as in the realm of international relations, particularly after 
the end of the Cold War. Ironically, the post-Cold War era began auspiciously. By 
the end of 1989, the Western world had much to be hopeful about: economically, 
globalisation would lead to increasing living standards world-wide; socially, various 
activist movements seemed to be successful in reducing inequalities between groups; 
and politically, the collapse of communist regimes proclaimed a new age of 
democracy and freedom throughout the world.
However, if the fall of communism ushered in a hopeful nouvelle vague, its 
ripples were shallow and ephemeral. WTiile the end of the Cold War initially sounded 
a triumphalist note on the part of Western leaders and intellectuals—most well- 
known perhaps was Francis Fukuyama’s The End o f History and the Last Man —no 
sooner had the Berlin Wall collapsed than discordant noises were heard; as William 
Pfaff intoned, ‘The second millennium closes with the secular optimism of modem 
times confounded and history set upon an unmapped course’.4 Fukuyama’s 
resounding optimism could not be squared with bloody conflicts in Africa and the 
former communist bloc, the spectre at Liberalism’s short-lived feast. Unlike 
Fukuyama, who argued that the end of communism heralded the remaking of a new, 
liberal international order, alternative voices spoke of disorder, chaos, violence, and 
dislocation in a confusing, rapidly globalising world, where loyalties were loosened,
1 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto III (1321).
2 The terms ‘post-Cold War’ and ‘the 1990s’ will be used interchangeably throughout the text since the 
period we are discussing refers to 1989-2001, roughly corresponding to the 1990s. More specifically, 
we are speaking of the period between the fall of die Berlin Wall in October 1989 and the terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.
3 Francis Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992).
4 William Pfaff, ‘Progress’, World Policy Journal (Vol. 12, No. 4,1995). Available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?docid=lCSl :39731
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primordial identities awakened, and the ‘nation-state’ was in terminal decline.5 
Rousseau’s maxim that ‘everything degenerates in the hands of man’ became the 
implicit slogan of the 1990s.6
Indeed, what distinguished much of the post-Cold War’s international vision 
during the 1990s, if there can be said to be one, was its almost unremitting 
gloominess, akin to Nietzsche’s ‘spirit of heaviness’, which one could call a ‘Zeitgeist
n
of pessimism’. This spirit of collective pessimism and decline has a venerable 
intellectual pedigree. As historian Arthur Herman remarks, the intellectual tradition of 
Western ‘declinism’ ‘formed the dark underside of modem European thought in the 
nineteenth century and [...] became arguably the single most dominant and influential
o
theme in culture and politics in the twentieth century’. This contemporary sense of 
decline is neither culturally Western nor historically unique. The ancient Egyptians, 
Greeks, and Romans, as well as medieval peoples all lamented the decay in their 
societies and cultures from a previous Golden Age.9 Can Cicero’s famous cry ‘O 
temporal O mores V be understood as anything other than an appeal to the past glory 
of Rome during a period of decline?
Further, declinism is often bereft of a specific ideological content. As Herman 
explains, declinism’s characteristic feature is pessimism, which is neither a left-wing 
nor a right-wing ideology but a rather an attitude, a sensibility, or feeling, noting, ‘Of 
course, facts alone cannot make or unmake a theory of history. Pessimism and 
optimism are attitudes the scholar brings to his analysis of events, not conclusions 
that arise from analysis’.10 Indeed, it could be argued that the philosophical and 
cultural pessimism that underpins declinism is itself an ideology. Alternatively, such 
pessimism could be considered a psychological or biological disposition, as Oliver 
Bennett argues.11
5 The literature on this topic is vast. Yahya Sodowski discusses ‘global chaos theory’ in The Myth o f  
Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1998).
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1755). The complete quote is ‘everything is good when it leaves the 
hands of the Creator, everything degenerates in the hands of man’.
7 Christopher Coker discusses some of the post-Cold War malaise in the West in Chapter 1 of his book, 
Twilight o f the West (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
8 Arthur Herman, The Idea o f Decline in Western History (New York, NY: Free Press, 1997), p. 7.
9 Herman, pp. 13-16. For a discussion of Eastern ideas about past Golden Ages and utopias, see Zhang 
Longxi, ‘The Utopian Vision, East and West’, Utopian Studies (Vol. 13, No. 1,2002).
10 Herman, p. 3.
11 Oliver Bennett, Cultural Pessimism: Narratives o f Decline in the Postmodern World (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2001).
22
Chapter 1
Critics and commentators on all sides of the political spectrum are prone to 
declinism. To use a medical analogy, the main difference between declinists is not 
necessarily their diagnosis of the patient’s illness, but rather their recommendations 
for the best course of treatment. Using an example from US domestic politics, 
conservative Charles Murray (Losing Ground, 1984) has emphasised cultural 
decay—for example, a growing underclass and an increase in family breakdown—in 
his critique of American society and makes conservative prescriptions for change. 
Likewise, liberal American social critics, like Christopher Lasch {Culture o f 
Narcissism, 1979), take similarly pessimistic views of American society from the
19opposite end of the political spectrum and offer progressive policy as an antidote. 
Declinism is no stranger to the field of international relations. For example, scholars 
with views as politically different as Mary Kaldor {The Disintegrating West, 1978) 
and Paul Kennedy {The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, 1987) have used the 
attitude of pessimism inherent in declinism as the underlying sensibility behind their 
arguments.
What is notable about the tide of declinism in many of its forms during the 
1990s is that it seems to have a number of similarities with the Romantic period of 
the nineteenth century, so much so that the post-Cold War Zeitgeist, or spirit of the 
age, could be re-labelled ‘Postmodern Romanticism’.13 While some observers and 
commentators on international relations have analogised the post-Cold War era to the 
Middle Ages and labelled the post-Cold War world as one of ‘neo-medievalism’, we 
will attempt to analogise the 1990s to another, more recent period: the nineteenth 
century. The nineteenth century, especially during the early part of the century, was 
also a period of extraordinary political, economic, and cultural change and 
uncertainty. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that followed indelibly 
redrew the political map of Europe; the Industrial Revolution in Britain introduced 
enormous economic and social disruptions and dislocations; and cultural revolution in 
Germany generated significant new philosophical insights which were to have far- 
reaching impact even in the twentieth century.
12 For a discussion on pessimism and nostalgia in examinations of American society, see Stephanie 
Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1992).
13 Note that the term postmodern here is meant to indicate a time period—a time after the modem or 
modernity—while Postmodernism or Postmodernist indicates a viewpoint, ideology, or methodology.
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Just as significant dislocations at the end of the Cold War bred fear and 
uncertainty in the 1990s, disruptive transformations in the nineteenth century rocked 
the sure foundations of European societies during the age, creating a deep sense of 
malaise and uncertainty. The Romantic ‘movement’, or Romanticism, developed 
partly as a reaction to these disturbing uncertainties. What defines Romanticism is not 
a set of ideological precepts, since it ‘cannot be identified with any particular political 
or social doctrine’,14 but it can be likened to a ‘mood’, ‘atmosphere’, or ‘sensibility’. 
Rather than offering a set of ideological precepts, nineteenth-century Romanticism 
cultivated several key themes which also seemed to flourish in popular and academic 
post-Cold War interpretations of international relations in the 1990s: anti-rationalism 
and the rejection of reason as the primary means of ascertaining truth; pessimism and 
a sense of ‘end times’ despair; nostalgic reappraisals of the past; relativism and the 
role of national identity and culture in society; as well as a focus on nature, including 
views of society as an organic whole, man and nature as a unity, and the duality of all 
existence. The predominance of these themes had an impact on Western thinking 
about international relations in the 1990s, including interpretations of post-Cold War 
conflicts, particularly Yugoslavia.
To examine some of the similarities between nineteenth-century Romanticism 
and post-Cold War thinking about international relations, we will first look at the 
concept of Zeitgeist Second, if the post-Cold War Zeitgeist is distinctly ‘Romantic’, 
we need to ask, what was nineteenth-century Romanticism, who were the Romantics, 
and what were the key features of the ‘movement’? Finally, how is the Romantic 
Zeitgeist of the 1990s related to our understanding and interpretation of politics, 
particularly international relations? In order to provide a tentative answer to these 
questions, this chapter and the next will review the concept of Romanticism and how 
it has affected thinking about international relations since the end of the Cold War, 
more specifically from 1989-2001.15 First, we will define nineteenth-century 
Romanticism and the concept of Zeitgeist (itself an idea rooted in the Romantic age). 
Second, we will provide an overview of the historic conditions of the Romantic age 
and the responses of some writers and thinkers of that era to those conditions. Finally, 
we will discuss five salient Romantic themes—anti-rationalism, pessimism,
14 Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832 (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1934), p. 55. Artz notes that Romantics came in various political stripes; while some were 
conservatives or reactionaries, others espoused liberal ideas. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
15 We primarily consider the period 1989-2001 in our analysis.
24
Chapter 1
relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature—and how they defined and were 
expressed throughout the nineteenth century. We will use the analysis developed in 
this chapter in the following chapter to examine the role of Romanticism in popular 
and academic approaches to international relations in the 1990s.
1.1 Romanticisms and the Zeitgeist—Definitions
7 must first protest against the notion that [RJomanticism can he 
enclosed within a concept; for [RJomantic precisely means that it 
oversteps all bounds. '
— Soren Kierkegaard16
The first difficulty in discussing ‘Romanticism’, the ‘Romantics,’ or the ‘Romantic 
era’ is defining these terms, or even delineating the time period during which the 
‘movement’ occurred. Is there a single ‘Romanticism’ or do we need to speak of 
‘Romanticisms’ in the plural? Even critics writing during the period had difficulty in 
providing a definitive taxonomy of Romantic ideas. French literary and social critic 
Madame Germaine de Stael seems to have coined the term ‘Romanticism’ in 1813 in 
her celebrated essay De VAllemagne (,From Germany), using it to differentiate a style 
of Romantic poetry that had a ‘naturalness’ that she favourably contrasted with the 
‘artificiality’ of Classicism.17
However, the term has come to embrace much more than a certain type of 
poetry or literary style to include an entire ‘view’ on life. George Mosse notes, ‘The 
Romanticism which became all pervasive in modem European culture was a “mood” 
which escaped any rigid scheme of classification.’18 By 1930, Ernest Bembaum had 
noted that there already were ‘[hjundreds of definitions of Romanticism’ and that the 
‘attempt to reduce [Romanticism] to one formula was begun more than a hundred 
years ago, and has occupied an incredible amount of time and ingenuity.’19 According 
to A.O. Lovejoy, it is difficult to define Romanticism because it runs the gamut of 
writers and thinkers, both on the left and the right.20 Isaiah Berlin calls any definition
16 S0ren Kierkegaard, Journal (1836).
17 George L. Mosse, The Culture o f Western Europe: the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: An 
Introduction (London: Murray, 1963), p. 16.
18 Mosse, p. 13.
19 Ernest Bembaum, ‘The Romantic Movement’, in Romanticism: Points o f View, in eds. Gerald 
Enscoe and Robert F. Gleckner (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962).
20 A.O. Lovejoy, ‘On the Discrimination of Romanticisms’, in The Romantic Movement, ed.
Anthony.K. Thorlby (London and Harlow: Longmans, 1966), pp. 14-19. The Thorlby book is an edited
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91a ‘trap’. His circumspection is due to the fact that whenever one scholar tries to 
generalise on the subject of Romanticism, another one immediately finds a 
countervailing tendency. As Berlin argues, ‘the literature on [Rjomanticism is larger 
than [RJomanticism itself, and the literature defining what it is that the literature on 
[RJomanticism is concerned with is quite large in its turn. There is a kind of inverted 
pyramid.’22 Additionally, it can be difficult to decide whether the terms ‘Romantic’ or 
‘Romanticism’ have true analytical purchase or whether their use is mainly rhetorical, 
used to dismiss or exalt certain types of works.
Dating the period of Romanticism precisely is equally open to debate. While 
some scholars date Romanticism’s beginnings to the early nineteenth century, others 
believe it began either earlier or later. Some scholars argue that the age of 
Romanticism began with the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his writings 
glorifying ‘natural’ man unsullied by the corrupting influence of civilisation,23 while 
others point to Immanuel Kant or Francis Bacon as forebears, although both are 
sometimes associated with the Enlightenment.24 Indeed, the number counted among 
the ‘Romantics’ is vast; some have even included Plato or Homer as the ‘fathers’ of 
the movement for various ‘Romantic’ characteristics in their writings.25
Despite the lack of precise dating, many scholars trace Romanticism’s 
beginnings to the era of the French Revolution, or just before, and its end to around 
1830—with July Revolution that ended the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 
France.26 Others end the Romantic period at about 1850, with the quashing of various 
uprisings and revolutions around Europe (1848) and before the publication of 
Darwin’s Origin o f the Species (1859), which some argue was the first work to 
seriously challenge some of the moral underpinnings of the movement27 However, 
the Romantic ‘mood’ continued among various artists, writers, and philosophers well 
past 1850—for example with French Romantic painting, the English Pre-Raphaelites,
compilation of excerpts and essays by key scholars of Romanticism writing during the first half of the 
twentieth century, many of them in the 1920s and 1930s.
21 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots o f Romanticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 1.
22 Ibid.
23 For a discussion on Rousseau’s contribution to Romanticism, see Hugh I'Anson Fausset, ‘Rousseau 
and Romanticism’, in eds. Enscoe and Gleckner, pp. 72-87.
24 Lovejoy, ‘On the Discrimination of Romanticisms’, pp. 14-15.
25 Bembaum, ‘The Romantic Movement’, pp. 89-90.
26 For example, Thorlby dates the period from about 1770-1830, which reflects beginning 
Romanticism with the works of Rousseau, and ending the period with the restoration of the Bourbon 
monarchy. See A.K. Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 1.
27 Bembaum, ‘The Romantic Movement’, p. 91.
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the Russian Pan-Slavists—into the early twentieth century, and beyond.28 For the 
purposes of this discussion, we will look at the most expansive timeframe that 
scholars can use to discuss Romanticism, from approximately 1780 to the end of the 
nineteenth century.
As for the characteristics, ‘moods’, ‘sensibilities’, or ideas that define the 
Romantic period, ‘[t]hese differing versions of the age of Romanticism are matched 
by a corresponding diversity in the descriptions offered by those of our time who 
have given special care and observation of it.’29 Yet considering that ‘[RJomanticism 
[...] is the largest recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the 
Western world’, some generalisation is appropriate, even if the resulting analysis can
■JA
only be said to be tentative. Although Lovejoy and Berlin underscore the perils that 
lie in wait for any scholar trying to define something as slippery and with as many 
countervailing tendencies as an ‘age’ or ‘era’, commentators on the time period do 
look to particular events, trends, and sensibilities that they believe define the 
Romantic era or capture the spirit of the age—the Zeitgeist.
Interestingly, Romantics were the first to express the idea that ‘time has a 
material meaning and is imbued with context’, which we have come to know as 
Zeitgeist.31 Originally known as Geist der Zeit or Geist der Zeiten, the phrase meant 
the totality of the spirit of many generations through time. Later, the term Zeitgeist 
came to mean ‘the characteristic spirit of a [sic] historical era taken in its totality and 
bearing the mark of a preponderant feature which dominated its intellectual, political, 
and social trends’, as well as the way in which a particular period conceives of 
itself.32 In other words, the term moved away from describing a universal or 
cumulative understanding throughout historical time, and instead to the relative, 
particularistic understanding of a specific period of time.
The concept of Zeitgeist could be said to have been expressed most fully in 
G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy, in which Geist (spirit) is both the motivating force and 
justification for a particular philosophy.33 Hegel famously saw what he called the
28 Arguably some Romantic ideas, such as nationalism, were more important and had an even larger 
impact on the twentieth century. However, we will limit our discussion here to the nineteenth century.
29 Lovejoy, ‘On the Discrimination of Romanticisms’, p. 15.
30 Berlin, p. 1.
31 Nathan Rotenstreich, ‘Zeitgeist’, in Dictionary o f  the History ofIdeas: Studies o f  Selected Pivotal 
Ideas, ed. Philip P Wiener (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974) Vol. 4, pp. 536-537.
32 Rotenstreich, p. 536.
33 Ibid.
27
Chapter 1
‘World Spirit’—the face of history yet to come, personified by Napoleon Bonaparte 
on the battlefield at Jena.34 Hegel’s fatalistic observation—that there is an 
untrammelled fate written within and through history—implies that an historical era 
is imbued with a particular social, cultural, or political ‘spirit’, ‘atmosphere’, or 
‘climate’ that is both embedded in time and which embeds actors within their time.
This spirit swirls around actors and events like a swift, invisible current, 
sharply defining the time period, which makes it impossible or even foolish to try and 
fight the prevailing tendency. In this sense, Zeitgeist can be both a guiding principle 
as well as a limiting one, since those who swim successfully with the tide are landed
or
safely while those who fight against it are likely to drown. Further, it implies that 
judging the best swimmer is relative task, since the tide will change with changes in 
the course of history. As A.K. Thorlby argues,
the [Romantic] period saw the emergence of a new sense that all things may 
be immersed in the absolute flow of history: in which case, neither the 
excellence of art, nor the truth of philosophy should be understood as standing 
above the stream in the changeless light of a purely rational order, while the 
stream itself loses its merely factual character.36
Indeed, the notion of Zeitgeist and its emphasis on the history of ideas through time— 
with an historic, and hence relativistic, understanding—may be said to be the key 
concept of the age of Romanticism. Historicism and Zeitgeist form a particularly 
‘nineteenth-century understanding of history’,37 as nothing can be understood as 
timeless, but rather as a product of the particular spiritual age in which it exists, or as 
Heidigger suggests, that it is a certain interpretation of truth. As A. Cobban argues, an 
‘[hjistoric conception of society [is] perhaps even the nucleus of [R]omanticism’.38
39Or as Ernest Renan put it, ‘Z, ’histoire est la vraie philosophie du XLXeme siecle\
34 Christopher Coker, ‘How wars end’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 26, No. 3, 
1997), p. 621.
35 Rotenstreich, p. 537.
36 A.K. Thorlby, ‘The History of Ideas’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, pp. 46-47. Emphasis 
in original.
37 Coker, ‘How wars end’, p. 624.
38 A. Cobban, ‘The Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, 
p. 130.
‘History is the true philosophy of the 19th century’, quoted in ibid., p. 129. Author’s translation.
28
Chapter 1
1.2 Historicising Nineteenth-Century Romanticism—Political,
economic, and cultural background
‘It is nowadays becoming gradually understood that one o f the basic 
elements o f reality is precise locality. ’
—Victor Hugo40
What is the Zeitgeist that defines Romanticism—the specific history and dominant 
trends that differentiate the era? Many scholars note that Romanticism was a reaction 
to the Enlightenment. However, this reaction was not merely the philosophical 
rejection of the rationalism and ideals of the Enlightenment, although this did play a 
part.41 Romanticism was also an historical reaction, bom of the crises and turbulence 
that plagued Europe in the nineteenth century, which due to the Napoleonic wars ‘for 
the first time made history a mass experience [...] on a European scale.’42 Other 
scholars also note the importance of the ‘disruption’ of war in generating a sense of 
Romantic restlessness and insecurity:
Romanticism [is] the sum total of the ways in which man’s self-awareness 
was affected by the Revolutionary-Napoleonic dismption, and in which he 
tried to take his bearings in a world that had lost its ‘fixities’ and ‘definities’. 
Man was at once a revolte and a creature craving some objective order; a 
being strained to express and assert itself and a soul yearning for self- 
surrender 43
Indeed, as Alex Comfort argues, if Classical periods are those in which men have a 
great sense of economic and psychological security, then Romantic ones are those in 
which men have lost their moorings on an uncertain sea, noting ‘[t]he [C]lassic sees 
man as master, the [RJomantic sees him as victim of his environment. That seems to 
me to be the real difference.’44 The Romantic age was certainly one of those eras, 
tempest tossed by three great transformations: political revolution in France,
40 Victor Hugo, Preface to Cromwell (1827).
41 Some scholars argue that the ideas of Romanticism and the ‘revolutions’ that defined the historical 
period need to be considered separately, although we will consider both here. For a discussion of this 
point, see Morse Peckham, ‘Toward a Theory of Romanticism’, in Romanticism: Points o f View, eds. 
Enscoe and Gleckner, p. 213.
42 G. Luk&s, ‘Social and Historical Conditions for the Rise of the Historical Novel’, in The Romantic 
Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 93. Emphasis in original.
43 J.L. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815-1848 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), p. 
136.
44 Alex Comfort, ‘Art and Social Responsibility: The Ideology of Romanticism’, in Romanticism: 
Points o f  View, eds. Enscoe and Gleckner, pp. 168-169.
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industrial revolution in England, and cultural revolution in Germany.45 We will now 
briefly outline these three upheavals facing European societies of the period.
Politically, the Romantic period was a ‘drama of revolution and reaction’ 46 
The French Revolution in 1789 shattered illusions about a stable political order based 
on monarchy and strengthened the desire for democracy across Europe, although the 
Reign of Terror and the Directoire that followed shook the political landscape with 
their brutality and incited widespread reaction. Furthermore, the rise of Napoleon, the 
expansion of the French empire, and the Napoleonic wars that followed the 
Revolution spread the ideals of revolutionary republicanism throughout Europe and 
engendered extreme resistance among the conquered nations 47 These wars played an 
important role in fanning the flames of European nationalism and in the consolidation 
of subjugated territories into unified national states, particularly Italy and Germany.
Economically, the Romantic period was defined by rapid growth and 
industrialisation made possible by technological change 49 The Industrial Revolution 
in Britain not only made it the wealthiest state, it also permanently changed the nature 
of British society, ushering in a wealthy new middle class as well as economic 
dislocation, urbanisation, and a changing social value structure. The unprecedented 
wealth that economic growth brought created a new bourgeoisie that not only enjoyed 
a much-improved standard of living, but also sought the franchise to ensure its new­
found wealth, widening social access to political power and furthering democracy. 
Additionally, the Industrial Revolution transformed social relations. Before the 
Industrial Revolution, most families lived in small villages and worked together on 
farms. Industrialisation changed the face of society through economic dislocation— 
many small farmers and artisans lost their livelihoods through increasing 
mechanisation—and urbanisation, as workers sought factory work and found 
themselves in crowded and unsanitary social conditions. Further, the pursuit of profit 
and growing demand for more consumer goods changed the value structure of society
45 Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.
46 Georg Brandes quoted in A.K. Thorlby, ‘Political Thought’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. 
Thorlby, p. 127.
47 For a discussion of how the Napoleonic wars affected the areas and peoples conquered by the 
French, see Michael Broers, Europe Under Napoleon 1799-1815 (London: Edward Arnold, 1996).
48 See Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins o f Nations and the 
Politics o f Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), especially Chapter 3, ‘Europe: 
Movements for National Unity’.
49 For a wide-ranging discussion on the Industrial Revolution, see E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age o f  
Revolution, 1789-1848 (New York, NY: Mentor Books, 1962), pp. 44-73.
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to one of greater materialism.50 Reaction to capitalism came in various forms, 
including the Luddites, Chartism, and socialism.
Culturally, the Romantic period was characterised by a movement away from 
the Neoclassical values of order and rationality that had defined the Enlightenment, 
beginning with the Sturm und Drang (storm and stress) literary movement—typified 
by Schiller and Goethe—which coincided with the beginning of the Romantic age.51 
German philosophical thought was ascendant in the early nineteenth century and 
thousands of Europeans were influenced by German writers, whether in the original 
German or in translation. The cultural revolution in Germany emphasised feeling 
and sensibility and glorified the traditions and the oneness of the Volk (people), 
exemplified in Herder’s doctrine of cultures as organic growths.53 This emphasis on 
national culture was a turn towards relativism; one scholar notes, ‘volkish ideology 
was a direct denial of all universalism’.54 As F. Stricht argues, much of 
Romanticism’s cultural element was defined by the German cultural Geist, a 
combination of Weltschmertz (world-weariness), Faustian rebellion, and idealism. 
This Geist looked for release from the mundane and into the spiritual, visionary, or 
magical realm. For some writers the goal was to break down the barrier between 
themselves and others and to be absorbed into the ‘oneness’ of the Volk?5 This 
concept of national oneness was significantly different from other European concepts 
of ‘oneness’. For example, the French spirit of being bound together was based on 
reason—being a citoyen (citizen) erased the differences between people within the 
state.56 However, the German idea of being bound together is based on spirit, so it 
focuses on common beliefs, hence church, language, culture, and nation are
50 ‘Industrial Revolution’, in The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2001).
51 Mosse, p. 15.
52 Some foreign critics were particularly influential in disseminating the philosophy of German writers. 
For example, Madame de Stael’s De I Allemagne ‘did more than perhaps any other book to spread the 
new gospel [Romanticism] throughout Europe’. Artz, p. 61.
53 Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, p. 4.
54 Talmon, p. 127.
55 F. Stricht, ‘Europe and the Period of German Classicism and Romanticism’, in The Romantic 
Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 53.
56 Some scholars argue that the widely-held academic concept that French nationalism—through 
citizenship—has solely political origins, and thus is based purely on reason, is false. As one scholar 
notes, ‘any interpretation that reduces nationalism to a political strategy and to a series of claims about 
political sovereignty is fundamentally mistaken’. David A. Bell, The Cult o f  the Nation in France: 
Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 18.
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important.57 As a result, legacies of the Romantic period include the concepts of 
nationalism and cultural determinism.58
To a significant extent, these tectonic changes within the span of just two 
generations radically undermined what remained of the certainties of eighteenth- 
century European society and created the foundations of the modem states and 
societies we now recognise as our own. These transformations also wrought a deep 
pessimism within societies produced by a ‘moral malaise which was undoubtedly 
influenced by the historical situation and by the loosening of the social framework’59 
and strengthened three tendencies in the new Romantic state of mind: ‘dissatisfaction 
with the contemporary world, restless anxiety in the face of life, and sadness without 
cause.’60 As one commentator notes,
[t]he [RJomantic mood thus capitalized on the dissatisfactions engendered by 
rationalism’s disavowal of the emotions, particularly man’s need for a security 
which discounted external reality by escaping into a contemplation of the 
inner man. No doubt the change of Europe from a rural to an industrial and 
urban civilization enhanced the attractiveness of this habit of mind. It gave 
men a feeling of importance, of stability in terms of their own souls amid 
rapid and uncomprehensible changes.61
Although the cultural aspects of Romanticism are important to understanding the 
movement, Romantics made significant contributions to political theory, offering 
some of the first critiques of modem society, seeing it as an ‘organic’ being existing 
within a natural organism (the environment). Indeed, some scholars tend to see 
Romanticism as both the aesthetic reaction against Classicism and the political 
reaction against the French Revolution, although some early Romantics were fervent 
champions of the initial ideals of the Revolution. The cultural projects of the early 
Romantics can even be seen as a route to change society; as Frederick Beiser argues, 
‘Placed in its historical context, [...] the [RJomantics’ aestheticism was simply their 
strategy for social and political reform.’63 As a result, many Romantic cultural and
57 Stricht, pp. 52-53.
58 Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, p. 13.
59 P. Van Tieghem, ‘The Romantic Soul’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 23.
60 Ibid., p. 22.
61 Mosse, p. 14.
62 Frederick C. Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis o f  Modem German 
Political Thought, 1790-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 222-224.
63 Ibid, p. 229.
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political works reflect affinities toward particular types of subject matter and moods. 
Thorlby has classified some of these as:64
• a reaction against abstract reason and faith in ‘feeling’;
• a sense of Weltschmerz and ennui (boredom);
• ‘truth to one’s time and country’ (relativism);
• a nostalgia for the Middle Ages;
• a fascination with power and will;
• a focus on nature and ‘natural’ man;
• a ‘celebration of the Doppelganger\ and finally;
• a tragic tone and pessimism.
We will examine some of these tendencies which define key aspects of the Zeitgeist 
of Romanticism below, grouped together under the following broader categories: 
irrationality, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature. As we will see, 
many of these ideas are interrelated and any categorisation is therefore somewhat 
arbitrary. For example, the Romantic movement’s preoccupation with history and 
movement through time, as well as its tragic outlook on the future that coloured the 
interpretation of events, often resulted in nostalgia for a golden past, resignation to an 
uncertain present, and fear of the future—all interrelated subjects.
1.3 Deep Sleep of Reason—Anti-rationalism and spiritual 
reawakening
‘Reason is perhaps the most limited o f all our faculties. ’
—Ludovico Di Breme65
One of the key features of the Romantic era was the spread of anti-rationalist modes 
of thought, many of which were promoted by the growth of religious belief during the 
period, especially highly emotional forms of Christianity.66 As Lord Acton argues, 
Romanticism was a function of the historical and political situation of the early 
nineteenth century, which included a resistance to and a reaction against the 
revolutionary rationalism and secularism of the eighteenth century. As Acton
64 Thorlby, ‘Part Two: Select Documents’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, pp. 145-161. We 
will also examine one Romantic tendency that Thorlby did not identify individually—increased 
spirituality.
65 Ludovico Di Breme, II Conciliatore (1818).
66 Note that Christianity was not the only source of anti-rationalist belief. The Romantic age saw a 
greater emphasis on mysticism and spirituality overall, including a renewed interest in the occult and 
the supernatural. See Georges Poulet, ‘Romanticism’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 40
67 L. Kochan, ‘The Internal Vision: Sympathy’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 89.
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asserts, Romanticism sought to make ‘distant times [...] acceptable and intelligible to 
a society’ that knew nothing but a rationalist outlook in order ‘to establish a 
counterweight to claims of reason’.68
Other scholars also maintain that Romanticism had a strongly anti-rationalist, 
religious (Christian), and emotionalist sensibility. Nicholas Riasanovsky contends 
that Romanticism’s true emergence began less as a materialistic reaction to the 
turbulent events of the early nineteenth century than as a pantheistic, religious vision 
within Christianity among German and English poets and writers who sought to 
transcend the ‘finite’, the eternal striving for perfection.69 Others also highlight 
Romanticism’s anti-rationalist and emotionalist roots, noting that that ‘Romanticism 
began as a moral revolt against physics’. This anti-rationalism morally rejected the 
objectification of nature; one of its key facets was a reaction against the ‘abstract 
reason’ of the Enlightenment that preceded it, and the exaltation of the emotional, 
irrational, and sentimental side of man’s nature.71 Romantics argued instead that 
reality was merely superficial, an outward expression of something deeper that only 
the emotions could truly fathom. Thus ‘the Romantic craved not to find the same 
universal truth, but to experience reality in a way wholly his own. This was to be 
done not by reasoning, but through feeling, sentiment, imagination, instinct, passion, 
dream and recollection’.72
For Romantics, one manner in which man could restore the balance between 
reason and emotion was through rootedness in spiritual faith. The Romantic age saw a 
great upsurge in deeply emotional, eclectic, and personal—as opposed to rigidly 
formal, ritualistic, and impersonal—forms of religiosity, and the period from the 
Enlightenment to the Romantic age could be called ‘from an age of unbelief to the 
Ages of Faith’.73 The revived anti-rationalist spiritual fervour that emerged as one 
reaction against the hard rationalism of the Enlightenment was an important stimulus 
to Romantic writers, artists, and thinkers who were inspired by a growing interest in 
emotional forms of Christian religious worship. Pietism in Germany, Methodism and
68 Kochan, p. 89.
69 See Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, The Emergence o f Romanticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992).
70 C.C. Gillespie, ‘The Edge of Objectivity’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p.100.
71 A.O. Lovejoy, ‘Romanticism and the Principle of Plenitude’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. 
Thorlby, p. 49.
72 Talmon, p. 139.
73 Cobban, p. 131.
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evangelism in England, conversions to Catholicism—and the concomitant growth in 
political ultramontanism—throughout Europe, and even the proliferation of new 
religious sects in the United States all fuelled the Romantic mood.74
In Germany, Pietism sought to rid religion of its arid intellectualism and 
emphasised the emotional nature of spirituality, ‘kindl[ing] the flame of Christian 
mysticism’.75 As Artz argues, Pietism preached ‘an ardently emotional faith’ that had 
a profound influence on German philosophy and political thought. Its concern with 
an individual’s personal morality and salvation, the divine truth of the ‘piety of the 
heart’, and its views on religion as mainly a sentimental and emotional experience 
provided a solid rejection of the Enlightenment’s secularism and ‘the dry-rot of 
rationalism’.77 In England, Methodism and evangelism represented ‘a revolt against 
the deism, skepticism, and democratic thought of the eighteenth century’, and 
emphasised the emotional aspects of ‘coming to Christ’, collective religious revivals, 
and hymn singing, or raising voices to God in prayer. On the Continent, the 
resurgence of Catholicism was fuelled by a similar reaction against rationalism and 
the anti-clericism of the French Revolution. For example, one of the most influential 
books of the period, Chateaubriand’s Genie du christianisme (The Genius o f  
Christianity) published in 1802, was an ardent defence of Catholic Christianity and its 
emphasis on the redemption of sin, as well as its appeal to tradition, social harmony, 
order, and hierarchy.79
In the United States the Second Great Awakening was contemporaneous with 
the European Romantic movement—from about 1790 to the mid-1800s. The 
Awakening fuelled an emotional Christian spiritual observance, mainly rooted in 
evangelical Protestantism, and spawned a variety of new Christian religious sects.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), the Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
and the Seventh-Day Adventists were all bom of the religious seers of the Romantic 
age in America. The American revival also inspired the establishment of radical
74 Mosse, p. 38.
75 Artz, p. 50.
16 Ibid.
77 Ibid., pp. 50-51. Isaiah Berlin describes Pietism as ‘the most introspective and self-absorbed of all 
the Lutheran sects, intent upon the direct communion of the individual soul with God, bitterly 
antirationalist, liable to emotional excess, preoccupied with the stem demands of moral obligation and 
the needs for severe self-discipline’. See Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, in Dictionary of 
the History o f Ideas: Studies o f Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York, NY: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1974) Vol. 2, p. 103.
78 Artz, pp. 50 and 54-55.
79 Mosse, p. 34, and Artz, pp. 56-57.
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Christian utopias, such as Shaker communities. The mood for utopian redemption and 
reform based on a revival of Christian ideals reached deep into the fabric of American 
society. As Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to Thomas Carlyle in 1840, ‘[w]e are all a 
little wild here [in America] with numberless projects of social reform. Not a reading
OA
man but has a draft of a new community in his waistcoat pocket.’
This Christian reawakening in Europe and the United States was imbued with 
the urgency of impending doom, as religious visionaries predicted the end of the 
world, spurring a growth in millennialist and apocalyptic thinking during the 
Romantic age.81 For example, in America, William Miller (founder of the Seventh- 
Day Adventists) predicted the end of the world in 1844 while the Mormons sought to 
prepare the way for the millennium by creating a perfect society on earth.82 As such, 
Christian religious revival was seen as part of the coming ‘end times’, a way to either 
convert non-believers or remake the world in anticipation Christ’s coming in order ‘to 
purify [...] society and to make it ready for the coming Kingdom.’ These 
apocalyptic sentiments were disseminated among the writers, artists, and philosophers 
of the period. J. K. Huysmans’ Against the Grain (1884) incorporated catastrophic 
visions of the destruction of the world, predicting that it would end either in biblical 
cataclysms, or that civilisation would drown in its own filth; Elemir Bourges’ The 
Twilight o f the Gods (1884) shared this prophetically tragic tone.84
The revival in religion also had a significant impact on European and 
American civil societies throughout the nineteenth century. In Germany, Pietists 
produced hundreds of books and pamphlets that overwhelmed the reading public 
through their sheer quantity, significantly informing the views of the general reading 
audience as well as influencing the key thinkers of the age, such as Lessing, Herder, 
and Novalis.85 In England and the United States, as readership increased among
80 Quoted in Paul Johnson, ‘God and the Americans’, Commentary (Vol. 99, No 1,1995).
81 Richard Landes, ‘Millennialism (Millennarianism, Chiliasm)’, in Merriam Webster’s Encyclopedia 
o f World Religions (1999). Available from http://www.bu.edu/mille/people/rlpages/millennialism-mw- 
encyl.html
82 William C. Placher, A History o f Christian Theology: An Introduction (Westminster: John Knox 
Press, 1983). Available from http://home.ntelos.net/~userper/religion/2nd_awaking.htm Note here that 
there is a distinction between pre- and post-millennialist Christian thinking, with Miller’s sect 
emphasising pre-millennialism while the Mormons are post-millennialists. For a discussion of this 
issue see Nancy Koester, ‘The Future in Our Past: Post-millennialism in American Protestantism’, 
World & World (VoL 15, No. 2,1995), pp. 137 and 142
83 Placher.
84 W. Warren Wagar, Good Tidings: The Belief in Progress from Darwin to Marcuse (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 156.
85 Artz, p. 51.
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Victorian populations, the average reader was exposed to a steady diet of materials 
discussing personal morality—books, pamphlets, and newspapers of the age were all 
laced with morality tales. Additionally, the growth of associations based on an ideal 
of Christian ‘good works’, such as temperance leagues, societies against vice, and 
organisations such as the Salvation Army put the teachings of Christian faith into 
action within society.86
1.4 O Temporal O Mores!—Pessimism and ennui
‘[M]an, having relegated to hell all pain and torments, had nothing 
left for heaven but ennui. ’
—Arthur Schopenhauer87
The Romantic age is often defined by a sense of Weltschmerz (world-weariness) and 
ennui (boredom) which critics attribute to the social upheavals of the time:
the [R]omantic movement was in its very essence the expression of an acute 
sense of cultural failure. The [Rjomantic was a man convinced that the old 
world of courts, salons, dynastic wars, rational religion, and enlightenment 
stood in ruins [...] He felt himself called to create a new order... 8
A tragic tone and pessimism accompanies this Romantic ennui and sense of loss, 
leading one critic to claim that Romanticism was
a movement which [...] producfed] the greatest literature of despair the world 
has ever seen. No movement has perhaps been so prolific of melancholy as 
emotional [R]omanticism. To follow it from Rousseau down to the present 
day is to run through the whole gamut of gloom.89
As E. Cassirer puts it, Romanticism is a ‘ Weltanschauung [worldview] that searched 
out the dark places rather than the light and found its own peculiar satisfaction in so 
doing’, while Irving Babbitt notes that Romantic poets were in ‘a veritable 
competition with one another as to who shall be accounted as the most forlorn.’90 
Indeed, one scholar’s labels for describing the various periods within Romanticism 
are replete with foreboding: sensibility (beginning with Rousseau, 1761),
86 Placher.
87 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea (1818).
88 Wagar, p. 151.
89 Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1924), p. 307.
90 E. Cassirer, ‘Romanticism and the Beginnings of the Critical Science of History’, in The Romantic 
Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 87; Babbitt, p. 308.
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Weltschmerz (Schiller, 1795), mal de siecle (Hugo, 1830), pessimism (Schopenhauer 
and Stendhal, 1865), and neurasthenia (the culmination of the fin de siecle movement, 
1900).91
The Romantic age’s literary dramatis personae reads like a roster of pathetic 
souls, heroic misfits, and misunderstood geniuses living a tragedy, bound by the ‘loss 
of a world explainable by myth’, who need protection from life’s philistines.92 
Tennyson’s nobility in suffering (‘Thou majestic in thy sadness’); Wordsworth’s 
bucolic melancholy; de Maistre’s rejection of the modem world; Baudelaire’s 
‘disdain for the world’; Mallarme’s ‘romantic despair’; Carlyle’s and Coleridge’s 
pessimism; Poe’s and Melville’s ‘vivid expressions of [Rjomantic anxiety’; and 
Hardy’s fin de siecle angst were all representative of the period. Heroines of the age 
were no less tragic. Romantic literature is replete with Camilles—Dumas-fils’ fragile 
heroine; Catherines—Bronte’s wild, tragic creation; and Carmens—Bizet’s exotic, 
doomed femme fatale?A
In this Romantic anguish from the heart, sadness equals wisdom, with the 
lyricism closely allied with nostalgia and the pursuit of the strange and the exotic.95 
However, the Romantic’s pessimism itself is not ‘natural’ but an artifice of the 
storyteller, since tragedy is the product of two elements. One element is the fact, 
myth, or story. The second is the handling, treatment, or art of the piece. In that sense, 
tragedy is not a work of nature but a work of art, or an interpretation of nature.96 The 
interpreter par excellence of Romanticism’s theology of despair was the Marquis de 
Sade:
the archetypal prophet of naturalistic despair was [...] the Marquis de Sade 
[...] Sade’s anti-heroes, for all their success as libertines and criminals, 
repeatedly confessed their hatred of the natural order [...] Their mle of life— 
to enjoy oneself at no matter whose expense—was a transparent counsel of
07despair, in a world bereft of all purpose or goodness.
This interpretation became more pessimistic as the century wore on. The taste for ‘the 
wild, the macabre, and the horrific’ among early Romantics developed into ‘a 
programmatic aestheticism that scorned the world or rejoiced, masochistically, in its
91 Babbitt, p. 307, quoting the labels created by E. Seilliere in Mal romantique.
92 Mosse, p. 20.
93 Babbitt, p. 132 (on Tennyson and Wordsworth); Wagar, pp. 152-158 and 171 (on de Maistre et seq.).
94 Mosse, p. 25.
95 Babbitt, pp. 308-311.
96 Prosser Hall Frye, Romance & Tragedy (Boston, MA: Marshall Jones Company, 1922), pp. 143-144.
91 Ibid.,p. 168.
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decay’ in the latter nineteenth century. Toward the turn of the century, scientific 
pessimists, like H.G. Wells, ‘painted lurid prophetic pictures’ of decadent society’s 
last men caught in dystopian worlds, while others like Anatole France, in The Garden 
o f Epicurus (1894), offered pessimistic parables with end-of-world visions."
Outside the literary realm, there were many ‘politically minded exponents of 
cultural despair’, such as Julius Langbehn in Germany, Charles Maurras in France, 
and the Russian Pan-Slavists.100 However, perhaps the most long-lasting effect of 
Romanticism’s pessimistic tendencies was on the study of history and philosophy, 
affecting their interpretation even today. Romanticism in philosophy and history 
contributed to the atmosphere of pessimism, especially in Central Europe: 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Burckhardt, Nietzsche, and Spengler (sometimes 
described as a late Romantic despite the fact that his works were in the twentieth 
century) were philosophical pessimists.
Furthermore, in the study of history, the relativistic spirit of historical 
scholarship combined with organic or lifecycle views of human institutions which 
were developed during the Romantic era can be said to be a variety of disenchantment 
and despair.101 Historians of earlier periods, such as Polybius, Seneca, and Floras, had 
analogised history in terms of the human lifecycle—birth, youth, maturity, and 
death.102 Indeed, the idea that states rise and decline as part of an organic lifecycle is 
found in Pericles’ defence of his policy against the Spartans, when he notes that ‘all 
things are bom to decay’, even Athenian power.103
As David Lowenthal argues, in Europe the organic or biological analogy was 
reintroduced and popularised by Johann Joachim Winckelmann, whose perspectives 
about art and culture were influential in the eighteenth century. Winckelmann’s ideas 
gained widespread currency with art critics and writers in the nineteenth century; 
indeed, Herder applied the analogy to whole cultures. Others such as Hegel and 
Schelling denounced those civilisations that had unproductively prolonged their 
appearance on the world stage. The organic view of vaunted youth and senescent old
98 Wagar, p. 155.
99 Ibid., pp. 169-170.
100 Ibid., p. 153. Wagar notes that some of these were saved from complete despair by their chiliastic or 
nationalistic hopes for the future.
101 Ibid., p. 174.
102 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 140-141.
103 Thucydides, History o f the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1985), Book II, ‘The Policy of Pericles’, section 64, p. 162.
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age which Giambattista Vico applied to nations and political institutions in 1744, and 
which was a preoccupation of eighteenth-century writers, also became a dominant 
analogy during the Romantic age.104
Building on these analogies, Romanticism’s cyclical theories of history where 
institutions, states, cultures, races, or civilisations are said to rise and decline over 
time are representative of historical pessimism, particularly when married to medical 
analogies of health and disease. The rise or development phase is seen as the 
perfection of youth and analogised to vigour and robust health, while declining stages 
are seen as a part of the decay of old age, sickness, and impending death.105 In 
particular, these metaphors play on the almost universal human distaste for age, and 
its associations with decay, weakness, senility, impotence, and corruption.106
Oswald Spengler’s work in this regard could be seen as the apotheosis of late 
Romantic pessimism, as could the work of Brook Adams in the twentieth century, 
both of whom exploited the analogy between the decadence and decay they saw in 
their own societies and the fall of ancient Rome.107 ‘Race failure’ theories were 
another popular species of pessimism during the late Romantic period. They posited 
that the ‘nobler’ races—such as the Aryans—would be overrun by the rapidly 
multiplying hoards of barbarians comprised of assorted ‘inferior’ races.108
1.5 Protagoras’ Children—Relativism, nationalism, and will
'The idea o f happiness changes as circumstances and regions change 
[....] Every nation has its centre o f happiness within itself ’
—Johann Gottfried von Herder109
In contrast to the Enlightenment’s turning outward to search for universal ideas, the 
Romantics turned inward to seek the truth within their own thoughts and spirits. The 
Romantics exhibited a ‘heightened self-consciousness’ that, as one critic sardonically 
quips, ‘[l]oved not so much truth, whose hard master is the actual world, as the
104 Lowenthal, pp. 140-142. Isaiah Berlin notes that while Vico was rarely read during his age, his 
works were revived a century later during the Romantic period. Berlin claims that Vico’s most original 
contributions were his insistence on the uniqueness of culture, cultural relativism, and historicism 
which were part of the Counter-Enlightenment. See Berlin, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment’, pp. 102-103.
105 Wagar, pp. 154 and 158.
106 Lowenthal, pp. 127-135.
107 Wagar, pp. 164-166. Note that both of these scholars produced works in the twentieth century.
108 Mosse, pp. 79-80.
109 J.G. Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit [trans.: Yet Another 
Philosophy on the History o f  the Education o f Mankind] (1774).
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process of their own thinking, which they believed to be the key to the universe.’110 In 
comparison to the grand, universalising vision of such Enlightenment masterworks as 
Diderot and D’Alembert’s L ‘Encyclopedie, the Romantic period’s representative 
forms of expression were more intimate and parochial—diaries, confessional poems, 
and individual accounts of the writer’s process of personal inspiration. This stress on 
individual expression in Romanticism found a stronger outlet in France and Britain, 
which were unified states, than in states that sought national independence, such as 
Germany and Italy, where emphasis was laid more on the development of national 
unity.111
If truth was relative to the individual, it was also relative to time and place; 
Romanticism asserted that there was a ‘truth to one’s time and country’ that could
119  •only be known through history. Romanticism’s ‘scientific kernel’ was histoncism, 
summed up as ‘sympathy’—sympathy for the man, his age, his society—which meant 
an understanding of the relativistic context of history, or an emotional ‘internal 
vision’ of a period. The key failure of Romanticism was its lack of an ‘external
11 o
vision’, a universal morality or standard. Herder’s historicism and Burke’s 
traditionalism—his belief that a nation is a community bound by long historical 
tradition—contributed to the relativistic idea that political values are to be judged in 
their relation with the historical community.114 If the Enlightenment was a challenger 
to history—by wiping the slate clean and beginning again from the universal 
principles of reason—Romanticism was its champion, arguing that neither man nor 
society, as a product of history, is infinitely malleable.
Relativism and historicism applied to societies appeared as nationalism. 
However, nationalism was not uniquely a development of the Romantic era, a part of 
the process of modernisation or modernity as many scholars, such as Ernest Gellner, 
Eric Hobsbawm, or Benedict Anderson argue.115 George Mosse and Adrian Hastings 
point to the medieval roots of nationalism. Mosse notes that nationalism existed in
110 Thorlby, ‘Introduction’, p. 9.
111 Mosse, p. 41.
112 Thorlby, ‘Part II: Select Documents’, p. 154.
1]3 Kochan, pp. 90-92.
114 Cobban, pp. 129-130.
115 See Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origins and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1991); and Ernest 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past (London: Blackwell Publishers, 
1983).
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most medieval states, usually associated directly with the person of the king, a 
common language, and mercantilism. Additionally, the Reformation and ensuing 
wars of religion fostered a type of nationalism before the Romantic era. This leads to 
the conclusion that, for example, England was ‘English’ before it was ‘modem’.116 
Hastings contends that religion, as a key aspect of identity, had decisive and 
irreversible effects on the shaping of national identities among many European 
nations during medieval times, particularly through the development of a vernacular
117liturgy, or through biblical and religious literature or teaching in the vernacular.
Due to the differing circumstances in which various peoples achieved national 
consciousness, it is possible only to talk about ‘nationalisms’ in the plural. Indeed, the 
Romantic era saw a significant transformation in the idea of nationalism—from 
cultural to political nationalism. In early Romanticism, nationalism took a cultural 
form predicated upon the idea of harmony among nations, with disputes centring on 
the specific contributions that each nation could make toward the broader European 
civilisation.118 If in Schlegel’s terms, only those with ‘great national memories’ 
survive as a people, then with no such memories the Germans and Slavs turned to the 
Volk for their inspirations of greatness and unity.119 This was the cultural nationalism 
of folk ballads and fairytales.
However, in the latter nineteenth century Darwinism and its law of the 
survival of the fittest ultimately was synthesised with nationalism, particularly after 
the 1871 Franco-Prussian war, which was perceived as a struggle between rival 
nations and cultures. After that point, ‘Social Darwinism [became] the natural 
theology of nationalism’ and nationalism achieved a hard political core which sought 
self-determination and territorial sovereignty as key goals.120 This political core had 
particular resonance among nations under foreign occupation and subjugation, who 
had known no glorious past but only disunity and backwardness.121 In an age which 
embraced emotion and rejected reason, part of political nationalism’s appeal was its 
spiritual vision of the people living in a national state, a utopia of unity and
116 Mosse, p. 53.
1]7 Adrian Hastings, The Construction o f Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
118 Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871 (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1935), pp. 25-33.
119 Mosse, p. 42.
120 Binkley, p. 30.
121 Mosse, p. 46.
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belonging. These moving visions, often imbued with mystical, occult, or Christian 
meanings, played a similar role to chiliasm and millenarianism, acting as a secular
199dogma in rousing the ‘faithful’ to action. Indeed, nationalist visions could readily 
be infused with religious meanings; Romantics such as Herder, who was a scholar of 
biblical poetry, were often much taken by biblical stories. As one scholar notes, 
‘[tjaking the Bible seriously nurtured the Romantic fascination with cultural 
particularity’ since knowledge of the Bible shaped their moral understandings and 
sentiments o f ‘a single nation [Israel] in its struggle for survival’.123
The fusion of nationalism—often casting the nation in mystical or even 
biblical terms—with the metaphor of evolutionary biology has cast a long shadow 
into the twentieth century. Tzvetan Todorov comments that twentieth-century 
totalitarianisms are based on the union of Darwinism and politics, where 
Clausewitzian war (war as a continuation of politics by other means) is seen ‘as the 
truth of life’ and society is seen as engaged in various forms of permanent struggle: 
national clashes, racial conflicts, class wars, or even the ‘battle’ of the sexes. Not only 
were Hitler and Lenin influenced by the synthesis of political and Darwinian 
thinking, but earlier Marx and Engels were as well.124
Such fusions of Darwinism and politics could have quasi-spiritual, 
apocalyptic, or millenialist undercurrents. As Norman Cohn observed in 1957,
What Marx passed on to present-day communism was not the fruit of his long 
years of study in the fields of economics and sociology but a quasi- 
apocalyptic fantasy which, as a young man, unquestioningly and almost 
unconsciously, he had assimilated from a crowd of obscure writers and 
journalists [....] Capitalism as Babylon, now about to go under in a sea of 
blood and fire so that the way shall be cleared for the egalitarian 
millennium.125
Finally, Romantics shared a fascination with power—the power of nature, of 
nations, and of the individual, particularly the lone, brooding heroic genius who was
19  f i‘firm in [his] passions’ and created new worlds from the sheer force of his will.
122 Mosse, pp. 71 and 74.
123 George P. Fletcher, Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age o f Terrorism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 194-195.
124 Tzvetan Todorov, Hope and Memory, trans. David Bellos (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), pp. 32- 
33.
125 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit o f the Millennium (1957), quoted in Tom Naim, ‘Breakwaters of 2000: 
from Ethnic to Civic Nationalism’, New Left Review (No. 214,1995), p. 93.
126 Mosse, p. 27.
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Napoleon, Hegel’s spectre haunting Europe, aroused this fervour for men of power 
and will who were to be judged not by a universal standard, but under their own terms 
and in their own time. As Chateaubriand says,
Napoleon’s greatness does not lie in his words [...] or any love of liberty [...]; 
he is great because he created a working and powerful government [... and] 
great above all because he owed everything to himself, and without any 
authority but that of his genius made thirty-six million subjects obey him in an 
age where no illusions surrounded a throne.127
This hero worship and admiration for the powerful was not limited to France. In 
Britain, Thomas Carlyle moved Romantics from reverence for the awesome power of 
nature to an appreciation of the awesome power of man—his industry and capacity to 
exercise his individual will. Carlyle’s Past and Present (1843) portrays the hero not 
as a man with nostalgia for the medieval past, but as one who creates his own future, 
who reforms society through his will. This conquering hero stands for industrial and 
later imperial progress, championing the national cause.128 In Germany, late 
Romantics like Nietzsche echoed Protagoras’ aphorism that ‘man is the measure of all 
things’ by extolling the power of individual will and distinguishing between master 
and slave moralities: ‘the noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of 
values [...] he knows himself to be that which in general first accords to honour
1 <^Q
things, he creates values'
1.6 Search for a Golden Age—Nostalgia and medievalism
‘[The Middle Ages] were beautiful, brilliant times, when Europe was a 
Christian country, and a single Christian faith dwelt in this humanized 
region o f the world; one great communal interest united the most 
distant provinces o f this vast realm o f the spirit. ’
—Novalis130
For Georges Poulet, nostalgia rests at the heart of the Romantic soul: ‘the central 
belief [...] of nearly all the Romanticists [was...] the belief in the continued existence
127 Quoted in Thorlby, ‘Select Documents: The Fascination with Power’, in The Romantic Movement, 
ed. Thorlby, pp. 159-160.
128 Mosse, pp. 27-30.
129 From Beyond Good and Evil, 188, in A Nietzsche Reader, ed. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin 
Books, 1977), p. 107. Emphasis in original.
130 Novalis (pseudonym for Georg Friedrich Philipp von Hardenburg), Die Christenheit oderEuropa 
[trans.: Christianity or Europe] (1799).
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1 O 1
of the past, in the wonderful possibilities of its revival. Nothing is lost.’ Yet what is 
nostalgia? One everyday definition describes it as a fond remembrance of the past. 
However, nostalgia was originally classified as a mild form of mental illness, first 
coined by a Swiss doctor to characterise the symptoms some Swiss mercenaries 
exhibited. Another doctor later defined it as ‘[a] species of melancholy, or a mild type 
of insanity, caused by disappointment and a continuous longing for home’.
Contemporary psychologists have noted that nostalgia gives a sense of
permanence and stability during rapid change and ‘indicates individuals’ desire to
regain some control over their lives in an uncertain time’, often performing ‘as a
means of temporal escape’.133 However, nostalgia is more than a personal
reminiscence. It is also a collective means of reconstructing the past to fulfil a variety
of social purposes which involves selective remembering and selective forgetting to
filter and construct a narrative of the past.134 The key to nostalgia is longing, mostly
to recapture a previous idealised and idolised mood or spirit—nostalgia is expressed
for what is loved or hoped for, a species of wishful thinking or wish fulfillment, often
1for something that never really was. However, nostalgia may not only be a longing 
for the past; while conservative Romantics may yearn for the past, progressive 
Romantics may long for an age yet to come. Indeed, some writers suggest that this 
sense of nostalgia as an ‘infinite longing’ is in fact ‘the essence of Romanticism’.136
During the unstable Romantic period, nostalgia manifested itself in many 
ways, one of the most important being a revival of interest in the Middle Ages, which 
was inherently tied to the central importance that spirituality and mysticism played 
during the age. While some Liberal commentators during the nineteenth century— 
such as John Stuart Mill—saw the medieval period as ‘barbaric’, and unfavourably 
contrasted it with their own ‘modem’ era,137 others lauded the Middle Ages as a time 
not only of mystery, romance, and adventure, but also as a Golden Age of higher 
spirituality and morality, as well as a time of great social stability.138 Writers,
131 Georges Poulet quoted in A.K. Thorlby, ‘Psychological Symbols’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. 
Thorlby, p. 39.
132 Janelle L. Wilson, ‘Remember When: A Consideration of the Concept of Nostalgia’, ETC.: A 
Review o f General Semantics (Vol. 56, No. 3,1999), p. 296.
133 R.C. Aden quoted in ibid., p. 296.
134 Ibid.
n5Ibid.
136 E.T.A. Hoffmann quoted in Talmon, p. 149.
137 Coker, ‘How wars end’, p. 623.
138 Cobban, 129-133.
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painters, and philosophers of the Romantic age mined the history of the Middle Ages 
for its heroes and images to inform and inspire their own societies towards perceived 
medieval ideals.
In literature and poetry, Romantics emphasised the ‘use of imagery,
symbolism, and myth’, some retelling chivalrous historical morality tales from the
1 ^ 0Middle Ages, and recounting folk stories. In some cases, such as with Germany’s 
Brothers Grimm, the revival of fairy tales was also a form of nationalism, a way to 
build a unified, ‘authentic’ national consciousness through the Volk. Medieval 
historical novels, such as Ivanhoe by Sir Walter Scott—who was probably the most 
widely-read novelist in Europe during the early nineteenth century140—also 
flourished during the period, and early Romantic writers and poets extolled medieval 
chivalry and Christian themes.141
Romantic, idealised heroes from the Middle Ages such as Robin Hood and his 
merry men and chivalrous knights from the Crusades pervaded Romantic culture: the 
Exhibition of Paris in 1819 was filled with people dressed as latter-day Merovingians 
and roving troubadours.142 Additionally, interest in the Middle Ages as a time of 
mystery and inspiration is evidenced in the growth of the so-called ‘Gothic’ novels, 
exemplified by the emotionally-charged works of the Bronte sisters.
In the visual arts, admiration for the medieval past came not only in terms of 
images on canvas but also in the physical representation of the past in bricks and 
mortar. Pre-Raphaelite painters like John Everett Millais and Dante Rossetti focused 
on the beauty of Christianity, using medieval imagery to underscore the mystical, 
transcendent qualities of deep spiritual faith.143 A Gothic revival in architecture, not 
only in churches but also in public buildings such as the British Houses of Parliament, 
was a testament to the strength of the medieval revival in visual culture.
Yet the period’s fascination with medievalism went beyond culture. While 
scholars note that the roots of the medieval revival began as a reformist movement 
with nineteenth-century Liberals and early Romantics, the movement became 
reactionary in the later Romantic period.144 As Frederick Beiser notes
139 R. Wellek, ‘The Concept of Romanticism’, in The Romantic Movement, ed. Thorlby, p. 29.
140 Artz, p. 61.
141 Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders: Europe 1800-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987), pp. 130-135.
142 Mosse, pp. 21-22.
143 Ibid., p. 33.
144 Cobban, pp. 130-131.
46
Chapter 1
[w]hat separates early from later [RJomanticism is [...] this distinction 
between the community and the paternal state. The more the [R]omantics 
feared the social disintegration created by the [French] Revolution and 
advancing capitalism, the more they looked back with longing on the 
corporate order of the Middle Ages. The more they lost faith in the power of 
the people to develop a community through their own spontaneous efforts, the 
more they trusted the powers of the state. Eventually, it seemed as if only the 
paternal state could ensure the bonds of community against all the 
disintegrating and corrupting forces of modem life. The [R]omantics’ 
increasing identification of the community with the old corporate order 
brought their position closer to the conservatives.145
The Romantics’ historical re-discovery of the Middle Ages, which was 
conducted in terms of an ‘idealised Medievalism’ that replaced the ‘idealised 
Classicism’ of the Enlightenment, also rehabilitated perceived medieval corporatist 
ideas on social relationships.146 Far from seeing the Middle Ages as a period of ‘fluid 
identities’, conservative Romantics appreciated the Middle Ages for its ‘fixities’, its 
social and political stability. They looked to the medieval era nostalgically as one of 
paternalistic social relationships with order imposed through a hierarchical and 
corporate state.147 In this image of medievalism, identities and loyalties were fixed 
and deeply spiritually rooted in Christianity. Lord, merchant, peasant, and priest all 
had their assigned roles in society which they performed dutifully.
1.7 Dreaming of Arcadia—Nature and the exotic
‘The pleasure we take in nature is not aesthetic but moral [... the 
things o f nature] are what we once were, and what we must become 
again. ’
—Friedrich von Schiller148
The idea of ‘nature’ in the nineteenth century had two fundamental meanings—one 
historical and one philosophical—which were ‘confusingly intertwined’.149 The 
historical meaning was nature as it was or now is, known as natura naturata. This 
definition saw nature as something in its ‘original’ state, the state during which it is 
free from any artificial blemish after leaving the Creator’s hands. The philosophical
145 Beiser, p. 223.
146 Cobban, p. 130.
147 Mosse, p. 22.
148 Friedrich Schiller, Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung [trans.: On Naive and Sentimental 
Poetry] (1796).
149 Basil Willey, The Eighteenth-Century Background (Middlesex: Peregrine Books, 1965), p. 196.
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meaning was nature as it could become, known as natura naturans. This view 
perceived nature as something in its final state of development, or in its most perfect 
state attainable. Both are intertwined and yet have opposite implications. Is nature a 
fixed state, a dynamic process, or both? Furthermore, is ‘nature’ to be understood by 
reason or emotion? While more conservative Romantics regarded the idea of natura 
naturata as the true meaning of ‘nature’, and Romantic progressives preferred notions 
of natura naturans, both agreed that feeling and emotion, rather than abstract reason, 
was the best method to understand ‘nature.’150
In their understanding of nature, early Romantics shared an emotional beauty 
aesthetic which was also an ethic: beautiful places were virtuous places. Arcadia was 
not only a place of physical perfection, but a spiritual utopia as well. For Romantics, 
sylvan woods, storm-blown shores, and craggy hills were not merely beautiful in 
themselves; they also held deep symbolic and moral meaning, often filled with 
longing for an unattainable perfection and sense of loss for the past. As W.K.
Wimsatt notes, ‘the common feat of the [RJomantic nature poets was to read 
meanings into the landscape’, where nature articulated the highest form of perfection 
and human emotion, and where man could attain transcendence.151 Painters such as 
Turner and Constable also expressed this sentiment visually, with their windswept 
landscapes filled with longing and foreboding.
In an increasingly urban, industrialising society, Romantics also idealised 
children, childhood, and the ‘natural man’—often represented by the peasant—as 
these were seen as innocents, exhibiting the purer virtues, unspoiled and untouched 
by the corrupting hand of civilisation or living in a bucolic, nostalgic vision of the 
perfection of simpler times.152 Indeed, so far had the idea of the ‘natural man’ gone 
that it became somewhat of a fad. Louis XVI had a rural village recreated so he and 
his wife could play the roles of a ‘natural’ married couple.153 The perfection of this 
original state of nature and state of man was also linked to the Christian and the 
divine. For example, Chateaubriand integrated nature and man into a Romantically 
Christian ideal.154
150 Willey, pp. 196-200.
151 Quoted in. Thorlby, ‘Psychological Symbols’, p. 37.
152 For a discussion of the Romantic vision of children, see Linda M. Austin, ‘Children of Childhood: 
Nostalgia and the Romantic Legacy’, Studies in Romanticism (Vol. 43,2003).
153 Mosse, p. 14.
154 Ibid., p. 21.
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Romanticism’s fascination with nature turned toward the darker side of the 
human psyche—the ‘unnatural’, cruel parts of human nature and the evil 
Doppelgdnger in Gothic horror novels and romans charognes. Writers such as the 
Marquis de Sade regaled and horrified readers with tales of pleasure and perversion, 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886) played on the ambiguity 
between vice and virtue existing in the same man, and other writers spoke of the 
duality of human nature, of noble criminals and fatal women.155
The idealisation of nature also created a penchant for the exotic, especially the 
Orient, as Romantics deemed far away, primitive peoples from ‘lesser’ civilisations to 
be closer to the natural state of man, pure and unspoiled. This growing interest 
coincided with the ‘unparalleled’ European colonial expansion from 1815-1914, 
when European direct colonial rule swelled from 35 per cent to 85 per cent of the 
earth’s surface.156 Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt greatly fuelled this fashion, as the 
expeditionary forces included some of the great minds of the time. Napoleon counted 
among his expedition’s savants some of the most well-known astronomers, engineers, 
painters, linguists, poets, musicians, and experts on the Orient who produced a 
collection of work called Description de VEgypte, one of the most influential bodies 
of work on the region.157
These experts also brought back artefacts, such as the Rosetta stone, creating 
the beginnings of a ‘renaissance’ in the West’s understanding of the Orient, which 
more broadly included a new scientific and artistic awareness of the region— 
Champollion’s decoding of the hieroglyphs being one of the most famous 
accomplishments of the age.158 The growth of specialist societies founded to study the 
Orient—such as Britain’s Royal Asiatic Society and the American Oriental Society— 
reflected this growing interest in the exotic, as did the increase in the number of 
published books and journals, and the number of new professorships created in 
Oriental subjects.159 This burgeoning curiosity spawned new translations of texts in 
Arabic as well as other non-Western languages, such as Sanskrit.160 More broadly,
155 Thorlby, ‘Psychological Symbols’, p. 43.
156 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f  the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 
p. 41.
157 Lesley and Roy Adkins, The Keys o f  Egypt: The Race to Read the Hieroglyphs (London: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), pp. 7-41.
158 For a discussion of Champollion’s work, see Adkins.
159 Said, p. 43.
160 Ibid., p. 41. For a discussion of the importance of Napoleon’s expedition on future scholarship on 
the region, see ibid., pp. 76-92.
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escalating interest in the Orient also influenced such artists as Delacroix and Vemet 
of the French Romantic School, who filled Western audiences with images of exotic 
landscapes and languorous, mysterious women.161
Finally, Romanticism’s fascination with nature and the exotic influenced a 
number of racial theories explaining the historical rise and fall of civilisations. Some 
late Romantics, such as Joseph Arthur de Gobineau, made the correlation between 
man and nature and used ‘natural’ racial stereotypes to explain these cyclical patterns. 
These theories described the ‘natural’ pattern of the rise and the decline of certain 
races and delineated a hierarchy of races where some—like the Aryans—had the 
‘natural’ right to rule over lesser races.162
1.8 Walking by Faith, Not Sight—Conclusion
‘For we walk by faith, not by sight ’
—2 Corinthians, 5:7163
If during the Enlightenment period Classical man learned to trust his own senses and 
hard reason in his walk through life, Romantic man would trust his walk to a 
sentimental faith, not sight. Whereas Classicism, which ‘[stands] on the ground of the 
present’ is—in the words of Wilhelm Schlegel—the ‘poetry of possession’, the 
possession of stability and a known truth, Romanticism, which ‘[sways] between 
recollection and atonement’, is ‘the poetry of longing’—a longing for security, for 
meaning in an age beset by rapid change.164 As we have argued, nineteenth-century 
Romanticism was partly a philosophical reaction against the Enlightenment and partly 
an historical response to the uncertainties of the age, particularly to the three 
transformations that shook the European consciousness: the political revolution in 
France, the Industrial Revolution in Britain, and the cultural revolution in Germany. 
These developments wrought a change in outlook among European publics, writers, 
thinkers, and artists during the nineteenth century, from one of the optimism, 
universalism, rationality, and sense of progress during the Enlightenment, to one
161 For a discussion of the French Romantics, see Anita Brookner, Romanticism and its Discontents 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001).
162 Mosse, pp. 76-80.
163 New Testament, King James Version.
164 Wilhelm Schlegel (brother of Friedrich) called Classical art the ‘poetry of possession’. The rest of 
the comments in quotes are Talmon’s. See Talmon, p. 149.
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emphasising a variety of related themes during the nineteenth century, in particular 
anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on nature and the 
exotic.
When looking at nineteenth-century Romanticism—or more accurately, 
Romanticisms—it is difficult to set out any all-encompassing definition or tendency; 
even less still a coherent ideology. Perhaps this is because, in a significant sense, 
Romanticism is about rejection, about loss, and about protest—protest against the 
Enlightenment’s overweening rationality and objectification of the human soul, of 
unsettling and uneven material progress in the face of vast human suffering, and of 
the smallness of man when faced with the infinitude of God and nature. This protest 
and rejection took many forms and directions. Unlike Realism or Liberalism, which 
rest on a set of foundational precepts and logically drawn arguments bound by human 
reason, Romanticism’s goal is to transcend mere human logic to get at a higher truth, 
the truth of the divine. This anti-rationalism, bound up with a turn to emotionalism 
and spirituality as the true seats of knowledge and understanding, pervaded the era 
along with a deflated sense of the possibilities for the future.
This atmosphere of decline suffused a significant body of the literature and 
philosophical work of the age. Romantic pessimism stems from the desperate 
knowledge that human logic will not triumph, but this failure is also a form of 
exhilaration; that there can be a release and liberation from the bounds of logic. Yet 
what can start as a noble effort to redefine the boundaries of liberty can degenerate 
into libertinism; an ironic sense of horror into the idolatry of violence and barbarism. 
As the ideals of the early Romantics—whose flight from the strictures of logic led 
them to seek the immanence of the divine—morphed into the hardened pessimism of 
the late Romantics—who rejected the possibility of the divine—the Romantic 
sensibility of Wordsworth’s bucolic transcendence became Nietzsche’s godless abyss. 
Fascination with the duality of all life—the inhuman, the diseased, the malformed, 
criminals, prostitutes and others at the extremes and margins—as well as with the 
exoticism of ‘Others’ deemed at once both innocent and barbaric created a picture of 
contradiction and incoherence in the Romantic ‘movement’.
By its very nature, this type of rejectionism often lacks unity or coherence 
since it is a negative turning away from something, rather than an affirmative 
movement toward something: a refutation of logic, of optimism, or of hope. 
Therefore, Romanticism may be more an attitude, mood, persuasion, sensibility, or
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receptivity to certain themes than a particular logic or set of logics as commonly 
understood. As a Geist, a feeling, an atmosphere, it can be everywhere and nowhere 
at once, subtly informing attitudes and opinions, the selection of topics and what 
counts as evidence. In this sense Romanticism is less an ideology—or so at least it 
likes to see itself as less an ideology—than other ‘isms’ we can think of, in part 
because its goal is to break free of ideology or the strictures of convention without 
itself necessarily creating new rules or foundations, a logical impossibility. What is 
something that has no foundation—is neither itself nor its opposite?
In essence, Romanticism may be said to have been everything and its 
contradiction at once, thesis and antithesis bound within an uncomfortable synthesis. 
Romantics were seeking it all at once, to feel the heights of passion, the agonies of 
despair, the thrill of the divine, and the taste of blood—negative or positive, all was 
equally sensation. Perhaps it is this sense of extreme sensation, the need to feel 
intensely rather than to think intensely, that describes the core of its anti-rationalism 
and relativism. Yet once the sensation is gone, what then? What may be left are 
escapes to even greater extremes of sensation, or a lingering nostalgia about loss for 
the ‘innocence’ of the past. From that perspective, Romanticism may be more about 
the thrill of the journey than the actual destination. Of course the problem is that in 
the end we always arrive somewhere.
Romanticism’s legacies have a long arm. It is almost impossible to think of 
our own era outside the framework of Romanticism’s key themes: its cyclical sense 
of history, its nostalgia, its views of society as an organic whole, of nature and man as 
a unity, of identity and cultural determinism, or of the essential duality of life. 
Furthermore, Romanticism bequeathed us a sense of historicism, an understanding 
that time it is imbued with specific meanings relative to a certain age, which forms 
the foundation of modem political thinking. Indeed, the very fabric of contemporary 
scholarship in the social sciences is rooted in Romanticism’s historic conception of 
society. However, perhaps Romanticism’s most enduring legacy is its tragic sense of 
destiny and the inevitability of decay and decline. Declinism, often expressed through 
the medical metaphor of health/disease or the biological metaphor of youth/old age, 
has been a recurrent theme for the past 200 years, profoundly affecting perceptions of 
and approaches to politics and international relations. In the next chapter, we explore 
how these Romantic themes have been expressed in international relations during the 
1990s.
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Chapter 2. Age without a Name: The Romantic Zeitgeist in 
post-Cold War International Relations
‘The piers are pummeled by the waves; /  In a lonely field the rain 
Lashes an abandoned train; /  Outlaws fill the mountain caves. ’
—W.H. Auden1
While the Cold War ‘created a sense of stability among most of the world 
population’, the troubling conflicts that followed the fall of communism created 
widespread apprehension and a sense of pessimism. With the promise of an ‘end to 
history’ dead, would the West end up as a slowly decaying, pitiable figure like a 
barbarian-sacked Rome sapped of power, while the rest of the world degenerated into 
chaos? That was a key question in the 1990s, a period during which we were so 
anxious of our seemingly awful, uncertain era that we were living in an age without a 
name whose only solid reference was to its past: the post-Cold War.
By 2000, the editors of one academic journal noted that ‘[i]n the past decade, 
the phrase the end of the Cold War has recurred with numbing frequency [....] 
Perhaps it is time to coin a new phrase for the dawn of a new millennium: the age of 
angst.’ Outside the ivory tower, those policymakers tasked with predicting the future 
of international relations, such as intelligence scenario developers and military 
planners, came to cautious, sceptical, and even pessimistic conclusions, ones replete 
with increasing polarisation between the haves and have-nots, economic rivalry and 
regional conflicts, rapid climate change and competition due to resource depletion.4 
Those predicting the long-term business environment for global corporations also 
offered some grim possibilities for the future, including growing economic rivalries 
and conflict.5
1 W.H. Auden, ‘The Fall of Rome’, 1-4 (1940).
2 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1994), p. 9.
3 ‘The Age of Angst’, Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy (Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000), p. 5.
4 For an example of this in the US intelligence community see, National Intelligence Council, Mapping 
the Global Future: Report o f the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, NIC 2004-13 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, December 2004). Available at 
http://www.cia.gOv/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html#contents
5 In this vein, see some of the scenarios offered by long-term planners for oil producer Shell, a pioneer 
in scenario planning. Shell International Limited, Shell Global Scenarios to 2025. The Future Business 
Environment: Trends, Trade-offs and Choices (2005).
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The lack of clarity that accompanied the melancholic loss of what was 
believed to be a predictable system of international relations led to a revival of the 
Romantic mood in the 1990s, with its concomitant emphasis on anti-rationalism, 
pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and nature. Yet aspects of this mood may persist 
post 9/11. One scholar noted that, in the United States, the calls for waging a ‘just 
war’ on terrorism as well as the mounting discussions of the roles that honour, 
integrity, morality, and collective guilt play in international conduct are a species of 
Romanticism:
[TJhose sympathetic to war in our time are heirs to the Romantic tradition. We 
are the children of William Wordsworth’s and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s ardour 
in resisting Napoleon. We think and feel in the moral currents still surging 
from John Brown’s attack on Harpers Ferry and from Abraham Lincoln’s 
conceiving the United States as a single ‘nation under God’ that must Tong 
endure’. We have come to think of our nation as an actor in the drama of good 
and evil [....]6
Other commentators pointed out the way in which anti-globalisation scholars, 
environmentalists, and Postmodernist thinkers expound theories akin to Romanticism, 
which place an emphasis on nature (whether the natural environment or the various 
aspects of ‘normalcy’ in human nature), on the importance of the ‘irrational’
(emotion, sentiment, or religion), on relativism (culture, identity, or ethnicity), or 
which reject industrialisation and commoditisation.7
However, we will argue that the spirit of 1990s post-Cold War Romanticism 
in international relations may be broader than any single Romantic strand, such as
o
Postmodernism. One way to describe the work of influential thinkers in 1990s 
international relations, particularly American international relations which informed
6 George P. Fletcher, Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age o f Terrorism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 8.
7 Tilottama Rajan notes that the focus on ‘marginalised voices’ in Postmodernism is an inheritance 
from the Romantics: ‘it is Romanticism which inaugurated our interest in marginal voices, and which 
initiated a fascination with the challenge posed to “normal” society by madness and borderline states 
that continues to resonate in the work of theorists such as Foucault and Kristeva’. See Tilottama Rajan, 
‘Mary Shelley’s “Mathilda”: Melancholy and the Political Economy of Romanticism’, Studies in the 
Novel (Vol. 26, No. 2,1994). On Romanticism and environmentalism, see Thomas Dunlap, 
‘Communing with nature: continuing our series on History and the Environment, Thomas Dunlap 
explores the development of quasi-religious environmentalism in North America’, History Today (Vol. 
53, No. 3,2003). On Romanticism and similarities with elements of Postmodernism, see for example, 
Pauline Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 13-14. On these issues see also Keith 
Windschuttle, ‘The Cultural War on Western Civilization’, New Criterion (Vol. 20, No. 5,2002).
8 Note that postmodern or postmodernity refer to a period of time—a time after the modem era which 
is widely seen as our current age—while Postmodernism or Postmodernist used as an adjective denote 
a mode of thought, an ideological standpoint, or methodology.
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the foreign policy of the world’s most powerful state, is as part of a Zeitgeist, an 
atmosphere, mood, or sensibility which gripped the academic, media, and 
policymaking communities. If, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, manifestations of 
culture and politics in society can sometimes follow a common spirit or Zeitgeist, 
then what is the Zeitgeist that defines 1990s Romanticism—the specific history and 
dominant trends that differentiate the first decade of the post-Cold War era, 
particularly in international relations? We will argue that the popular and academic 
Zeitgeist in 1990s international relations had several striking resemblances to the 
nineteenth-century Romantic period, but with various changes that fit within the 
particular history of the post-Cold War era.9 Clearly, there were a variety of 
countervailing tendencies in international relations at that time; however, 
Romanticism may be a particularly strong contender to describe the 1990s Zeitgeist.
A brief glance at some of the topical preoccupations of pundits and academics on 
issues in international relations during that period includes a roster of Romantically- 
themed subjects:
• considerations of ethics and morality in international relations including 
psychoanalytic, emotional, or irrational approaches to understanding such 
issues as warfare and human rights;
• constructivist and relativistic international relations approaches with an 
emphasis on ethnic identity, culture, or gender;
• generalised sense of pessimism or ‘emptiness’ within materialism, or of 
societal failure and decline;
• sense of loss, melancholy, or nostalgia for the past, whether for the 
stability of the Cold War or for the imperial age; and
• environmentalist discourses and others concerning nature as well as a re­
examination of human nature, such as the proper role of man and society.
Our inquiry into the post-Cold War 1990s Zeitgeist will be impressionistic, discussing 
a wide variety of popular and scholarly strains of Romanticism and their impact on 
international relations during that period. However, the anecdotal evidence may be 
used as a starting point for further research.
While 1990s Romanticism—which we will call Postmodern Romanticism to 
distinguish it from its nineteenth-century cousin—may have been part of the
9 For a discussion on the dominance of Realism and Neorealism in international relations during the 
Cold War era, see for example, Miles Kahler, ‘Inventing International Relations: International 
Relations: Theory After 1945’, in New Thinking in International Relations, eds. Michael W. Doyle and 
G. John Ikenberry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 20-53. For a discussion of the ‘rollback’ 
of Realism after the end of the Cold War, see Michael D. Yaffe, ‘Realism in Retreat? The New World 
Order and the Return of the Individual to International Relations Studies’, Perspectives on Political 
Science (Vol. 23, No. 2,1994), pp 79-88.
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philosophical reaction against the dominance of Cold War Realism or Liberalism,10 
we will argue that the considerable re-emergence of Romantic modes of thought and 
analysis in international relations during the 1990s was also an historic reaction that 
gained momentum with the crises and uncertainties that followed the fall of 
communism and the destruction of the bipolar world, just as Romanticism was an 
historic reaction to the political, economic, and cultural changes that followed the 
Enlightenment. In essence, Romantic moods and modes of thought survived the 
period of the nineteenth century, but were often drowned out by rationalist 
perspectives and sensibilities during the Cold War. After years of labouring away in 
comparative Cold War obscurity, the vital shifts that accompanied the end of the Cold 
War put Realist (and other rationalist) perspectives and ‘moods’ under greater 
scrutiny and provided Romantics with their historical and philosophical ‘moment’, 
particularly during the 1990s.11
First, we briefly outline some common perceptions and impressions about the 
post-Cold War in the 1990s. Second, we historicise the 1990s to discuss how the 
perceptions of the period were founded on contemporary ‘revolutions’ which 
accelerated the pace of social change. These changes had a significant hand in 
undermining the seeming political, economic, and cultural verities of the Cold War, 
leading to greater feelings of insecurity among policymakers and publics. These 
uncertainties also added impetus to those who challenged the Cold War 
predominance of rationalist paradigms and lent greater receptivity to the Romantic 
message. In international relations this translated into a challenge against the
19predominant Realist (and to some extent Liberal Internationalist) frameworks.
Third, we examine the Romantic strain of thought in the 1990s. We apply the same 
categories of analysis used in the previous chapter—irrationality, pessimism, 
relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—to examine how they helped to describe
10 In international relations, the death of the bipolar confrontation has led to the concomitant decline of 
the dominant Realist paradigm and a search for other explanatory frameworks, some of the most 
prominent of which could be described as Romantic. Romantic ideas have never truly ‘gone away’, 
although they were perhaps less pervasive before the end of the Cold War in various academic 
disciplines. Therefore, whilst the reaction against Realism is not new; it has become more prevalent in 
some disciplines.
11 One author has argued that Realism’s ‘real strengths [...] do not lie in its concepts and precepts, in 
its clear and accurate understanding of the reality of international affairs. Rather, they lie in its attitudes 
and sensibilities’. See James Kurth, ‘Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies’, The National 
Interest (No. 53, Fall 1998).
12 The end of the Cold War has also caused difficulties for traditional liberal internationalists. For a 
discussion, see Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, Foreign Policy (Spring
1995).
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the 1990s Zeitgeist and affected understandings of international relations. Finally, we 
offer some tentative observations about how the ‘atmosphere’ or ‘sensibility’ of 
Postmodern Romanticism affected perceptions of international relations in the 1990s.
2.1 Historicising Postmodern Romanticism—Global disruptions in 
the 1990s
If the Romantic mood of the nineteenth century was a response to the uncertainties 
generated by three upheavals in European society—political revolution in France, 
industrial revolution in Britain, and cultural revolution in Germany—what fuelled the 
pessimistic mood of 1990s Postmodern Romanticism? Greater receptivity to 
Romantic modes of thought in the 1990s seems to have been a response to three 
dislocating global transformations which may have taken root during the Cold War, 
but which only fully came to fruition in the post-Cold War 1990s. Together, these 
transformations are often referred to collectively as the processes of fragmentation 
and globalisation which can be viewed as mirror images of each other. In abbreviated 
form these transformations are: 1) political revolution through the fall of communism 
and the destruction of bipolarity in the international system; 2) economic revolution 
through intensified globalisation, including a significant retreat of the state from 
social provision and control of national economies, and; 3) cultural revolution, partly 
through technological changes such as satellite-based media with global audiences 
and the internet, as well as the internationalisation and possible homogenisation of 
culture.
These transformations created disruptions in the 1990s which, similar to those 
during the nineteenth century, generated a public sense of uncertainty, restlessness, 
and anxiety in the face of change, calling into question the Cold War’s rubric of 
progress through rationalism. There is a significant body of literature discussing the
i <2
end of the Cold War and these transformations that need not be repeated here. The
13 There is a vast literature discussing all three of these transformations, much of which is pessimistic. 
On the perils of democratisation see Amy Chua, World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy 
Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York, NY: Doubleday Books, 2002). On globalisation, 
cf, Stephen McBride, Globalization and its Discontents (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Vincent 
Cable, ‘The Diminished Power of the Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power’, 
Daedalus (Vol. 124, No. 2,1995); and Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, Inequality, Globalization 
and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a critical view of cultural 
homogenisation, see Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How the Planet is Falling Apart and
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origins, development, direction, and meaning of fragmentation and globalisation, as 
well as their relationship to each other are contested, as is their continuity or 
discontinuity with the past.14 Rather than reiterating these arguments, we will 
examine four concerns that have underpinned the pessimistic conclusions that the 
‘New World Order’ was and remains highly disorderly: 1) the differences in the 
underlying political and ideological framework of the international system post-1989; 
2) the unclear dividing lines between the ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’; 3) the 
perceived new threats facing Western governments and publics; and, 4) the new 
‘rules of the game’ emerging from these realities.
First, the underlying political framework of the early post-Cold War era then 
seemed and continues to seem unstable, in contrast to the apparent stable bipolarity 
that developed during the Cold War. Politically, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and 
the disintegration of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
defined the early post-Cold War era. While initially trumpeted by Liberals as the 
wave of the future, communism’s failure left significant political, economic, and 
social problems in its wake.15 In particular, the violent fragmentation of multinational 
states in the region, especially the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
through seemingly ethno-nationalist conflict (not to mention burgeoning African 
conflicts), provided a sobering lesson in the perils of democratisation and transition 
towards market capitalism after the Cold War.
At the same time, the early post-Cold War world could boast no ascendant 
ideology or overarching framework, like Realism (or at times, Liberalism) in 
international relations, which filled the vacuum left by the collapse of communism. 
As a result, many scholars questioned—and continue to question—Realism’s 
applicability as an explanatory model not only in the post-Cold War period, but also 
its record during the Cold War.16 Fukuyama’s famous notion that democracy was left
Coming Together and What this Means for Democracy (New York, NY: Times Books, 1995); for a different 
view, see Tyler Cowan, ‘The Fate of Culture’, The Wilson Quarterly (September 2002).
14 For a wide-ranging discussion of this literature, see Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: 
International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), especially 
pp. 172-196.
15 For a survey of the economic transition in Eastern Europe, see Adam Zwass, Incomplete 
Revolutions: Successes and Failures o f  Capitalist Transition Strategies in Post-Communist Economies 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). See also Minton F. Goldman, Revolution and Change in Central 
and Eastern Europe: Political Economic, and Social Challenges (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
16 See for example, Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of 
Realism’, in International Relations Theory and the End o f the Cold War, eds. Richard Ned Lebow 
and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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the unchallenged global conqueror after the fall of the USSR proved to be
17Liberalism’s fifteen minutes of fame. Indeed, the only certainty about the new order 
seemed uncertainty itself. Christopher Coker summed up Western disillusionment 
with the post-Cold War world thus: ‘What we Westerners see is anarchy, a “new 
world disorder”, in which wars are seemingly endless, an age in which war has 
become a condition of life.’18 If what Westerners expected at the end to the Cold War 
was greater peace of mind, it proved elusive.
Second, what were once thought to be the clear dividing lines between the two 
opposing sides during the Cold War had blurred by the early 1990s. One main 
division was that the Cold War had sectioned Europe into neat parcels of East and 
West, both engaged in a seemingly endless if relatively bloodless struggle for position 
and mastery—a chess game for the highest stakes. The rest of the world was also 
similarly separated between client states of either side, with the non-aligned 
movement on the sidelines. By contrast, the 1990s New World Order defied these 
tidy partitions. Eastern Europeans clamoured for acceptance into Western institutions, 
both the US and USSR either scaled down support to or abandoned client states, and 
seemingly stable parts of the former Soviet empire—Tajikistan, Georgia,
Moldova—and Yugoslavia succumbed to apparent anarchy, ethno-nationalist 
conflict, or economic despair. Furthermore, the old areas of bipolar Cold War conflict 
and cooperation lacked clear demarcation lines in the post-Cold War era.19
Third, the perceived threats that the West faced during the Cold War seemed 
certain and straightforward, focused on a single adversary: Soviet expansionism and 
the possibility of nuclear attack. The methods the West developed to thwart these 
threats were equally certain: variations on the themes of containment, mutually 
assured destruction, or developing a modus vivendi through detente.20 By contrast, the 
early post-Cold War era offered no certain directed threat or unitary adversary. While 
some commentators have offered up the war on terrorism as the new post-Cold War
17 Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992).
18 Christopher Coker, ‘How wars end’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 26, No. 3,
1997), p. 623.
19 However, commentators forget that the term ‘Cold War’ itself comes from a privileged perspective, 
since what was a ‘cold’ war of strategy and position to Americans, Europeans, and the Soviets, was a 
‘hot’ war for millions in the developing world. Proxy wars raged in the Third World during the Cold 
War, killing 37 million people — about seven million soldiers and a further 30 million civilians, or 
nearly two-thirds as many as had died in World War II. See Coker, p. 619.
20 For a discussion on strategies the US used to meet the Soviet threat, see for example, John Lewis 
Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security Policy 
(Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982).
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enemy, it is an enemy that has lacked direct control of state structures, a unified 
leadership, and a clear, single-minded goal.21 Additionally, while we may have 
thought that the Islamist terrorist enemy has been ideologically unified, religion is
often a blunt political instrument and it may be more analytically useful to speak of
0 0Islamic fundamentalisms in the plural, rather than of a single ideology.
Further, new security issues came to the fore as surges in what appeared to be 
identity-based conflicts, a breakdown of traditional state authority, floods of refugees, 
growing environmental degradation and resource depletion, and potential
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed highly diffuse challenges without
0*1
an identifiable adversary that require multiple methods to contain them. Some of 
these challenges have appeared to be so complicated that they have often been 
considered ‘complex emergencies’ rather than straightforward conflicts. The term 
‘complex emergency’ bespeaks the supposedly depoliticised and multifaceted nature 
of the challenge: it is both ‘complex’—hence a difficult issue without ready political 
solutions—and an ‘emergency’, thus fundamentally humanitarian in nature. As one 
scholar notes, ‘[t]he widespread use of the term in describing conflicts may be due to 
the way it diverts attention from any possible political connotations, blaming instead 
the ‘complexity’ of the causal picture, and excuses the absence of solutions’ 24
Fourth, the rules of the game—from the Cold War to the 1990s—appeared to 
have changed. The Cold War seemed to be an era in which the state was in control, 
and during which Realism was ascendant in international diplomacy. In the 1990s, 
the state appeared to have lost control to multiple other actors that were performing 
tasks that states have traditionally seen as their own purview—like defence—or to 
more idealistic or utopian ideologies that seek to supplant the state itself, such as 
Islamic fundamentalism, or political Islam.25 Indeed, throughout the 1990s the Cold
21 See, for example, Matthew J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters: US Army 
War College Quarterly (Vol. 34, Spring 2004), pp. 29-43.
22 For a discussion on the multiple ideologies in Muslim societies, see Akeel Bilgrami, ‘The Clash 
within Civilization’, Daedalus (Vol. 132, No. 3,2003).
23 For a discussion of redefining the idea of national security in the post-Cold War era, see Emma 
Rothchild, ‘What is Security?’, Daedalus (Vol. 124, No. 3,1995), or Ronald Steel, ‘A New Realism’, 
World Policy Journal (Vol. 14, No. 2,1997). Steel notes the emotional aspects of security, 
commenting, ‘[sjecurity is, after all, not a condition, but a feeling and a process. It is also an 
abstraction. We may feel secure and not be so, or be secure and not feel so. We are all vulnerable in 
ways we cannot imagine and cannot fully protect ourselves against. That is our human condition.’
24 Jenny Edkins, ‘Legality with a Vengeance: Famines and Humanitarian Relief in “Complex 
Emergencies’”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 3, 1996), p. 554, note 37.
25 A wide number of books and articles have appeared discussing the privatisation o f traditional 
defence structures and military capabilities. On the growing use of privatized armies Mid mercenaries,
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War’s secularism was steadily replaced in many parts of the world with a rise in 
religious fundamentalism that seriously questions many of the tenets of the state as
96we have known it. In the economic realm, past state controls on the economy—such 
as relatively closed trading regimes, strict controls on currency convertibility and 
financial flows, and foreign direct investment rules—also gave way to increasingly 
unfettered globalisation and the dislocations and uncertainties that it can create.
Finally, to the great chagrin of Atlanticists, the multilateral approach of 
America’s ‘wise men’—that the US should broadly define its self-interest and work 
through alliances and multilateral institutions to bring it about—was replaced with 
greater emphasis on unilateralism and ‘coalitions of the willing’ which have shunned 
multilateral interference. While to a significant extent the multilateral institutional 
structures of the West, such as NATO, have been preserved, they have altered 
sometimes uncomfortably to adapt to these post-Cold War changes.27
This move towards unilateralism has come with a rising asymmetry of power, 
or the inequalities in capabilities, between the US and other states in favour of an 
expansion of US power measured across various indicators such as economic growth 
or defence expenditure 28 Examining the top eight ‘big spenders’ on defence in 
the 1990s, the US not only ranked first, but outspent the next seven combined 29 This 
military asymmetry has continued and has become particularly marked after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), worldwide military spending in 2004 
was $975 billion, only six per cent less than the peak level of Cold War spending in 
1987. With an expenditure of over $455 billion in 2004, the US accounted for 47 per 
cent of total global spending on defence and outspent the next top 14 states
see Eugene B. Smith, ‘The New Condottieri and US Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its 
Implications’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly (Vol. 32, Winter 2002). On their role in 
Africa, see Jakkie Cilliers and Richard Cornwell, ‘Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in 
Africa’, African Security Review (Vol. 8, No. 2,1999). See also, David Shearer ‘Outsourcing War’, 
Foreign Policy (Fall 1998), pp. 68-81. For a discussion of the need for states to regulate these 
organisations, see Caroline Holmqvist, ‘Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation’, SIPRI 
Policy Paper No. 9 (January 2005). Available at http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/SIPRI_PolicyPaper9.pdf
26 Scholars at the University of Chicago’s Fundamentalism Project charted the rise of fundamentalist 
ideologies through the 1990s. See Marty E. Martin, ‘The Future of World Fundamentalism’, April 
1996 Report to the American Philosophical Society, published in the Proceedings o f the American 
Philosophical Society (Vol. 142, No. 3, September 1998).
27 For a discussion on how the end of the Cold War affected Western institutions, see for example, G. 
John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding o f Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 233-256.
28 Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 233.
29 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Globalization and American Power’, The National Interest (Spring 2000).
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combined.30 Not only has American defence spending risen, the United States has
 ^i
also increasingly succumbed to the siren song of unilateralism, and the Bush 
administration has adopted a policy some have dubbed ‘pre-emptive war’, which 
seeks to eliminate potential power rivals.32
This trend toward asymmetry leads some American observers to conclude 
optimistically that unipolarity will continue to provide a stable international system 
for the foreseeable future. Yet while American policymakers often regard growing 
asymmetry in the international system as a positive factor both for the United States 
and the world, others perceive the advance of American hegemony differently.34 As 
one British diplomat comments, ‘One reads about the world’s desire for American 
leadership only in the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American 
arrogance and unilateralism’.35 These combined factors led to a growing rift between 
the United States and the rest of the international community during the post-Cold 
War period which intensified after 2001, with public opinion in most states, 
particularly those with large Muslim populations, increasingly antipathetic to US 
goals and hostile to US global leadership. According to the Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, the percentage of Europeans and Muslims expressing 
favourable perceptions of America plummeted after the war in Iraq.36 Thus the 
stability of American unipolarity is questionable—the global unipolar moment may
30 Elisabeth Sk6ns, Wuyi Omitoogan, Catalina Perdomo, and Petter St&lenheim, ‘Chapter 8: Military 
Expenditure’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 307-381. Note that the figures cited here reference the totals on a 
market exchange rate (MER) basis, and not on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis.
31 For a critique of US unilateralism from a conservative multilateralist, see Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue 
Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure o f  Good Intentions (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2003). Other critics include the venerable Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Cost and Consequences 
o f American Empire (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2000), and The Sorrows o f  Empire: 
Militarism, Secrecy and the End o f the Republic (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2004).
32 For the official US government position, see ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America’, The White House (September 2002). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf 
For a critical look at the strategy, see Mark Gerard Mantho, ‘The Bush Doctrine: Origins, Evolution, 
Alternatives’, Project on Defense Alternatives (Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 2004). 
Available at http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/0404mantho.pdf
33 William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security (Vol. 24, No. 1, 
1999), pp. 5-41. For the opposite view, see Waltz, ‘Globalization and American Power’.
34 For a positive statement of how US power is a force for good in the international system, see for 
example, The Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, 
Forces and Resources for a New Century (September 2000). See http://newamericancentury.org/ 
RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf
35 Anonymous British diplomat quoted in Waltz, ‘Globalization and American Power’, p. 46.
36 The Pew Research Center for die People and the Press, A Year After the Iraq War: Mistrust o f  
America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists (16 March 2004). Available from 
http://people-press.org/reports/display .php3?ReportID=206
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be short-lived if the American ‘locomotive of progress’ steams ahead with dissent 
building up in the ‘caboose’.37
Overall, the post-Cold War world has been marked with unsettling changes 
and uncertainty not only in individual states but also in the structure of the 
international system itself. At the state level, weaker states face the perils of uneven 
democratisation, ethno-nationalist conflict, state fragmentation, and the dislocations 
of globalisation. At the structural level, all states face the uncertainties of a contested 
nascent international system in which bipolarity has ended but the longevity of its 
unipolar replacement is in doubt. Indeed, some US government scenario planners 
note that part of the future of uncertainty is what they call ‘the architecture issue’; that 
is, the future structure of international relations is yet to be determined.38
These perceptions can be summarised and contrasted as follows:
Table 2.1: Summary of Common Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Order
Cold War ‘Order’ 
(1945-1988)
Post-Cold War ‘Disorder’ 
(1989-1999)
Political and ideological 
framework
Stable:
bipolar confrontation 
between democracy/ 
capitalism vs. communism
Unstable:
no single overarching 
framework
Dividing lines Clear.
divided Europe, and proxy 
wars in Third World
Unclear.
areas of cooperation and 
conflict not demarcated
Perceived threats Certain:
Soviet expansionism and 
nuclear war
Uncertain:
identity-based conflicts 
environmental degradation, 
migration surges, WMD, 
terrorism
Rules The state in control: 
realism, secularism, 
fixed trading regimes, 
US-led multilateralism
The state in retreat: 
idealism/utopianism, 
religious fundamentalism, 
globalisation, increasing 
unilateralism
These transformations of the post-Cold War age have signalled a shift in tone, 
atmosphere, or feeling among publics, policymakers, and academics from one of 
optimism about the possibility of progress and a sense of control over the future
37 McGeorge Bundy once called America ‘the locomotive at the head of mankind, and the rest o f the 
world the caboose’. Quoted in Waltz, ‘Globalization and American Power’, p. 46.
38 Comment dining a discussion at Chatham House in 2005.
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towards a deflated sense of the possibilities for the future and a sense of 
powerlessness over events, and hence greater receptivity toward Romantic messages, 
modes of thinking, and analyses.
If the Cold War’s mantra of progress through rationalism has rung hollow, 
then what has come in its place? We will argue that various strands of Romanticism 
have filled the vacuum since the 1990s, most broodingly declinist in outlook. While 
they share no particular ideology and may be propounded by conservatives and 
progressives alike, they do share similarities in sensibilite in the French sense—a 
sensitiveness, receptivity, or sympathy—to certain ideas and a penchant for similar 
themes. Perhaps most importantly, they often share a sense of philosophical 
pessimism and declinism. We will analyse these themes through the same five 
categories used to discuss nineteenth-century Romanticism—irrationality, pessimism, 
relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—and with the same caveats: first, that these 
ideas are impressionistic, and second, that they are interrelated and any categorisation 
is therefore somewhat arbitrary.
2.2 Armour of God—Anti-rationalism and emotionalism
‘Put on the whole armour o f God, that ye may be able to stand against 
the wiles o f the devil. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but 
against principalities, against powers, against the rulers o f the 
darkness o f this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places. ’
—Ephesians, 6:11-1239
If rationalism’s cold-eyed calculus dominated the Cold War era, then the Romantic 
logic of the heart—emotion, irrationality, and spirituality—arguably captured the 
mood of the 1990s. As with nineteenth-century Romanticism, multiple strands of 
anti-rational thought came to the forefront during the 1990s, some of which continue 
to have resonance. Perhaps the most important populist refutation of rationalism has 
been the role of religion in politics, particularly in the apocalyptic or fatalistic 
interpretations of various faiths. Among scholars, dissent from rationalism included a 
mounting rejection of logical positivism—including a turn against science and the 
application of scientific methods—in favour of relativistic standpoints emphasising 
cultural or particularistic interpretations of agents and events.
39 New Testament, King James Version.
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From a populist standpoint, during the 1990s more of the world’s faithful put 
on the armour of God. The growing role of religion, especially emotionally-driven 
‘fundamentalist’ and apocalyptic interpretations of religion, in politics was one 
Romantic sign of the times that continues. In fact, one important trend for this century 
may be the rise in new religious movements around the world, particularly new 
Christian movements, which bode to become a significant social and political force 
this century.40 However, the most obvious case in point has been the growth of 
political Islam, in politics around the world, not only as a factor in the domestic 
politics of predominantly Muslim countries, but also in international relations. While 
political Islam emerged as an important political actor before the end of the Cold 
War, the growth of the al-Qaeda network and the increasing number of assaults on 
Western targets, particularly the September 11 attacks on the United States, 
concentrated popular and scholarly attention on Islamism. Indeed, a vast literature 
dissecting the origins, goals, and methods of political Islam, and its emphasis on 
martyrdom and jihad as emblems of faith, exists that need not be repeated here 41 
While aspects of fundamentalist Islam could be said to have an apocalyptic vision at 
their core that motivates political action,42 what is perhaps less discussed is the 
political role of other fundamentalisms—in Hinduism, Judaism, or Christianity— 
particularly in international relations.
As Karen Armstrong argues, all fundamentalisms share certain similarities; 
fundamentalists of all stripes are often those who have been disappointed in life and 
are looking for a spiritual refuge and hope for the future in a world that seems 
confusing and uncertain. In essence, fundamentalists are seeking a ‘new redemptive 
order’ where only their virtue can reverse what they see as social decline in order to 
usher in a new Golden Age.43 Despite their utopian sensibilities, fundamentalist 
ideologies can have a violent or apocalyptic undercurrent, seething with rage about
40 Toby Lester, ‘Oh, Gods!’ The Atlantic Monthly (Vol. 289, No. 2, 2002), pp. 37-45.
41 See, for example, Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
42 See David Cook, ‘The Beginnings of Islam as an Apocalyptic Movement’, Journal of Millennial Studies 
(Vol. 1, No. 1,2001). Available at http://www.mille.org/publications/winter2001/cook.html Historian 
Richard Landes has discussed the rise of both Islamic and Christian apocalyptic thinking and its ties to anti­
semitism. See Manfred Gerstenfeld, ‘Jihad, Apocalypse, and Anti-Semitism: An Interview with Richard 
Landes’, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (1 September 2004). Available at 
http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-24.htm
43 Arthur Herman, The Idea o f Decline in Western History (New York, NY: Free Press, 1997), pp. 8 
and 16.
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circumstances in which followers feel trapped.44 Such violent or millennialist 
thinking ‘has historically appealed especially to those who see their era as a time of 
crisis’.45 Specifically, ‘[m]illennialism is indicative of a desire for social and political 
reformation’ that is ‘inherently political because it arises from the perception of 
political evil—the abuse of power—which it seeks to remedy’ 46 Such thinking rests 
on a pessimistic sense that the world is in decline, a nostalgic sense of past society’s 
moral probity, and a spiritual sense that both God’s chastisement and His redemption 
are imminent47
The 1990s saw a resurgence in anti-rationalist thought in the US which 
continues today post 9/11. The US has been experiencing what Robert Fogel calls the 
‘Fourth Great Awakening’: a revival of conservative Christianity and a reassertion of 
political activism around several core cultural issues, such as abortion.48 The United 
States has periodically gone through various cycles of religious revivalism, including 
those during the Romantic age. These revivals often were outbursts of activism 
against what believers saw as the corruption of modem society and its slide into an 
irreversible decline; they focused not only on personal redemption and self­
purification, but also on creating a state of grace and social perfection on earth.49
Considering the predominant international role of the United States, the rise of 
political Christianity in international affairs is noteworthy. While evangelicals were 
politically active and effective in the US domestic sphere during Reagan era, their 
attention to international affairs grew during the 1990s.50 As one critic observes,
44 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000).
45 Paul S. Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modem American Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 23.
46 Amy Luebbers, ‘The Remnant Faithful: A Case Study of Contemporary Apocalyptic Catholicism’, 
Sociology of Religion (June 2001).
47 Ibid.
48 Robert William Fogel, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future o f Egalitarianism (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 16.
49 Fogel contends that the Great Awakenings went through various lifecycle phases, including religious 
revival, political ascendancy, and political challengers (decline) so they span significant time periods, 
with various Awakenings overlapping. First Great Awakening’s revival period was from 1730-1760, 
political ascendancy was from 1760-1790, with decline coming from 1790-1810. The Second Great 
Awakening saw revival from 1800-1840, an activist phase from 1840-1870, and decline from 1870- 
1920, etc. In a sense, Fogel argues that the US is in some ways in a permanent state of religious 
revival, activism, or decline. See Fogel, pp. 17-43.
50 President Bush’s (43) election victories have been ascribed to the effective mobilization of 
evangelical voters. On evangelicals and the Reagan administration, see for example, Matthew Dallek, 
The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). On the religious right and the role o f values-based 
politics, known colloquially as ‘God, guns, and gays’ in various US states, see for example, John
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‘America’s evangelicals have become the newest internationalists’ which ‘reflects] a 
broad new trend that is beginning to reshape American foreign policy’.51 Part of their 
influence lies in their numbers. In 1976, only 34 per cent of Americans described 
themselves as evangelical Christians; by the end of the 1990s the figure rose to 45 per 
cent, according to the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals at Wheaton 
College, Illinois.52
Most of these believers are pre-millennial dispensationalists; as one scholar 
notes, ‘[acceptance of pre[-]millennial thought is now a majority position in the 
thought of Southern Baptist ministers’. Pre-millennialists are biblical literalists who 
take a keen interest in international events as signs of biblical prophecy about the 
coming end of the world. The apocalyptic arguments of these believers are not new: 
there is a history of prophetic discourses throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, beginning with the Millerite sect during the Romantic age in the US.54 The 
influence of these beliefs in the US has waxed and waned. As Wheaton College’s 
Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals notes, ‘The doctrine [of 
dispensationalism] has experienced fluctuations in its popularity over the years, often 
coinciding with times of national and international crisis,’ with numbers rising in 
turbulent periods in the United States.55
Many of these politically-minded evangelicals have shared a Romantic vision 
which sees the world as a battle for transcendence, a moral and religious crusade 
against the infidels abroad and the heretics at home. Much of their fatalism has come 
from observing the American scene, with social problems pessimistically interpreted 
in Victorian terms as character failings. Thus, dispensationalists tend to see a country 
prophetically caught in deep moral decline. To support this pessimistic view of 
America, evangelicals offer a variety of ‘scary numbers’ that convey a sense of moral 
panic about the state of American society, including out-of-control divorce rates,
Green, Mark Rozell, and William Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Christian Right in American Politics: 
Marching to the Millennium (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003).
51 Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Following God Abroad’, The New York Times (21 May 2002).
52 Michelle Goldberg, ‘Antichrist Politics’, Salon.com (24 May 2002). Available at 
http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/05/24/dispensational/index_np.html
53 William A. Pitts, ‘Southern Baptists and Millennialism, 1900-2000: Conceptual Patterns and 
Historical Expressions’, Baptist History and Heritage (Spring 1999). The Southern Baptist Convention 
is the single largest and most influential Protestant sect in the US.
54 Stephen D. O’Leary, Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory o f  Millennial Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998).
55 Wheaton College, Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals, ‘Defining Evangelicalism’. 
Available at http://www.wheaton.edu/isae/defining evangelicalism.html
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rising abortions, and the growing societal acceptance of homosexuality.56 However, 
evangelicals also expand this pessimistic vision to include world events as fulfilment 
of an apocalyptic prophecy found in the book of Revelation. Such signs include: 
increasing tensions in the Middle East; the removal of Saddam Hussein as a way to 
rebuild Babylon; developing power struggles in the EU, that will eventually spawn 
the Antichrist; the growing apostasy of the Christian church; and faltering democracy 
in Russia.57 For evangelicals, a worsening international situation and devastating war, 
particularly in the Middle East, is not only inevitable, it is indispensable to bring 
about biblical prophecy.58
However, even among non-evangelicals, the rubric of spiritual, moral, and 
social malaise in America was particularly acute in the 1990s and continues this 
decade. As one scholar notes, ‘[prestigious academics, popular magazines, and 
plenty of politicians all converged on moral decay’ as an important theme in the 
1990s, especially after the 1994 elections installed new conservative majorities to the 
US Congress and most US state legislatures. This return to Victorian moral messages 
‘rewrote American public policy in one area after another’.59 These messages, often 
with a doomsday undercurrent, have continued to be promoted in the 2000s.
Part of the American post-Cold War Zeitgeist has been defined by the 
popularity of various media expounding these apocalyptic visions, with an explosion 
of books published in this genre in the US.60 Particularly influential has been the 
dispensationalist Left Behind series which has included 12 books, each of which has 
been a bestseller. The series collectively sold over 60 million copies and boasts to be
56 For example, Focus on the Family, a prominent Christian organisation, produces and disseminates a 
significant amount of information on these themes. See http:Avww.focusonthefamily.org However, 
some of the data underpinning these ‘signs’ are open to competing interpretations. For a discussion on 
‘scary numbers’ and how they are used in social debates, see Joel Best, More Damned Lies and 
Statistics: How Numbers Confuse Public Issues (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 
pp. 63-90.
57 These are some of the signs as outlined by the works of Tim LaHaye. His newsletter, ‘Pre-Trib 
Perspectives’ offers a monthly commentary on prophetic signs of the ‘end times’.
58 One influential voice in propounding this view since the 1980s has been Hal Lindsey. For a 
discussion of his rhetoric, and its application to US politics and international affairs, see O’Leary, 
Arguing the Apocalypse.
59 James A. Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics o f Sin in American History (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2003), pp. 454-455.
60 For a detailed discussion of the wide variety of pre-millennialist fiction that has appeared in the US 
in the 1990s, see Thomas Doyle, ‘Competing Fictions: The Uses of Christian Apocalyptic Imagery in 
Popular Fiction Works’, Journal o f Millennial Studies (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001). There has also been 
growth in anti-apocalyptic religious fiction as well, see Thomas Doyle, ‘Anti-Apocalyptic Fictions’, 
Journal o f Millennial Studies (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2001).
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the ‘fastest selling adult fiction ever.’61 The books form part of a media empire 
extolling the fatalistic ‘end times’ message. This message is also promoted through 
movies, videos, CDs, audio books, discussion guides, a children’s series, graphic 
novels (comic books), calendars, cards, a prophecy club with regular e-mails, text 
messages, and a weekly newsletter—‘Interpreting the Signs’—which outlines how 
current global political events follow biblical prophecies
Regardless of their specific beliefs in dispensationalism and the coming 
apocalypse, American Christian leaders such as Gary Bauer also have underscored 
that evangelical Christians perceive the international scene pessimistically and 
fatalistically as a ‘clash of civilisations’.62 In this vision the Islamic world is directly 
opposed to God and will be defeated by the armies allied with God, namely Christian 
and American armies. This alignment between an evangelical Christian God and 
country at the highest reaches of the American military establishment is not new; 
evangelicals have comprised a significant proportion of military personnel for 
decades.63 However, recently personnel, such as recruits at elite military institutions, 
have come under intensified pressure to convert to evangelical Christianity.64
Beyond the evangelicals’ millennialist message, a variety of religiously- 
themed, anti-rationalist, and emotionalist works overall had great popular appeal in 
the 1990s. Indeed, the US-based Media Research Center found that religious 
depictions on American television increased by fivefold from 1993 to 1997.65 This 
trend seems to continue into this century. In terms of religiously-themed books, for 
example, the widely-decried The Da Vinci Code-which Christians denounce as 
blasphemous for questioning the divinity of Christ—spent 54 weeks on the US 
bestseller’s list.66 The mainstream secularist Penguin Putnam publishing house
61 See http://www.leftbehind.com for the series’ promotional material.
62 Michelle Goldberg, ‘Fundamentally Unsound’, Salon.com (29 July 2002). Available at 
http://www.salon.com/books/feature/2002/07/29/left_behind/print.html
63 On the growth of evangelicals in the US military, see, for example, Anne C. Loveland, American 
Evangelicals and the U.S. Military 1942-1993 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press,
1997).
64 Robert Weller, ‘Air Force Academy Accused of Favoring Christians: Pentagon Launches 
Investigation into Charges of Religious Bias’, Associated Press (4 May 2005), and Laurie Goodstein, 
‘Air Force Chaplain Tells of Academy Proselytizing’, New York Times (12 May 2005).
65 Wendy Kaminer, Sleeping with Extra-Terrestrials: The Rise o f Irrationalism and the Perils o f Piety 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2000), p. 25.
66 Richard N. Ostling, ‘Left Behind and The Da Vinci Code: Facts Conveyed through Fiction, or 
Fictional Facts?’, Associated Press (15 April 2004).
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f n
created its own religious fiction series based on the popular Left Behind model. 
Finally, The Passion o f the Christ became the eighth bestselling movie in history; it 
made over $355 million in the United States in a few weeks and broke records 
worldwide.68
While the growth of anti-rationalism was obvious in popular culture in the 
1990s, among scholars the post-Cold War rebellion against rationalism was more 
subtle, but nevertheless marked. The scholarly rejection of rationalism included a 
greater examination of irrational and relativistic or subjective factors, such as 
identity—religion, culture, or ethnicity—as the locus for group loyalty and as prime 
motivating factors for human action. The anti-rational strain of argumentation that 
gained ground in the 1990s has an intellectual pedigree that pre-dates the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. However, the turn against rationalism in international relations gathered 
momentum in a variety of forms: feminism, environmentalism, and Postmodernism 
or poststructuralism (among others), all which offered an anti-rational (some also an 
anti-foundational) intellectual critique of international relations.69
Of these, Postmodernism offers perhaps the most trenchant anti-rational, anti- 
foundational critique which rejects science and logical positivism, and instead 
pronounces the centrality of language and power in the modem world. As such, 
Postmodernism’s spiritual father may be Friedrich Nietzsche, whose late Romantic 
works proclaim the death of God. Postmodernism may be godless, but it is arguably 
founded on a greater sense of the irrational than is present even in religious faiths, 
which all claim that there is an underlying reality, truth, and logic in their 
worldviews. Postmodernists deny that there is an objective reality that is measurable 
and understandable through a scientific or logical method by scholars who merely 
interpret and analyse data, or any ‘empirical methodology, Cartesian subjectivity or
67 Gayle White, ‘The world’s demise gets lots of ink—and debate’, The Atlanta Joumal-Constitution 
(17 May 2003).
68 Associated Press, ‘Passion Back at Top of US Box Office’ (13 April 2004).
69 On feminism and IR, see for example, Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making 
Feminist Sense o f International Politics (University of California Press, 1989), or J. Ann Tickner, 
Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1992). A wide variety of works have been published on 
Postmodernist IR. See for example, David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy 
and the Politics o f Identity (Manchester: University o f Manchester Press, 1998); Cynthia Weber, 
Simulating Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); or R.B.J. Walker, 
Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).
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H(\[...] perfection of language’. For Postmodernists, the subject of the knower cannot 
be disconnected from the object of his knowledge; apart from individual experience 
the world is unknowable. Since scholars approach their subjects within particular 
standpoints, they engage in an interpretive interaction with the data and the text to 
reproduce, simulate, mediate, or generate social power structures. Thus knowledge is 
relative, the construct of specific human experience which exists in a particular 
context.71
Knowledge is also plural rather than unitary, and contingent rather than 
absolute, the product of subjectivity. Therefore, Postmodernists are sceptical about 
the claims of scholars to ‘truth’ since we cannot ‘verify an existence or truth 
independent of its representation’. They reject philosophical realism’s emphasis on 
parsimony, conceptual rigor, and clarity, sometimes dismissing them as ‘a 
particularistic sign system posing as a universal discourse’. Postmodernism also 
scorns meta-narratives—worldviews which reflect a variety of inter-connected 
assumptions—and the possibility of logical coherence within such narratives. Finally, 
since knowledge of human experience is conveyed through the form of imperfect 
language, deconstructing language and exposing its relationship to power is 
paramount.72
Many Postmodernist international relations works ‘celebrate’ subjectivity or 
performativity—the simulation, impersonation, or articulation of ‘realness’ or 
authenticity which is actually artificially constructed, or a performance of what ‘is’— 
concepts which can be applied to individuals, groups, and states. Such frameworks 
are based on an anti-rational, or perhaps post-rational, conception of the self and 
sometimes borrow ideas from gender theory or from broadly psychoanalytic 
approaches in philosophy and the social sciences. For example, academics such as 
Cynthia Weber have examined how the concept of sovereignty is performative and 
gendered, an artificial simulation of various acts that scholars and policymakers
70 Steven Ward, ‘Being Objective about Objectivity: The Ironies of Standpoint Epistemological 
Critiques of Science’, Sociology (November 1997). For a critique of how Postmodernists use science in 
their arguments, see Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern 
Philosophers’ Abuse o f Science (London: Profile Books, 1998).
71 James Der Derian, ‘3 Post-Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations’, in New 
Thinking in International Relations Theory, eds. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 57.
72 This discussion and quotes from Der Derian, ‘Post-Theory’, pp. 58 and 59.
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recognise as ‘sovereignty’,73 while others have explored the construction of humans 
rights discourses and subjectivity from Kristeva’s psychoanalytic perspective.74 Still 
others have examined aesthetic approaches to politics and international relations, 
including the importance of art, images, and narratives to constructions and 
representations of ‘the political’.75
After the end of the Cold War, increased academic attention to sentiment also 
extended to considerations of past historical events where sites of ‘memory’ and 
‘remembering’, rather than documents or other forms of evidence, become the focus 
of knowledge. The result is that Freudian or psychoanalytic understandings inform 
historical debate, with the relativistic view that one set of memories or one way of 
remembering is as valid as another. Without an objective or universalist concept of 
reality, sifting out the ‘truth’ about past events—the historian’s traditional role—is 
not possible; instead it is a process where history is what is remembered, felt, or 
believed, a contemplation of scattered and perhaps irreconcilable individual 
reflections. In this sense, Postmodernist ‘truth’ is spiritual, a revealed corpus of 
sacred knowledge that cannot be externally validated apart from the individual. 
Before the Enlightenment and during the period of nineteenth-century Romanticism, 
this sacred knowledge often came in the form of biblical revelation. For today’s 
Romantics, it resides in the holy temple of the ‘group’ or ‘self, whose individual or 
particularistic ‘truths’ cannot be externally challenged as they reside within the 
identity of the individual or group.
73 Cynthia Weber, ‘Performative States’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 27, No. 1,
1998), pp. 77-95. See also Costas Constantinou, ‘Before the Summit: Representations of Sovereignty 
on the Himalayas’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1998), pp. 23-53.
74 Simon Chesterman, ‘Human Rights as Subjectivity: The Age o f Rights and the Politics of Culture’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1998), pp. 97-118.
75 Millennium devoted an entire special issue to this subject. See ‘Images and Narratives in World 
Politics’, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 30, No. 3,2001).
76 For a critique of Postmodernism’s effect on the field of history, see Richard J. Evans, In Defence o f  
History (London: Granta, 1997).
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2.3 Valediction in the Air?—Pessimism and ennui
‘We have no more beginnings [....] [T]he contracts with time which so 
largely determine our consciousness point to late afternoon [....] We 
are, or feel ourselves to be, latecomers. The dishes are being cleared 
[....] Valediction is in the air. ’
—George Steiner77
With a dejected sense of loss, the 1990s felt ‘latebom’, valedictory. Just as pessimism 
and declinism were defining features of nineteenth-century Romanticism, they have 
characterised Postmodern Romanticism. While a tragic sense of history is at least as 
old as Thucydides, melancholic laments about the ‘death of progress’ have echoed in 
the popular culture and the scholarly community. Two widespread strands of 
pessimism in the mass culture have been the growth of fatalistic conspiracy theories 
as an explanation for international political events and the apocalyptic focus on 
impending global biological and ecological disasters popularised through the media.
In academe, various aspects of pessimism about the future of international relations 
have permeated the ivory tower: ‘coming anarchy’ theory, ‘clash of civilisations’ 
theory, and neo-medievalism.
Conspiracy theories have been part of American and European political 
culture since at least the eighteenth century.78 Fears of the Illuminati swept the United 
States after the time of the French Revolution, Masonic and Catholic plots were 
feared in the aftermath of the US Civil War, Jewish bankers were reviled by the 
Populist movement at the turn of the century, and anti-communist paranoia was rife in 
the 1950s and 1960s.79 These waves of paranoia in the West are hardly culturally 
unique; the predominant belief in conspiracy theories among societies in the Middle
on
East is also well documented. Considering this historical legacy of paranoia during 
various periods of uncertainty, it is useful to ask how a ‘culture of conspiracy’ could 
be seen as part of a new form of Romanticism. While belief in conspiracy theories 
could be said to be a marginal phenomenon, especially among serious scholars, it
77 From George Steiner, Grammars o f Creation (2001) quoted in Richard John Neuhaus, ‘The End of 
Endings’, First Things: The Journal o f Religion and Public Life (August/September 2001), pp. 47-56.
78 Comment by Robert Alan Goldberg, quoted in Johann Hari, ‘Who Really Downed the Twin 
Towers? Was 11 September Actually the Work of the CIA? Why Is No Plane Visible on Photos Taken 
Seconds before the Pentagon Was Hit? Johann Hari Reports on the Vogue for Conspiracy Theories’, 
New Statesman (22 April 2002).
79 James Surowiecki, ‘When Armageddon Looms,’ The Atlantic Monthly (30 April 1997).
80 Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears o f  Conspiracy (London: St. Martin’s Press,
1998).
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nevertheless increased as a mass explanatory model for politics generally and for 
international events more specifically, particularly after 9/11. In the wake of the 
attacks, international polls found that globally a large number of people believe in
Q 1
conspiracy theories to explain world events. The proof of conspiracy’s mass 
popularity shows in its balance sheet. Consumer thirst for this paranoid mode of 
thinking makes the ‘industry’ worth billions—conspiracy books, films, tabloid 
programmes, television shows, computer games, and the internet tout to an eager 
international audience.82
Conspiracy theorists have much in common with anti-rationalists, as the 
theories are based on an emotional faith imbued with pessimism: ‘[a] conspiracy 
theory [...] offers solace, an explanation that confirms an existing worldview. As 
thought, it’s pre-rational, arising not from fact but from belief. It’s about faith.’83 
Conspiracy fears rest on a search for certainty and determinism; those who feel 
powerless can find themselves in control, replacing the general ambiguity that most 
people face with a complete sense of clarity and purpose.84 Psychologist Patrick 
Leman has documented the trend in the United States, noting ‘people [in America] 
are becoming more likely to believe in conspiracy theories’; he surmises that this 
trend is also mirrored in Europe. Leman attributes the phenomenon to anomie, ‘the 
fact that people are experiencing increasing dissociation from society [.... and]
or
feeling increasingly powerless and divorced from the institutions that have power.’ 
Powerlessness begets paranoia and fatalism. Robert Alan Goldberg echoes this 
sentiment, associating the increase in conspiracy theories with the growing fatalistic 
sense among fundamentalist Christians that the ‘end times’ are upon us.86
The apocalyptic visions of catastrophes and plagues leading to worldwide 
chaos are two popular post-Cold War themes which continue to attract an eager mass 
audience. According to scholars Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, ‘The modem era is 
often cast as an age of catastrophe, of global conflicts, genocides and “ethnic 
cleansings”, disasters of industrial and agrarian change and of technological hubris,
81 Hari, ‘Who Really Downed the Twin Towers?’
82 Sam Vaknin, ‘The Economics of Conspiracy Theories’, United Press International (10 April 2002).
83 Rich Cohen, ‘Welcome to the Conspiracy’, Vanity Fair (May 2004), p. 80.
84 Surowiecki.
85 ‘It’s all a conspiracy, isn’t it?’, Western Mail (14 March 2003).
86 Robert Alan Goldberg, Enemies Within: The Culture o f Conspiracy in Modem America (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
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87and—increasingly—environmental cataclysms.’ Public fascination with diseases, 
plagues, and epidemics is not new but the number of articles, books, films, and news 
reports discussing these subjects reached new heights in the post-Cold War era. The 
accumulated effect is one of resigned pessimism or fatalism, as these disasters are 
acts of God—unpredictable and unstoppable by something as puny and insignificant 
as human action.
The fascination with the ability of disease to corrupt the body matches a 
millennial mood: doomsday scenarios often begin with plague and pestilence, both a
form of ‘apocalyptic purification [.. .that is a] technique of separating the damned
88from the saved’ which become ‘a metaphor for genocide’. The theme of disease as a
transformer of human life and civilisation is not new; historian William McNeill
famously outlined the role of disease exchanges in shaping history—the impact of
smallpox on the Amerindian population during the Spanish conquest, or the role of
80the Mongol invasions in spreading the Black Death in Europe. However, in the 
post-Cold War era, Pestilence—as one of the biblical Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse—has particular prophetic resonance for the chiliastically inclined. And 
pestilence there has been: AIDS, SARS, ebola, anthrax, smallpox, MRSA, the growth 
of dengue fever and malaria in the Third World, and the latest plague—avian flu. 
Considering disturbing trends in animal plagues, such as foot-and-mouth disease, the 
alarm grows further. All of these have received widespread media coverage in the 
post-Cold War period. The amount of literature targeted to a mass audience on the 
developing AIDS pandemic alone is vast. This is not to say that a serious concern 
about AIDS, and other possible biological threats, is unwarranted. However, such 
popularised forms of scientific knowledge about developing biological threats often 
lack subtlety, so the underlying message sent to the public is a gloomy one: science 
(and human rationality) may be no match for vengeful, irrational nature.
Attention to planetary calamities was also at new highs in the 1990s and the 
trend continues. Cataclysmic natural disasters, man-made environmental catastrophes 
like global warming, planetary-level extinctions by asteroid hits with end-of-the- 
world visions, or politically-created nuclear disasters have been in vogue. In 
particular, many Christian biblical literalists see these events—such as the 2004
87 Peter Gray and Kendrick Oliver, ‘The Memory of Catastrophe’, History Today (February 2001).
88 Elana Gomel, ‘The Plague of Utopias: Pestilence and the Apocalyptic Body’, Twentieth Century 
Literature (Winter 2000).
89 William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976).
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tsunami in the Indian Ocean—as prophetic. For secularists, books such as David 
Keys’ Catastrophe: An Investigation into the Origins o f Modem Civilization 
(1999)—which chronicles the role of plagues, climate changes, and volcanic 
eruptions on civilisation—dissect the frightening impact that natural disasters have 
had on societies. Others in a similar vein include: Brian Fagan’s Floods, Famines and 
Emperors: El Nino and the Fate o f Civilizations (1999); Mike Davis’, Late Victorian 
Holocausts: El Nino, Famine, and the Making o f the Third World (2001); or Richard 
B. Alley’s The Two-Mile Time Machine: Ice Cores, Abrupt Climate Change, and Our 
Future (2000), to name a few. While these works may be based on scientific 
evidence, the barrage of bad news fits in with a sense of pessimism and decline. The 
gloomy implication is that the past may be prologue, and sooner than we think.
Additionally, after years of languishing as B-movie also-rans, major-release 
disaster films made a comeback in the 1990s. According to ‘Disaster Online’, an 
internet almanac of disaster films, the number of disaster films produced in the US 
peaked in the 1990s with almost as many films screened in the 1990s as in the two 
previous decades combined.90 Unlike 1970s disaster films, which focused on single, 
containable calamities, such as a skyscraper on fire (The Towering Inferno) or a tidal 
wave striking a luxury liner (The Poseidon Adventure), 1990s disaster films often 
follow themes of planetary-level catastrophe, like asteroid strikes and other 
‘extinction-level’ events, such as the devastating effects of rapid and sudden global 
warming. The apex of the disaster phenomenon was in 1998, when 21 disaster movies 
were released. Hollywood produced more disaster films in that year than during the 
1960s.91 Post-9/11, 53 such films have been released. Trends in such films may 
follow popular feelings of pessimism and insecurity.92
In academia, post-Cold War pessimism in international relations is a many­
headed hydra. To explain the range of conflicts brewing worldwide—pictures of 
which were beamed live daily into Western homes via satellite thanks to the global 
communications revolution—many scholars reached into their Realist analytical 
toolboxes and came out empty. Ideologically-laden Cold War rationalist paradigms 
no longer seemed adequate to explain the course of international events in a brave
90 There were 83 American disaster films produced in the 1990s, while 88 were produced from 1970- 
1989. Available at http://www.disasteronline.com/Articles/swarm.html.
91 Eighteen films were released from 1960-1969.
92 For an overview of disaster films in culture, see Stephen Keane, Disaster Movies: The Cinema o f  
Catastrophe (London and New York, NY: Wallflower Press, 2001).
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new world filled with such seething, perplexing identity conflicts. Instead, pessimistic 
theories about an anarchical future filled the void where Realism seemed to fail.
Dubbed ‘chaos theory’ by Yahya Sadowski, these theories gained ground on 
the basis of a depressing reality—the outbreak of brutal new conflicts in Africa and in
Q 'y
the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The war in Bosnia had a particularly 
important role in undermining Western, and especially American, confidence about 
the post-Cold War future. While conflicts in the former Soviet Union, Rwanda, and 
Somalia dimmed the US public mood, ‘the war in Bosnia in particular worked to 
reshape the national mood in America (and elsewhere) into one of pessimism’.94 
These theories are particularly important since they have been widely disseminated 
by American scholars and pundits since the end of the Cold War.95 In particular the 
metaphors and historical analogies that these theories have created have been 
especially influential in framing policymakers’ visions and responses to Cold War 
challenges.96
Chaos theories share a declinist thesis about cultural and political decay, 
coupled with a pessimistic outlook for the future. They are a related set of pessimistic, 
Romantic theories (although Sadowski does not describe them as such) which see 
widespread anomie and globalisation as main factors in spreading future anarchy, 
fragmentation, and conflict across the globe.97 Sadowski underscores that chaos 
theorists trounce Fukuyama’s optimistic ‘end of history’ argument with three 
confounding points: 1) democratisation can be a trap, leading to libertinism (rather 
than merely liberalism) and conflict as new groups make demands on a weak state; 2) 
cultural anomie can set in as Americanisation, global homogenisation, or other forms 
of ‘McWorld’ vulgarise indigenous cultures and set up a wave of resistance, and; 3) 
globalisation and the economics of political chaos, such as mass migration and 
urbanisation, promote greater resource competition and ‘instrumental solidarities’ 
between ethnic groups that lead to violence.98
93 Yahya Sadowski, The Myth o f Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998).
94 Ibid.
95 Sadowski, p. 5.
96 For a discussion on the importance that metaphors and analogies have in foreign policymaking, see 
Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions o f  
1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
97 Sadowski.
9% Ibid., pp. 31-44.
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The first of these theories is ‘the coming anarchy’, named after the title of a 
book by Robert Kaplan which secured his position as a postmodern Jeremiah. 
Kaplan’s work places emphasis on the fragmentation side of the globalisation- 
fragmentation debate; he is most concerned with the ‘externalities’ of globalisation, 
namely the strife and conflict that accompany economic dislocation. As a travel 
writer-cwm-political theorist, or as one wag put it ‘part Arnold Toynbee and part 
Robert Pelton’,99 Kaplan has traversed the world’s post-Cold War conflict hotspots— 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia, and Central Asia—not looking to create mere 
reportage, but to elaborate upon his core thesis: that the problems of weak states in 
the developing world are a mere precursor to the larger global anarchy to come.100
Kaplan’s work is generally fatalistic in tone, and can be described as ‘tragic 
realism’; that is, politics is essentially about tragedy.101 For Kaplan, conflict is 
inevitable, a part and parcel of the centrifugal forces pulling states and regions apart 
under the onslaught of globalisation. Kaplan crafts his thesis largely through visual 
impressions of a particular place and conversations with locals in true travelogue 
style, leaving no stone unturned in his pursuit to capture the Third World’s misery, all 
of it coming soon to a state near you. However, his fixation with visual aesthetics 
slides into a Romantic, quasi-Victorian philosophical elision between aesthetics and 
ethics, where wealthy, physically attractive Westerners in tidy homes become 
paragons of modem political virtue, while the world’s scraggly poor share a barbaric 
spirit. As one critic chides, ‘Put bluntly, Kaplan doesn’t like poor people’.102 In 
coming to his pessimistic conclusions Kaplan quotes extensively from a rich, historic 
panoply of conservative thinkers —Malthus, Huntington, van Creveld, Hobbes, and 
Kissinger, just to name a few—whose views on the perfectibility of human nature, the 
existence of justice, or merely the possibility of progress ranges from the simply glum
1 mto the downright desperate.
99 Pelton is the adventure journalist who writes for Fielding Guides’ World’s Most Dangerous Places. 
Parag Khanna, ‘Tragic realism: Robert D. Kaplan’s book may be out of print in Britain, but he is 
emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order’, New Statesman (25 
February 2002).
100 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams o f the Post Cold War (New York, 
NY: Vintage Books, 2001).
101 Khanna.
102 Jesse Walker, ‘Review of “An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America’s Future’”, Reason (April
1999).
103 Kaplan, Coming Anarchy, see pp. 9 (Malthus), 26-30 (Huntington), van Creveld (44-50), Gibbon 
(111-117), and Kissinger (127-155).
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For its supposed stabilising effects, Kaplan also waxes nostalgic over the 
benefits of empire as it keeps down the noisome nationalism of small ethnicities, 
quoting Rebecca West’s famous remark: ‘I hate the corpses of empires, they stink like 
nothing else.’104 More recently, Kaplan has written approvingly of empire in his 
attempt at creating a grand strategic vision for his philosophical pessimism in 
Warrior Politics}05 In this guidebook for would-be American praetorians, Kaplan 
emphasises the nostrum that those who forget history are bound to repeat its tragic 
mistakes, or at least remain in a perpetual state of delusion about the possibilities 
(generally grim) for the future. With another trip through philosophical pessimists 
down the ages—again Hobbes, Machiavelli, Malthus—Kaplan provides readers with 
a grand tour of laments and cautions about the dangers that lie in wait in international 
relations.
‘Clash of civilisations’ is another pessimistic international relations theory 
that sees so-called irrational and relativistic factors, such as cultural differences, as 
the primary motivator for future conflicts—the principal fault lines of 
fragmentation—which will come about through globalisation (or perhaps more 
accurately, through democratisation and Americanisation). Importantly, the theory 
argues that modernisation and economic development, including economic 
globalisation, along Western lines has not led to the acceptance of Western universal 
values; rather, these processes have created various patterns of rejection and 
revisionism that threaten both the stability of non-Westem states and set the stage for 
future clashes between civilisations.106
Originally developed by American scholar Samuel Huntington, clash of 
civilisations theory has sparked considerable controversy among scholars of 
international relations across the globe.107 Huntington’s work has had a significant 
impact outside the United States and English-speaking world, particularly with 
Japanese, Malaysian, Chinese, Russian, and Arab scholars, especially those who see 
Western influences as normatively bad and who desire to promote their own
104 Sadowski, p. 8.
105 Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York, NY: 
Vintage Books, 2002).
106 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order (London: 
Touchstone Books, 1998).
107 Huntington’s work has been translated into many languages and has generated responses across the 
globe. For a review of Chinese scholars’ responses to Huntington, see, Christopher Hughes, 
‘Globalisation and Nationalism: Squaring the Circle in Chinese International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 26, No. 2, 1997), pp. 103-124.
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particularistic ethnic or national values.108 Overall, the thrust of Huntington’s work is 
very pessimistic. His idea of the rise and decline of civilisation is mainly seen through 
the eyes of philosophical pessimists such as Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, and 
Fernand Braudel.109
Another strand of chaos theory is neo-medievalism. Struggling to understand 
the brave new world of post-Cold War phenomena without clear theoretical 
frameworks to fall back on, some experts mined history for explanations. Were the 
growing fragmentation, ethno-religious conflict, and warlordism in the world signals 
that we were on the cusp of a new Middle Ages? Did we need to look back in order to 
see the future?110 Some scholars wove these modem threads into an old historical 
analogy and thus was bom a popular strain of post-Cold War analysis—neo­
medievalism.111 Neo-medievalism stresses that the post-Cold War era represents a 
break with the immediate Cold War past on several different levels, such as locus of 
political control, security, loyalty, and state authority. Neo-medievalists focus on the 
effects that globalisation and fragmentation have on states, with special emphasis on 
the fragmentation process, arguing that ‘the process most characteristic of our age is 
political splintering, decentralization, even disintegration’.112 Neo-medievalists see 
globalisation as the motor for change, and developing technologies, particularly in 
communications, as a key method for fragmentation or ‘“decentering” or dispersal of
i  t o
authority to multiple and overlapping sites’.
Neo-medievalists analogise the new situation to the Middle Ages, and 
emphasise the revival of religion, loose identities, and fluid boundaries as the future 
for the post-Cold War world. While some authors clearly state that they are not 
making a direct comparison between the Middle Ages and our own era, and that the 
term is being used essentially as a trope, the method of comparison between the
108 Sadowski, p. 72.
109 Huntington, pp. 40-45.
110 John Mearsheimer was the first to use the phrase ‘Back to the Future’—in parody of a popular 
1980s movie—in his article of the same title, which argued that the future was much more bleak than 
the liberals suspected, and that the West would look back nostalgically at the bipolarity of the Cold 
War as a stable period. See John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War’, International Security (Vol. 15, No. 1,1990).
111 For example, see Alain Mine, Le nouveau Moyen Age (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1993).
112 Martin Van Creveld, ‘The New Middle Ages’, Foreign Policy (Summer 2000).
113 Ronald J. Deibert, Parchment, Printing and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order 
Transformation (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 206.
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Middle Ages is often seriously flawed.114 However, the unconscious imagery that the 
comparison between our era and the Middle Ages creates is nonetheless 
unmistakeable—a return to the horrors of a medieval past we thought we had left 
behind hundreds of years ago, only to be thrown into the abyss once again. The sense 
of tragedy and pessimism underlying this stream of thinking is palpable.
2.4 Cement of Blood—Relativism, nationalism, and identity
‘[AJrcadias, utopias, our dear old bag o f a /  democracy are alike 
founded: For without a cement o f blood (it must be human, it must be 
innocent) /  no secular wall will safely stand. ’
—W.H. Auden115
With universalist rationality having proved a cold and disappointing mistress, unable 
to predict the slide into conflict that succeeded the end of the Cold War, the Romantic 
‘cement of blood’—nation, religion, culture, identity—increasingly became the 
relativistic lens through which the Western public and academics analysed 
international events in the 1990s. Where once rational economics reigned supreme, 
irrational culture and ethnicity (or nationalism) were considered once more key 
variables motivating domestic and international political events. One key spark 
igniting the endless debates on identity and nationalism was the war in former 
Yugoslavia. As Anatol Lieven remarks, ‘Activated by the [Yugoslav] war, this debate 
on nationalism has spread far and fast beyond academic circles to become a central 
theme of the wider debate on the nature of our age and its future’.116
Anti-immigration and national unity parties—such as France’s National Front, 
Pirn Fortyun’s party in the Netherlands, or the British National Party—made inroads 
in the West. Domestic newspapers and magazines in the West resounded with articles 
ardently arguing issues of identity with titles such as the Observer’s ‘The English 
identity crisis; who do you think we are?’117 This decade, books such as Roger 
Scruton’s England: An Elegy (2001) or Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We? The 
Challenges to America's National Identity (2004) covered this type of ground, albeit
114 Stephen J. Kobrin, ‘Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World 
Economy’, Journal o f International Affairs (Vol. 51, No. 2, 1998).
115 W.H. Auden, ‘Vespers’, 484 (1954).
116 Anatol Lieven, ‘Qu’est-Ce Qu’une Nation? Scholarly Debate and the Realities of Eastern Europe’, 
The National Interest (Fall 1997), p. 10.
117 Amelia Hill, ‘The English identity crisis; who do you think we are?’, Observer (13 June 2004). 
Available at http://observer.guardian.co.Uk/focus/story/0,, 1237597,OO.html
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very differently. Indeed, ‘who are we?’ has encapsulated the plaintive refrain of an 
uncertain age. We will briefly consider two trends giving greater prominence to 
relativism, nationalism, and identity in the post-Cold War era, one popular and the 
other scholarly: populist nativism coupled with isolationism, and academic attention 
to considerations of culture and ethnicity, including nationalism.
A sense of isolationist nativism that puts a particular nation or polity first 
grew at the end of the Cold War, partly as a response to globalisation. In many 
countries, the concept of a core identity, core values, and the essential ‘nature’ of a 
particular society have been hotly contested. Immigration debates, particularly in 
Western countries, centre on this issue, especially due to the upturn in migration after 
the end of the Cold War. For example, the percentage of the foreign bom population 
in the United States doubled in 20 years, from just over 6 per cent of the population in 
1980 to about 14 per cent in 2000.118 In the US, this form of ‘backward-looking 
[Rjomanticism’119 has had a champion in Patrick Buchanan, one of the most stalwart 
advocates of promoting a fixed American national and cultural identity rooted in 
Judeo-Christian values.120 Buchanan’s alarmist visions of Third World immigration— 
as a form of demographic ‘swamping’ of the West—have found eager publics among 
those in the working class who are afraid of immigrants stealing their jobs and 
cultural pessimists who see a steady decline in the expression of specifically 
American values.
In addition to his views on cultural separatism—Buchanan’s theory seems to 
be that cultures should be separate but equal, shunning a vision of go-go American 
universalism—Buchanan proselytises against globalisation and the hollowing out of 
the American economy, which he believes undermines US sovereignty and imperils 
the standard of living of average working people.121 Interestingly, Buchanan’s list of 
global ‘baddies’ fits in with the usual suspects pummelled by evangelical Christians 
and conspiracy theorists: the United Nations, global bankers, global media, and
118 Data based on the latest US census taken in 2000. See Migration Policy Institute, ‘Size o f the 
Foreign Bom Population and Foreign Bom as a Percentage of the Total Population for the United 
States: 1850-2000’. Available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/charts/fmal.fb.shtml Data for other countries is also 
available.
119 Benjamin Schwartz, ‘The Tragedy of American Isolationism’, World Policy Journal (Vol. 13, No.
3,1996), p. 114.
120 Patrick J. Buchanan, The Death o f the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions 
Imperil Our Country and Civilization (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2002).
121 Patrick J. Buchanan, The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being 
Sacrificed to the Gods o f the Global Economy (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company, 1998).
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have become a core part of the social sciences across subject areas. For example, in 
Britain more new university courses on these subjects are being offered in 
departments, more new degrees—particularly at the postgraduate level—are being 
developed to incorporate these subjects into other fields of study, more textbooks are 
being written, and more new academic posts have been created in these subjects. At 
the British undergraduate level, cultural studies are being incorporated into the 
‘design, delivery, and contents of courses’ across the humanities and social 
sciences.124
Additionally, the 1990s saw at least a doubling, and in some subjects a larger 
increase, in the number of articles published on culture, ethnicity, identity, or 
nationalism as compared to the previous decade. These topics continue to be 
prominent post-2000. The chart below, based on results from the Social Sciences
122 On ‘Asian values’ see Surain Subramaniam, ‘The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread 
of Liberal Democracy’, Asian Affairs: An American Review (March 2000). On Slovenian panics over 
immigration, see Karmen Eijavec, ‘Media construction of identity through moral panics: discourses of 
immigration tn Slovenia’, Journal o f Ethnic and Migration Studies (January 2003).
123 Karl Fcpper, ‘The History of Our Time: an Ootimist’s Vies /’, World Affairs (Vol. 148, No. 3,
1985), p. 199.
124 Loredana Polezzi, ‘Cultural Studies in the United Kingdom’, Immaginare l’Europa (no date). 
Available at http://www.imageuro.net/network/Network/Eng/Topics/Curricula/Pollen.html
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international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Unfortunately, the 
list does contain a certain whiff of anti-Semitism as the terms ‘global media’ or 
‘global bankers’ are sometimes shorthand for ‘Jews’. Yet Buchanan is hardly alone in 
this view which has proven international purchase. ‘Enlightened nationalism’, as 
Buchanan terms it, coupled with certain isolationist tendencies has global takers. If 
the vision were a stock, it would be a ‘buy’. From Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad 
and his promotion of a unique vision of ‘Asian values’ to moral panics about 
immigrants in such small and homogeneous societies as Slovenia, the cocooning
199safety of cultural particularism has it own peculiar seductions.
Relativism’s seduction of intellectuals is hardly news. Indeed, Karl Popper 
once commented that relativism is an ‘understandable [result] of disappointment with
191dogmatism and authoritarianism’ . Throughout the Cold War, scholars examined a 
variety of topics through a relativistic lens, mainly in the fields of anthropology, area 
studies, women’s studies, or cultural studies, where issues such as race, gender, and 
ethnicity have been debated. However, since the end of the old War, cultural studies 
have become a core part of the social sciences across subject areas. For example, in 
Britain more new university courses on these subjects are being offered in 
departments, more new degrees—particularly at the postgraduate level—are being 
developed to incorporate these subjects into other fields of study, more textbooks are 
being written, and more new academic posts have been created in these subjects. At 
the British undergraduate level, cultural studies are being incorporated into the 
‘design, delivery, and contents of courses’ across the humanities and social 
sciences.124
Additionally, the 1990s saw at least a doubling* and iti some subjects a larger 
increase, in the number of articles published on culture, ethnicity, identity, or 
nationalism as compared to the previous decade. These topics continue to be 
prominent post-2000. The chart below, based on results from the Social Sciences
122 On ‘Asian values’ see Surain Subramaniam, ‘The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread 
of Liberal Democracy’, Asian Affairs: An American Review (March 2000). On Slovenian panics over 
immigration, see Karmen Eijavec, ‘Media construction of identity through moral panics: discourses of 
immigration in Slovenia’, Journal o f Ethnic and Migration Studies (January 2003).
123 Karl Popper, ‘The History of Our Time: an Optimist’s View’, World Affairs (Vol. 148, No. 3,
1985), p. 199.
124 Loredana Polezzi, ‘Cultural Studies in the United Kingdom’, Immaginare l’Europa (no date). 
Available at http://www.imageuro.net/network/Network/EngAropics/Curricula/Pollen.html
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Citation Index database, show the rise of these issues in journal articles across the 
social sciences from 1989-2005 compared to 1980-1988.125
Table 2.2 Growth of Cultural Topics in the Social Sciences, 1980-2005
Keywords searched Articles found 
1980-1988
Articles found 
1989-1999
Articles found 
2000-2005
Culture and identity 29 [3.2] 1,115 [101.4] 1,529 [254.8]
Ethnic or ethnicity 3,292 [365.8] 12,610 [1,146.4] 13,146 [2,191]
Nationalism 752 [85.6] 2,385 [216.8] 1,671 [278.5]
Religion and politics 280 [31.1] 633 [57.5] 380 [63.3]
‘Ethnic conflict’ 82 [9.1] 320 [29.1] 233 [38.3]
* number in brackets [] indicates average number of articles published per year
The effects of relativistic thought on interpretations of international relations 
have been varied. Perhaps one of the most important effects was the introduction of 
particular themes in international relations, such as: the return of culture as the main 
explanatory model with a focus on identity and identity politics; the role of ethics and
10f kaesthetics; and the place of nature and the environment. Indeed, in international 
relations the study of cultural and identity issues was marginalised during the Cold 
War. However, the 1990s saw cultural, ethnic, and nationalism studies soar to new 
heights to the point where reconsiderations of ethno-nationalism and related subjects 
became a major focus of study for many politics and international relations 
faculties.127
Whereas Cold War international relations scholars may have turned to the 
rationalist, materialist, and universalist demands of economics to underpin their 
theories, during the 1990s international relations scholars increasingly turned to 
borrowings from such fields as anthropology or psychoanalysis, with their anti-
125 Results from word searches in the SSCI performed in November 2005.
126See, for example Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, which has been in the forefront of 
publishing articles which discuss Postmodernist and Romantic themes in international relations. Over 
the past decade, the journal has published special issues on such themes as culture in IR (1994); ethics 
in IR (1998); territoriality and identity in IR (1999); religion in IR (2000); and the role o f aesthetics—  
images and narratives—in IR (2001).
127 The field of cultural studies has show significant growth overall. The humanities and media 
databases show extraordinary growth in cultural topics. See Maijorie Ferguson and Peter Golding,, 
eds., Cultural Studies in Question (London: Sage, 1997).
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10firationalist, quasi-spiritual, and relativistic understandings. This increase in 
relativistic and anti-rationalist approaches in international relations was reflected in 
the types of articles published in scholarly journals, in the courses and degrees offered 
to students, as well as the number of new academic posts opening for scholars 
working within these perspectives. Significantly, the trend to consider these issues 
seems to have begun with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, whose break-up was 
particularly disturbing and served as the touchstone for brooding commentaries about 
the corrosive effects of nationalism, the dangers of exclusive identities, and the perils
190of multiethnicity. Pessimistic scholarly analyses of ethnicity and nationalism
became so common that, as Tom Naim notes, nationalism became the ‘theory of the 
Ethnic Abyss’.130
These cultural theories achieved particular attention at end of the Cold War, 
just as the search for new frameworks and analogies to explain the ‘new world 
disorder’ began.131 Just as Vietnam became a metaphor for the 1960s, in many 
Western media and intellectual circles the violent break-up of Yugoslavia became the 
metaphor of the 1990s—a Postmodernist, relativistic vision of hell, complete with 
competing primordial identities engaging in meaningless orgies of nationalist 
violence.132 At least that was (and in some cases continues to be) one common, if 
covertly racist, interpretation of the conflict. Despite the actual historical 
particularities of the Yugoslav case, which would suggest that it was more unique 
than perfectly generalisable, any complex multinational state in potential crisis could
128 See for example, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Return o f Culture and Identity in IR 
Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
129 For a discussion of the importance o f the Bosnian war in these analyses, see Sadowski.
130 Tom Naim, ‘Internationalism and the Second Coming’, Special Issue on ‘Reconstructing Nations 
and States’, Daedalus (Vol. 122, No. 3,1993), p. 155.
131 This phrase is a distorted and ironic version of President George Bush’s proclaimed ‘New World 
Order’.
132 See, for example, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, ‘Yougoslavie: de l’ideal d’un Etat-nation a la barbarie des 
pouvoirs ethniques’, in Le dechirement des nations, ed. Jacques Rupnik (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1995).This vision had what scholars of political communication call ‘interpretive dominance’—the 
mainstream acceptance of a particular characterisation of an issue or event. Later on, Kosovo became 
both a metaphor war and a war of metaphors. See Roland Paris, ‘Kosovo and the metaphor war’, 
Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 117,2002).
133 On the dominant interpretation of the violence in ex-Yugoslavia, see Jacques Rupnik, ‘The 
Reawakening of European Nationalisms’, Social Research (Vol. 63,1996), pp. 53-54. For a discussion 
of how the disintegration of Yugoslavia brought up imagery of ‘the Other’, see Milica Bakic-Hayden, 
‘Nesting Orientalism: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, Slavic Review (Vol. 54, No. 4,1995), pp. 917- 
931. See also Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an 
historical discussion of how Western observers have perceived the Balkans, especially Yugoslavia, see 
Bozidar Jezemik, Wild Europe: The Balkans in the Gaze o f Western Travellers (London: Saqi Books / 
The Bosnian Institute, 2004).
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have been dubbed a future ‘new Yugoslavia’ (or a ‘cleft’ country, to use Huntington’s 
parlance), with all of its implications of violent disintegration and chaos to come. For 
example, was Pakistan the ‘next Yugoslavia’?134 Or, perhaps Indonesia?135 Even 
stable liberal democracies were not exempt from the comparison, as some suggested 
that multiculturalism in Great Britain could create the conditions necessary for a 
fixture Yugoslavia.136
In the 1990s, conflict in multinational societies, particularly in Yugoslavia but 
also in the former USSR, put the domestic rubric of Western liberal multiculturalism 
under pressure, from both the ideological left and right in their domestic culture wars. 
In the US, the violence in these multiethnic states served to underscore the fears that 
American critics had about a ‘growing “cult of ethnicity” in American education and 
civic culture’ that threatens to ‘[undermine] national cohesiveness by exacerbating 
ethnic strains’.137 In the United States, some conservatives argued that Yugoslavia 
showed the impossibility of true multiculturalism existing in one state, and used the 
case as a sobering illustration of what could happen in Western societies if the 
dominant Judeo-Christian culture were not openly reasserted.138 One commentator 
argued that as almost complete assimilation—if not annihilation—of other cultures 
was the true basis of American democracy, with the implication that it should be 
expected and, perhaps, tolerated in other states as well.139
For some on the left, particularly in the United States, the war in Bosnia—the 
vestige of Yugoslavia’s shattered multiculturalism—had a different meaning. The Los 
Angeles riots after the Rodney King verdict prompted anxieties about racial 
meltdown in the United States. Policymakers in the Clinton administration used the 
Bosnian conflict as a metaphor about the legacy of domestic racial division in the
134 The metaphor of Yugoslavia—with its subtext of anarchy and ethnic violence— has been used by 
politicians, academics, and journalists in a range of situations. Robert Kaplan used the metaphor to 
describe the potential for fragmentation in Pakistan. See Robert Kaplan, ‘The Lawless Frontier’, The 
Atlantic Monthly (Volume 286, No. 3, September 2000), pp. 66-80.
135 A well-respected journalists’ roundtable posited that Indonesia was the ‘next Yugoslavia’. See 
Reporting the World’s seminar on ‘Indonesia—The Next Yugoslavia?’ Available at 
http://www.reportingtheworld.Org/clients/rtwhome.nsf/h/3pbx
136 For example, the former British Tory Party Chairman Lord Tebbit claimed that devolution would 
lead to the creation of a Yugoslavia-like situation in Britain. See Lord Tebbit, ‘Britain’s Desperate 
Need for a Sense of Identity’, Conservative Way Forward (2001).
137 Yossi Shain, ‘Multicultural Foreign Policy’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1995).
138 See, for example, Alvin J. Schmidt, The Menace o f Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).
139 Benjamin Schwartz, ‘The Diversity Myth’, The Atlantic Monthly (Vol. 275, No. 5, May 1995), pp. 
57-67.
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United States. In other words, Bosnia became the proxy battleground of the angst- 
ridden intellectual ‘culture wars’.140 Unfortunately, pundits of all political persuasions 
with an ideological axe to grind could find some aspect of its bleeding corpse a useful 
rhetorical foil.
In the US, post-9/11 the issue of immigration and cultural assimilation has 
focussed on the integration of Muslims in Western societies. Commentators and 
scholars have put particular emphasis on uneven assimilation and persistence of a 
Muslim identity, despite their modernisation and even secularisation within Western 
societies.141 This trend is also repeated in Europe. In the Netherlands, murders by 
Muslims of critics of Islam have provoked a backlash against immigration and 
intensified government efforts to assimilate immigrants into Dutch society.142 In 
France, widespread rioting by disaffected Muslim youths in several cities in 
November 2005 questioned French attempts at integrating their Muslim population 
and underscored popular unease with the growth of Muslim immigration.143 In 
Britain, the 7/7 attacks on the public transport system in London highlighted public 
disquiet at growing social divisiveness and have prompted calls for a new 
understanding of ‘Britishness’, including a shared commitment to British civil
144institutions.
140 See, for example, the comments by Michael Omi on the intersection of concern in the US about 
race and immigration, images of Bosnia as an example of warring ethnicities, and American 
nationalism tinged with racism. See the University of Minnesota Institute on Race and Poverty’s forum 
report on ‘Race and Poverty: Our Private Obsession, Our Public Sin’ (13 October 1995). Available at 
http ://www 1 .umn.edu/irp/publications/race.htm
141 See, for example, Mustafa Malkik, ‘Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation’, Middle East 
Policy Journal (Vol. 11, No. 1,2004).
142 Economist, ‘Another political murder’ (11 November 2004).
143 The conservative journal Le Point is typical of some of this unease. It has published a series of 
articles on die topics of Muslim immigration, integration, and French social unease. See their series of 
articles ‘Banlieues-Ce que l’on n’ose pas dire’at http://www.lepoint.fr/dossiers_france/ 
doc_banlieues.html
144 Michael White, ‘Call for a new definition of Britishness’, Guardian (20 December 2005). The 
article discusses the Fabian Society’s ‘Charter for a New Britain’.
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2.5 Painting Over the Ugly Parts—Nostalgia and neo-imperialism
‘Advice is a form o f nostalgia, a way o f fishing the past from the 
disposal, wiping it off, painting over the ugly parts and recycling it for  
more than it’s worth. '
—Mary Schmich145
Nostalgia for the past, including painting over the ugly parts, was in full swing in 
during the early post-Cold War. In 1990, John Mearsheimer predicted that we would 
soon miss the Cold War: ‘We may [...] wake up one day lamenting the loss of the 
order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations’.146 If 
multipolarity results in anarchy and conflict, he concluded, then ‘the stability of the 
past forty-five years is not likely to be seen again in the coming decades’. 
Mearsheimer was right about the sense of loss. A variety of post-Cold War trends can 
be seen in the light of nostalgia. For example, the anti-globalisation movement can be 
seen as a form of nostalgia for the past, when workers had secure jobs with good 
employee benefits and less domestic and global labour competition. Various forms of 
nativism and cultural particularism hark back to a nostalgic, innocent Golden Age 
untainted by multiculturalism or the invasion of a foreign set of values.
Additionally, a nostalgic wave of reappraisal of the Cold War and the search 
for a new role for the West in the world was in vogue in the 1990s, and some aspects 
of this trend continue. Populist nostalgia for the certainties of the Cold War is one 
version of this trend, while in the academy and among policymaking circles, the 
revisionism extends further to a growing reappraisal of colonialism, in Kipling’s 
words, taking up ‘the white man’s burden’ in ‘savage wars of peace’.147
In popular culture, nostalgia for the clarity and seeming simplicity of the 
bipolar world and economic ‘good times’ under socialism bloomed in the 1990s and 
continues in some respects. In the states of the former Eastern bloc, it has taken the 
form of residual nostalgia for communism and the relative social and economic 
stability of the Cold War. While some of the nostalgia is clearly tongue-in-cheek, 
such as communist-themed pubs in Ukraine or Good Bye, Lenin!, a film satirising 
communist nostalgia in Eastern Germany, a majority of Eastern Europeans express
145 Mary Schmich, ‘Advice, like youth, just wasted on the young’, Chicago Tribune (1 June 1997).
146 John Mearsheimer, ‘Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War’, The Atlantic Monthly (August 1990); 
pps. 35 and 50, respectively. This article is the popular version of Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ 
published in International Security.
147 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The White Man’s Burden’ (1899).
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nostalgia for the days of a strong authoritarian state and the socialist economy.148 
Much of this nostalgia is bound up with a sense of uncertainty about the future. 
Despite their accession into the EU in 2004, nostalgia for the past may remain in 
some former communist states due to pessimism about the new democratic system 
and dissatisfaction about the economy.149 In the Czech Republic, one political analyst 
says that ‘There are still a lot of people who long for the communist days, when 
everything was clear, black was black and white was white’, while one novelist notes 
that ‘many old people are nostalgic for their youth. They miss the security of 
communist times ’.150
According to polls by the New Europe Barometer, approval ratings for a 
return to communist rule in Eastern Europe ranged between about 6-16 per cent of 
population in 1993 (depending on country) rising to 16-30 per cent in 2001, 
expressing a trend of political support for communist parties. Significant majorities 
across Eastern Europe also indicated a desire for a strong state, even one based on 
non-democratic principles. While these views were most common amongst the old, 
there were increasing levels of nostalgia amongst the young. Additionally, majorities 
of post-communist citizens saw the former socialist economy in a positive light, 
suggesting that nostalgia is based on dissatisfaction with the economic system and the 
inability of the transition economies to deliver prosperity rapidly or evenly.151 This 
may reflect a low level of public trust in political institutions in these states that 
continues.152 As the economic benefits of EU membership may take some time to 
become clear, nostalgia may persist.153
148 For a discussion of continuing communist nostalgia in Central Europe, see Victor Gomez, ‘Central 
Europe: Nostalgia for the Communist Past’, Transitions Online (17 November 2004). For some 
examples of this nostalgia in products, see Jan Puhl and Marion Kraske, ‘Products Create Market for 
Communist Nostalgia in Eastern Europe’, Spiegel Online (28 February 2005).
149 Martina Jurinovd, ‘Velvet Celebration’, The Slovak Spectator (22 November 2004). Available at 
http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok-17862.html
150 Gareth Harding, ‘East Europe’s communist nostalgia’, United Press International (11 August 2004).
151 Data in this paragraph from Joakim Ekman, ‘Communist Nostalgia in Central and Eastern Europe:
A Matter of Principles or Performance?’, paper presented at the Nordic Political Science Association’s 
Annual Meeting, Aalborg, Denmark (15-17 August 2002). Note that these figures were lower in the 
Baltic states.
152 Jonas Linde, ‘Institutional Trust and Democracy in the New EU Member States’, paper presented at 
the XTV Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA) conference, Reykjavik, Iceland (11-13 August 
2005).
153 Post-accession data from new members suggest a waning of EU enthusiasm. See European 
Commisssion, Eurobarometer: Comparative Highlights, Report EB61-CC-EB 2004.1 (May 2004), pp. 
4-5, and European Commisssion, Eurobarometer 63: First Results (July 2005), p. 11.
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In the West, Cold War nostalgia is also present, with Western publics 
similarly hungering for stronger political leadership, a sense of purpose and direction, 
and a better economy. In the US, former President Ronald Reagan’s funeral was 
accompanied by a mass outpouring of nostalgia for his optimistic ‘it’s-dawn-in- 
America’ leadership style and the economic ‘miracle’ that Reaganomics was credited 
with producing (whether rightly or wrongly).154 As Professor Peter Bondanella notes, 
‘Fascination with the Cold War persists because it was a time when we hunkered 
down for the long haul [....] It was in many ways our finest hour [....] There was no 
immediate gratification. We had real direction.’155
Beyond the Reagan and Cold War nostalgia, nostalgia persists for the heroism 
and sacrificial responsibility of World War II, or ‘The Good War’. In the US, 
nostalgia for World War II began after the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day in 1994 and 
continued throughout the 1990s.156 It has been underpinned by a wide variety of 
popular books, films, and television programmes taking a Romantic view of the
1 cn
war. The implicit undercurrent of these works is one of declinism and a sense of 
nostalgic loss at the fact that there will be no equal to the generation that fought and 
won the war—‘The Greatest Generation’. Since Vietnam did not serve as the younger 
generation’s honourable, sacrificial service to country, the implication is that the 
current generation is decadent and lacks a sense of duty and commitment to country. 
This conclusion also extends to the Cold War society that the ‘Greatest Generation’ 
built after the war, which is now a crumbling and decaying husk of its former self. 
There is a sense that with the passing of this generation, twilight will descend on one 
of the greatest periods in Western (or at least American) history.
For academics and policymakers, post-Cold War nostalgia also extends to a 
reconsideration of the age of empire with a wide variety of titles discussing the 
challenges and perils awaiting a budding American imperium. Others openly
154 Mark Egan, ‘US Ripe for Reagan Nostalgia After Grim Year’, Reuters (10 June 2004).
155 Jennifer Harper, ‘Cold War Nostalgia Spawns Museums, Memorabilia Trades’, Washington Times 
(23 May 1999), p. 2.
156 David Greenberg, ‘D-Day OD: Why World War II nostalgia has gone too far’, Slate.msn.com (4 
June 2004). Available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2101752/
157 These include, for example, the film Saving Private Ryan; books by Stephen Ambrose such as Band 
o f Brothers, D-Day June 6, 1944, Citizen Soldiers, or Pegasus Bridge, and Tom Brokaw, The Greatest 
Generation (New York, NY: Random House, 1998); or the television programme Band o f  Brothers.
158 Anatol Lieven, ‘The empire strikes back: imperialism isn’t pretty. Add a sense of righteous 
victimhood and it’s downright dangerous’, The Nation (7 July 2003).
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champion the white man’s burden.159 Imperialism and neo-imperialism are again 
being discussed as benign forces for peace and prosperity among academics and 
policymakers.160 In a era replete with perceived ‘failure’—the growth of ‘failed’ 
states, ‘rogue’ states, international criminal gangs, drug barons, global sex trafficking 
and human exploitation, global terrorist groups, and other lethal non-state actors— 
empire presents the image of an orderly return to good governance in areas where the 
norms of democracy have not taken root.
A variety of scholarly works in the 1990s examined empires, both old and 
new.161 Post-9/11, discussions of empire still have purchase. Among these, Dominic 
Lieven’s Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (2001) provides an historical 
examination into empire, presenting an extensive view of the rise and decline of the 
Russian empire. However, much of the discussion on empire and imperialism is 
geared towards an examination of America’s role as the lone superpower and US 
unipolarity. Andrew Bacevich’s American Empire: The Realities and Consequences 
o f US Diplomacy (2002) argues that domestic considerations, specifically the interests 
of US corporations, are setting the US agenda in foreign policy and driving the US 
towards empire. Rashid Khalidi’s Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and 
America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East (2004) examines the legacy of empire in 
the Middle East and how this applies to America’s attempts to control and rebuild 
Iraq. In Incoherent Empire (2003), Michael Mann criticises the US focus on military 
power as a form of domination that creates significant resistance abroad.
While these authors are critical of empire, others suggest that the main flaw is 
in the US not pursuing empire in a coherent and sustained fashion. In an idea 
reminiscent of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers (1987), Niall 
Ferguson explores the rise and decline of the British empire to glean history lessons 
for America in Empire: The Rise and Demise o f the British World Order and Its 
Lessons for Global Power (2003). Ferguson follows up with a paean to America’s
159 See, for example, Thomas Sowell, Conquests and Cultures: An International History (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1998). Sowell, who seems to argue from an ethnocentric standpoint and creates a 
hierarchy of cultures with the usual suspects (Europeans) on the top, offers a murderous view of 
Africans.
160 John Lloyd, ‘The return of imperialism; Empire is no longer a dirty word: It is now a respectable 
debating point among thinkers and politicians. John Lloyd on a global U-turn’, New Statesman (Vol. 
131, No. 4583,15 April 2002).
161 Alexander Motyl notes the significant growth among academics considering the topics o f empire 
and imperialism during the 1990s. See Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and 
Revival o f Empires (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), especially ‘Introduction: 
Finding Empire’.
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liberal empire which is in the unique position of enforcing a benign order on the 
world in Colossus: The Price o f America's Empire (2004). Ferguson’s argument has 
the scent of nostalgia; he might as well be quoting Joseph Conrad:
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those 
who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not 
a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea
However, the key question for Ferguson is whether Americans lack the political will 
to see through their mission, arguing that America’s ‘best and brightest’ do not have 
the same commitment to administer an empire that the British did. However, this 
aspect of Ferguson’s thesis collapses when it hits the hard pavement of American 
reality. The British administration was largely staffed by those who were clever but 
blocked by class or connection from rising in society or getting rich. First-bom sons 
of the aristocracy did not sail for distant shores. In Britain’s class-bound and 
hierarchical system, the empire provided a safety valve for all those talented sons who 
threatened to become disaffected if their ambitions were checked in the motherland. 
This sense of limited opportunity is not present in America’s ‘best’, as they see a 
bright future for themselves; they need not seek their fortunes on the empire’s 
peripheries.
2.6 Hearts of Darkness—Essential human nature and the exotic
‘Other’
‘“'Don’t you hear them? ” The dusk was repeating them in a persistent 
whisper all around us, in a whisper that seemed to swell menacingly 
like the first whisper o f a rising wind. “The horror! The horror! ” ’
—Joseph Conrad163
While there are a variety of post-Cold War trends that focus attention on the 
Romantic concept of nature, particularly environmentalist discourses, we will 
examine one that more squarely approaches issues of conflict and violence: the 
current resurgence of late nineteenth-century Romanticism’s fascination with the 
‘unnatural’, horrific side of human nature, the heart of darkness that lies within
162 Joseph Conrad, Youth, Heart o f  Darkness, the End o f  the Tether: Three Stories (London: J. M. Dent 
and Sons Ltd, 1946), pp. 50-51.
163 Joseph Conrad, Heart o f Darkness, p. 157.
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individuals and nations. The popular allure of contemporary forms of horror and 
Gothic is complemented by an academic preoccupation with the essential barbarity of 
human nature and the vision of an exotic, tragic ‘Other’ wracked by violence and 
despair.
Popular culture has seen the resurgence of Gothic in all its gory glory, like the 
Grand Guignol and romans charognes of the late nineteenth century. Slasher films, 
television programs featuring vampires, and gritty crime shows all exhibit a 
contemporary taste for the exotically dark, hidden underside of a society which is 
seen as only superficially ‘normal’.164 Additionally, modem panics over the 
prevalence of serial killers or paedophiles, as well as bizarre or quasi-religious beliefs 
in the occult, all conform to a darkly pessimistic view of the world and a foreboding 
sense of the duality of human nature, of the hidden evil lurking menacingly close to 
the surface in everyday life. This fascination with the lurid and bizarre parallels the 
late Romantic despair of Nietzsche, with the popular mythos fatalistically repeating 
that we live in the worst of all possible times, perhaps even the ‘end times’.
Among academics and intellectuals, fascination with the duality of human 
nature and an exotic ‘Other’ has centred on analyses of conflict in the post-Cold War 
period. Significantly drawing on the experiences of the outbreak of war across West 
Africa, as well as the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, and rapidly disintegrating 
pockets of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many scholars rejected what 
they saw as liberalism’s Pollyanna-ish international vision of the benign effects of 
growing democratisation and globalisation. Both the pictures and the tone of the 
reporting in the Western media on these wars underscored scholarly pessimism. 
Mainstream reports of these conflicts in the West often centred on ‘heart of darkness’ 
stories that focussed on the atavistic ‘nature’ of the conflict or the ‘savagery’ of the 
people, as well as broad-brush journalistic impressions led by sensationalistic 
television pictures.165 Sometimes journalists fell back on racist explanations for 
violence in regions they knew little about, and for which they had been ‘parachuted 
in’ for the story.166 Nevertheless, such reporting became a staple in the media news 
diet.167
164 Mark Edmundson, Nightmare on Main Street: Angels, Sadomasochism and the Culture o f Gothic 
(Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
165 Mora McLean, ‘The “Africa Story” in American News’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1999), p. 6.
166 These comments on media coverage were made by Mark Huband, editor of the world economy 
pages for the Financial Times, at a Reporting the World conference, ‘Is Coverage of Africa Racist?’.
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The conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Africa also prompted scholarly 
consideration about the essential ‘nature’ of warfare. The consensus has become that 
warfare is essentially an emotional act, imbued with religious or cult meanings, 
replete with heroism and the notions of honour, as Michael Ignatieff has argued.168 
Those who study the biological bases of behaviour have added to this perception of 
violence and war as irrational and passionate endeavours, hidden deep inside human 
nature as primitive yet inescapable ‘urges’. Barbara Ehrenreich, a social critic with a 
background in science, has argued that war is a passionate act rather than a rational 
calculation of interest and that there is an inner human need to ‘sacralize’ war.169 For 
Ehrenreich, while war is socially constructed, it also has biological, ‘primal’ roots, 
arguing that this is more apparent in recent ‘tribal’ conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, 
rather than in the more antiseptic and aesthetic American conflicts.170 However, 
Ehrenreich’s view may be more an artefact of the American media’s unwillingness to 
show the casualties of war on the other side than the truly ‘clean’ or ‘surgical’ nature 
of the actual conduct of American warfare.
While Yugoslavia could serve as a facile metaphor and exotic ‘Other’ for 
many of the post-Cold War’s internal ills and sense of domestic decline in the West— 
including the problems of racial polarisation, multiculturalism, poverty, and social 
exclusion—other conflicts also became apocryphal. African wars in the early 1990s 
became political shorthand for the loss of all rationality, not only for the loss of 
rationality in war, but for the loss of all rationality throughout the entire non-Westem 
world. While previous African conflicts were analysed within the Cold War 
framework of wars of liberation or conflicts over state governance—in other words,
Other journalists at the conference echoed these sentiments. For the complete roundtable discussion 
between British and African journalists on coverage of African conflicts, see Reporting the World’s 
website. Available at http://www.reportingtheworld.org/clients/rtwhome.nsf/seminarwrapups/
1205801A5205F10980256A4F006F188E
167 For a discussion about racism in American coverage of international news, see Danny Schecter, 
‘Helicopter Journalism and its Limits: Why Reports Who Only Look Down Tend to Cover Up’, Tikkun 
(Vol. 9, No. 5, September/October 1994).
168 For a discussion of some of these points, see Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War 
and the Modem Conscience (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998). In his latest book, Ignatieff argues that 
terrorism has emotional and irrational roots, rather than mainly political causes. See Michael Ignatieff, 
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age o f Terror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
169 Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History o f the Passions o f  War (New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books/ Henry Holt & Company, 1997).
170 This view ignores the anthropological literature on conflict resolution and management techniques 
long employed by traditional cultures throughout the world. See, for example, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. 
Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca, eds., Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Westport, CT 
and London: Praeger, 1991).
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as rationally-based conflicts grounded in the political and economic realities of 
people’s lives—in the post-Cold War these wars were to become the bywords for 
anarchy and the unending ‘nature’ of ethnic conflict and the essential, ‘natural’ 
barbarism of Africans.171
The conflicts in West Africa—particularly in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia—became bywords for the cruelty of war and for the ‘strangeness’ of
1 7 0Africans, who in one account have ‘a paper-thin veneer of civilization’. Other
conflicts in Eritrea, Somalia, and Rwanda served a similar rhetorical purpose. 
Africans were deemed incapable of waging war out of rational calculation or any 
form of higher interest—the main explanations for the conflicts that swept through 
Africa during the 1990s consisted of appeals to the ‘atavistic’ nature of these
17^conflicts, and by implication, the people involved in the violence. While some 
experts with in-depth knowledge particular conflicts underscored their rational 
basis—for example, Philip Gourevitch’s investigation in Rwanda, that detailed the 
highly calculated and structured nature of the Hutu genocide against the 
Tutsis174—the mythology has remained with the ‘unending conflict’ model, followed 
by its quasi-rationalist stepsister, the ‘criminal activity’ model.175
Various aspects of African conflicts served to underscore Western prejudice 
that they were somehow more barbaric. For example, since African wars have 
generally been waged on a low-tech basis—that is by guns and machetes rather than 
by Cruise missiles and Stealth technology—they have been seen as ‘primitive’ and 
‘bloody’ compared with the supposedly antiseptic and civilised nature of Western 
wars. Additionally, some commentators have categorised acts such as the cutting off
171 Compare this type of treatment focusing on irrational factors in Africa with, for example, the 
rationalist discussion of political conflict in the Congo in the 1960s. See Rene Lemarchand, Political 
Awakening in the Congo: The Politics o f Fragmentation (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University 
of California Press, 1964).
172 David Lamb, The Africans (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1987), p. 132.
173 Bill Berkeley discusses these images in Bill Berkeley, ‘Race, Tribe, and Power in the Heart of 
Africa’ World Policy Journal (Vol. 18, No. 1, 2001).
174 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda (New York, NY: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).
175 The World Bank’s Paul Collier has focused on the economics of civil war, publishing a variety of 
articles on the ‘criminal activity model’. See, for example, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War’, World Bank Working Papers (21 October 2001). Available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=12205 See also Mats Berdal and D. M. Malone, eds., 
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2000). While the criminal activity model presupposes a rational economic basis for conflict, it does 
essentialise the participants or instigators of war as greedy criminals and their societies as especially 
prone to criminality and opportunism.
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of limbs as proof of the ‘barbarism’ and ‘irrationality’ of African wars, despite 
evidence that such tactics are rationally calculated to terrorise the population and
176lower morale against resistance, both rationally effective methods in war-fighting. 
Furthermore, the rituals that some African militias employed before fighting, such as 
wearing wigs or women’s clothing, walking backwards, casting magical spells, or
1 77using drugs or alcohol, also fed this image of irrationality. However, this ignores 
the fact that such rituals prepare the troops for battle and lower their psychological 
resistance to killing enemy combatants, a key aspect of success in war. Since only 
about two per cent of any population is capable of killing without hesitation on the 
battlefield, professional armies in wealthy states expend a great deal of time and
1 7ftmoney training troops to overcome their instinctive hesitation to kill. For example, 
it has been estimated that it costs over $44,000 to train and basically equip a US 
marine.179 With a lack of resources, militias in developing countries turn to lower- 
tech methods of achieving the same results: magic, drugs, and alcohol. In other 
words, far from being irrational, these conflicts are governed by a situational 
rationality that forces poor participants to ‘make do’ with the low-cost resources at 
hand.
Finally, unlike the case of Yugoslavia, which some experts cited as a 
convenient vehicle to critique or to make comparisons with their own developed, 
multicultural societies, African conflicts were less flatteringly—and in more overtly 
racist tones—deemed the shape of things to come for many developing post-colonial
1 ftfisocieties. Overall, the main theme that came out of these conflicts was one of 
unmitigated tragedy; that the conflicts, and the people involved in them, were caught 
up in tragic circumstances beyond understanding or control—theirs or ours. However,
176 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth, & Resources in Sierra Leone (Portsmouth, 
NH: Heinemann, 1996).
177 See Associated Press, ‘Tribal Hunters Bank on Mysticism in Fighting Sierra Leone Rebels’ (28 
November 1998).
178 John Mueller, ‘The Banality of “Ethnic Conflict”: Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC (31 August-3 September 
2000), p. 25. Mueller cites work by Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost o f  Learning 
to Kill in War and Society (1995).
179 Diane Olick, ‘An army of one carries a high price’, CNBC (21 October 2002).
180 Some authors contend that racist American coverage on Africa has a long pedigree. For example, 
Milton Allimadi claims that the New York Times archives show that its journalists and editors were 
using racist language to describe Africans, and that editors were even concocting fabricated but 
plausible ‘scenarios’ that fit racists stereotypes to insert into stories, at least as far back as the 1960s. 
See Milton Allimadi, The Hearts o f  Darkness: How White Writers Created the Racist Image o f Africa 
(New York, NY: Black Star Books, 2003).
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what we see in a tragic context may be otherwise for the combatants or others 
involved in those conflicts. Christopher Coker notes, ‘As Aristotle reminds us, 
tragedy works on the spectator. It is we—the spectators—who find life tragic. This is 
not necessarily true for those involved in the events we see on our television screens 
at night’.181
2.7 No Shelter, No Relief?—Conclusion
‘What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow /  Out o f this stony 
rubbish? [...] A heap o f broken images, where the sun beats, /  And the 
dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief, /A nd  the dry stone no 
sound o f water. ’
—T.S. Eliot182
If no clear definition of nineteenth-century Romanticism exists, the post-Cold War’s 
Postmodern Romanticism also suffered from a similar definitional weakness. No 
coherent set of precepts much less a specified ideology defined the ‘movement’, if it 
can be called one; rather, it is ‘a heap of broken images’. As with nineteenth-century 
Romanticism, it had been a sensibility, mood, series of metaphors, or receptivity to 
certain themes and ideas defining the 1990s. Perhaps this is because Postmodern 
Romanticism was also defined by rejection and protest: it was partly a philosophical 
protest against the rationalism and economistic thinking of the Cold War, and partly 
an historical response against the transformations that spurred global change. 
However, since protest and rejectionism rarely offer a clear way forward, no singular 
or dominant model of international relations has presented itself.
In this chapter, we tried to historicise the decade of the 1990s and its 
‘revolutions’—often collectively called fragmentation and globalisation—which have 
seemingly accelerated the pace of social change, arguing that these changes 
undermined the certainties of the Cold War period, leading to greater feelings of 
insecurity among policymakers and publics. These uncertainties added new impetus 
to those who challenged the Cold War predominance of rationalist paradigms and 
greater receptivity to the Romantic message. We also explored the Romantic strain of 
thought during the post-Cold War era using five categories—irrationality, pessimism, 
relativism, nostalgia, and focus on nature—to describe the Zeitgeist and how it
181 Christopher Coker, War and the Illiberal Conscience (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 208.
182 T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, 19-22 (1922).
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affected popular and academic contemporary understandings of politics and 
international relations.
How did this shift towards more Romantic perceptions affect international 
relations? One of the most important shifts was, and continues to be, attitudinal: an 
atmosphere of decline and a sense of pessimism have pervaded international relations. 
While Realist approaches often have an underlying sense of pessimism, even tragedy, 
about them, post-Cold War pessimism has been deeper. From the paranoia of 
conspiracy theorists to increased awareness of potential natural catastrophes, the post- 
Cold War continues to be defined by deep public pessimism. As George Steiner put 
it, this is a latebom era, one in which a persistent sense of valediction is indeed in the 
air.
Yet since the shape of what will definitively follow the Cold War is still too 
amorphous to describe, despite burgeoning US unipolarity, bleak images such as T.S. 
Eliot’s ‘Waste Land’ serve as a standing metaphor for the desolate future that is seen 
for international relations. This sense of decline is no respecter of ideology. Both left- 
and right-wing commentators have expressed declinist views of international 
relations. In some part, these visions are a form of nostalgia and a longing for the 
Cold War past. Indeed, it could be argued that a growing post-Cold War ‘red-brown 
alliance’ is based on a shared nostalgic sense of Romanticism.183 Such fusion of 
conservative religion and left-wing militancy may not be restricted to Christians; in 
Britain, Islamists and the extreme left have found common cause on a variety of
184issues.
The expansion of anti-rationalist thought and spirituality have been key post- 
Cold War trends, paralleling nineteenth-century Romanticism’s search for 
transcendence and existential meaning. The growth of fundamentalist religions of all 
stripes, with a concomitant rise in the political activism of religious fundamentalists, 
and the post-Cold War upsurge in all forms of spirituality have been popular aspects 
of this trend toward irrationalism. A growing rejection of logical positivism and a 
turn towards irrational, emotional, or sentimental factors as key explanatory variables 
in politics are academic reflections of this trend. Attention has increasingly turned
183 Stephen Schwartz, ‘Two Faces of Fascism?’, FrontPage Magazine.com (23 April 2003). Available 
athttp://www.ffontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=7453
184 Amir Taheri, ‘We don’t do God, we do Palestine and Iraq’, The Sunday Times (12 February 2006),
p. 12.
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away from materialism or rationality and towards a key aspect of Romanticism— 
irrationality, emotionalism, and spirituality.
Another Romantic theme, relativism or the return of identity—ethnicity, 
religion, culture, or language—as a key variable and motivator for human action also 
gained prominence in theories of international relations in the 1990s, and issues of 
culture and identity continue to be important topics this decade. If during any age the 
key question is ‘who are we?’, during the Cold War era the answer was often a 
rationalist one—Homo economicus, defined by his utility-optimizing behaviour. With 
the waning of rationalism and its economically-based thinking, the developing post- 
Cold War answer seems to be Homo sociologicus—defined by his cultural, religious, 
or ethnic identity and values. From a variety of forms of populist nativism around the 
world to the growing ‘cottage industry’ in identity and similar cultural issues in the 
academy, the Romantic, sentimental ‘cement of blood’ created by shared ethnicity, 
religion, or culture is at the centre of popular and academic thinking about the future 
of politics and international relations.
Nostalgia is another Romantic theme, or perhaps more accurately ‘mood’, that 
has defined the post-Cold War period, partly because in an era of ‘endings’—of 
communism, of bipolarity, of materialism, of history—and the uncertainty of 
‘beginnings’ there is a melancholic search for meaning and a necessary reappraisal of 
the past, part of which entails ‘painting over the ugly parts’ of history. The 
uncertainty of the post-Cold War transition has spurred popular revisions of the Cold 
War. Among citizens of former communist states, it has brought some nostalgia for 
socialism and strong (even authoritarian) government. In the US, it has generated 
nostalgia for strong political leadership a la Reagan. This nostalgia also has included 
a popular re-examination of the World War II era as a ‘Golden Age’ and eulogies to 
the rapidly passing members of the ‘Greatest Generation’ who fought the war. The 
political turbulence of the post-Cold War period also has been followed by a revival 
of interest in empire and imperialism as a possible solution to international conflict 
and political instability.
Finally, the Romantic focus on nature, particularly the sinister duality of 
human nature, was prevalent during the 1990s. The ‘heart of darkness’ leitmotif runs 
deep in the post-Cold War psyche and in understandings of international relations. 
The popular revival of interest in the dark side of human nature whether on television, 
films, or in bestselling books recalled the nineteenth century fm-de-siecle fascination
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with Gothic, which explored the hidden undercurrent of violence and degradation that 
exists within Western society. This theme extended to popular and academic 
understandings of international relations. For example, depictions of African conflicts 
often focussed on the irrationality and barbarity of war, providing images of an 
exotic, orientalised ‘Other’ which was so prevalent in nineteenth-century 
Romanticism. However, unlike the sometimes languorous and mysterious 
descriptions of the Orient that nineteenth-century Romantics presented, the post-Cold 
War’s Romanticism focussed on the ‘mindless’ brutality and violence present in often 
poor, generally non-Westem states.
100
Chapter 3
Chapter 3. Prophets of the Apocalypse: Romantic 
Approaches to Conflict in Kaplan, Huntington, and van 
Creveld
‘And the kings o f the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and 
the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every bondman, and every 
free man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks o f the mountains; 
/  And said to the mountains and rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the 
face o f him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath o f the Lamb: 
/  For the great day o f his wrath is come; and who shall be able to 
stand? ’
—Revelation, 6:15-171
Romantic visions of politics and international relations flourished during the 1990s. 
One area in which they gained a foothold is in approaches to conflict studies where, 
after the collapse of the bipolar world, some scholars, policymakers, and pundits 
detected prophetic signs and portents—metaphorically speaking—of an apocalyptic 
‘great day of wrath’ to come. In particular, many observers saw a violent future for 
international relations along Yeatsian lines, with ‘mere anarchy loosed upon the 
world’ resulting in a rising ‘blood-dimmed tide’ of primordial ethnic conflict.2 While 
there are many authors whose works can exemplify the Romantic Zeitgeist in post- 
Cold War international relations, we will mainly look at three authors who write on 
security and conflict and whose works reach deep into the academic and 
policymaking heart of the American imperium in international relations—Robert D. 
Kaplan, Samuel P. Huntington, and Martin van Creveld. Their works are prominent 
among those who foretold (and continue to foretell) of an apocalyptic era of chaos 
and conflict in international relations. We have chosen these three for a variety of 
reasons: they are recognised experts in their fields; they reach different influential 
audiences; they answer different and complimentary questions about past conflicts 
and potential conflicts; and their work has been important in moulding interpretations 
about the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
1 New Testament, King James Version.
2 The phrases are from W.B. Yeats, ‘The Second Coming’, 3-6 (1921): ‘Things fall apart; the centre 
cannot hold;/ Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. / The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and 
everywhere / The ceremony of innocence is drowned’.
101
Chapter 3
First, they are widely recognised as expert observers in their respective fields 
among scholars, policymakers, and journalists. Each has been widely cited, 
particularly in English, which indicates that scholars read and recognise their work. 
For example, according to the Social Science Citation Index of academic journals, 
Huntington’s The Clash o f Civilizations, which is widely available in translation and 
has spawned a minor cottage industry either in support or refutation, was cited over 
1,000 times in major journals. Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy was cited 307 times, 
while Balkan Ghosts was cited 97 times. Martin van Creveld’s Transformation o f 
War has been cited at least 142 times and his other works cited 455 times.3 These 
totals do not include the numerous citations to their works in the popular press, or 
discussions about them in other media. Considering that most scholarly works are 
never cited, these are fairly impressive totals. Additionally, neither Kaplan, 
Huntington, nor van Creveld is a ‘soft target’ or a strawman—they do not represent 
the most extreme, inarticulate, or least thoughtful strain of the Romantic Zeitgeist in 
studies of conflict in international relations. Rather, they are highly articulate, have 
well-thought out views, and are intellectually respected among many of their peers.
Second, while their work is in many ways complimentary—they may often be 
read together, and in fact these authors cite each other in their works—they reach 
different, but influential audiences.4 Kaplan is a journalist, polemicist, and populiser 
of the ‘new world disorder’ thesis. His work touches the ‘chattering classes’ and 
public intellectuals as well as policymakers, including those in the US military. 
Huntington mainly reaches an academic audience, although his work is also widely 
known in policymaking circles, and his Clash o f Civilizations was a bestseller in the 
US and worldwide in translation. While van Creveld has a strong reputation among 
academics as a military historian, his key influence is over the Western military and 
defence policy establishment, particularly in the United States. Van Creveld has
3 These totals are as of November 2005. The precise totals for are 1005 citations in 796 articles for 
Huntington’s Clash o f Civilizations, including the original article that appeared in Foreign Affairs and 
the book. For Kaplan, 307 citations were made to the Coming Anarchy in 263 articles, 210 o f which 
cited the original article published in The Atlantic Monthly and the rest which cited the book. For 
Balkan Ghosts, the 97 citations were in 79 separate articles. Van Creveld’s Transformation o f War was 
cited 142 times in 120 articles; since the work was published under the title On Future War in Britain, 
this total includes citations to both titles. The rest of van Creveld’s works were cited 455 times in 266 
articles. Note that these numbers may vary and are not comprehensive due to the limitations o f the 
database and authors’ inconsistencies in reporting citations. The data is not standardised, so searching 
must be done through a variety of alternatives (for example, by searching for Vancreveld, Van 
Creveld, Creveld, M. van, etc.) These results were based on a combined search for all terms.
4 According to Amazon.com, the world’s largest online bookseller, readers who purchased books by 
Kaplan often purchased books by Huntington and van Creveld as well.
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lectured widely in high-level military circles and his views can be prominently found 
in journals targeted to a US military audience, such as the US Army War College’s 
Parameters.
Third, each author answers a slightly different question with respect to past 
and future conflicts. If we analyse conflict in terms of the six journalistic 
questions—who, what, when, where, why, and how—each writer answers separate 
but complimentary aspects of those questions. While each seeks to answer all six, 
they lean more heavily towards answering certain questions. For example, Kaplan’s 
work focuses the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of conflict—on what the future of conflict will be 
about, and why. While Huntington also considers why conflicts arise, he primarily 
answers the questions of ‘who’ and ‘where’—which groups will do the fighting 
(civilisations), and where those conflicts are likely to occur (along fault line states). 
On the other hand, while van Creveld provides answers to all these questions, as a 
military historian his forte is on the ‘hows’ of conflict—the methods by which that 
those wars will be fought and the setting of conflict. His neo-medieval vision for the 
context of future wars has also been a particularly compelling metaphor for 
policymakers and military planners.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, their metaphors of anarchy and chaos, 
their predictions of civilisational clash, and their analogies to the Middle Ages as the 
shape of post-Cold War international relations provided (and may continue to 
provide) academics, policymakers, and pundits with a pervasive and influential 
framework within which to understand global politics and conflict. While it is 
difficult to say with any certainty whether these views became the dominant 
interpretation of conflict in the 1990s, some of their ‘clash’ and ‘chaos’ metaphors 
were particularly influential in interpretations of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
In order to discuss how these authors exemplify the post-Cold War Zeitgeist, 
we will first briefly discuss the creation of metaphors and analogies in policymaking 
and their importance in the construction of persuasive analytical frameworks. One 
reason these authors gained influence in international relations is through their use of 
vivid analogies and metaphors, some of which achieved if not interpretive 
dominance, then interpretive ascendancy, in international relations during the post- 
Cold War, especially in the US. After this discussion, we examine each of these 
authors in light of the various aspects that define the mood of Postmodern
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Romanticism—such as anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus 
on nature—that we developed as the framework for our discussion in the two 
previous chapters. Since Kaplan’s popular themes of anarchy and chaos resonate with 
perhaps the widest general public and provide the Romantic ‘mood music’ that plays 
in the background of ‘chaos theories’, we will examine his work in greater detail than 
the other two. Finally, we also examine how these authors construct the Yugoslav 
conflict as a broader metaphor for their views on the future of conflict, and the 
various heuristic techniques and biases in their work.
3.1 Making Meaning—Metaphors and analogies
‘[VJery frequently the “word images” that have been created by 
“ideas” have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic o f interest. ’
—Max Weber5
With the reappraisal of Realism that came with the collapse of the bipolar system, 
scholars and policymakers in international relations began searching for new 
frameworks to understand the post-Cold War era, to provide policy guidance, and to 
develop predictive models for the future. Significantly, since international relations 
scholars and policymakers often draw on history and the concept of ‘learning from 
history’ when faced with new situations, this process entailed the search for new 
historical analogies and metaphors as the basis for developing new approaches to 
understand the post-Cold War period.
As Yuen Foong Khong notes, learning from history is the idea that 
policymakers and scholars examine the past for historical similarities with the present 
that can provide useful, predictive guidance about a problem or offer a series of 
actions; Stanley Hoffmann underscores that this method of historical analogical 
reasoning is part of the American ‘national style’ in foreign policymaking. The logic 
policymakers use to connect any two historical periods is generally through an 
analogy, with the reasoning as follows: situation A (in the past) looks like situation B 
(usually in the present) in that they both share characteristic X. Since situation A also 
has characteristic Y, by implication situation B has it as well. Other characteristics
5 From Weber’s The Social Psychology o f the World Religions as quoted in Yuen Foong Khong, 
Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions o f1965 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 19.
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that A has, like Z, can be imputed to B as well. The structure of theses analogies has 
several functions: it allows policymakers to go beyond the given information; allows 
top-down (‘theory’-led) processing of information, rather than bottom-up (data-led) 
which is faster and more efficient; and it creates a durable, or persistent, framework 
of understanding for the future.6
Yet how do we (and policymakers more specifically) choose among the vast 
array of cognitive schemas, scripts, metaphors, and historical analogies available to us 
at any time in order to make decisions, and how do we judge the probability of 
various outcomes? Cognitive psychologists have shown that various heuristic devices 
(or rules of thumb) are used in the formation of judgement and decisionmaking.
These heuristic devices determine the choice of analogies and cognitive frameworks 
as well as estimations of probability. These rules include the availability of 
information (how easily we remember and recall it), its recency, its perceived 
representativeness, and ‘surface commonalities’—that is, the effects that mere 
appearances have on observers.
The availability heuristic is about how easily recalled or remembered 
information or a particular event is. The more easily we can recall information, the 
more ‘real’, ‘plausible’, or ‘truthful’ the information seems to us, the more ‘available’ 
it is said to be. As social psychologist Scott Pious notes,
[s]ome events are more available than others not because they tend to occur 
frequently or with high probability, but because they are inherently easier to 
think about, because they have taken place recently [recency heuristic], 
because they are highly emotional, and so forth.
Thus our ability to imagine an event or an outcome makes that event more 
psychologically ‘available’ to us, which highly increases our probability (or risk) 
estimates of that event actually happening whether or not it is statistically more 
probable. One factor that increases our memory and recall of an event or information 
is vividness.8 As psychologists have shown, one key to persuading an audience is the 
use of vivid language, and the use of such language—especially if it appeals to the 
senses—is even more convincing to the target audience than logic because vivid
6This paragraph is based on Khong, pp. 6-7, and 14.
7 Scott Pious, The Psychology o f Judgment and Decision Making (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1993), p. 121.
8 Vividness is defined by social psychologists as ‘how concrete or imaginable something is’. That is, 
how ‘real’ or ‘life-like’ the author or speaker can make something seem. See Pious, p. 125-126.
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information is easier to recall, particularly over the long term. In fact, psychologists 
Richard Nisbett and Eugene Borgida have found that audiences are affected and 
persuaded strongly by vividness, much more so than by pallid—dry or abstract— 
information, such as statistics.
In particular, first-hand accounts, individual testimonies, and anecdotes 
including personal experiences are consistently more persuasive to audiences than 
more objective information, like comprehensive statistical summaries. Indeed, in a 
legal setting, personal accounts like eyewitness identification and testimonies are 
often the least accurate yet the most persuasive types of evidence.9 Audiences are 
more likely to use such personalised information disproportionately in the formation 
of their judgements because it is vivid and easy to recall.10 Thus vividness affects the 
availability of information. The recency heuristic is also related to availability, 
affecting memory and recall. The more recent an event is, the more easily it is 
recalled, which increases its availability and hence our judgements about an event’s 
probability.
The representativeness heuristic judges the likeliness of a particular outcome 
or event by asking the question, ‘to what extent does X represent Y?’ Psychologists 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have found that people perceive more detailed 
and specific scenarios to be more representative, or plausible, than general, less 
detailed ones, even though more general ones are statistically more probable.11 
Therefore, increasing the amount of detail in describing any event or scenario 
increases its perceived representativeness. Thus, we perceive any event described in- 
depth and detail as more probable not because it is statistically more probable 
(actually, it is usually less probable), but because it conforms to the way we imagine 
events taking place in a highly specific manner. Questions of representativeness often 
involve errors of omission when considering probability. For example, 
decisionmakers often ignore ‘base rate’ information, that is, information on the 
relative frequency an event or outcome occurs, and neglect to factor in the idea of
9 Roger Brown, Social Psychology, Second Edition (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 258- 
275.
10 Pious, p. 126.
11 For example, in a reader’s survey Pious asks subjects to judge the probability o f the following two 
scenarios: ‘Scenario 1: An all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Scenario 2: A 
situation in which neither country intends to attack the other side with nuclear weapons, but an all-out 
nuclear war between the United States and Russia is triggered by the actions of a third country such as 
Iraq, Libya, Israel, or Pakistan’. Subjects judge Scenario 2 to be most likely because it is how we 
imagine events unfolding, even though its likelihood is less probable. Pious, pp. 110-112.
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regression to the mean (that is, that extremes in events, outcomes, or performance do 
not necessarily follow each other; instead a more general regression to the ‘average’ 
outcome will likely follow).12 In terms of international relations, for example, this 
principle suggests that periods of extreme global violence (which could be considered 
statistical outliers) are not representative; they do not necessarily herald the beginning 
of a greater ‘age of chaos’. Instead, such periods are more likely to be followed by a 
return to ‘average’ levels of violence worldwide.
Finally, the heuristic of surface commonalities or mere appearance suggests 
that we choose those frameworks which have perceived (and often superficial) 
similarities with each other. Out of any group of possible variables, which ones do we 
concentrate on to compare similarities? Those variables that are chosen for specific 
attention by policymakers often share one important characteristic: salience—that is, 
a dominant, obvious, or even extreme trait that commands attention. We choose to 
lavish attention on salient factors because we perceive them to be more causal than 
other factors, often wrongly. Therefore, policymakers’ perceptions of causality will 
be influenced by where their attention is turned, which is a function of salience and 
the appearance of surface similarities.13
Additionally, policymakers can make various other errors of causality (known 
as attribution errors), the most common of which is known as the fundamental 
attribution error. This error is the tendency of observers mistakenly to attribute 
various behaviours to dispositional factors, that is, to traits specific to a person or 
group (agents), rather than to impersonal or general situational factors (structures or 
systems). While most participants attribute their actions to the situation in which they 
find themselves—and perhaps even see themselves as reacting to the situation or to 
larger events—outside observers often attribute others’ actions as resulting from the 
traits of individual personalities or the group. When observers are negatively disposed 
towards certain individuals or groups, attributing actions to immutable traits becomes 
the basis for prejudice, especially since observers generally see others as less variable 
and multifaceted than themselves.14
Therefore, we may be more prone to attribute rational situational influences as 
the causes of our own actions, but perceive others as behaving less rationally based
12 Pious, pp. 109-120.
13/&</., pp. 178-180. 
u Ibid., pp. 180-187.
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on their presumed dispositional (character) traits. This attribution error may explain 
why Western policymakers may be more inclined to define Western actions in terms 
of rational adjustments to an existing situation, structure, or system while attributing 
the cause of others’ behaviour to cultural, religious, or other dispositional traits. 
Indeed, in international relations, the dispositional versus situational question of 
causality may lie at the heart of the discipline’s agent/structure debate.15
These various heuristic devices and their limitations and biases often lead to 
the selection and application of incorrect, often superficial, analogies and metaphors 
by policymakers in international relations.16 Most importantly perhaps, once these 
analogies and metaphors are developed and repeated many times, they become 
durable and persevere, gaining what scholars of political communication call 
‘interpretive dominance’ even in the face of contradicting evidence. Thus, consistent 
exposure to and repetition of various metaphors and analogies can lead to the creation
17of a default framework of policy analysis that anchors subsequent information.
In the next sections, we will examine Romantic aspects in the work of Kaplan, 
Huntington, and van Creveld, including the Romantically-themed analogies and 
metaphors they develop, and we will investigate how this has impacted their views of 
the conflict in former Yugoslavia. We also will comment on the types of heuristic 
devices and biases that their works present.
3.2 Postmodern Jeremiah—Kaplan and the ‘coming anarchy’
‘And I  will send the sword, the famine, and the pestilence, among 
them, till they be consumed from off the land that I  gave unto them and 
their fathers. '
—Jeremiah, 24:1018
War, famine, and disease are some of the common threads that bind American 
journalist Robert D. Kaplan’s disparate work together. While ostensibly a travel
15 For some discussion on the fundamental attribution error in the construction of identity and the 
agent/structure debate, see Paul Kowert, ‘Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National 
Identity’, in Paul Kowert, Vendulka Kubalkova, and Nicolas Onuf, eds., International Relations in a 
Constructed World (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 101-122.
16 Khong, pp. 29-46.
17 For a discussion of the role of exposure and repetition in persuasion, see Philip G. Zimbardo and 
Michael R. Leippe, The Psychology o f Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991), pp. 168-181.
18 Old Testament, King James Version.
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writer, Kaplan’s work has grander pretensions than this humble title suggests. Indeed, 
Kaplan has been one of the most influential populisers of the Zeitgeist of Postmodern 
Romanticism and its inherent pessimism whose travelogues filled with dire 
predictions on the state of the world have graced the pages of The Atlantic Monthly, 
an intellectually well-regarded and influential magazine published in the United 
States. Kaplan has used the magazine as a springboard for his views, some of which 
have also been reprinted in books. He is occasionally featured in columns and 
commentaries in such mainstream, Establishment newspapers in the United States as 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. He is also a 
Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation. Kaplan is influential in military 
circles—he lectures frequently to the US military and was a consultant to the US 
Army’s Special Forces Regiment. His articles and books are widely cited, and he is 
invited to high profile meetings and events as a top speaker on international relations 
and the future of conflict.
Although Kaplan has been prominently criticised for writing ‘alarmist 
jumbles’ and for using African conflicts as ‘passive foils for the psychoses of others’, 
his work nevertheless had a significant impact on US policy during the Clinton 
administration, particularly with regard to US policy on Bosnia. President Clinton 
noted Kaplan’s influence on his views of the Yugoslav conflict several times, 
including in front of then Secretary of Defence Les Aspin and then Joint Chiefs of 
Staff chairman Colin Powell.19 As Sabrina Ramet noted, Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts had 
a ‘baneful influence, infecting the rhetoric of British Prime Minister John Major and, 
by their own admission, influencing the thinking of US President Bill Clinton and EU
OCimediator David Lord Owen’. This section will discuss some of this work and its 
influence over the past decade, beginning with an analysis of Kaplan’s methodology. 
Afterwards, we will examine how Kaplan uses this methodology to expound on the
19 See Toby Lester, ‘Beyond “The Coming Anarchy”’, The Atlantic Monthly (August 1996). Toby 
Lester has written about Kaplan’s influence in the White House during the Clinton era as well as about 
Kaplan’s critics. President Clinton was said to have been stunned by Kaplan’s work and made it 
required reading in the White House. Additionally, Kaplan discusses this in an interview with Toby 
Lester in ‘Manifest Destiny’, The Atlantic Unbound, 18 September 1998. (The Atlantic Unbound is the 
The Atlantic Monthly magazine’s online edition.). Yahya Sadowski has also discussed Kaplan’s 
influence on the Clinton administration’s Bosnia policy in The Myth o f Global Chaos (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), pp. 13,67, 68, and 72.
20 Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and 
the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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Romantic themes we have identified, and how the heuristic devices and biases 
presented in his works make his views influential.
The first work of Kaplan’s we will discuss is a series of travelogues published 
in 1998 in the Atlantic Monthly'. ‘Travels Into America’s Future’.21 In this series, later 
published as a book, Empire Wilderness: Travels Into America’s Future, Kaplan 
explores the US Southwest and Mexico, as well as the US Pacific Northwest and 
Canada as microcosms of what the future holds in store for the Americas.
Considering that we will be focusing on aspects of Kaplan’s writing that deal with the 
former Yugoslavia, it might seem unusual to discuss these writings at all, as the 
regions that Kaplan discusses in this text—all in North America—are not in conflict. 
However, we will start with these articles because they give us the sharpest insight 
into Kaplan’s analytical technique and methodological approach. Why? These two 
articles, which were conceived as a single work, provide us within a unified text with 
the strongest contrast between different places that Kaplan visits—the Third and First 
Worlds. As we will see, throughout the travelogue on North America, there is a 
distinct difference in the way in which Kaplan reports his travels through Mexico 
from those in the US or Canada. These differences—which highlight his analysis and 
methodology—may not be so readily apparent in a text which focuses simply on one 
region, such as the Balkans. Additionally, these regions in North America, as well as 
their societies and histories, are also familiar to many in the West, and therefore 
Kaplan’s analysis may be more readily scrutinised. Finally, we will use the same 
method of analysis in comparing Kaplan’s work that focuses on the former 
Yugoslavia. Further, we will argue that Kaplan’s methods, and the conclusions that 
result from his analysis, stem not only from logical errors, but also partly from 
heuristic biases and attribution errors.
We will first look at the main techniques that Kaplan uses to derive his 
analyses: use of vivid language; focus on aesthetics to draw essentialist sociological 
conclusions; haphazard collection of anecdotal facts; and lack of attention to possible 
alternative explanations. While we examine these issues, we will discuss how his 
work fits the major themes of Romanticism we outlined in the last two chapters: anti­
21 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Travels into America’s Future: Mexico and the Southwest’, The Atlantic 
Monthly (Volume 282, No. 1, July 1998), pp. 47-68, and Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Travels into America’s 
Future: Southern California and the Pacific Northwest’, The Atlantic Monthly (Vol. 282, No. 2, August 
1998), pp. 37-61.
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rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and the use of nature as an aesthetic and 
ethic. For example, Kaplan’s work draws heavily on the assumption that people’s 
actions are based on irrational motivations, often those deeply rooted in a 
dysfunctional culture. Kaplan also primarily presents anecdotal evidence (some of it 
nostalgic) that is interpreted pessimistically, formed in a highly personal and 
impressionistic manner (for example, by simply strolling through an area rather than 
using more systematic techniques), which he then uses to draw broad, empirical 
social generalisations that are not tenable. Unfortunately, he often does not consider 
possible alternative explanations when forming conclusions. Finally, Kaplan bases a 
significant amount of his judgement of people, their motivations, their character, and 
their level of ‘civilisation’ on a key Romantic trope: the use of aesthetic judgements 
to draw historical, sociological, or ethical conclusions. In particular, Kaplan uses 
vivid language to describe the physical landscape and the people he encounters which 
is an especially potent persuasive technique.
(a) Reading Meanings into the Landscape—Kaplan’s Methods and
Approach
The concept of nature and the importance of aesthetics is an important Romantic 
theme. Kaplan largely relays the aesthetics of his surroundings through the technique 
of vivid language. What is significant about Kaplan’s writing is its vividness, which 
captures and captivates his audience, increasing its availability and perception of 
plausibility. Kaplan has an affinity for creative description that strikes the reader as 
almost akin to watching a film or television—the images, crafted through strong 
verbs and liberal use of adjectives, unfold clearly in the reader’s mind’s eye and 
become real. Kaplan’s forte is capturing the space around him—its sights, sounds, 
smells and other sensual aspects of the places he visits. This is both its strength and 
its weakness.
There is a danger in the use of vivid language in that it can be used to 
supercede logic, by basing its appeal on mere ‘appearance’ alone, which leads to 
severely flawed judgements. It is this part of the logical flaw that makes Kaplan draw 
essentialist conclusions from his anecdotes. Yet the use of vivid language is a staple 
of travel writing, so what differentiates Kaplan’s work from others in the genre? What 
makes Kaplan’s work different is that it goes beyond mere travelogue; Kaplan draws
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heavily on his physical surroundings—that he persuasively describes through vivid 
language—in order to make more attenuated social, historical, political, and moral 
judgements. These descriptions are not neutral, but rather are imbued with either 
pessimistic or optimistic connotations which imply social or ethical judgements.
Thus, his writing is not merely about a place, but also about the ‘essence’ of its 
people, their history, their society, their level of ‘civilisation’, and their morality. He 
uses these ‘essences’ to causally attribute actions to people, relying on a dispositional 
rather than situational interpretation of causality. He then uses these conclusions 
about causality to draw broad foreign policy prescriptions which have resonance with 
American policymakers and political commentators.
We see the use of this technique often in Kaplan’s work. For example, the 
travelogue through Mexico and the American Southwest begins as Kaplan travels by 
bus to the north of Mexico bordering on Texas, with a pessimistic depiction of the
landscape and people. He begins with a bleak description of desperate people
00scratching a meagre living on a desolate wasteland. Kaplan is immediately struck 
by the ugliness of northern Mexico. For Kaplan, there are no dirt roads with mere 
potholes, instead he declares them to be ‘cratered’; clouds are not ‘grey’ they are 
‘iron’-coloured, conveying a sense of heaviness and despair; the landscape may lack a 
‘poisoned ugliness’, but it is nevertheless ‘environmentally ravaged’ and scarred by 
‘bleak underdevelopment and deforestation’. Indeed, Kaplan takes his forlorn 
description so far to declare that even the town’s green spaces are ‘overgrown and 
scruffy’, while the washing lines ‘sag’.23
After situating the reader mentally in this depressing physical space, Kaplan 
then moves on to recount ‘the’ history of the place—a sad tale of brutal Spanish 
conquest, of Cortez and the conquistadors (‘crude zealots’)—and of the ‘macabre’ 
savagery of the Indians, with their ‘human sacrifices’, which he juxtaposes with a 
comment about the difference between the ‘Enlightenment Europeans’ who came to 
build the US and the barbaric nature of Spanish rule in Mexico.24
This combination of a depressing physical description of the landscape and a 
pessimistic socio-historical commentary forms the pattern that Kaplan follows
22 Kaplan, ‘Travels into America's Future: Mexico and the Southwest’, hereafter ‘Mexico and the 
Southwest’, p. 47.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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throughout, with the current material living conditions of the locals serving as a 
reflection of their historical or social patterns. Throughout the text, Kaplan’s work 
exhibits signs of several classical historians’ fallacies—selection bias (very highly 
selective use of history); telescopic history (making a very long and multifacted story 
very short and simple); tunnel history (the past leads inevitably to the contemporary 
situation); and presumptions of historical continuity (or inertia) in the case of Third 
World peoples, coupled with occasional presumptions of historical change (or 
dynamism) in the case of those in the First World.25
However, the first fallacy we readily notice is Kaplan’s insistence on the 
literal truth of physical beauty—that beauty is more than skin deep: aesthetically 
pleasing surroundings imply a contented, democratic, free, efficient, hardworking, or 
moral populace. Ugly also goes straight to the bone—sagging washing lines imply 
laziness, inefficiency, despotism, or criminality. Like the Romantic poets, Kaplan 
reads meaning into the landscape. Hence Kaplan’s version of historical logic is 
summed up by Keats—‘“beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all / Ye know on earth 
and all ye need to know’” . The aesthetic fallacy leads Kaplan to tell either beautiful 
truths or ugly ones. The beautiful ones are usually told about the Americans and 
Canadians. The ugly ones are told about the Mexicans.
In one passage, the physical scars on the Mexican landscape betray deeper 
historical ones, lurking deep in the heart of a people. For example, Kaplan combines a 
sombre description of Ixtldn del Rio, with a telling historical point:
I opened the window curtains and saw dusty streets, broken sidewalks, and 
windows protected by metal bars; a man in worn and filthy clothes slowly 
cutting sugarcane; women with plastic buckets waiting in line for water; 
peeling posters advertising a bullfight; and men partly uniformed and carrying 
AK-47 assault rifles. On one comer was a white-tiled shrine holding busts of 
three early-twentieth-century revolutionaries: Francisco Madero, Venustiano 
Carranza, and Emiliano Zapata. I knew that they had fought one another and 
that each had been assassinated.27
The deprived physical environment—‘dusty’, ‘broken’, ‘filthy’, ‘peeling’—is merely 
the outward manifestation of an even uglier social history, littered with assassinated 
revolutionaries, the symbols of a failed past.
25 For a discussion on these fallacies, see David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a 
Logic o f Historical Thought (New York, NY: Harper, 1970).
26 John Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’, 49-50 (1819).
27 ‘Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 48.
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Further on, Kaplan uses the same technique to describe Tepic and its 
residents—by turns punctuated with ‘boxy buildings marred by graffiti’, a ‘treeless 
wilderness of broken signs [...] and hard right angles’, filled with ‘architectural 
bleakness’ —which he pairs with the spiritual and moral emptiness of the social 
environment:
[l]ater, in the hotel restaurant, half a dozen young men in jeans, T-shirts, and 
Nikes entered. Two of them carried Magnum revolvers, which they carefully 
placed on the chair cushions and then sat on. They ate a three-course meal 
without the slightest show of discomfort.29
Yet Tepic, and by way of corollary the rest of Mexico, is not merely physically 
ravaged or socially deprived. It is also lost—its people are either in ‘denial’ of their 
brutal past or are ‘ambivalent’ about it, both of which have dire implications for its 
future. How do we know? Kaplan asks two hapless receptionists at a local hotel and 
tourist office workers about the Spanish explorer Coronado, and draws a universal 
blank. The implication seems to be that a people so out of touch with its own history 
cannot understand its future.31
This method of drawing conclusions is typical of Kaplan’s work. Kaplan does 
not merely commit the fallacy of the lonely fact once;32 he does it consistently, 
drawing generalisations from a single anecdote. The evidence he gathers is 
haphazard—asking a question of two or three people who happen to be in the 
vicinity—and the resulting effort is just a ‘lonely fact’ from which broad 
generalisations are not sustainable. Kaplan does not seek out any empirical evidence, 
solid case studies, or expert opinion about Mexicans’ knowledge of their own 
history—of what they know, their attitudes about the past, and what it means (if 
anything) for the future.
The first full introduction we get to the US is in Tucson, which sharply 
contrasts with first impressions of Mexico. The American city is all ‘luminous 
metallic signs’, ‘landscaped roadsides’, and ‘upscale mini-malls’, in a ‘warm and
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid
30 ‘Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 48
31 Interestingly, Kaplan considers the historical amnesia of many Americans to be a positive factor in 
economic development as it frees Americans from their past, making the US more dynamic and open 
to experimentation and innovation.
32 The fallacy of the lonely fact is when a scholar uses a singular ‘lonely’ fact in order to extrapolate a 
much larger conclusion, which is only supportable with many more facts. See Hackett Fischer, p. 109- 
110.
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scenic desert location’ peopled with ‘prosperous retirees with independent 
incomes’. Kaplan continually suffuses his text with this optimistic, even nostalgic, 
image of pristine cleanliness, angularity, standardisation, and seeming tidiness, less as 
mere description and more as a general commentary on the inherent moral virtues and 
wholesomeness of American society, whose ‘silent streets’ and ‘their display of 
noncoercive order and industriousness, cast the United States in a different light not 
only from Mexico but from many of the other countries I had seen in my travels’.34 
Kaplan’s America nostalgically retains an almost-1950s quality about it, with order 
and efficiency the defining themes.
At the same time, ‘the chaos of Mexican construction’35—the shoddy material 
landscape of Mexico—is visible proof that ‘centuries of oriental despotism’ have kept
36Mexico down despite the influence of ‘a great democratic civilization to the north’. 
Even worse, Mexico may never be able to replicate the economic dynamism of its 
northern neighbour, since ‘[t]he unpalatable truth about Mexico is its 
intractability—the intractability of an ancient “hydraulic” civilization [....] in which 
the need to build great water and earth works [...] led to a vast, bureaucratic 
tyranny’.37 The past is surely prologue, at least for Mexicans.
Kaplan’s reliance on aesthetics to draw social conclusions causes his analyses 
to misfire seriously. For example, in his travels through the US Southwest and 
Mexico, Kaplan is surprised to learn of criminality in a ‘well-maintained’ Tucson, 
Arizona, suburb:
When Strong told me about the drive-by shootings and the crack houses, I was 
truly surprised: I saw well-maintained tract houses with metal or asphalt roofs 
and white-painted brick; some even had gardens of bougainvillea and 
oleander, despite the arid desert soil. The only hints of working-class poverty 
were old pickups and the occasional sagging clothesline.38
While here Kaplan admits surprise at his mistaken analysis, one where American 
material success is a sign of proper behaviour and lack of criminality, it does not 
cause him to question how it may reflect on the rest of his social judgements; indeed,
33Ibid., p. 55.
34Ibid., p. 54.
35 Ibid., p. 53.
™ Ibid., p. 52.
37 Ibid., p. 52. The comment on ‘hydraulic civilisation’ is a reference to Karl A. Wittfogel’s Oriental 
Despotism (1957). Wittfogel hypothesised that oriental civilisations became despotic because of a need 
to control water resources, which made them essentially different from the West.
38 ‘Travels into America’s Future: Mexico and the Southwest’, p. 57.
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he continues a similar travelogue-cwm-sociological commentary in his follow up work 
on Southern California and the Pacific Northwest.39
For example, equally mistakenly in this travels to California and the Pacific 
Northwest, Kaplan observes while strolling in a Latino community in Los Angeles 
that bridal shops are ‘suggestive of strong family patterns’ (unlike the black 
community), offering a pat cultural reason for the phenomenon rather than seeking a 
rational alternative explanation—a demographic bulge of youth of marriageable age 
among Latinos.40 Or, Kaplan notes that the influx of new Chinese immigrants to the 
region are particularly wealthy, and again commits the fundamental attribution error 
by concluding that they are therefore more diligent, hardworking, successful—and 
thus better immigrants. However, he again fails to consider an alternative 
explanation—the significant flight of Chinese capital from Hong Kong to Canada and 
the US in the late 1990s following the handover of British sovereignty to China.
Those best able to expatriate their profits did so as rapidly as possible.41 This pattern 
repeats itself throughout his works; Kaplan consistently offers dispositional factors 
rather than situational ones as causal explanations. In essence, Kaplan does not 
consider possible alternatives and instead draws value-laden sociological judgements 
based on anecdotes, often obtained in a haphazard way. These judgements reflect 
social prejudices about certain groups, implying a clear hierarchy, from poor to rich, 
with blacks on the bottom, Latinos next, and wealthy Asian immigrants on top.
In some sections of the text on his travels through North America, Kaplan 
slips into an essentialist analysis, betraying a disdain for Mexican ‘values’ and 
admiration for America ‘values’. For example, in one discussion of Latinos in the 
United States, Kaplan seems to imply that the only hope for Mexicans is if they 
become Americans even if this is merely the superficial adoption of American (or 
European) good habits and manners, particularly economic efficiency. If lucky, they 
may even be able to become ‘thoroughly modem’:
The people I saw on the street [in Arizona] were in most instances speaking 
Spanish, but they might as well have been speaking English. Whether it was 
the quality of their clothes, the purposeful stride that indicated they were 
going somewhere rather than just hanging out, the absence of hand
39 Kaplan, ‘Travels into America’s Future: Southern California and the Pacific Northwest’, hereafter 
‘Southern California and the Pacific Northwest’.
40 Ibid., p. 40.
41 Ibid, pp. 40-42.
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movements when they talked, or the impersonal and mechanical friendliness 
of their voices when I asked directions, they seemed to me thoroughly modem 
compared with the Spanish-speakers over in Sonora [Mexico]. The sterility, 
dullness, and predictability I observed on the American side of the 
border—very building part in its place—were signs of economic efficiency.42
Here Kaplan commits the fallacy of special pleading—that is, using a double 
standard of inference and interpretation 43 Kaplan seems to see the Mexican adoption 
of European values (or at least the mere appearance of European mores and manners, 
such as fashionable European clothing, ‘purposeful’ striding, and lack of 
gesticulation) as a path to transcendence—to obliterate a dysfunctional past, and 
replace it with a functional present and future, unlike the other incapable peoples of 
the South. Interestingly, Kaplan views this obliteration, a form of purposeful 
historical amnesia, as a positive force in the US, while at the same time condemning 
it in Mexicans. As outlined earlier, at the same time he questions how Mexicans— 
seemingly ambivalent, ignorant, or in denial about their violent history—can progress 
without knowing their past. Thus, Kaplan ascribes two different meanings and draws 
two distinct conclusions (and makes opposite judgements) about the same 
phenomenon. The only difference is whether he is speaking about Mexico or the 
United States.
Throughout, Kaplan draws broad conclusions and offers a strong opinion 
based on weak method; thus, at several points Kaplan’s work is, at best, a 
combination of extremely detailed (mainly pessimistic or nostalgic) descriptions and 
a series of personal anecdotes. However, it is precisely this weak method which 
resonates with his audience and which makes his work memorable. By eschewing 
sound, yet pallid, information such as statistics or academic studies and relying on 
anecdotes and personal testimonies, Kaplan boosts the credibility and plausibility of 
his conclusions because the information he presents becomes readily available in the 
mind of his reader. Additionally, Kaplan’s detailed word pictures and eye for the 
minutiae of life also increase the perceived representativeness of his information, 
while his reliance on the most prominent and obvious features enhance its 
plausibility. We will meet these and other biases in his work on the Balkans.
42 ‘Mexico and the Southwest’, pp. 53-54.
43 Hackett Fischer, p. 110-113.
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(b) Ethnic Cauldron?—Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts
As we have seen from this overview of Kaplan’s writings on the Americas, Kaplan 
reflects various moods of the post-Cold War Romantic Zeitgeist, in particular its 
pessimism, emphasis on the irrational aspects of human nature, nostalgia for an often- 
idealised past, and the use of nature as an ethic and aesthetic. We will now examine 
how these techniques have been applied to his views on the former Yugoslavia.
With his dystopian vision of conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Robert Kaplan 
sprang to intellectual prominence as one of the new prophets of the post-Cold War 
world with his widely-read and influential Balkan Ghosts.44 Indeed, one scholar notes 
the particular influence of this work on US policymaking circles: ‘Balkan Ghosts was 
the only readable, up-to-date account of political life among the Serbs and Croats 
available when many Americans (including those who slept in the White House) were 
scrambling to understand the Bosnian tragedy’.45 A US Naval War College 
publication notes in a short blurb to one of Kaplan’s articles that Balkan Ghosts 
‘directly influenced US foreign policy in that region’.46 Throughout the work, Kaplan 
uses similar techniques to the ones in used to describe the Americas: vivid 
descriptions in a travelogue style; use of aesthetic assessments to stand in as 
historical, cultural, and ethical judgements; use of historical analogies to discuss 
present-day problems; and finally a focus on the irrational, emotional, and relativistic 
aspects of the human condition, especially the obduracy of culture and religion as 
inescapable categories that determine historical destiny.
Kaplan opens his vision of the Balkans with a quote from Rebecca West: she 
had come to Yugoslavia ‘to see what history meant in flesh and blood’, both a lyrical 
and gruesome notion 47 He then moves into his travelogue style of describing a 
nostalgic sense of place, and linking it with his pessimistic view of both history and 
its implications for the future. Thus Kaplan analogises the past as an object, being 
‘underfoot’ in Croatia, like a soggy carpet of leaves, or as a hole in the Zagreb fog. 
The place itself is depressing, a ‘shadow-show’ (in the words of Rebecca West), a
44 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York, NY: Vintage Books,
1994).
45 Yahya Sadowski, The Myth o f Global Chaos (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997),
p. 6.
46 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-First Century’, US 
Naval War College, Jerome E. Levy Occasional Paper, Economic Geography and World Order (No. 2, 
August 2001).
47 Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, p. 4.
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tragedy where people ‘become phantoms’, a place of ‘primitive ferocity’ with a 
history of ‘forty-five years of systemized poverty’ under communism.48 Yet Croatia’s 
deeper past, the past of Austria-Hungary, is still there in the ‘luxurious decadence’ 
and ‘delicious gloom’ of Zagreb, a mini ‘fin-de-siecle Vienna’. All the signs of the 
degenerate Austrian Secession period and its subtext of louche disregard for the 
norms of propriety are there. In Zagreb’s Esplanade hotel:
The lobby and dining hall resembled a cluttered art gallery whose pictures 
recalled the universe of Sigmund Freud, Gustav Klimt, and Oscar Kokoschka: 
modernist iconography that indicates social disintegration and the triumph of 
violence and sexual instinct over the rule of law 49
In contrast with his descriptions of Croatia, which begin in the corrupt 
cosmopolitanism of an urban centre, Kaplan begins his treatise on Serbia in the pure, 
ascetic confines of the Gracanica monastery, with its Byzantine masterpiece of the 
suffering of John the Baptist, a figure ‘distorted by hunger’ who was ‘too preoccupied 
with ideas to notice his physical suffering’, which is a ‘particularly oriental strength’ 
that serves Kaplan’s starting point for understanding the Serbs.50 These separate 
visions, one of degenerate urbanites the other of rural monks, set up Kaplan’s 
dichotomy of Yugoslavia, a place where the debauched West, with its emphasis on 
commerce and pragmatism, meets the spiritual East, and its emphasis on magic and 
beauty. Indeed, Kaplan plays out a Huntingtonian theory of East and West 
churches—one of Western ideas and deeds versus Eastern splendour and mysticism 
which engenders inherently conflicting approaches to life.
The inevitable clash of civilisations between East and West—or where ‘Asia 
meets Europe’, as Kaplan again quotes Rebecca West—‘the ultimate historical and 
cultural conflict’ is the broader theme of Kaplan’s book which he primarily explores 
through the prism of religion and how it creates primordial identity attachments that 
ultimately lead to tragedy.51 Indeed, most of Kaplan’s section on Yugoslavia is a 
pessimistic tale of competing religions with repeated emphasis on images of 
Christianity and on the differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. While some 
attention is paid to the notion of Yugoslavism and such figures as Yugoslavist Bishop
™ Ibid., p. 5.
49 Ibid., p. 6.
50 Ibid, pp. 29-30.
51 Ibid., p. 7.
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Jure Strossmayer, the focus remains squarely on religion as a locus of identity in 
Yugoslavia. In Croatia, Kaplan mainly examines the Catholic Church and particularly 
the debate over Cardinal Alojze Stepinac—his fanaticism, bigotry, and ‘Cromwellian 
air’—and his relationship with the fascist Ustashe puppet state during World War II. 
While certainly Stepinac is part of the story of the Catholic Church, Kaplan’s text 
makes it seem as if it were the only story, as he returns to this theme time and again: 
Stepinac’s guilty ghost clearly stalks not only the region, but Kaplan as well.
Kaplan repeats this sense of the tragic and nostalgic in Serbia, noting ‘[a]s I 
had tried to intuit the sensibility of Croatia’s national problem through its cathedral, I 
tried to do the same with respect to Serbia through its monasteries.’ Kaplan begins 
his religious history of Serbian orthodoxy not during World War n, as with the 
Croats, but 800 years ago, charting the history of the Serbian church and state from 
the time of Stefan Nemanja to his son Sveta Sava (Saint Sava), and later to his 
descendent King Milutin, of whom Kaplan paints a scandalous picture of lust for 
women and voracious ‘sexual proclivities and imperialist ambitions’ which included 
Milutin consummating his marriage to the six-year old daughter of Byzantine 
emperor Andronicus as part of a deal to keep him out of Constantinople.54 Whether 
discussing Serbia or Croatia, Kaplan’s emphasis remains squarely on the emotional 
aspects of human action, with a pessimistic undertone of instinctive violence and 
barely-concealed primitive desire.
While Kaplan makes an uncharacteristic foray into an economic interpretation 
of the reasons for Yugoslavia’s demise, noting that ‘positions [between Yugoslavia’s 
republics] hardened under the weight of increased poverty, an annual inflation rate of 
several thousand percent, and the fragmentation of the Yugoslav federation’,55 he 
maintains that the real battle between Yugoslavia’s national groups is one over the 
historical meaning, real or imagined, of a thousand different forms of suffering which 
forged their national identities, whether from the almost mythical past, like the history 
of Kosovo Polje, or of more recent nostalgic vintage, like the horrors of World War 
II. Through these references to a tragic past, Kaplan consistently implies that 
Yugoslavia’s core problem may be ‘too much history’, or at least too many collective 
memories of suffering and grief, implying that a form of historical amnesia might be
52 Ibid., pp. 9-16.
53 Ibid, p. 30.
SA Ibid., p. 31.
55 Ibid., p. 13.
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a potent cure for the region’s ills. Yet this is a form of special pleading: it is precisely 
this historical forgetting that Kaplan deplores in his other travels through Mexico, 
where he signals that a nation so out of touch with its past cannot have a future.
Kaplan’s characterisations of people are also instrumental to this task. For 
example, the first Croat Kaplan meets in Zagreb is Slavenka Drakulic, the well- 
known writer, dressed ‘with a panache that complemented’ her opulent surroundings 
in the Esplanade hotel: ‘designer black glasses’ and ‘a bright red headband that 
perfectly matched her red blouse and lipstick’. Drakulic provides Kaplan with an 
expertly articulated argument about Yugoslavia’s downfall, drawing parallels to the 
Soviet Union.56 By contrast, the first Serb Kaplan meets in Kosovo (which he uses as 
his set piece to discuss the Serbian mentality) Kaplan describes as a ‘peasant’— 
Mother Tatiana, a nun with a ‘strong, lusty appearance’ and eyes ‘strangely 
unfocused, as though blotted out by superstition’.57 Mother Tatiana is no sophisticate 
and does not wax historic or provide complex political analyses; she is prone to 
simplistic, nationalistic outbursts against Albanians. Thus, Kaplan again 
pessimistically underscores the differences between East and West through a 
bifurcated cultural prism—educated, pragmatic West versus uneducated, superstitious 
East—based on a few personal conversations and other anecdotal evidence. However, 
whether educated urbanites or unsophisticated peasants, both inevitably seethe with 
historical and cultural resentments: the Croats over the ever-present ghosts of Austria- 
Hungary, the Serbs over the fact that the wealth and prosperity of Western Europe 
was ‘constructed over [their] bones’, and both over World War II.59
Kaplan also tries to provide an irrational, emotionally-based explanation for 
the ‘tribal’ nature of Yugoslavia and its ‘tendency’ towards mass fanaticism: ‘[the] 
psychologically closed, tribal nature tribal nature of the Serbs, Croats, and others 
makes them [...] suited to crowd symbols’.60 The clear image is that these people are 
pre-modem, reacting to deep, irrational passions and emotive primitive symbols 
rather than reason, ‘full of suspicions and hatreds’.61 Kaplan highlights this idea by
56 Ibid, p. 6.
57 Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid, pp. 33-34.
59 Ibid., pp.23-36 and 33.
60 Ibid., p. 16.
61 This is one of Kaplan’s comments on Bosnia. He also adds that Bosnia is replete with villages ‘full 
of savage hatreds, leavened by poverty and alcoholism’, Ibid., pp. 22-23.
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paraphrasing West’s comment on the fall of the Ottoman empire, that ‘there is a lot of 
emotion loose about the Balkans which has lost its legitimate employment’.
Kaplan’s use of sources also reveals his pessimistic vision of history as an 
inescapable tragedy that will be repeated over and over again by successive 
generations. For example, Kaplan makes extensive use of old sources to confirm and 
colour his own views. He uses West’s 1937 pessimistic travelogue extensively 
throughout to guide him and to pepper his own views of Yugoslavia, which he 
considers as relevant today as when they were written. He also uses the accounts of 
pessimistic observers John Reed (1915) and Nevill Forbes (also from 1915) to 
provide an analysis of the contemporary situation in Yugoslavia, as if nothing, 
especially the mentality of the people, had changed in 75 years.62 This is despite the 
fact that in those 75 years the regions which later became Yugoslavia went from 
being one of the poorest and most poorly educated in Europe to Western levels of 
literacy and technical education, with the highest standard of living in communist 
Eastern Europe. Thus, Kaplan’s work is stuck in a time warp of interpretation. By 
relying so heavily on such pessimistic sources, Kaplan is almost compelled to see a 
grim future in a gloomy past, using selection bias, a reliance on tunnel history (all 
tunnels lead to today), and the telescopic fallacy (making a very long history very 
short through selective facts) which limit his vision.63 Had Kaplan chosen to follow 
the work of another commentator who travelled to the region during West’s time, 
such as journalist Elizabeth Wiskemann, he might have had a different view on 
Yugoslavia.64
While Kaplan extrapolates more of a theory with less material than many 
writers, his thesis—that the religious basis of identity and historical animosities 
created the conditions of a Balkan tinderbox and generated the war in Yugoslavia—is 
highly persuasive for policymakers because it fits several key criteria for successful 
heuristic devices: easy availability; recency; high perception of representativeness; 
and use of surface commonalities, especially salience, to draw conclusions. First, 
Kaplan’s information is easily available (memorable) to policymakers because his 
writing is so vivid and emotional, as well as based on compelling first-hand
62 Ibid., pp. 25 and 35 (Forbes); pp. 8, 34, 35, 38, and 52 (Reed); and pp. 1 ,4 ,10 ,26 , 35, 52, 58, and 
72 (West).
63 For a discussion on the logical fallacies of tunnel history and telescopic history, see Hackett-Fischer, 
pp. 142 (tunnel history) and 147 (telescopic fallacy).
64 Elizabeth Wiskemann, Undeclared War (London: Constable, 1939).
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experiences and conversations rather than on pallid academic statistics. His 
information is also recent (the war in the former Yugoslavia was ongoing at the time 
of his writing), boosting its ease of recall. Second, Kaplan’s information has a high 
perception of representativeness because it contains rich details, which are important 
in helping his audience imagine his scenarios unfold, thus making policymakers’ 
judgements of their probability, and the concomitant acceptance of Kaplan’s ideas, 
more likely. Finally, Kaplan’s use of surface commonalities, particularly the salience 
of ethnic differences—that is, since differing religious and cultural groups were in 
conflict, thus it was a conflict about religion and culture—boosts his believability 
since a factor’s prominence or obviousness is a key factor in its perceived importance 
and thus in the persuasiveness of Kaplan’s arguments.
For all these heuristic biases, perhaps Kaplan’s most significant weakness in 
Balkan Ghosts is promoting the ‘fundamental attribution error’—that of asserting that 
possibly situational actions of participants are actually dispositional, a function of the 
actors’ immutable group traits. This gives Kaplan’s writing the sense that the culture 
of the ‘Other’ is hermetic, unified, and unchanging rather than as complicated or 
multifaceted as that of the West and varying over time. Instead, this error promotes 
the understanding of identity as a fixed and given end rather than a means to an end 
and leads to silences about the possibilities for instrumentalising culture and religion 
to serve political purposes, or how the rhetoric of culture or religion can be used to 
achieve specific political goals.
3.3 Every One Against His Brother—Huntington’s culture clash
‘[A]nd they shall fight every one against his brother, and every one 
against his neighbour; city against city, and kingdom against 
kingdom. '
—Isaiah, 19:265
Does the future hold increasing conflict, pitting neighbour against neighbour across 
lines of culture and identity? Samuel Huntington’s controversial work, The Clash O f 
Civilizations, forcefully puts forward the thesis that conflicting cultural values along 
civilisational lines defined the post-Cold War conflicts of the 1990s and will be the
65 Old Testament, King James Version.
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shape of wars to come.66 While a variety of commentators have objected to 
Huntington’s claims, his paradigm of increasing civilisational conflict remains 
pervasive and influential.67 Indeed, Huntington’s work—which exhibits several traits 
common to Romanticism including pessimism, a sense of nostalgia, and a focus on 
irrational and relativistic factors—has reached a large audience outside the United 
States and the English-speaking world, particularly gaining a hearing with some 
Asian and Muslim scholars.
First, ‘clash of civilisations’ is an intrinsically pessimistic theory. Importantly, 
the theory contradicts the rationalist view that modernisation and economic 
development, including economic globalisation, along Western lines will lead to 
greater Westernisation or the acceptance of Western universal values. Rather, ‘clash’ 
theory argues that these processes have created various patterns of rejection and 
reform that threaten both the stability of non-Westem states and may set the stage for 
future clashes between different civilisations.69 Part of its pessimism is its declinism 
and cyclical sense of history. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory contains 
within it an unspoken understanding of the rise and decline of civilisation that is 
largely channelled through the intellectual prism of scholars with cyclical views of 
history, such as Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler, Fernand Braudel, and Carroll 
Quigley—philosophical pessimists to a man.70
The inherent declinism in these works tacitly pervades Huntington’s own 
thesis and informs the direction of his analysis. For example, without the implicit 
Romantic notion of cyclical history in ‘clash of civilisations’ theory, Huntington’s 
future of identity-based rivalries and conflicts would not necessarily be viewed as 
‘inevitable’, nor would the rise or decline of any particular civilisation be seen in this 
light. Indeed, so strong is the embedded understanding of a cyclical history within 
‘clash’ theory that Huntington’s thesis has attracted supporters among Romantics in 
the non-Westem world. These observers see outside (generally Western, often 
American) influences as normatively bad and share a declinist and melancholic,
66 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order (London: 
Touchstone Books, 1998). Huntington’s thesis was first published in 1993 as an essay in Foreign 
Affairs.
67 The Council on Foreign Relations has published a collection of essays of various criticisms and 
allowed Huntington a chance to respond. See Council on Foreign Relations, Samuel P. Huntington's 
The Clash o f Civilizations?: The Debate (New York, NY: Foreign Affairs, 1996).
68 Sadowski, p. 72.
69 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations.
70 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations, pp. 40-45 and 302-304.
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cyclical historical view of their own ‘decaying’ cultures. They therefore seek to create 
a separate carve-out for their own particularistic ethnic or national values, such as 
‘Asian values’ or ‘Islamic values’, which they believe have socially regenerative or 
spiritually redemptive qualities.
Second, Huntington’s emphasis on civilisations contains within it an unseen 
kernel of nostalgia. Fundamentally, descriptions of anything as broad as a 
‘civilisational character’ simplify the multiple historical strands, narratives, or themes 
that occur through time by reifying some and minimising others. Often those themes 
we choose to represent the ‘character’ of a civilisation while salient (in the sense of 
most obvious) are not necessarily the most important or enduring. They can be, 
however, the most nostalgic. Such character descriptions may be tales of how we 
wish to see ourselves and our past, rather than complete descriptions of the lived past. 
For example, Huntington’s description of Western civilisation focuses on a few key 
themes, in particular the rise of the West economically (through capitalism), militarily 
(through technological superiority), and politically (through democratisation). Thus, 
the great river of ‘Westemness’ has one fountainhead, only flows in one teleological 
direction, and has no tributaries. This creates the impression of a hermetic notion of 
‘Westemness’ as defined by these characteristics, which then become ideals by which 
all cultures are judged, rather than merely a potentially changing set of values or 
practices common to a specific group at a certain time. It also enshrines the rise and 
apogee of capitalism, innovation, and democracy in Western society as being firmly 
in the past, thus engendering a certain sense of decline and a nostalgia for those past 
Tost’ values.71
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington’s theory stresses the 
importance of anti-rationalism and relativism in international relations. ‘Clash’ theory 
sees so-called irrational and relativistic factors, such as culture and ethnicity, as the 
primary motivator for future conflicts—the principal fault lines of fragmentation— 
which will come about through increasing globalisation (or perhaps more accurately, 
through democratisation and Americanisation). ‘Clash’ theory takes as its basic unit 
not the state, which has traditionally been the focus of international relations, but 
more broadly the concept of ‘civilisations’. While the idea of ‘civilisation’ is always a
71 Huntington’s nostalgia about past ‘lost’ values is perhaps best outlined in a later book discussing the 
decline of traditionally Anglo-Protestant American values and the challenge of Latino culture. See 
Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster, 2004).
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slippery notion, Huntington presents a well-thought out concept of civilisation, 
despite many criticisms about the foundational problems about parsing identities 
while living in a so-called world of multiple or fluid identities that many of his critics
nosee as his main flaw. Huntington sees nine basic civilisations, mainly defined by 
religion, each with a ‘core’ or dominant state or set of states that support and 
discipline others within its civilisation and take the lead in inter-civilisational conflict 
and cooperation. For Huntington, these nine civilisations and possible dominant states 
are: Western (United States and Western Europe); Latin American (Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, and Venezuela); African (Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and South Africa); 
Islamic (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Malaysia); Sinic (China); Hindu (India);
no
Orthodox (Russia); Buddhist (Thailand, possibly); and Japanese (Japan).
Two brief general points about the focus on culture and irrational factors in 
‘clash’ theory can be made. First, Huntington’s list o f ‘civilisations’ and core states 
seems fairly reflective of international power politics as it already stands, where most 
of the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful states are now also leaders (or ‘core 
states’) within their civilisations, as well as powerful state actors in their own right. 
Indeed, Huntington tries to graft the concept of culture to the more traditional one of 
power (‘culture [...] follows power’), even quoting Shakespeare’s Brutus in Julius 
Caesar to elucidate his point.74 Therefore, there is a question as to how much an 
improvement over the traditional concept of power politics the notion of civilisational 
politics has if power, traditionally-defined by Realist as capabilities, and leadership 
within a civilisation automatically go hand-in-hand. Second, Huntington’s use of
72 However, critics themselves generally do not see the possibility of a hierarchy of identities within 
their conception of multiple identities. Identities are assumed to be equal. For one critic’s view of this 
issue, see Stephen Chan, ‘Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 26, No. 1, 1997), pp. 137-140.
73 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations, pp. 45-48. Note that Huntington’s separates Western and 
Classical (Ancient Greek and Roman) civilisations. His views are parallel to Carroll Quigley’s who 
discusses the differences between the two in The Evolution o f Civilizations: An Introduction to 
Historical Analysis (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1979), pp. 269-414. Historian David Gress also 
separates Classical and Western civilisations, arguing that the Western ‘grand narrative’—which 
recounts a continued, unbroken line of intellectual history from the ancient Greeks to Western 
civilisation today—is flawed, and that Western culture has been mediated through both Roman thought 
and Christianity, particularly Germanic Christianity. See David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea 
o f the West and Its Opponents (New York, NY: Free Press, 1998).
74 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations, pp. 310-311. The quote Huntington uses is: ‘Our legions are 
brim-full, our cause is ripe. / The enemy increaseth every day; / We at the height, are ready to decline. / 
There is a tide in the affairs of men, /  Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. / Omitted, all the 
voyage of their life / Is bound in shallows and in miseries. / On such a full sea are we now afloat, / And 
we must take the current when it serves, / Or lose our ventures.’ Interestingly, the quote also suggests a 
raison d ’etre for preventative war.
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religion as shorthand for ‘civilisation’ and perhaps less grandly, ‘culture’, and its 
relationship to development is not new—Max Weber uses religion as an explanation 
for the rise of capitalism in Protestant countries.75 However, Huntington’s particular 
view of some religions is very heavily influenced by what can be described as 
Romantic Orientalist works which essentialise other cultures. For example, 
Huntington relies on Bernard Lewis, who has been criticised for his anti-Arab and 
Romantically-tinged emotionalist views, to inform his perspective of Islam.76
From a methodological perspective, the metaphor of Yugoslavia and what it 
means more broadly for ‘clash’ theory looms large in Huntington’s analysis. 
Huntington fleshes out his thesis with a variety of examples for different types of 
conflicts including what he terms ‘fault line wars’, or wars in which two civilisations 
meet and clash. The most extended of the examples that Huntington offers dissects 
the war in former Yugoslavia, which he calls ‘the most complex, confused, and 
complete set of fault line wars of the early 1990s’, and indeed his entire chapter on 
‘The Dynamics Of Fault Line Wars’ draws heavily from the Yugoslav case.77. Thus 
Huntington derives a significant amount of mileage for his general thesis on this 
example. Indeed, when interviewed, Huntington has specifically mentioned the 
Yugoslav case as an example of what can happen when dangerous inter-civilisational 
rivalries break into conflict.78
Importantly, Huntington uses the Yugoslav case to argue one of the key 
premises for his clash thesis: that civilisational conflicts provoke ‘kin country’ 
rallying across borders; that is, that civilisational brethren rally to each others’ causes 
based on their (irrational) cultural or religious affinities rather than on a serious, 
rational calculation of economic or political interest. This premise is important 
because it suggests both the pattern of alliances in conflict and also implies how 
conflict can either be spread as more cultural ‘kin’ become involved or contained as 
cultural core states move to police conflict. However, Huntington’s assertion of the 
primacy of culture may be one long fundamental attribution error, as it places 
disposition (cultural characteristics) above situation as the seat of causality.
75 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism (London: Routledge Classics, 2001).
76 Sadowski, pp. 76-78. See also Alain Gresh, ‘A l’origine du “choc des civilisations’” , Le Monde 
diplomatique (September 2004), pp. 23-24.
77 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations, p. 281 and pp. 266-298, respectively.
78 See a transcript of his interview with journalist David Gergen for the American television 
programme The News Hour with Jim Lehrer in PBS, ‘Many World Orders’, Online NewsHour, (9 
January 1997), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/januar5f97/order_l -10.html
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Huntington tries to prove his concept of ‘kin country’ rallying with the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia by claiming that the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims all 
received support from ‘civilisational’ kin (the Russians, Germans, and Iranians, 
respectively). Unfortunately, his analysis misfires largely through a lack of seeking 
alternative explanations. While he recognises that one major player—the United 
States—did step outside its ‘civilisational’ (Western) interests to support the Bosnian 
Muslims, Huntington’s explanation for this falls flat: that the US did so mainly for a 
dispositional reason, which is according to Huntington a ‘widespread sympathy’ for 
the Bosnians as well as American ‘idealism, moralism, [...] naivete, and ignorance’ 
about the region.79
Thus, Huntington downgrades the importance of situational possibilities and 
causes for US actions. Could there not have been various situational factors or 
interests at stake, for example the US recognition of its broader role in maintaining 
post-Cold War order as the world’s lone superpower? Some of Huntington’s despised 
‘isms’ could have been at issue, but within the larger context of situational interest, 
broadly defined. Additionally, Huntington is silent on why those with the same 
cultural dispositions acted so differently in the case of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. 
While Huntington notes German support for Slovenian and Croatian independence, 
he omits mentioning opposition to it from Great Britain and France, both of which 
failed to rally to the Croatian (Western Christian) side of a supposedly ‘civilisational’ 
war, as his thesis would predict. Clearly, other types of interests or considerations 
must have been in play, yet Huntington fails to elucidate any of them.
If cultural ‘kin’ do rally to support each other, then the reason is assumed to 
be that the action is ‘civilisational’ (rather than interest-based) and that cultural 
survival is at stake. Yet if cultural ‘kin’ do not rally then other, non-civilisational 
issues are presumed to be involved. This pattern repeats itself through the work. For 
example, in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Huntington fails to explain why the 
Islamic Republic of Iran (a core Islamic state) failed to support its Muslim brethren, 
the Azeris, and instead sided with the Orthodox Armenians, while Russia (the core 
Orthodox state) backed the Azeris. Clearly, civilisational compatibility took a 
backseat to some rational consideration of interest. This begs the question: when does
79 Huntington, Clash o f Civilizations, p. 290.
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action on the basis of interest trump identity? Or, can identity itself merely be a cloak 
for interest?
While these and other flaws exist in Clash o f Civilizations, Huntington’s work 
is persuasive because it relies on a few key heuristic devices that convince his 
audience of the purchase of ‘clash’ theory. Although Huntington writes well, he 
generally eschews the more colourful, vivid language that Kaplan employs to such 
heady effect in his travelogues-cw/w-commentaries and provides more logically 
compelling evidence such as statistical information. Instead of vividness, Huntington 
relies on the heuristics of availability, representativeness, and surface commonalities 
(such as salience) to persuade his reader. For example, Huntington’s examples are 
drawn from (at the time) current events, thus making the events compelling to his 
audience and easy to remember, which has the effect of increasing their availability in 
the mind of the reader.
Additionally, Huntington offers a considerable amount of detail in his key 
examples (particularly in his longer cases, such as Yugoslavia) which heightens their 
plausibility and hence our perception of their representativeness, or the probabilistic 
assessment of their likelihood of happening in a particular manner. Most importantly, 
Huntington’s use of surface commonalities pervades his work. In particular, 
Huntington uses the salience of culture or religion in a few key examples, particularly 
Yugoslavia, to argue that cultural factors are indeed the most important ones in 
leading to conflict. However, it is a fallacy to argue that the obvious trait that 
commands the most immediate attention, in this case cultural difference, is the actual 
reason for the underlying conflict. Indeed, without offering and eliminating other 
possibilities for conflict this assertion cannot be made.
Finally, Huntington’s work exhibits some aspects of the fundamental 
attribution error in action. Through its emphasis on the most salient characteristics of 
culture and identity Huntington’s thesis relies largely on dispositional characteristics 
of ‘civilisations’ rather than on situational factors to explain actions. By discounting 
situational effects, Huntington’s limits his exploration of motives past the most 
obvious or seemingly dominant traits of post-Cold War conflicts and does not 
adequately test alternative explanations, creating a major lacuna in his work.
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3.4 Return to Darkness and the Sword—Decline of the state and 
rise of insecurity in Van Creveld’s neo-medievalism
‘He believeth not that he shall return out o f darkness, and he is waited 
for o f the sword. ’
—Job, 15:2280
Another influential commentator who heralded the 1990s as an era on the cusp of an 
increasingly anarchic future is Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld. Van 
Creveld perhaps most clearly exemplifies those works which postulate the decline of 
the modem, centralised state, a state that has for 200 years effectively imposed order 
on its territory through the Weberian monopoly of violence while summoning great 
loyalty to its cause by a grateful (or at least placid) citizenry. Rather than today’s 
Westphalian world of state-imposed, territorially-bounded order, van Creveld and 
others envision a future encompassing a looser constellation of weaker, quasi- 
medieval powers that lack the centralising will to impose order and extinguish 
conflict, thus generating greater global insecurity, if not downright chaos. In this 
sense, for van Creveld and other neo-medievalists, the decline of the state and the 
security umbrella it provides for its population means that we are approaching a 
period of darkness where the collapse of authority will doom many for the sword.
Van Creveld outlines these pessimistic visions in two of his main works, The
o I
Transformation o f War and The Rise and Decline o f the State. Van Creveld sets out 
his views on the decreasing capabilities of states in Rise and Decline, while 
Transformation o f War focuses on the move towards a more anarchical future, a 
scenario which had particular resonance in the early 1990s.
For van Creveld, the decline of traditional strategy- (or policy-) driven war 
made by states for political ends augurs the end of modem war as we know it and 
instead portends of a more ominous anarchical future. In Transformation o f War, van 
Creveld argues that modem, Clausewitzian war (‘trinitarian’ war) is comprised of the 
trinity of government (state), army, and people.82 This ‘trinity’ is breaking down as
80 Old Testament, King James Version.
81 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation o f War (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991), and Martin van 
Creveld, The Rise and Decline o f the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Note that 
Transformation o f War was published by Brassey’s in Britain under the title On Future War.
82 While Clausewitz himself uses the term ‘remarkable trinity’ in reference to war, some scholars claim 
that van Creveld and others misunderstand Clausewitz’s use of the term when they apply it to mean a 
modem ‘trinity’ of state, army, and people. Instead, they argue, Clausewitz used the term to describe
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states disintegrate; armies outsource, relying on mercenaries or privatised security 
forces; and the people become less loyal to the state. State decline and breakdown has 
led to a greater number of low-intensity conflicts that will further erode the 
‘trinitarian’ structure of war as the people see that the state is impotent in the face of 
this type of challenge. The future of warmaking is likely to be less by states than by
tribes, robber barons, guerrillas, or religious zealots supporting themselves through
0*1
criminal activity. Thus, future wars are more likely to resemble medieval patterns, 
where ‘to speak of war in modem Clausewitzian terms as something made by the
Q A
state for political ends is to misrepresent reality’. Therefore, trinitarian war is 
inherently political, but non-trinitarian war is essentially apolitical, being more an
or
extension of personal rivalries and loyalty-based charismatic leadership. Indeed, the 
concept of ‘interest’ (rational calculation) as a cause of war in the future might well 
be dead; van Creveld notes that the concept itself is a sixteenth-century neologism 
and, therefore, by implication not applicable to pre-modem forms of warfare.86
For van Creveld, the root cause of the coming transformation of war—from 
modem, political Clausewitzian war, to a more barbaric and loose quasi-medieval, 
apolitical form of war—and impending insecurity is the decline of the modem state. 
Van Creveld’s thesis is based on four trends which he sees as hastening this decline 
and the slide into neo-medieval anarchy and conflict. These factors are: the state’s 
declining ability to fight other states; the waning of the welfare state and its 
paternalistic treatment of citizens; the effects of democratisation and ease of access to 
various technologies and mass communications, as well as globalisation; and the
o n
state’s declining ability to maintain public order.
In Rise and Decline van Creveld provides us with a broad, sweeping overview 
of the development of the modem Western (or at least westernised) state, which he 
contends reached its apotheosis from 1789 (the French Revolution) to about 1945, at
the irrational (emotion), non-rational (chance), and rational (calculation) forces at play in war. Thus the 
concepts of ‘non-trinitarian’ or ‘non-Clausewitzian’ war are a contradiction in terms since these forces 
would be in play in pre-modem as well as modem war. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher 
Bassford, ‘Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly (Vol. 
25, Autumn 1995).
83 Van Creveld, Transformation o f War, pp. 194-198.
™ Ibid.,p. 52.
85 Ibid., pp. 52,197, and 212.
86 Ibid., p. 212. However, this last point is a bit like arguing that gravity never actually existed until 
Newton ‘discovered’ it and gave it a name.
87 Van Creveld initially outlines these points in a 1996 article, Martin van Creveld, ‘The Fate o f the 
State’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly (Spring 1996), pp. 4-18. He also makes these 
arguments throughout The Rise and Decline o f the State (1999).
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the end of WWII, although he does also discuss the burgeoning growth of the welfare
00
state from 1945-1975. Van Creveld argues that this Golden Age represented ‘the 
transformation of the state into a god on earth’, a period during which successful 
states were capable of ‘squeezing the last ounce of marrow out of their citizens’ 
bones’.89 Before the development of a strong centralised state, van Creveld argues, 
insecurity in its various guises was endemic throughout the world, not only during the 
period of city states or tribal rule but also during the period of medieval governments. 
Indeed, it was not until the medieval state had faced down the external challenges of 
the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman empire, the nobility, and the entrenched 
interests of urban communities, morphing into the more modem monarchical state 
from 1300 to 1648 (the date of the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia), that greater 
order and security were possible for most of its subjects.
Since 1975, van Creveld contends, the modem state has gone from being 
considered by its citizens as both necessary and idealised to being burdensome. This 
is seen in the state’s declining share of gross national product at its command; the 
dwindling scope of its responsibilities, especially in terms of providing mass welfare; 
the increasing capabilities of non-state actors, such as NGOs and corporations; and 
the state’s growing impotence at providing security and enforcing its sovereignty over 
its territory. With this diminishing power has come diminishing respect for the state 
itself; van Creveld cites a growing lack of tmst in governments, a lack of willingness 
among citizens to fight for the state, growing integration in such entities as the EU, 
and even the waging of unpopular wars (such as the US war in Vietnam or the 
USSR’s war in Afghanistan) as factors that lead to the erosion and loss of popular 
loyalty to the state.90
While van Creveld paints a pessimistic picture of the future, to a significant 
extent his views are coloured by several Romantic aspects to his work, including a 
sense of nostalgia about the modem state and warfare (perhaps as they never really
88 Van Creveld, Rise and Decline, pp. 354-376.
89 Ibid., pp. 261 and 262, respectively.
90 Ibid., pp. 410-414. Interestingly, while noting the state’s decline in welfare provision, van Creveld 
does not suggest that it may have natural limits. He does not discuss the problems o f privatisation, 
namely the lack of public accountability of private or privatised entities and public distrust of for-profit 
government outsourcing, no matter how efficient it may be. Such public disquiet over the democratic 
deficit this poses suggests a natural limit on public, taxpayer, citizen, and voter tolerance for such 
schemes.
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were) within a Romantically cyclical view of history, as well as a projection of our 
modem insecurities and feelings of pessimism coupled to a deja-vu medievalism.
Van Creveld’s work contains a subtle sense of nostalgia about the modem 
state and modem warfare that we mainly discern through his stark dichotomy 
between the modem state and war, and the pre-modem or non-modem ‘state’ and pre­
modem war. Van Creveld does this by creating a significant distance between modem 
war and pre-modem or medieval war. Whereas the modem state is impersonal and 
professional, its goals political and rational, the pre-modem forms of political 
organisation were personal and parochial, their goals apolitical and irrational.
Whereas modem war is surgical, clinical, and antiseptic, non-modem war is messy, 
barbaric, and intimately—if not passionately—human, unlike the bloodlessness of 
modem, technology-driven warfare. Indeed the entire concept of ‘trinitarian’ 
(Clausewitzian and hence ‘modem’) war in van Creveld’s hands almost sounds like a 
form of religion; a holy trinity of state, army, and people performing in sacred unity, 
whereas ‘non-trinitarian’ war is an unholy act, bereft of the divine blessings of the 
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost of warfare.
Van Creveld couples this pessimistic sense of the future of the modem state 
(and the certain demise of ‘clean’ modem warfare) to a cyclical understanding of 
history and implicit analogies of youth (virility) and old age (impotence). While the 
future looks bleak and anarchical, the virile, young modem state over the past 200 
years created a Golden Age in terms of order; its increasing impotence now in the 
face of challengers foretells of anarchy. In this way, van Creveld argues that the 
modem state is now reaching its nadir; in its crippled old age it cannot fight back 
against the centrifugal forces pulling it apart to impose order. Yet how likely is it that 
perhaps the most successful and democratic form of political organisation, with an 
historically unparalleled extractive ability, will go gently into that good night? As one 
commentator notes, such analyses about the death of the state ‘[miss] the slyness of 
states, the unsentimental and cold-blooded nature of so much of what they do as they 
pick their way through chaos’.91 Indeed, far from being news, reports of the death of 
the state have been greatly exaggerated. As one observer has noted, the role of the 
state in the future is always predicted to be less than it was in the past; even Adam
91 Fouad Ajami, ‘The Summoning: “But They Said, We Will Not Hearken’”, in The Clash o f  
Civilizations?: The Debate (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 27.
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Q9Smith and Karl Marx have made this claim. In various fits of wishful thinking, 
Liberal declinists have been writing its obituary since at least the middle of the last
n - j
century. Therefore, the trajectory of state decline, if there even is one, is unlikely to 
be clear, linear, or particularly rapid.
With regard to Yugoslavia, since van Creveld mainly takes a generalist and 
long historical view, his works make only a passing mention to Yugoslavia, often 
within the broader context of World War I , World War I I , or other post-Cold War 
ethnic conflicts, for example, Somalia, Sri Lanka, or Rwanda.94 Thus, van Creveld 
does not explicitly use an extended discussion of the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a 
framework for his thesis or to develop a metaphor for post-Cold War conflict. 
However, in the preface of Rise and Decline, van Creveld argues that his final chapter 
on the decline of the post-1975 state outlines ‘forces which, even now, are 
undermining states all over the world, and which, will in all probability, cause them 
to collapse (as in Yugoslavia)’.95 Thus, while the specific causes of Yugoslavia’s 
demise are not carefully delineated, the break up of Yugoslavia still remains a 
cautionary tale, the key—if unspoken—example of post-Cold War state failure and 
rapid decline into a neo-medieval future.
Van Creveld persuades his reader not through the technique of vivid language 
like Kaplan, or through use of the salience of culture like Huntington. Rather, van 
Creveld’s key heuristic is representativeness, specifically in arguing that the medieval 
past is being reborn in modem times by creating an artfully crafted mosaic out of 
various fragments of history. In this way, van Creveld projects our modem 
insecurities about the crumbling of the Cold War order onto an assembled version of 
medievalism. Yet is history merely a repetition of assembled facts or an interpretation 
of events? If the latter, then history is what we make of it, and van Creveld has turned 
the medieval state into a metaphor for post-Cold War disorder and the collapse of the 
certainties of the bipolar world. Interestingly, van Creveld’s medieval state is
92 Observation made by commentator at Chatham House discussion in 2005.
93 See, for example, Per Hammarlund, Liberal Internationalism and the Decline o f  the State: The 
Thought o f  Richard Cobden, David Mitrany, and Kenichi Ohmae (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005).
94 Van Creveld mentions Yugoslavia on four pages (pp. 48, 61,194, and 220) in Transformation o f  
War, and Bosnia on one page (p. 44). In Rise and Decline, he discusses Yugoslavia on seven pages 
(pp. 36,255, 353, 375, 395-396, and 414) and Bosnia on three pages (pp. 353, 385, and 414).
95 Van Creveld, Rise and Decline, p. viii.
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remarkably different from its earlier Victorian version, which was prized for its moral 
clarity, paternalistic order, and strict hierarchies.
If we read van Creveld’s descriptions of the state in decline—moving towards 
a more medieval type of security regime—less as a theoretical framework for 
understanding the future of the state or of the anarchical future of international 
relations and more as a product of our particular time and place, we see that the 
collective ‘storyline’ does not speak of a ‘straight’ medievalism with all of its 
complexities. Rather, the tone of neo-medievalism is a postmodern twist on 
nineteenth-century Romanticism. Just as the early Victorian Romantics turned to the 
nostalgia of a specific version of the Middle Ages during their own turbulent times in 
order to reject what they saw as the horrors of the industrial age, the postmodern turn 
to medievalism fits the needs of our post-Cold War age.
The Romantics dressed up their desire for a ‘purer’ society that existed before 
the Industrial Revolution and their nostalgia for an age of stability with a fashion for 
Gothic horror, neo-gothic architecture, and revivals of interest in Arthurian legend, 
chivalry and good manners, as well as romance novels akin to Rolland’s medieval 
masterpiece, La Romance de la Rose. This Romanticised view of the Middle Ages 
represented the period as an age of romance and adventure, as well as one of 
orderliness, patrimony, and security. In a pessimistic and uncertain age, the 
Romantics mined medieval history and selected those aspects which best suited their 
needed version of the Middle Ages, one which offered a nostalgic salve and the 
promise of a social utopia.
However, the Romanticised post-Cold War version of medievalism—neo­
medievalism—radically departs from the typically nostalgic and sentimental 
Victorian version of the Middle Ages and instead offers a dystopic reading of the 
medieval period. For van Creveld and other Postmodern Romantics, the Middle Ages 
are no longer associated with a sentimental nostalgia and a mythical longing for a 
medieval Golden Age. The orderly hierarchical society and the chivalrous manners of 
its errant knights are gone. Instead, neo-medievalism has selected those dismal 
aspects of the medieval past which it pessimistically projects onto the present and 
future. For neo-medievalists, the Middle Ages have become a shorthand for the fear, 
foreboding, and pessimism that have plagued the post-Cold War ‘order’—pessimism 
about the barbarism of war, the insecurity of globalisation, and the uncertainties of 
democratisation that have come in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar world.
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With its emphasis on loose identities, fluid boundaries, and fragmentation of 
authority, neo-medievalism may be less an assessment of the objective realities of the 
1990s than a reflection of the underlying pessimism and sense of decline stalking the 
post-Cold War era, mirroring the myriad insecurities and uncertainties facing publics 
and policymakers during an age of seemingly rapid transformation. Just as the 
utopian Romantic vision of the Middle Ages says more about the nostalgic Victorian 
longing for stability in turbulent times than it does about the medieval period, the 
dystopian Postmodern Romantic vision of the Middle Ages (neo-medievalism) says 
more about the post-Cold War era’s collective sense of insecurity in the 1990s than 
what the medieval past actually was. In both cases, an emotion-laden selection bias 
seeks to condense the specific Romanticised ‘truths’ from the past that we believe are 
most closely reflected in our era.
3.5 Omnium Finis Imminet?—Conclusion
‘But the end o f all things is at hand: be ye therefore sober, and watch 
unto prayer. ’
— 1 Peter, 4:796
With their vivid visions of the future of conflict—partly drawn through the metaphor 
of Yugoslavia—Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld foretell the ‘end of all things’ 
the West took for granted under the Cold War’s bipolar system of international 
relations: order and stability, peace and predictability. All three authors develop their 
arguments and base their predictions by drawing on a rich and varied set of Romantic 
themes, including irrationalism, pessimism, relativism, and nostalgia, persuading their 
readers through the use of various heuristic devices and the operation of heuristic 
biases. They also rely to various extents on the violence generated by the 
disintegration of former Yugoslavia as a broader metaphor for the future of conflict.
All three authors place a strong emphasis on the growing importance of 
irrational, emotional, and relativistic factors in early post-Cold War conflict and in the 
future of conflict. Kaplan argues the importance of religion in shaping national 
character and culture in an unnuanced and essentialist manner. His views telescope 
hundreds of years of national histories into clean and predictable trajectories for the
96 New Testament, King James Version. The quotation in Latin is ‘Rerum omnium finis imminet. Sitis 
igitur sobrii, et vigilantes ad orandum.’
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future based on various religious differences. In contrast, Huntington avoids this 
simplistic formula, but still outlines the centrality of religion in shaping political 
culture through a more sophisticated argument about the development of civilisations. 
While Van Creveld does not directly tackle these arguments, he heralds the end of 
rational calculation in warfare, since for him the developing non-trinitarian conflicts 
seen worldwide will be more about personal or parochial disagreements and be fought 
based on irrational loyalties to tribes or local fiefs rather than to large utility- 
maximising, rationalist agglomerations, such as states.
Pessimism and nostalgia are also recurring themes with all three authors. 
Kaplan’s work is replete with pessimistic judgements, mainly told through his 
depressing physical descriptions of various poor places. Additionally, his trope of 
reading meanings into the landscape lends his work the air of an inescapable tragedy, 
where actors are passively, or at least helplessly, caught in circumstances beyond 
their control. In Kaplan’s world, these circumstances were foretold through the iron 
logic of history, as some sort of biblical destiny. For Huntington, pessimism is most 
fully expressed through his implicit understanding of cyclical history, of the rise and 
decline of civilisations, while Van Creveld waxes pessimistic through his selection of 
aspects of medieval history. A Romantic concern with nostalgia also flavours these 
works. Kaplan manifests nostalgia through his telescoping of history, where the past 
is always melancholically present. Huntington’s focus on civilisations is a form of 
nostalgia, as civilisations inevitably become unchanging essences caught in a 
timewarp of interpretation. Van Creveld’s nostalgia comes through with regard to 
trinitarian (modem) war and the modem state, which he reifies into especially 
rational, orderly, and antiseptic beings when contrasted to the bloody messiness of 
‘pre-modem’ states and warfare.
These declinist views of the future of international relations are persuasive 
because of the various heuristic devices and biases that Kaplan, Huntington, and van 
Creveld employ throughout their works. For Kaplan, the most persuasive technique at 
his disposal is his journalistic gift for vivid language, which has a striking immediacy 
that places the reader in the centre of an easily imagined space. Kaplan uses this 
technique to elide between aesthetic and ethical judgements of whole cultures. 
Huntington’s work plays on various causal biases, including salience and the 
fundamental attribution error. By assuming that wars between cultures (or 
civilisations) are fundamentally about them, Huntington elevates salience to
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causation. This has the potential to turn culture almost to a post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy. Huntington also uses the observer’s natural psychological willingness to 
attribute the causes for the actions of others to their irrational dispositions, while 
attributing his own actions to a situational rationality. Thus the fundamental 
attribution error of seeing character (or culture or identity) as the key variable 
determining the actions of others, while seeing rationality as the seat of our own 
motivations, may operate powerfully in Huntington’s work. Van Creveld’s work 
relies on the heuristic of representativeness: on how closely the period of the Middle 
Ages parallels our own. However, van Creveld’s work is an historical mosaic of 
selected, often-pessimistic aspects of the medieval period. As we have seen with the 
Victorians, the Middle Ages could equally be seen as representative not of conflict 
and disorder, but of political stability, religiously-inspired order, and a corporatist 
form of paternalism in society, depending on the selection bias of the observer.
Each of the three authors also develops his thesis with regard to the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and how it serves as a Romantic metaphor for the future 
of conflicts. Kaplan offers an extended commentary on the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia through the perspective of inevitably clashing, primordial ethnicities 
indelibly marked by religious differences. Huntington uses the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia as the prime example of his theory on the clash of civilisations, 
particularly the concept of ‘kin country rallying’, and the future of civilisational 
alliances and clashes in ‘cleft states’. By contrast, Van Creveld eschews an extended 
dissection of the Yugoslav wars but notes that his neo-medieval vision of the future 
of conflict had already essentially come true in the example of Yugoslavia. Thus 
Yugoslavia stands as a foretaste of the great day of wrath to come in the post-Cold 
War world.
If we view these three authors’ interpretations of conflict from a broader 
perspective, we can see that the Romantic (and often pessimistic) analyses of ‘exotic’ 
conflicts are often judgements about the unpleasant or at least different dispositional 
(cultural and hence irrational) factors of those involved in conflicts rather than 
analyses of their situations. At the same time, in Western conflicts, such as the war in 
Iraq, we recognise the situational (interest-based and hence rational) factors that drive 
conflict and are less likely to attribute our motivations in conflict to cultural 
characteristics. Therefore, we in the West are more likely to see our own conflicts 
from a more rational and dispassionate perspective, as the result of underlying
138
Chapter 3
necessity and reason, and hence to see them as less tragic. Conflict viewed from the 
perspective of those involved in conflict is not necessarily futile, barbaric, or even 
tragic, but may be a deliberate act, or even a sacrifice for a group goal.
Thus warnings of a coming anarchy, civilisational clash, or the possibility of a 
neo-medieval future are not simply descriptive of the post-Cold War world, a series 
of objective assessments about international relations, nor are they just predictive of 
the world to come. These pessimistic pronouncements are also prescriptive, operating 
as prophetic admonitions about the prospect that violence and chaos in the developing 
world will act as a contagion—infecting a complacent, apathetic West—and sounding 
a call to arms against this complacency. In this sense, they fundamentally resonate 
with the aura of declinism that pervades the Romantic Zeitgeist of post-Cold War 
international relations. In the next chapter we will examine the accuracy of these 
Romantic pronouncements of chaos, anarchy, and ethnic conflict through an 
empirical investigation that compares trends in armed conflict during the Cold War 
era with those of the 1990s.
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Chapter 4. Increased Conflict in the Early 1990s: A 
Harbinger of the Coming Anarchy?1
‘[I]t is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher o f demographic doomsday, 
who is now the prophet o f West Africa’s future. And West Africa’s 
future, eventually, will also he that o f most o f the rest o f the world. ’
—Robert D. Kaplan2
In the early 1990s, Postmodern Romantics like Robert Kaplan, Samuel Huntington, 
and Martin van Creveld predicted a coming era of conflict that would differ 
significantly to what had gone before. Their visions painted a disturbing picture of 
growing anarchy, civilisational clash, and state fragmentation that would not just 
engulf the Third World, but would also increasingly threaten the West. These visions 
of fragmentation and disorder generated specific predictions about conflict, especially 
that post-Cold War conflicts would be both quantitatively more numerous and 
qualitatively different from Cold War conflicts. Their hypotheses may be summed up 
as follows:
1) the dislocations of globalisation create social frictions and state fragmentation 
leading to disorder and generating a greater number of conflicts;
2) these social frictions are over identity-based (ethnic, cultural, or civilisational) 
differences;
3) identity-based conflicts are more intense, leading to more death and 
destruction;
4) identity-based conflicts are intractable, creating longer conflicts that are more 
difficult to end;
5) African conflicts are a ‘contagion’; they are an example of what lies in wait 
for the developed world.
Considering the prevalence of their message in the 1990s, it is valid to ask whether 
these Romantic predictions of anarchy and chaos came to pass or whether they were 
manifestations of the sense of pessimism and decline that defined the Romantic
1 This chapter is based in large part on the author’s work as a Summer Associate at The RAND 
Corporation in Santa Monica, California in 2000.
2Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams o f the Post-Cold War (New York, 
NY: Random House, 2000), p. 9. Reprinted from the February 1994 edition of The Atlantic Monthly.
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Zeitgeist in post-Cold War international relations. The most objective way to 
investigate that question and the validity of the Romantic ‘coming anarchy’, ‘culture 
clash’, or ‘neo-medievalism’ hypotheses about conflict is through an examination of 
the empirical evidence on armed conflicts, comparing the 1990s with the period of the 
Cold War, and investigating whether the post-Cold War era actually experienced 
greater, and growing, conflict along the lines that Romantic theories would have 
predicted. Based on the empirical evidence, we will argue that Romantics incorrectly 
predicted a decade of increasing conflict in the 1990s. Furthermore, these predictions 
remain invalid this decade.
4.1 Looking Backward—Background to the chapter
If we were to look at the historical conflict data narrowly from the vantage point of 
1992, then our answer to Romantics purporting that the world was on the cusp of a 
‘coming anarchy’ and endemic conflict might be ‘maybe we are’. If we were to 
restrict our discussion to conflicts from 1945-1992, then the unmistakeable trend in 
conflict at that point would seem to be ever upwards, particularly after 1989, when 
conflict trends careened skywards after the end of the Cold War, sharply and 
ominously so. In that period, the number of total ongoing conflicts in the world 
during a particular year rose from less than ten in the wake of World War II in 1945 
to nearly 60 ongoing conflicts by 1992.3 Perhaps more importantly, there was a sharp 
spike in new conflicts from 1989 forward, from an average of about two new conflicts 
per year in the Cold War 1980s—the decade immediately preceding the end of the 
Cold War—which almost doubled to an average of 3.5-3.75 new conflicts per annum 
in 1989-1992, based on results obtained from the Singer & Small and SIPRI 
quantitative datasets, and the Kosimo qualitative dataset, respectively.4 The following 
graph highlights these results.
3 Based on the results from the Singer & Small and SIPRI, as well as Kosimo datasets.
4 For a discussion of the methodology used in this chapter, see the Appendix.
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Graph 4.1: New Conflicts: Annual average base rates, 1945-1992
 Singer & Small/SIPRI Kosimo
From the perspective of the early 1990s, then, anarchy and ever-growing ethnic 
conflict seemed a potential future scenario as conflict spiked in the first few years of 
transition from the Cold War. Behind these cold numbers, the human toll of post- 
Cold War conflict was harrowing. As two scholars noted, ‘[a]t the beginning of 1993, 
about 63 percent of the world’s 42 million refugees were fleeing from ethnopolitical 
conflicts and repression’.5 All of these observations lent themselves to the pessimistic 
conclusion that the world was indeed on the cusp of increasing disorder, if not 
outright anarchy. In particular, commentators noted the rise and rise of ‘ethno- 
nationalist’ conflict in the 1990s as a key harbinger of increasing anarchy worldwide. 
From the vantage point of the early 1990s, the Romantics seemed to have been right.
However, what does the empirical evidence say about this trend? Did the 
number of conflicts increase throughout the 1990s and beyond? Did any particular 
conflicts contribute disproportionately to the common perception that the world was 
on the brink of increasing anarchy? As the Romantics predicted, were ‘culture 
clashes’ the primary forms of conflict? Could we therefore expect an anarchical 
future of ethnic conflict or o f fissiparous states? Were identity-based conflicts more 
intense or intractable? Did African conflicts act as a ‘contagion’, ‘infecting’ other 
parts of the world?
5Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 7.
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In order to examine the viability of the Romantics’ predictions, in this chapter 
we will examine some of the empirical data on armed conflict to ascertain:
1) conflict levels during the Cold War period from 1945-1988, overall and by 
region as a basis for further comparison with the post-Cold War period;
2) conflict levels in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, from 1989-1992, 
and conflict from 1993-1999, overall and by region, in order to ascertain 
whether conflict increased in the 1990s;
3) conflict levels after 2000, in order to explore whether conflict levels 
increased this decade;
4) how the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia affected post-Cold 
War conflict levels, in order to investigate whether the disintegration of 
these two multinational states disproportionately affected conflict levels;
5) how African conflicts affected post-Cold War conflict levels, in order to see 
if African conflicts provided a ‘contagion’ effect;
6) the rate of conflict termination during the Cold War and the 1990s, in order 
to see whether conflicts in the 1990s had become more intractable;
7) the relationship between conflict and state creation from 1945 to 1999, in 
order to investigate whether identity-based conflict had become more 
prevalent in the 1990s, or whether state creation could explain an increase in 
1990s conflicts;
8) the main reasons for conflict from 1945-1999, including the effects of 
conflict issues on conflict duration and casualties, in order to examine 
whether identity-based conflicts had become more numerous, more intense, 
or more intractable than other conflicts in the 1990s.
4.2 Methodology—Definitions of conflict and overview
In order to answer these questions, we need to define what we mean by ‘conflict’ for 
the purposes of our study. Various empirical datasets use several alternative 
definitions for conflict, whether measured in qualitative or quantitative terms.6 For 
this study, we are interested in the most serious cases of conflict, those that would
6 For a discussion of the methodology we use to create greater comparability between the databases, 
see the Appendix.
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conventionally be called a war. That would mean that lower levels of violence, such 
as various state police actions, riots, or coups would necessarily be excluded. It would 
also exclude low-level terrorism. In quantitative terms, one of the most common 
definitions for a conflict rising to the level of a war is that at least 1,000 deaths have 
occurred over the course of the conflict.7 In qualitative terms, there are many 
possible thresholds for war, however, the definition we will use is any conflict which 
brings about the sustained use of regular government troops.8 Both types of 
definitions have their strengths and weaknesses.
The quantitative definition allows easy comparability in terms of magnitude 
or scale of the conflict. We can ascertain that conflicts that reach the threshold of
1,000 deaths are of sufficient magnitude to deserve serious scholarly attention. Such 
conflicts are unlikely to include local skirmishes or minor outbreaks of violence, and 
instead are likely to occur only as a result of deliberate actions and intent, as well as 
some form of group organisation. Additionally, quantitative definitions are 
scalable—conflicts with more deaths are readily identified as being more serious, 
more intense, or more longstanding, therefore indicating the willingness of the parties 
to pursue violence at a high level of intensity to achieve a particular outcome.
To track quantitatively-defined conflict levels,9 we will examine two widely 
used conflict databases that use this definition of conflict: the Singer & Small 
database and the SIPRI database.10 Both databases categorise conflict in terms of the
7 This definition was first used by Quincy Wright. The 1,000 deaths threshold has also been used 
subsequently by many other scholars. This is the threshold definition used by the Singer & Small and 
SIPRI databases. Other definitions include 1,000 deaths per year, or at least 1,000 deaths in any one 
year of a conflict.
This definition is the highest threshold definition for war used by the researchers at Heidelberg 
University in developing the Kosimo database, which uses qualitative criteria for defining levels of 
conflict.
9 ‘Conflict levels’ are defined as the amount of ‘conflict’ present—whether quantitatively or 
qualitatively defined—at a certain time.
10 The Singer and Small data are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, Correlates Of War Project: 
International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993). The Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) database on Major Armed Conflicts is compiled by researchers for the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Project (UCDP) in Uppsala University, Sweden, and is published annually in the Journal 
of Peace Research. See http://www.pcr.uu.se/researchAJCDP/ While it is sometimes referred to as the 
UCDP dataset, we will call it the SEPRI data here as it is the data that appears in SIPRI’s annual 
yearbook on armed conflicts. In our analysis, we use the data as updated in 2000 throughout, except for 
post-2000 data, in which case we use Version 3 of the data which is noted. The data have gone through 
various updates. For a discussion of changes to the database, see ‘Armed Conflict Dataset
Version History and Known Errata’. Available at http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/current/ 
version_history.pdf Although a revised version of the Correlates o f War dataset now has data through 
1997, we use the SIPRI data for the post-1992 period. Note that the new version of the SIPRI dataset 
(Version 3.0) includes coding for a conflict’s Correlates of War number.
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number of battle deaths. The Singer & Small Correlates of War database from the
University of Michigan, which is used for data from 1945-1992, defines ‘war’ as
1,000 deaths incurred over the course of the conflict.11 The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on armed conflict, which we use for the
quantitative data from 1993, codes for three levels of intensity: minor armed conflict,
intermediate armed conflict, and war. For our purposes, we only consider the two
higher SIPRI levels, intermediate armed conflict and war. SIPRI defines the threshold
for intermediate armed conflict as ‘[a]t least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an
accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year’, while the
threshold for war is ‘[a]t least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year’. For our purposes,
this means defining ‘war’ at the level of at least 1,000 deaths over the course of the
10conflict since these levels are comparable to the Singer & Small definition. Both the 
Singer & Small and the SIPRI datasets require that one party to the conflict be a state.
On the other hand, while quantitative definitions have the benefit of being 
readily comparable, qualitative definitions of conflict can convey the implied intent or 
the seriousness with which a state’s government perceives a particular conflict, even 
if few or no deaths are involved. For example, a state’s use of regular government 
troops to put down a relatively small rebellion in a minority region that results in few 
deaths may indicate that the state views any type of rebellion as a serious existential 
issue and therefore would be worthy of scholarly attention. To track qualitatively- 
defined conflict levels, we will use the relatively new Kosimo database developed at 
Heidelberg University in Germany, which broadly defines conflict qualitatively as
the clashing of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national 
values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territory, 
access to or distribution of domestic or international power); the conflict has 
to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, groups of 
states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their 
interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state.13
Kosimo qualitatively defines ‘war’ as a ‘systematic, collective use of force by regular 
[government] troops’.14 Therefore a state has to be one party in the conflict as well.
11 See the Correlates o f War Project Database User Manual.
12 See the SIPRI Data Codebook, section on ‘Intensity Level’.
13 The Kosimo data was developed by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. See 
http://www.hiik.de For the definition of ‘conflict’, see the Kosimo Manual, section on ‘Operational 
Definition’. Available at http://www.hiik.de/en/manual.htm
14 See the Kosimo Manual, section on ‘Variable 14, intensity of conflicts’, which it codes from 1-4 for 
intensity. Kosimo collects data on all conflicts, violent and non-violent and uses other definitions for
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The comparative use of both definitions to examine conflict levels over a long 
period has several advantages. First, it allows us to check whether scholars’ analyses 
of conflict levels mostly depend on which definition of conflict they use. Do 
perceptions of conflict—in this case, wars—and pessimistic conclusions about a 
‘coming anarchy’ depend merely on scholarly choice of definitions? This would be 
true if conflict levels between the datasets differed significantly over time, 
particularly if they went in different directions, with one definition showing 
increasing conflict levels while another indicated decreasing levels over time.
Second, using both types of definitions significantly improves the robustness 
of any conclusions we can draw. If conflict levels across both types of definitions 
show trends of relatively similar magnitude and direction, then the conclusions we 
can draw from them are not dependent on a particular, narrow definition of conflict, 
possible diverging interpretations of data, differences in data collection, or any 
idiosyncrasies specific to any one particular dataset. Instead, confirming results 
across datasets would suggest that despite differences in definition and data 
collection, the results robustly reflect actual conflict trends.
(a) Methodology—Level of analysis
The level of analysis we will use in this study will be states. All three databases use 
this level of analysis, so it is the most pragmatic level of analysis to continue to use 
for this study. Additionally, the state has been the traditional subject of study in 
international relations and most available data are gathered on this basis. Apart from 
these practical considerations, using the state as the level of analysis also has another 
advantage: it allows us to examine trends in types of conflict. For example, are new 
conflicts arising within sovereign borders (intrastate) or between them (interstate)? 
Are new conflicts between neighbours sharing a border? Are they over the creation of 
new states or over governance and control?
lower-level conflicts. These types of conflicts are: latent conflict (completely non-violent); crisis 
(mostly non-violent); and severe crisis (irregular use of force). The only level we will consider in this 
chapter is for conflicts coded as level 4, ‘war’.
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(b) Methodology—Unit of analysis and ‘counting’ conflicts
There are various ways to count conflicts, such as the number of total conflicts in any 
one year, whether new or ongoing. The unit of analysis we will use is the number of 
‘new conflicts’ per year. A new conflict is defined as a war between two or more 
parties that has arisen in a particular year that is not part of an already ongoing 
conflict. A conflict can be categorised as a ‘new conflict’ in several ways. For 
example, a new conflict may be between two parties that have never engaged in 
conflict before. Or it may be a new issue area of conflict between two parties that 
have experienced conflict in the past. Alternatively, it may be a new party that arises 
in an already ongoing conflict, changing the conflict dynamic.
This has an impact on how conflicts are counted. For example, a conflict is 
only counted once: in the year it begins. While conflicts can last several years, they 
are only counted in the initial year of conflict. For example, a war beginning in 1982 
and ending in 1985 would only be coded as new for 1982. Considering that there are 
various ways to count conflicts, why do we use ‘new conflicts’ as the unit of 
analysis? One reason is that counting the total number of ongoing conflicts during 
any one year gives a different picture of conflict than examining new conflicts. If we 
were to use the method of counting ongoing conflicts, or total conflict, we would get 
an aggregation effect. The picture we would see is one of steadily increasing conflict 
over time merely through the accretion of old conflicts. By this we mean that since 
many conflicts do not end in the year that they begin, but rather that there is an 
overhang of several years. For example, if in 1980 there were 10 ongoing conflicts 
and 4 new conflicts, while in 1981 there was only 1 new conflict, the data would 
show that there were 14 total conflicts in 1980 (10 ongoing plus 4 new conflicts) but 
15 conflicts in 1981 (11 ongoing plus one new conflict). Therefore, even though 
many more new conflicts were started in 1980 than 1981,1981 would appear to be a 
year of higher conflict. Unless many ongoing conflicts terminate and no or very few 
new conflicts start, these results easily compound over time, and the picture that we 
would build is one of increasing conflict.
The advantage of using ‘new conflicts’ as a unit of analysis is that it avoids 
the accretion of conflicts over time and allows us to examine whether the end of the 
Cold War actually heralded an age of greater conflict. We can specifically compare 
the number of new conflicts and rate that new conflicts have been developing in the
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post-Cold War era with the number of new conflicts and the rate that existed during 
the Cold War. With these definitions and parameters in mind, we examined aggregate 
conflict data that have been developed from three databases—the Singer & Small 
database, the SEPRI database, and the Kosimo database.
(c) Methodology—Calculating base rates of conflict
In order to ascertain whether conflict went up inexorably during the 1990s as 
Romantics predicted, we need some way to measure the relative frequency of conflict 
before and after the Cold War to create a basis for comparison. By examining conflict 
levels during the Cold War period, we can determine the expected level of conflict; 
that is, the level of conflict we could have expected had the Cold War not ended. This 
level of Cold War conflict will serve as our primary means of comparison with the 
1990s. We will also examine the regional distribution of conflict over time to see if 
there are any changes from the Cold War period.
To compare conflict levels between the Cold War era and the 1990s, we 
calculate base rates for conflict by region for each decade of the Cold War. The Cold 
War base rate is calculated by counting the number of new conflicts that were started 
during a particular time period (usually a decade) and dividing by the number of years 
covered.15 The base rate per decade tells us what the expected conflict levels are for 
any given region during the Cold War period. We then compare these expected rates 
of Cold War conflict with the actual observed rates of conflict after the Cold War. Do 
expected and observed rates differ considerably in the 1990s? In other words, had the 
expected rates of conflict during the Cold War changed after the end of the Cold War, 
and if so, did these trends continue, as Romantics argued? If conflict continued to rise 
after the end of the Cold War, then Romantic visions of a ‘coming anarchy’ may have 
been correct.
However, if conflict levels from 1989-1999 continued at the same rate or 
lower than during the Cold War, it suggests that the ‘coming anarchy’ hypothesis was 
incorrect. We will also look at levels of conflict termination to see if the end of the 
Cold War changed the rate at which ongoing conflicts ended. Again, a high rate of 
conflict termination when compared to Cold War levels also suggests that there was
15A calculation for the base rate is included in the Appendix.
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no ‘coming anarchy’ as Romantics predicted. Indeed, it may signal the opposite: that 
the 1990s was a time of conflicts ending.
Differences between the expected and observed conflict rates by region over 
time also allows us to determine if conflict in certain regions—particularly in the 
former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (FSU/FY)—contributed 
disproportionately to overall conflict levels in the 1990s. For example, if much of the 
new conflict we saw in the early 1990s was concentrated in a particular region or a 
few states, such as FSU/FY, then this would also question the Romantic ‘coming 
anarchy’ thesis as these conflicts were not generalised; rather they may be 
epiphenomena.
Finally, if conflict levels changed, then how did they differ and in which 
regions over time? For example, did conflict levels increase in all regions after the 
Cold War, or did they decrease or remain on par with Cold War levels in some 
regions? Widely distributed increasing levels of conflict, particularly after 1989, 
would indicate that the Romantics’ predictions were correct, while falling conflict 
levels would suggest that they were incorrect. Indeed, an inconsistent rise in conflict 
levels across regions raises doubts about Romantic hypotheses about conflict.
4.3 Conflict Levels—The Cold War, 1945-1988
To determine expected levels of conflict for the Cold War for comparison with the 
present, we examined conflict rates for the following categories of regions: Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, Oceania, Europe, and the FSU/FY.16 We chose 
the categories mostly on a geographic basis, but also partly to be able to distinguish 
clearly conflict levels in FSU/FY and their overall contribution to conflict rates.17 
Because of this, the regional category ‘Europe’ is defined as all European states from 
the Atlantic to the Urals except for those in the FSU or FY. When we complete our 
calculations, the time series for quantitatively-defined conflict is as follows:18
16 The countries defined in each category are listed the Appendix.
17 Of course, we could have validly defined other regions, such as all of Europe, including the FSU in 
that category, or Eastern Europe and Western Europe if  we did not wish to examine the FSU/FY as a 
separate region in greater detail.
18 Note that the time periods used in the graph are decades, except at the beginning and end o f the 
series which are shorter. Strictly speaking, graphs should always use equal units for comparison 
purposes, in this case years. However, since the study covers the period of the Cold War, usually 
defined as non-World War II related conflicts from 1945-1988, the beginning and ending ‘decades’
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Graph 4.2: Base Rates of Conflict by Region (Singer & Small), 1945-1988
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What is immediately noticeable from the graph is that base rates for Cold War 
conflict hit their peak in Asia immediately after World War II, with the second 
highest overall peak also in Asia in the 1970s, although Africa runs a close second in 
the number of new conflicts for that decade. In Africa, base rates of conflict were 
relatively low after World War II, and climbed during the 1950s and 1960s, reaching 
their peak in the 1970s and dropping off sharply in the 1980s. Base rate conflict 
trends for the Americas indicate that conflict was at its highest in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, with rates dropping in the 1950s, and then levelling off 
throughout the rest of the Cold War. The Middle East also showed relatively steady 
base rates of conflict throughout the period. By contrast, Cold War conflict base rates 
were zero for FSU/FY and for Oceania. Similarly, if  we develop a graph for 
qualitatively-defined conflict using the Kosimo dataset, the time series is:
under consideration are shorter than 10 years. This is not an attempt to confuse the reader, rather 
simply a matter o f trying to capture the historical time period as conventionally defined.
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Graph 4.3: Base Rates of Conflict by Region (Kosimo), 1945-1988
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The Kosimo dataset confirms that the peak of Cold War conflict was reached in Asia 
in the late 1940s, immediately after World War II. For Kosimo, the second highest 
peak occurs in Africa in the 1970s, with the number of Asian conflicts close behind. 
Thus the second peaks differ between the datasets, with the positions of Asia and 
Africa reversed. However, since the difference between Africa and Asia is fairly 
small, the results are fairly comparable to the quantitative data.
4.4 Conflict Levels— The post-Cold War transition, 1989-1992
When we compare the Cold War period with its immediate aftermath— the three 
years from 1989-1992— a different pattern of conflict arises. In the graph below, we 
use the Cold War annual base rates of conflict calculated for each region to determine 
the number of conflicts we would have expected if Cold War conflict rates had 
continued during the period 1989-1992; this is the number of expected conflicts. The 
observed conflicts are the actual number of new conflicts that started from 
1989-1992.
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Graph 4.4: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts (Singer & Small),
1989-1992
Region
■  Expected conflict (1989-92) 
□  Observed conflict (1989-92)Source: Singer & Small
What is immediately noticeable is the sharp spike in the number of actual conflicts 
observed occurring during the period of 1989-1992. Instead of the ten new conflicts 
that would have been expected if Cold War conflict trends had continued, 1989-1992 
saw 17 new conflicts, or a rise of 70 per cent above expected levels. However, the 
trend is not uniform across all regions. Conflict levels in Asia and the Americas show 
a trend downwards—the end of the Cold War signalled fewer conflicts in those 
regions in its immediate aftermath—and Oceania remained at its Cold War historic 
zero level of conflict. Surprisingly, Europe showed an increase in conflict; however, 
that conflict was a single, brief conflict—the Romanian revolution—which was more 
of an outlier than part of a larger trend across non-FSU/FY Eastern Europe. The 
Middle East also saw a rise in conflict at the end of the Cold War due to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War against Iraq. However, the main reason for 
the significant rise in conflict from 1989-1992 was due to the doubling of the number 
of new conflicts in Africa and to the development of new conflicts in FSU/FY, a 
region which had experienced a zero level of conflict during the Cold War; had Cold 
War conflict trends continued, this area would have expected a zero level of conflict. 
Examining the data from the qualitative Kosimo dataset shows similar results—a 
sharp upwards trend in conflict levels with a similar conflict distribution.
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Graph 4.5: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts (Kosimo), 1989-1992
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While the qualitative data would have predicted that about eight new conflicts would 
have been expected worldwide during 1989-1992, 15 conflicts actually started, almost 
double the rate of new conflicts erupting during the Cold War. However, confirming 
the Singer & Small data, the qualitative data indicate that conflict levels were not 
uniformly high in all regions. The number of actual conflicts in Asia and the 
Americas dropped significantly lower than their expected levels,19 while conflict was 
up in the Middle East (again the invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War), and one 
conflict began in Europe—again, the Romanian revolution—which caused an 
unusual, if brief, trend upwards in Europe. However, the Kosimo data also confirm 
the quantitative data and indicate that conflict rates increased markedly in Africa, and 
perhaps most surprisingly in the FSU/FY—which had a zero base rate of conflict 
during the Cold War and therefore had no expected conflicts.
4.5 Conflict Levels— The later post-Cold W ar, 1993-1999
Did conflict levels continued to follow the pattern of increasing conflict set at the end 
of the Cold War or did the pattern change? If we consider 1993-1999 we see that the 
number of new conflicts by region actually dropped to Cold War levels. That is, after 
a period of significantly increased conflict during the immediate end of the Cold War, 
overall conflict levels regressed to the mean and were approximately at or below their 
expected Cold War levels. Neither the quantitative nor qualitative data suggest that
19 The SIPRI data show a smaller drop in Asia.
153
Chapter 4
conflict was on an increasing spiral upwards after 1993, thus refuting the Romantics’ 
predictions. Examining the numbers of expected and observed new conflicts, and 
comparing the quantitative and the qualitative data side-by-side, we obtain the 
following chart:
Graph 4.6: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 1993-1999
Region
■  Expected conflicts (Singer & Small) VI Observed conflicts (SIPRI)
□  Expected conflicts (Kosimo) □  Observed conflicts (Kosimo)
Overall, the quantitative data indicate that the number of observed conflicts 
worldwide during 1993-1999 was below Cold War levels, while the qualitative data 
denote that conflict levels were just slightly higher than those during the Cold War. In 
both cases, the data suggest that conflict levels peaked in the early 1990s and fell at or 
below their historical Cold War levels afterwards.
From a regional perspective, all regions except Africa and the FSU/FY 
showed significant declines in observed levels of conflict when compared with 
historical Cold War levels. This occurred even in regions o f perceived high conflict, 
such the Middle East. The Americas also showed improvement, with conflict rates 
dropping about 50 per cent over Cold War levels after 1988. Perhaps the most 
significant reduction in conflict rates occurred in Asia, which held the dubious title of 
‘leader’ in the Cold War conflict stakes, with the highest regional conflict levels 
during the Cold War. Levels of conflict in Asia plummeted in the range of 50 per cent 
(qualitative data) to 80 per cent (quantitative data) after the end of the Cold War.
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For Africa, conflict levels continued to be higher. While the data show a wide 
range, they indicate the same general trend—conflict was up significantly after the 
end of the Cold War—35 per cent higher (according to the quantitative data) to 106 
per cent higher (qualitative data) than their Cold War rates. Comparatively speaking, 
both types of data show that conflict rates in Africa rose during the whole of the post- 
Cold War period (1989-1999) were higher, and showed no signs of improvement 
post-1992, the peak year of world conflict overall. When compared to the Cold War 
period, the number of observed conflicts over the number of expected conflicts in 
Africa more than doubled from 1989-1992, with a similar trend seen from 1993-1999.
Put into an historical perspective, during the Cold War, Asia was the region 
with the highest overall conflict levels, with average Cold War base rates of conflict 
of 0.66 conflicts per year, which was about 14 per cent above Africa’s average base 
rate of 0.57 conflicts per year (Kosimo qualitative data). The Singer & Small 
quantitative data show an even larger difference between the two regions during the 
Cold War, with Asian base rates at 0.9 conflicts per year—or almost 50 per cent 
higher—than African rates of 0.61. Conflict levels for Africa from 1989-1999 
surpassed the high historic expected levels reached during the peak period of Cold 
War conflict in Asia.
An unexpectedly high post-Cold War conflict rate was also true for the 
FSU/FY, where conflict rates were higher in the post-1989 period than during the 
Cold War. However, from a comparative historical perspective, observed conflict 
rates in the FSU/FY from 1993-1999 were still relatively low when compared to the 
Cold War expected rates for other regions. For example, observed rates in the 
FSU/FY were lower during 1993-1999 than the historical, expected Cold War 
conflict rates for Asia, Africa, the Americas, or the Middle East. Indeed, the observed 
rates for the FSU/FY for 1993-1999 were lower than all other regions except Europe 
and Oceania, which experienced similarly low levels (virtually zero) of conflict 
during the Cold War.
Overall, 11 out of the 15 new violent conflicts that arose during 1989-1992 
were in the FSU/FY or Africa. Considering that Africa and the FSU/FY seem to be 
the outliers in the regional trend towards lower levels of conflict during the 1990s, we 
will examine their contribution to the ‘conflict spike’ that occurred in 1989-1992 in 
more depth in section 4.7.
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4.6 Conflict Levels— The turn of the millennium, 2000-2004
If Romantics’ predictions were incorrect between 1993-1999, did they hold true after 
2000? According to the most recent SIPRI data (the Kosimo database stops at 1999), 
despite the threat of terrorism and the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
number of new armed conflicts fell further after 2000. In fact, the early part of this 
decade experienced about half of the expected level of new conflicts when compared 
to the Cold War. This pattern was repeated in every region except the Middle East, 
where the 9/11 attacks on the US and the US war in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq 
doubled over expected conflict levels. Interestingly, Africa saw a significant decrease 
in new conflicts, reversing its post-Cold War trend. The graph below illustrates these 
points.
Graph 4.7: Expected versus Observed New Conflicts by Region, 2000-2004
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Without the 9/11 attack on the United States, and US retaliation against the al- 
Qaida network in Afghanistan and war against Iraq, the Middle East would also 
reflect the more general trend downwards that other regions experienced. This 
decrease in new conflicts also reflects a trend towards an overall decline in the
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number of total ongoing conflicts; the number of ongoing conflicts in 2004 was lower 
than during the 1980s, and approximately approached a level similar to the 1970s.20
4.7 The Effects of State Collapse on Conflict Levels— The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
If we specifically examine the conflict ‘spike’ that occurred in 1989-1992, both the 
quantitative and the qualitative data suggest that conflicts over the creation of new 
states in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia had a significant impact on 
conflict levels. The Kosimo data show that 15 new conflicts broke out worldwide 
during that period, the most intense single period of conflict during the post-Cold 
War era, surpassing the highest levels of conflict found during the Cold War. Of these 
15 new conflicts, six were the wars following the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. In percentage terms, the collapse 
of the FSU and FY contributed 40 per cent to conflict levels during the period 1989- 
1992. With the end of the wars in FY, that rate dropped significantly in the 
subsequent period, 1993-1999. Comparing historical eras then, the FSU/FY region 
contributed zero to all new violent conflicts during the Cold War, 40 per cent from 
1989-1992, and about 10 per cent from 1993-1999. The next graph shows the relative 
total contribution to conflict levels for the FSU/FY region over time.
Graph 4.8: Contribution of FSU/FY to Overall Conflict Levels, 1945-1999
100%  -
80%0)
3  60%
S£ 40% 0)
20%
0%
1945-88 1989-92
Years
1993-98
Source: Kosimo I FSU/FY □  All other regions
20 Havard Strand et al, Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 3-2005, International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2005, p. 13. Available at http://www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict
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The Singer & Small and SIPRI data confirm these findings: 17 conflicts occurred 
from 1989-1992, five of which were the result of the disintegration of the FSU and 
FY. In percentage terms, these conflicts contributed about 30 per cent to overall 
conflict levels. The quantitative data also suggest that conflict fell significantly from 
1993-1999 to nine new conflicts, two of which, or about 20 per cent overall, were due 
to FSU/FY conflicts. If we compare the quantitative data historically, the FSU/FY 
region contributed zero to new violent conflicts during the Cold War, about 30 per 
cent from 1989-1992, and about 20 per cent from 1993-1999.
Further, if we look at the data available for the number of expected conflicts 
for 1989-1992, we find that conflicts in the FSU/FY region comprised a high 
percentage of those ‘excess’ or unexpected conflicts during the period. According to 
the Kosimo data, 82 per cent of new conflicts above those expected during the period 
are attributable to the disintegration of those communist states. That is, over 80 per 
cent of the growth in new conflicts during the period can be attributed to the conflicts 
in FSU/FY. If Cold War rates of conflict had continued during 1989-1992, then there 
would have been about eight new conflicts expected worldwide, with none expected 
in the FSU/FY region. Instead, there were 15 new conflicts, seven more than 
expected, and six of which are attributable to wars in the FSU/FY. If we take the 
FSU/FY conflicts out of the equation for 1989-1992, we obtain a level of conflict that 
is almost the same as that found during the Cold War. While eight conflicts would 
have been expected worldwide if Cold War base rates persisted into the post-Cold 
War era, nine non-FSU/FY conflicts were observed during the period, a rise of just 
over 10 per cent above Cold War levels. Instead, the actual number of new conflicts 
almost doubled in the after the Cold War. The graph below illustrates the point.
Graph 4.9: Contribution of FSU/FY to Excess New Conflicts, 1989-1992
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The Singer & Small and SIPRI datasets confirm these results, indicating that while 
about ten new conflicts could have been expected during the period, 17 were 
observed, a 70 per cent increase over expected rates. Of those seven conflicts above 
the expected number, five were in the FSU/FY. Therefore, the disintegration of the 
FSU and FY contributed over 71 per cent of new conflicts above expected rates from 
1989-1992. In other words, the violent collapse of the FSU and FY accounted for 
most of the rise in worldwide conflict levels above their expected Cold War rates, in 
the region of 70 per cent (quantitative data) to 80 per cent (qualitative data). The 
conflict ‘spike’ observed during 1989-1992 would not have appeared without the 
break-up of these two multinational states. With the resolution of the wars in former 
Yugoslavia, conflict levels again tumbled to near-Cold War levels in 1993-1999.
4.8 The Effects of African Conflicts on Conflict Levels in the 1990s
What is interesting about conflict during 1989-1992 is how it departed from Cold 
War norms. While the disintegration of the FSU and FY contributed 
disproportionately to rising conflict levels worldwide above their expected Cold War 
norms, other regions actually experienced lower than expected levels of conflict. 
Significantly, Africa bucked that downward trend, with conflict more than doubling 
over its expected regional Cold War base rate. These results confirm those obtained 
by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank, who have found that Africa 
had a lower incidence of intrastate conflict from 1965-1980, but then saw conflict 
increase through the 1980s and grow significantly from 1990.21 This phenomenon 
may have led some Romantic observers to predict that African conflicts were the 
wave of the future, providing a ‘contagion’ effect that would sweep the world.
21 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’, World Bank Working 
Paper (August 2000), pp. 6 and 16. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/ 
papers/incidencel .pdf
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Graph 4.10: Expected versus Observed Conflicts in Africa, 1980-1999
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In terms of raw numbers, the qualitative data indicate that from 1989-1992 African 
conflicts doubled from their expected Cold War rates: while about two conflicts could 
have been expected, four were observed. This trend continued from 1993-1999, 
where Kosimo indicates that about 3.5 conflicts (actually between three and four 
conflicts) could have been expected, while seven were observed. The graph above 
illustrates this point, showing the raw numbers (right-hand side of graph) and the 
steep increase as a percentage (left-hand side of graph). The quantitative data confirm 
this initial steep rise in African conflicts, with the Singer & Small data indicating that 
about two new African conflicts could have been expected during 1989-1992 while 
five were observed. However, the data from 1993-1999 are more equivocal; while 
about four new conflicts could have been expected from 1993-1999, SIPRI observed 
five.
If we examine the data on African conflicts as a contribution to overall 
international conflict levels, we see that the immediate end of the Cold War did not 
signal a disproportionate rise in African conflicts, as the percentage contribution of 
new African conflicts to overall conflicts remained steady. While the raw number of 
African conflicts increased, since the 1989-1992 period saw a total rise in 
international conflict, Africa’s proportion of conflicts remained the same. African 
conflicts comprised about 27 per cent of all new conflicts started both during the Cold 
War and from 1989-1992. However, the 1993-1999 period marked a significant shift 
from the Cold War norm, with the proportion of African conflicts rising to about 54
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per cent of all new conflicts as conflict levels in other regions fell. These results 
confirm separately tabulated SIPRI findings; for example, SIPRI’s 1999 Yearbook 
noted that Africa was the one region where armed conflict was one the rise.
Graph 4.11: Percentage Contribution of Africa to Conflict Levels, 1945-1999
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The distribution of the most afflicted conflict regions changed from the patterns 
established during the Cold War. While conflict levels in other regions fell to below 
Cold War levels or remained steady, from 1993-1999 the percentage of new African 
conflicts as a proportion of all new conflicts worldwide rose by 100 per cent, from 
about 27 per cent of all new conflicts to about 54 per cent of all new conflicts 
worldwide. However, as discussed in the previous section, the number of new 
conflicts in Africa dropped significantly after 2000. Thus counter to Romantic 
predictions, African conflicts did not spiral ever upwards; they did not provide a 
‘contagion’ effect, nor did they presage the shape of things to come in the developed 
world.
22 See ‘Highlights from the SIPRI Yearbook 1999’. Available at http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb99/ 
pr99.html
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4.9 Conflict Termination— An under-explored post-Cold War 
trend
While the presence of conflicts in the FSU/FY and Africa made headlines in the 
1990s, one important point to highlight is that the absence of conflict in some regions 
was and continues to be an under-explored topic. For example, both the qualitative 
and the quantitative data show a decline in the number of new conflicts in Asia since 
the 1970s, with a significant drop over Cold War levels after the end of the Cold War. 
The graph below exhibits this unsung success story.
Graph 4.12: Declining Conflict in Asia, 1945-1992
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Not only did fewer new conflicts arise in Asia after the end of the Cold War, more old 
conflicts terminated globally.24 Worldwide, the total number of ongoing conflicts that 
ended after the fall of the Berlin Wall was higher than the number of conflicts that 
terminated in the 1980s. Depending on how we define conflict, the total raw number 
of total ongoing conflicts ending during the four years of the immediate post-Cold 
War transition (1989-1992) was slightly lower than (using quantitative data) or
23 Again, the time units used in the graph are not in even increments in order to highlight changes 
during the immediate post-Cold War era.
24 The data is somewhat divergent from 1945 to the 1960s, where the direction each graph is going is 
different. For example, Kosimo shows an increase in conflict from the 1950s, while the Singer &
Small data indicate a drop in conflict during the same period. However, both datasets agree on the 
direction and magnitude of conflict post-1970.
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slightly greater than (using qualitative data) during the previous nine years. The 
following graph illustrates this point.
Graph 4.13: Overall Conflict Termination Over Time, 1945-1992
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When we express these raw numbers as an average annual rate, the rate of conflict 
termination during 1989-1992 was actually twice that of the 1980s, the immediately 
preceding decade during the Cold War. In fact, old conflicts terminated at a more 
rapid rate from 1989-1992 than during any single period of the Cold War.
Graph 4.14: Rates of Conflict Termination, 1945-1992
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According to the Singer & Small quantitative data, the rate of conflict termination 
from 1989-1992 was 25 per cent higher than during the 1970s, the peak conflict 
termination period during the Cold War, and about 97 per cent above the rate during
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the 1980s. Similarly, for the Kosimo qualitative data, the 1989-1992 period exhibited 
a 12 per cent higher rate of conflict termination compared to the 1970s, and a 166 per 
cent greater rate than in the 1980s.
Graph 4.15: Comparison of Conflict Termination Rates by Region, 1945-1999
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When we look at the trend towards conflict termination from 1993-1999, we see a 
similar pattern emerging, with the number of old, ongoing conflicts terminating at a 
rate of about 4.5 per year (Kosimo data). This compares favourably with the Cold 
War period, when on average about 1.5 ongoing conflicts would end each year, as 
well as with the immediate post-Cold War period (1988-1992), when about 3.3 
ongoing conflicts ended per year (Kosimo data).
Additionally, the regional pattern for conflict termination shows that rates of 
conflict termination after the Cold War not only increased in Asia, but also in other 
regions such as the Americas, the Middle East, and even in Africa. Therefore, while 
there may have been more new post-Cold War conflicts in Africa, some of these new 
conflicts ended during the period and older Cold War conflicts also terminated. If we 
look at the types of conflicts that ended during the 1990s, we find that many of those 
terminating were ongoing, old Cold War conflicts of long duration.
Of the 45 conflicts that ended between the years 1989-1999, 17 were conflicts 
started during the Cold War. These conflicts had an average (mean) duration of 14.4 
years and a median duration of 13 years. This is in sharp contrast to wars that started 
and finished during the Cold War (1945-1988), whose average duration was about 
three times shorter—4.4 years, with a median of 3 years.25 This means that about one-
25 Note the large variance in these figures.
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third of post-Cold War conflicts that ended were particularly longstanding Cold War 
conflicts. O f these longstanding conflicts, seven were less than 10 years in duration, 
seven were 10-20 years in duration, and three were over 20 years in duration. The rest 
o f the conflicts ending during 1989-1999 started during the post-Cold War period. 
These were actually shorter in duration than average Cold War conflicts, with a mean 
duration of 3.3 years and a median duration of 2 years (Kosimo data). The graph 
below illustrates these points.
Graph 4.16: Duration of Conflicts by Start and Termination Date
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Overall conflict termination trends during the 1990s were positive, 
contradicting Romantic predictions of ever-increasing conflict. The post-Cold War 
period from 1989-1999 was also a time of increased conflict termination, with the rate 
that conflicts ended being higher than any period during the Cold War. These trends 
were seen across all regions, even those of higher conflict, such as Africa and 
FSU/FY. Additionally, many older Cold War conflicts of long duration were ended 
during the 1990s, while new conflicts commencing in the post-Cold War era were 
generally shorter in duration than those begun during the Cold War.
4.10 Conflict and State Creation during the Cold War— W ars of 
decolonisation
As we have demonstrated, contrary to Romantic hypotheses about post-Cold War 
conflict, the wars that followed the disintegration of the FSU and FY and the creation 
of new states in this region contributed disproportionately to the rise in conflict levels
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during the early 1990s; the post-Cold War spike was not generalised to other regions. 
Indeed, between 70-80 per cent of all new conflicts above expected Cold War levels 
(excess conflicts) were due to the collapse of these states. Had these states not 
fragmented, Romantics would have seen no ‘coming anarchy’—conflict levels after 
the end of the Cold War would have remained roughly on par with expected Cold 
War norms. However, are there any parallels between the 1990s and the Cold War 
process of decolonisation? Counter to Romantics’ hypotheses that the 1990s 
represented a disruption in traditional Cold War patterns of conflict, did the creation 
of new states also contribute significantly to conflict levels during the Cold War era?
(a) State Creation—Definitions
To examine this question, we need to define state creation as a specific moment in 
time that a new state is created. But when is that moment? Since state creation may be 
more a continuum or a period of time rather than a single, specific date, there are 
several qualitative definitions open to scholars, such as the creation of leaderships 
whose stated goal is independence, or the installation of new governments. However, 
to examine the issue within the parameters of the available data, two definitions we 
will investigate further are 1) the date when independence or autonomy is declared 
and 2) the date of UN admission of the new state.26 Both have strengths and 
weaknesses, as listed below:
26 Note that the source we use for the dates of UN admission is the United Nations ‘List of Member 
States’, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html The source for dates on 
declarations o f independence is the CIA World Factbook. The Factbook notes that ‘[f]or most 
countries, this [independence] entry gives the date that sovereignty was achieved and from which 
nation, empire, or trusteeship. For the other countries, the date given may not represent 
“independence” in the strict sense, but rather some significant nationhood event such as the traditional 
founding date or the date of unification, federation, confederation, establishment, fundamental change 
in the form of government, or state succession’. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
docs/notesanddefs.html#2088
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Table 4.1: Definitions of State Creation
Independence declared UN admission
Definition Date a party to conflict 
declares that independent or 
autonomous state is the goal 
of conflict
Date of admission to UN
Strengths Considers all cases of 
conflict over independence 
or autonomy regardless of 
outcome; looks at motives or 
intent of parties to conflict
Precise, knowable date 
and single definitive 
source of information 
about dates
Weaknesses Date open to interpretation, 
particularly if there are 
multiple parties to a conflict, 
and various sources needed 
for information
Not all wars of 
independence end in 
statehood, so restricts 
number of cases
The first point to note about state creation is that the majority of new states created 
under decolonisation during the Cold War did not have to fight for independence, 
which has remained true for the new states created in the post-Cold War era.27 During 
the Cold War, about 30 per cent of all new states had conflicts over state creation.
The figure is slightly lower for the 1990s, with about 24 per cent of new states created 
involved in state creation conflicts. The following chart illustrates this point.
Graph 4.17: Conflicts Over Independence in New States, 1945-1999
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27 Note that states in the Americas are not included in this analysis since the period of decolonisation 
and the creation of new states in the region date to before 1945.
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(b) Timing State Creation Conflicts
In order to determine whether conflict is in some way connected to the development 
of new states, we need to understand the timing of conflict. We assume that conflicts 
that occur near the time a state is created are most likely related to state creation since 
proximity in time can impute motive. On the other hand, conflicts occurring 
significantly earlier or later than the ‘moment’ of state creation may not be about state 
creation. O f the new conflicts that developed in newly independent states, we can 
examine the timing of conflict. We can do this by looking at the onset of conflict over 
certain time intervals. For example, if  conflict occurs about one year before or after a 
declaration of independence or autonomy, we can be fairly confident that the conflict 
is actually over the issue of state creation. Similarly, we would be less likely to 
attribute a conflict to state creation if  it broke out a decade before or after such a 
declaration.28 The graph below shows the results of this analysis, plotting the 
percentage of new conflicts started over the years before or after state creation using 
both definitions.29
Graph 4.18: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1945-1988
years -10/-6 (5yrs) years -SI-2 (4yrs) years -1/0/+1 years +2/+5 (4yrs) years +6/+10
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28 There could of course be cases where a decades-long conflict finally does result in a declaration of 
independence by one party, and therefore we would be undercounting the number of conflicts over 
state creation, but we are assuming that such conflicts are less likely than ones where a party declares 
its intentions much sooner to the onset o f conflict.
29 Note that the time intervals are not evenly divided. The -1/+1 interval is 3 years long, the -5/-2 and 
+2/+5 intervals are 4 years long, and the -10/-6 and +6/+10 intervals are 5 years long. The reason for 
this difference in the size of each interval is to examine the occurrence of conflict in the short-, 
medium-, and long-terms after state creation. With each further interval, conflict is less likely to be 
about state creation.
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If we compare the two definitions of state creation—a declaration of independence 
and UN admission—side-by-side with the starting dates of new conflicts, we see that 
we get different results for each definition. If we define state creation from the 
moment a declaration of independence is made, then the onset of conflict often came 
within one year of state creation with the plurality of the data supporting this view. 
This holds for both the qualitative and the quantitative data, with the percentage of 
new conflicts starting within one year of a declaration of independence being 44 per 
cent and 36 per cent, respectively. The second largest number of conflicts arises in the 
6-10 years after a declaration of independence, with 25 per cent (qualitative data) or 
16 per cent (quantitative date) of conflicts likely to occur at that time.30 This suggests 
that many new conflicts occur at the point of state creation, and then much later, 
possibly over another issue, such as national power, or the control of the new state 
government.
If we use the date of UN admission as our definition of state creation, these 
positions are reversed. We see that conflict in new states was more likely to occur 6- 
10 years after UN admission. Again, both the qualitative and the quantitative data 
show the same trend, with the percentage of conflicts starting during this time being 
37 per cent (qualitative data) or 27 per cent (quantitative data), respectively. The 
second largest number of conflicts arises in the one year before or after UN 
admission, with 25 per cent (qualitative data) or 22 per cent (quantitative data) of 
conflicts likely to occur at that time.
Clearly, the choice of definition of state creation in this context has an 
important impact on the results of the timing of conflict. Why would the positions be 
reversed? One possible reason for the difference is the time lag involved between a 
declaration of independence and UN admission. Clearly, many states had conflicts in 
which one party declared independence, a conflict ensued resulting in independence, 
and then the state was admitted to the UN much later. This suggests conflict timed to 
the earlier move toward independence.
If we compare the Cold War period to the post-Cold War era, we see that the 
onset of conflict during both periods generally came within one year of state creation. 
The qualitative data suggest that all of the post-Cold War conflicts that involved new
30 Note that the Kosimo qualitative data are more clear on this point, since the +6/+10 interval is 
clearly the second highest for that dataset. The SIPRI quantitative data are more ambiguous—all 
intervals other than the -1/+1 are at about 16 per cent.
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states started within one year of a declaration of independence or UN admission, so 
the choice of definition of state creation made no difference to the results. However, 
the quantitative data differ slightly depending on which definition is used. While they 
do indicate that about 80-82 per cent of these conflicts began within the -1/+1 interval 
of state creation for both definitions, they make a departure in direction for the rest of 
the data. If state creation is defined as a declaration of independence, the data show 
that about 18 per cent of conflicts will commence in the 2-5 years after such a 
declaration, while the UN admission definition suggests that about 20 per cent of 
conflicts would be initiated 2-5 years before the declaration. Despite this discrepancy, 
the preponderance of the data in both datasets strongly indicates that post-Cold War 
conflict in new states began a year before or after state creation, suggesting that state 
creation was a primary reason for conflict.
Graph 4.19: Comparing Definitions of State Creation, 1989-1999
years -10/-6 years-5/-2 (4yrs) years-1/0/+1 years+2/+5 years +6/+10 
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While the data are equivocal in favouring one definition over another in the 1990s, 
since the results barely differ in either case, the results for the Cold War period 
suggest that the best definition for state creation is a declaration of independence or 
autonomy, since the immediate onset of conflict is most closely matched to the period 
one year before or after such a declaration. Within that interval, we can be fairly sure 
that such conflicts are more likely to be about state creation, rather than about other 
issues. The disparity in the results for the Cold War period between the two
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definitions suggests that there was a time lag between most declarations of
independence and UN admission from 1945-1988, which could account for the 
11
different results. It also suggests that there are two types of conflicts to consider in 
new states. First, conflicts that are about state creation—triggered in the year 
immediately preceding or following a declaration of independence (or autonomy), 
many of which were about decolonisation. Second, conflicts occurring in the wake of 
state creation are more likely to be about governance—the control of the state—or 
national power conflicts after the creation of a new state.
4.11 Why Fight?—Tracking reasons for conflict, 1945-1999
While much has been written about the post-Cold War upsurge in identity-based 
conflicts, national power struggles were at the heart of most 1990s conflicts, just as 
they were during the Cold War.32 Additionally, while identity-based conflicts often 
provoked images of unrestrained violence, conflicts over national power were more 
deadly. As one commentator notes, ‘[f]or the period after 1987, power-contention 
conflicts produced more than ten times the fatalities and refugees of indigenous-rights 
conflicts and more than 50 [per cent] more deaths and refugees than ethnonational 
conflicts’.33
31 Perhaps it also indicates that new states created in the post-Cold War era have experienced less of a 
time lag between their declarations o f independence and UN admission.
32 Kosimo included ethnic conflicts only as part of its basket of issues called ‘ethnic, religious, or 
regional autonomy’. These conflicts over autonomy have been aggregated with conflicts over 
independence or decolonisation since the core issue of creating a separate political entity is the same, 
with claims for autonomy often seen as a part of claims for later independence. See the Appendix for 
more information on methodology.
33 John Langan, ‘Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Religion’, Theological Studies (Vol. 56, No. 1, 
1995).
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Graph 4.20: Top Three Conflict Issues Over Time, 1945-1999
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When examining the variety of reasons for conflict in the Kosimo database (which 
only includes data to 1999), the top three conflict issues from 1945-1999 were: 1) 
national power conflicts, which are intrastate conflicts over who controls the state, 2) 
bids for independence or autonomy, which are often classified as intrastate conflicts 
but can just as easily be seen as interstate conflicts between a state and a state-in- 
waiting, and 3) ideological or system conflicts, which are mostly superpower proxy
34wars.
Of particular interest is the change over time of the predominance o f the three 
issues. From the late 1940s, and peaking through the 1960s, most conflicts were over 
issues of independence and autonomy, coinciding with the era of decolonisation that 
followed the end of World War II. By the 1970s, conflicts over state creation slipped 
into third place, and instead we saw a rapid rise in conflicts over national power—the 
internal governance of the state, as various groups within newly created states vied 
for political control. However, conflicts over state creation were once again rising by 
the 1980s, although national power conflicts remained the most numerous. By 
contrast, ideological conflicts remained fairly level throughout the Cold War in 
comparison with the other two issues. Overall, the graph describes the peak historical 
periods of decolonisation conflicts— from the 1940s through the 1960s—and traces
34 These results are based only on the Kosimo dataset, which is the only dataset to include this 
information. Note that Kosimo codes the data for multiple conflict issues that are not mutually 
exclusive, so a particular conflict could be coded for both national power and ideology, for example. 
Therefore, any single conflict may be included in more than one issue area on the chart. For our 
purposes, we have included all conflicts that are at least partly over the particular issue, rather than 
only those that were exclusively over a particular issue. For more information on issue coding, see the 
Appendix.
172
Chapter 4
the change to intrastate conflicts over state control from the 1970s onwards as newly 
decolonised states consolidated.
When comparing the 1990s with these results, we see that conflicts over 
national power remained the most numerous, steadily since the 1970s. However, 
another surge of state creation conflicts followed in the wake of the collapse of 
FSU/FY during 1989-1992, although such conflicts declined post-1993. Finally, 
ideology or system conflicts dwindled sharply at the end of the Cold War, as would 
be expected with the collapse of communism and the end of the ideological 
confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.
(a) Comparing Conflict Issues—Asia and Africa
If we take a regional approach to state creation in the two most conflictual parts of the 
Cold War world—Asia and Africa, which had the highest base rates of conflict from 
1945-1988—we see that state creation played a differing role in generating conflict in 
each region. In Asia, state creation played a major role in conflict, accounting for 
about 50 per cent of all new conflicts. Rates o f new conflict due to state creation were 
high from 1940-1950, and while they trailed off in the 1960s and 1970s, state creation 
still remained an issue in about one-third of conflicts during those periods. The graph 
below shows these points:
Graph 4.21: State Creation in Asia: New States, New Conflicts, and the Issue of 
Independence or Autonomy as a Reason for Conflict, 1945-1998
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However, Cold War conflicts in Africa did not follow this pattern. While state 
creation was an important conflict issue for Africa in the 1960s, during other decades 
most conflicts remained about other issues.
Graph 4.22: State Creation in Africa: New States, New Conflicts, and the Issue 
of Independence or Autonomy as a Reason for Conflict, 1945-1998
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As the previous graph indicates, about one-third of all African conflicts during the 
Cold War were about state creation— fighting for independence or autonomy. 
However, more African Cold War conflicts were about national power, the control 
and governance of the state, which occurred after state creation. Overall, compared to 
Asia, Africa had a less conflictual independence or decolonisation process; however, 
the period o f state consolidation was more conflictual. Indeed, in Africa most 
conflicts have been about control of the state after independence. According to 
Kosimo, of the 37 wars it lists in Africa for the period 1945-1999, 30 had a national 
power contention component, while 12 included issues of independence or autonomy, 
and only one conflict was part of an ideological or system conflict.
However, post-independence domestic power contention conflicts became 
more acute after the end of the Cold War. Why did this happen in Africa, and not in 
other developing countries? In other words, why did Africa not act as a ‘contagion’? 
A variety of scholarly explanations have been offered which include political, 
historical, and economic reasons for the upsurge in African conflicts. Jeffrey Herbst 
and William Reno contend that the state is particularly weak in Africa, which 
suggests that it is more internally fractured and politically unable to head off conflict
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than other regions. Crawford Young offers an historical explanation: that the 
European colonial state in Africa—in the form of the crushing, oppressive Bula 
Matari—had a particularly brutal effect on subsequent political and economic 
development when compared to colonial regimes in other regions.
Others, like Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank, maintain that 
African states have weak economic performance and are more reliant on primary 
commodities which are lootable assets prone to generating conflict. Their argument 
rests on Africa’s particularly dismal economic performance since the Cold War when 
compared to other developing regions. Another possibility is that these relatively 
poor states were more vulnerable to superpower priorities at the end of the Cold War. 
Once the Cold War ended the United States and FSU, as superpower patrons, 
restructured their strategic priorities and therefore were either less willing (in the case 
of the US) or able (in the case of the FSU) to fund or assist their African clients, 
creating a greater risk of conflict.
Additionally, some scholars have contended that post-Cold War African 
conflicts were not part of a trend towards global anarchy, but a part of a new period of 
African renaissance, creating a new balance of power in Africa. As one scholar noted,
The Age of Empire [had] truly ended in the 1990s. The political order 
imposed by the colonial powers and maintained until recently by U.S.-Soviet 
rivalry and French interventionism can no longer be taken for granted. States 
[in Africa] will survive only if they can establish domestic control and defend 
themselves against outside infringement.38
Finally, despite Africa’s reputation for conflict, considering the number of ethnic 
groups in Africa, scholars have calculated that only 0.05 per cent of all potential
35 Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Responding to State Failure in Africa’, International Security (Vol. 21, No. 3 
1996/1997), pp. 120-144; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998); and William Reno, ‘Clandestine economies, violence and states in Africa’, 
Journal o f International Affairs (Vol. 53, No. 2,2000). Robert Jackson has also questioned the strength 
of the African state. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
36 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1994).
37 Collier and Hoeffler, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’. Jeffrey Herbst has also written on 
the economic weaknesses of African states and the role of natural resources in conflict generation. See 
Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa’, Journal o f African 
Economies (Vol. 9, No. 3,2000).
38 Marina S. Ottaway, ‘Think Again: Africa’, Foreign Policy (Spring 1999), p. 15.
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ethnic conflicts between the time of state independence and 1979 actually erupted 
into violence.39
(b) Conflict Issues—Effects on Conflict Duration and Casualties
As Romantics predicted, are identity-based conflicts more intense and intractable? 
That is, do they generate more casualties and last longer than other conflicts? If we 
look at the duration of conflicts according to conflict issue and further divide these by 
three conflict periods—those starting and finishing during the Cold War (1945-1988); 
those starting during the Cold War (19845-1988) and finishing during the post-Cold 
War period (1989-1999); and those starting and finishing during the post-Cold War 
period (1989-1999)—we find that on average across time periods the longest lasting 
conflicts generally were those over independence or autonomy. For those Cold War 
conflicts started and finished during 1945-1988, ideological conflicts lasted about as 
long as independence conflicts, with national power conflicts in third place. These 
last two positions are reversed for conflicts started after 1989. In comparison with 
Cold War conflicts, post-Cold War conflicts over national power were about as long, 
while conflicts over independence or autonomy were shorter, and ideological 
conflicts were shortest of all, most likely due to the collapse of the bipolar 
confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.
If we examine those 83 conflicts in Kosimo that started and finished from 
1945-1988 (Cold War) separately, we find that independence and ideological 
conflicts had the longest duration, about six years, while national power contention 
conflicts were appreciably shorter, about three years in length. For the 28 conflicts 
started and finished from 1989-1999 (post-Cold War), these conflicts were shorter 
than those started during the Cold War. Post-Cold War conflicts over independence 
or autonomy were on average about 1.5 years shorter and conflicts over ideology 
have been 4 years shorter, while national power conflicts have lasted about as long as 
their Cold War counterparts (each just over 3 years).
More interestingly perhaps, the 17 conflicts that started during 1945-1988 
(Cold War) but that finished during 1989-1999 (post-Cold War) had a significantly 
different pattern of conflict duration. Not only were all their conflicts longer across all
39 John Mueller, ‘The Banality of “Ethnic Conflict”: Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC (31 August-3 September 
2000), p. 29.
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three issues, but their independence and ideological conflicts were particularly long- 
lasting (about 17 and 15 years on average, respectively). Additionally, when 
compared to other Cold War conflicts, their duration across issue areas was 2.5-3 
times as long. The chart below illustrates these points.
Graph 4.23: Mean Duration of Conflict by Issue and by Start and End Dates
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The fact that 1990s conflicts generally had a shorter duration than Cold War conflicts 
works to question Romantic predictions, since the length of post-Cold War conflicts 
make them seem no more ‘intractable’ than those during the Cold War. Considering 
that some Cold War ideological conflicts ground on for more than 15 years, it is hard 
to argue the ‘never-ending’ nature of 1990s conflict.
Finally, if we look at the deadliness o f conflict according to conflict issue, we 
see that of the top three issues—national power, independence or autonomy, and 
ideological or system conflict—the most deadly conflicts from 1945-1999 included 
an element of ideological or system conflict. According to the Kosimo database’s 
minimum casualty estimates for conflicts, ideological conflicts claimed, on average,
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194,000 casualties over the course of the conflict.40 National power conflicts ran a 
close second, with about 184,000 casualties per conflict. Far behind were conflicts 
over independence or autonomy. These were, on average, about half as deadly as 
ideological or national power conflicts, resulting in an average minimum casualty 
figure of about 90,000 casualties per conflict41 These results also seem to undermine 
Romantic predictions, since Romantics presume that the highest intensity (high 
casualty) conflicts are not over such ‘rational’ issues as ideology but over ‘irrational’ 
issues such as culture, primordial identity, or ethnicity which could include conflicts 
over ethnic autonomy or the creation of new ethnically-based states.
Graph 4.24: Average Minimum Number of Casualties by Conflict Issue
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40 Note that these figures are for average minimum number of casualties. Since casualty figures can 
vary widely, Kosimo states both minimum and maximum ranges for figures. We have used only the 
most conservative estimate here, o f average minimum casualties.
41 Note that the Kosimo database does not include casualty estimates for all conflicts, but only those 
for which it has some reliable estimates. For example, o f the 31 ideological conflicts, Kosimo 
contained 25 estimates. For the 41 independence/autonomy-coded conflicts, it had casualty estimates 
for 38 conflicts. Of the 60 conflicts coded for national power, the database included casualty estimates 
for 39 conflicts. Therefore, these figures are based on only those conflicts which included casualty 
estimates.
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4.12 The Coining Anarchy Myth—Conclusion
‘When the truth cannot be clearly made out, what is false is increased
through fear ’
—Quintus Curtius Rufus42
At the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the conflict spike created by the violence 
in former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and parts of Africa caused many observers to 
fear for the future, particularly since the trend in conflict in the early 1990s seemed 
ever upward. Romantics like Kaplan, Huntington, and van Creveld predicted a future 
of anarchical identity-based conflict which would be both more intense and more 
intractable, with African conflicts serving as a ‘contagion’, an example of what 
awaited the developed world. However, as our empirical data show, global conflict 
levels after 1993 fell to levels at or below those experienced during the Cold War. 
Indeed, post-2000 conflict levels are about half of expected Cold War levels. As we 
have argued, Romantic ‘chaos theories’—whether in their ‘coming anarchy’, 
intractable ‘culture clash’ or descent into neo-medieval violence forms—are more a 
myth based on a sense of pessimism at the loss of the certainties and perceived 
security of the bipolar world order than observations that have withstood empirical 
scrutiny, much less accurate predictions of the shape of the post-Cold War world. In 
effect, pessimistic Romantic assessments of the future of conflict promulgated during 
the post-Cold War era, although false, have been increased by the fear sown by the 
fog of uncertainty over the future ‘architecture’ and structure of international 
relations.
Our empirical results confirm the work of some other scholars in the field. For 
example, Roy Licklider’s work shows that while intrastate conflicts were the primary 
type of conflict in the 1990s, they had been so since the end of World War I I 43 In that 
sense, the movement toward intrastate conflict (rather than interstate conflict) was not 
a new phenomenon generated by the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the 
bipolar system but rather a continuation of a much older trend.
42 Quintus Curtius Rufus, De Rebus Gestis Alexandri Magni [History o f Alexander the Great] Book 
IV, section 10, sentence 12. The original reads ‘quippe ubi explorari vera non possunt, falsa per metum 
augentur.’ See http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/curtius4.html
43 See Roy Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993’, 
American Political Science Review (Vol. 89, No. 3,1995), pp. 681-690.
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Our results indicate that conflict levels dropped significantly by the mid- 
1990s, and other conflict researchers report that this trend continues unabated in the 
post-9/11 world. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2004 
Yearbook indicates that the number of major armed conflicts has fallen precipitously 
since 1991: from 33 wars in 1991 to 19 in 2003, a decrease of over 40 per cent.44 
Another NGO, Project Ploughshares, sponsored by the Canadian Council of 
Churches—using a separate methodology—estimates that the total number of armed 
conflicts fell from 44 in 1995 to 36 in 2003, a drop of over 18 per cent45 Casualty 
figures for the post-1991 period also decreased. Post-Cold War conflict casualties 
were down to about 20,000 estimated deaths in 2003, after having averaged 40,000-
100,000 per year in the 1990s 46 However, the ‘conflictual’ 1990s were still more 
peaceful than some years during the Cold War: the peak period for conflict deaths 
was in 1951. Indeed, one report notes that ‘the general magnitude of global warfare 
has decreased by over fifty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end 
of 2002 to its lowest level since the early 1960s’.47
Additionally, our results and analyses confirm work by Ted Robert Gurr, 
Yahya Sadowski, and Giacomo Chiozza who have argued that the Romantic 
contention that the world was sliding into a period of unending identity or ethnic 
conflicts is a myth 48 Gurr indicates that the brutality of some high-profile conflicts 
and ‘the messiness of the international responses to them [...] obscures the larger 
shift from confrontation to accommodation’. Therefore, ‘[ejthnic warfare’s heyday 
may belong to the last century’.49 Equally, Sadowski’s review of various empirical 
data on war shows that 1990s conflicts exhibited no more ‘culture clash’ elements 
than wars begun during the Cold War.50 Additionally, Chiozza has empirically shown 
that civilisational differences between states do not generate a higher propensity for
44 See Renata Dwan and Micaela Gustavsson, ‘Chapter 3: Major Armed Conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook 
2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
45 Ernie Regehr, ‘Introduction’, Armed Conflicts Report 2004 (Waterloo, ON: Project Plowshares, 
2004). Available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/eontent/ACR/ACR00/ACR00.html
46 Charles J. Hanley, ‘War deaths said to be declining’, Associated Press (27 September 2004).
47 Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, et al., Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey o f Armed 
Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park, MD: Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, 2003), p. 12.
48 Ted Robert Gurr, ‘Ethnic Warfare on the Wane’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 79, No. 3, 2000), pp. 52-64, 
and Yahya Sadowski, The Myth o f Global Chaos (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997).
49 Gurr, ‘Ethnic Warfare on the Wane’, p. 52.
50 Sadowski, especially Chapter 9, ‘Post Cold War Patterns of Conflict’, pp. 121-144.
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conflict.51 Indeed, the concept of a purely ‘ethnic’ conflict may be questionable, as 
many of these conflicts are tied up with bids for statehood or other forms of self- 
determination; according to David Quinn and Ted Robert Gurr, ‘[s]eventy territorially 
concentrated ethnic groups have waged armed conflicts for autonomy or 
independence at some time since the 1950s, not counting the peoples of former 
European colonies’.52 However, the number of these conflicts is on the wane: 
‘[e]thnonational wars for independence, which were the main threat to civil peace and 
regional security in the first post-Cold War decade, have declined to their lowest level 
since I960’.53
When examining the evidence from our database comparisons, our results 
show that levels of new conflicts did indeed rise sharply—by about 70 per cent— 
above expected Cold War rates in the immediate end of the Cold War, from 1989- 
1992, to new and unprecedented levels. However, much of that conflict spike was 
attributable to the break-up of two multinational states: the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. That is, the conflict spike did not represent a generalised upswing in 
conflict, but rather reflected the specific disintegration of two states: there was no 
‘contagion’ of conflict. If we examine the number of excess conflicts in the 1990s— 
those above expected Cold War rates—we see that about 70-80 per cent of these 
excess conflicts from 1989-1992 were due to the disintegration of and conflict in 
these two states. These occasional spikes of intrastate violence are not surprising as 
they happened during the Cold War period. As two researchers note:
[d]espite its higher prominence, the phenomenon of communitarian conflict is 
not new. Occasionally, major world events, such as decolonization, the 
collapse of empires, and, more recently, the collapse of communism, have 
caused spikes in the incidence of communitarian conflict.54
Further, when we examine conflict levels from 1993-1999, overall and by region, we 
see that the number of new conflicts was generally at or below expected Cold War 
levels. This regression towards the mean conflict rate found during the Cold War 
suggests that the collapse into conflict of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was
51 Giacomo Chiozza, ‘Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International 
Conflict Involvement 1946-97’, Journal o f Peace Research (Vol. 39, No. 6,2002), pp. 711-734.
52 Marshall, Gurr, et al., p. 26.
53 Ibid., p. 1.
54 Thomas S. Szayna and Ashley J. Tellis, Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application o f  a 
Process Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), p. 1. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MRl 188/
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unusual—perhaps even an epiphenomenon—rather than part of a larger worldwide 
trend towards anarchy, conflict, or the violent fragmentation of states. These trends 
continued into this decade: the post-2000 period has seen a halving of the number of 
new conflicts overall. Only one region—the Middle East—has seen an upswing in 
new conflicts due to events after 9/11.
There was one regional exception to the post-1992 trend towards lower 
conflict: Africa. Considering that Africa was not the region of highest conflict during 
the Cold War—that dubious distinction goes to Asia—this suggests a change in the 
distribution of conflict from Cold War patterns. Additionally, while African conflicts 
did not make up a disproportionate percentage of new conflicts from 1989-1992 as 
compared with Africa’s experience during the Cold War due to the overall rise in 
conflicts worldwide, that pattern changed after 1993. From 1993-1999, as conflict 
levels dropped in other regions, conflicts in Africa grew and comprised over 50 per 
cent of all new conflicts worldwide, double Africa’s Cold War contribution to 
conflict levels. However, post-2000 African conflict rates have dropped, following 
the pattern established in other regions. Therefore, African conflicts did not act as a 
‘contagion’, heralding a preliminary movement towards global anarchy, chaos, or 
state disintegration.
Another point at variance with the broad acceptance of the Romantic ‘chaos 
theories’ was the rate of conflict termination. If the 1990s were a period of growing 
anarchy, we would have expected fewer conflicts to terminate, or at least would have 
expected longer conflict duration, during that time. The rate of conflict termination 
during the 1990s was at or above Cold War levels; thus while new conflicts started, 
many old conflicts terminated after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, contrary to 
the 1990s being a period of greater anarchy, for some places the end of the Cold War 
meant the end of longstanding conflicts. However, since these incidents of conflict 
termination have, arguably, received far less attention from both popular media and 
scholars, they may appear to be less salient and therefore less obviously important to 
policymakers and academics alike.
A further issue is at odds with the Romantics’ thesis: the nature of post-Cold 
War conflict itself. ‘Chaos theories’ posited that identity-based conflicts would 
increasingly lead to unending, intractable conflicts. However, we find that state 
creation—the development of a new political organisation—rather than solely 
identity or culture per se was an important issue in 1990s conflicts. When we
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investigate the relationship between conflict and state creation and other conflict 
issues from 1945 to 1999, we see that a significant number of conflicts during the 
Cold War were over state creation (independence or autonomy). In the two most 
conflict-prone regions during the Cold War, Asia and Africa, state creation comprised 
a significant proportion of all conflicts: about 50 per cent in Asia, and about 33 per 
cent in Africa. These regions reached conflict peaks in the 1940s and the 1960s, the 
height of the decolonisation period for each region. By comparison, similar conflict 
spikes were seen in the post-Cold War mainly due to the wars over the creation of 
new states after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. If state creation is 
an important issue in a conflict, then it suggests that conflict is not necessarily 
intractable, and that conflict levels are likely to drop after the state creation process.
Finally, while Romantic hypotheses point to irrationally-based identity 
conflicts as being particularly deadly and intractable, the empirical evidence suggests 
otherwise. When we explore the top three reasons for conflict from 1945-1999— 
national power contention, independence and autonomy, and ideological conflicts— 
we find that conflicts over state creation—including conflicts over ethnic autonomy 
or independence—were not the longest in duration nor did they produce the most 
casualties. During the Cold War, ideological conflicts were on average as long as 
conflicts over independence and autonomy, while both national power conflicts and 
ideological conflicts were more deadly than state creation conflicts, producing double 
the number of average minimum casualties. Therefore, the contention that there is a 
‘coming anarchy’ of particularly troublesome ethnic, religious, or other identity 
conflicts may be more mythic than real. These results also mirror Licklider’s, who 
finds that identity conflicts do not result in either longer or more intense conflicts (in 
terms of casualties).55
Indeed, if Romantic predictions about a ‘coming anarchy’ of intense, 
intractable, identity-based conflicts prove anything at all it is the perils of projecting a 
series of specific events occurring over a relatively short period of time into a much 
longer time horizon. Rather than the early 1990s representing a spectacular break 
with the past in terms of conflict, as Romantics hypothesised, the number of conflicts 
regressed to the mean relatively soon after the end of the Cold War. In fact, post-2000
55 Licklider found that conflicts based on identity were no more intense and were as likely to end in 
negotiated settlement as non-identity conflicts. However, peace settlements in identity conflicts were 
more likely to break down. See Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars,
1945-1993’.
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the number of observed conflicts has fallen by half of what we would have expected 
during the Cold War.
Yet the Romantic idea of a ‘coming anarchy’ during the 1990s persists. For 
example, in 2003 one group of researchers noted that the 1990s were ‘a record decade 
for bloodshed’ due to the 2.5 million conflict deaths during the period.56 This type of 
analysis ignores the baseline—the death toll of Cold War conflicts—which some 
scholars put at 37 million conflict deaths, or approximately 8 million dead per decade, 
more than three times the post-Cold War average.57 Unfortunately, this view of the 
past may lead to erroneously pessimistic assessments about the future of conflict as 
analysts project Romantic hypotheses into this decade. As we have discussed in 
previous chapters, such judgements may be less a reflection of the empirical realities 
of post-Cold War conflict than the hold that the Postmodern Romantic Zeitgeist— 
with its emphasis on anti-rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and focus on 
nature—may have on interpretations of post-Cold War international relations.
56 Richard P Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 
2003), p. 21.
57 See Coker, ‘How wars end’, p. 619.
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Chapter 5. Rationalism Redux: Assessing State Stability 
from a Structural Perspective
‘Andyet, in my conceit, in public affairs, there is no government so ill, 
provided it be ancient and has been constant, that is not better than 
change and alteration. ’
—Michel de Montaigne1
The conflicts of the 1990s proved Montaigne’s aphorism—the states deemed worthy 
of changing and altering rarely had either proven age or constancy on their side.
Some were what political scientists have come to call ‘weak’, ‘failed’, ‘rogue’, or 
collapsed states. While some observers highlight the intractable ‘culture clash’ 
elements of conflict as the most salient features of post-Cold War violence in these 
states, our empirical examination in Chapter 4 has shown that conflicts over national 
power contention and state creation have been a significant driving force for conflict 
in these states, as well as during the Cold War. In other words, struggles for control of 
an existing state—its power and resources—or the decision to carve out a new state 
from an existing state have been over the past 50 years, and will likely continue to be, 
major reasons for conflict. In the sense that conflict is likely to be over such rational 
political ends as the control of a state, there has been much continuity since the end of 
World War II. In this chapter, we will examine some of the risk factors that may be 
markers for potential future struggles over national power and state creation, leading 
to state instability and conflict.
As we have argued, identity conflict per se—where primordial identities 
clash—outside the context of structural conflict over power and resources is a 
hypothesis that is difficult to support with the empirical data we examined in the 
previous chapter. Rather than being primordial, we will take our departure on the 
basis that identity is often significantly instrumental and therefore the underlying 
structure of a particular state has a significant impact on the possibilities and limits of
1 Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. Charles Cotton, Chapter X: ‘Of Presumption’, [1575]. Available 
at http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/montaigne/m-essays_contents.html.
2 In some cases, even the word ‘state’ is inaccurate, as places like Bosnia and Kosovo have become de 
facto international protectorates.
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conflict. However, since certain types of state structures may be necessary but 
insufficient to create state instability and conflict, a limited analysis of the role that 
agency may play in conflict be helpful in this regard. Therefore, we will try to 
introduce the role of agency in a circumscribed way into our analysis by examining 
how agents may react in a narrow set of circumstances—when state structures are 
perceived to deteriorate—through the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty.
While the agent/structure debate continues to rage in international relations 
with inconclusive results, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
our framework will focus more on structures than on agents, with the concomitant 
weaknesses that this brings.4 In particular, we will investigate four structural factors 
that may impact conflict: a state’s past colonial legacy, the structure of its political 
institutions, its economic system, and its demographic structure. We will first briefly 
summarise and discuss the importance of some structural factors in generating the 
potential for conflict. In addition, we will outline a framework for analysing how 
change in these factors under the condition of the perceived deterioration of the state 
leads groups to pursue one of two key options—either voice or exit—depending on 
their loyalty to the state. In effect, an analysis of the exit/voice strategies that various 
groups pursue suggests that there are differing structures for various types of 
intrastate conflict. Groups less loyal to the state are more likely to pursue exit 
strategies (such as autonomy or secession), which can generate conflict over 
territorial issues, while groups loyal to the state are more likely to pursue voice 
strategies (such as institutional reform or reconstruction), which can prompt conflicts 
over governance. While this framework is neither definitive nor comprehensive, it 
can serve as the foundation for further research.
3 For a discussion of the debate over primordial versus instrumental identity, see Donald L. Horowitz 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
4 For a discussion of the agent/structure debate in international relations, see Alexander E. Wendt, ‘The 
Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 
3, 1987), pp. 335-370, and Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, eds., International 
Relations in a Constructed World (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe Armonk, 1998). On favouring 
structural approaches, we agree with Alexander Motyl who notes, ‘my approach is structural, less so 
because I am wedded to its charms and rather more so because the alternative—agency oriented, 
choice centered, and intentionalist—persuades me even less. Because incompleteness and imperfection 
distinguish theory from faith, structural theories, like all theories, are severely flawed’. Alexander J. 
Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival o f  Empires (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2001), p. 5. For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses in structural theories, 
see pp. 27-38.
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5.1 Structures, Stability, and Conflict—Examining four risk
factors
We partly base the choice of our structural factors from some of the results obtained 
by the work of the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) in the United States.5 SFTF has 
been a working group of scholars led by a team at the University of Maryland and 
funded by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence who have been researching the 
underlying structural conditions present in state failure. SFTF has developed perhaps 
the world’s most comprehensive dataset which includes information on almost 1,300 
political, economic, demographic, social and environmental variables for all states 
from 1955-1998. Using logistic regression analysis, neural networks analysis, and 
expert surveys the Task Force identified some of the key risk factors associated with 
state instability, failure, and conflict to a 70-80 per cent rate of accuracy.6
Their general or global model indicates that several key factors influence state 
instability and conflict, including: quality of life; regime type; international influences 
(trade openness, membership in international and regional organisations, i.e., the 
socialisation of the state into international structures); and demographic factors 
(ethnic composition of population or leadership). Additionally, SFTF also developed 
regional models for state failure, including an ‘ethnic war’ model and an ‘African 
war’ model. While the indicators that predict state failure globally also apply to these 
cases, a few extra factors are also important, especially ethnic discrimination (in both 
models) and colonial history (in the African model). In our streamlined examination 
of key structural factors, we will group these issues into four main categories: 
colonial history, political institutions, economic institutions, and demographic 
changes. In some sense these factors require an analysis of a state’s past (colonial 
history), its present (current economic and political institutions), and future trends 
(coming demographic shifts).
While these factors point us to what structures may be important in setting the 
stage for conflict, they do not in themselves make conflict inevitable. Often, what
5 The SFTF’s data and codebooks are available online at http://www.cidcm.nmd.edu/inscr/stfail/ 
index.htm Note that the latest version was published in 2000.
6 See Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert 
H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, Jr., and Alan N. Unger, 
State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings (McLean, VA: Science Applications International 
Corporation, 30 September 2000). Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfaiF 
SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf Hereafter, ‘SFTF Phase III report’.
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may create conflict is change in structures: structures are not static; they are dynamic 
and evolve over time. However, while structures may ‘prime the pump’ of conflict, 
they are not necessarily sufficient in themselves to cause conflict since various agents 
can react differently to the same structural conditions. Therefore, we introduce an 
aspect of agency in a circumscribed way into our analysis. In order to interpret how 
groups within a state react to structures, we use the exit-voice-loyalty framework that 
political economist Albert Hirschman developed in the 1970s. In particular, 
Hirschman explores the options that groups have and the choices that they pursue 
when an organisation, such as the state, is in the throes of deterioration or decline. 
Under conditions of decline, two main options present themselves to actors in order 
to forestall or reverse a deteriorating situation: exit (leaving an organisation) or voice 
(usually some form of dissent). The choices are mediated by loyalty, the strength of 
ties that a group has to the organisation and its perceived influence within it. As one 
scholar notes, ‘Hirschman’s grand theory carries an important message to the study of 
civil war as it suggests a typology of exit and voice conflicts.’7 The exit-voice-loyalty 
framework suggests that responses to institutional failure in states can result in a push 
to reform the system from within (voice) or for the search for separation or secession 
(exit) depending on the specific loyalty that groups have to the state. Thus, we 
examine Hirschman’s thesis for what it can say about power contention within states, 
particularly those facing difficult or deteriorating circumstances.
5.2 The Legacy of the Past—Colonial/imperial history and 
institutions
Considering that most of today’s internationally recognised states were created as part 
of the process of decolonisation, a key factor when considering their historical past is 
the colonial legacy that each has been left, especially since the history of colonisation 
in these states is relatively fresh—within the living memory of some of its citizens. 
The process of foreign conquest and local struggle against occupation, and often 
colonial reconquest by other foreign powers through various periods in history, has 
bequeathed many of these states a variety of social, economic, and political
7 Halvard Buhaug, ‘Exit, Voice, and Violence: Determinants of Territorial and Governmental Conflict,
1946-99’, paper presented to the Annual National Political Science Conference 2005, Hurdalsjoen, 
Norway (5-7 January 2005). Available at http://www.statsvitenskap.uio.no/konferanser 
/nfkis/cr/buhaug.pdf
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challenges that find their roots during the period of colonial administration and the 
reaction of the local population to colonisation. These residual problems can be either 
deeply embedded as part of the ingrained patterns of colonial society or are the result 
of ‘untidy departures’ by the previous colonial administration. Whether historical or 
of more recent issue, in the words of one commentator they often ‘remain
Q
dangerously stalemated’.
The State Failure Task Force tested the proposition that colonial legacies may 
have an impact on conflict, using African states as their test model. SFTF found that 
the risk of state failure was lower in post-colonial states that had been French 
colonies. This effect could be institutional, that is that the French institutional legacy 
has been more stabilising, or it could be an artefact of France’s greater involvement 
with her former colonies, which might have various stabilising effects.9 However, 
since the population data sample was small, only 15 states, the results could not be 
said to be statistically significant.10 Despite the inconclusive results due to the small 
sample, various qualitative researchers indicate that colonial legacies have an 
important bearing on institutional structures and therefore on the future stability and 
the potential for conflict of postcolonial states. There are both direct and indirect 
challenges associated with previous colonial rule that these new states face.
State boundaries. One of the most discussed direct problems has been the 
effect that the creation of colonial boundaries has had on subsequent state 
consolidation and unity, particularly with regard to Africa. Colonial powers 
competing for Africa had no regard for boundaries between ethnic or linguistic 
groups; their main concern was to control as much territory as possible, resulting in 
the famous scramble for Africa. The main check on the unbounded expansion of one 
colonial power was another colonial power, consequentially colonial boundaries were 
artificial—the outcome of negotiations between colonial powers as to the extent of 
their respective control over conquered territory rather than representative of ‘natural’ 
boundaries between subject colonial peoples, such as the extent of the traditional
8 Shashi Tharoor, ‘The Messy Afterlife of Colonialism’, Global Governance (Vol. 8, No. 1,2002).
9 Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. 
Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, ‘State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings’, 
Environmental Change & Security Project Report (No. 5, Summer 1999). Hereafter ‘SFTF Phase II 
report’.
10 SFTF Phase III report, pp. 22-23.
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territory of the various ethnic, tribal, or linguistic groups.11 When decolonisation 
came to Africa, new states were created along pre-existing colonial boundaries. While 
the new rulers and governments accepted these boundaries—indeed, insisting on their 
territorial integrity in the post-colonial era—many separate groups were ‘trapped’ in 
these very heterogeneous new states.12 Compared to other regions of the world, 
African states are the most heterogeneous; however, this can actually serve as a 
protective social factor against conflict.13
Economic practices. Additionally, there have been other perhaps less 
discussed direct effects, stemming from colonial treatment of issues as varied as: land 
use and regulation; population transfers and colonial settlement policy; colonial 
labour policies, such as indentured labour or slavery; colonial economy and system of 
colonial distribution of resources; and the creation of colonial systems of 
preference.14 Another factor in the colonial legacy may be the sheer brutality of 
colonial rule, which seems to be a factor in subsequent political and economic 
development.15
When we examine the issue of land use, the legal treatment of land and 
patterns of colonial settlement have had a lasting impact on some states. For example, 
patterns of colonial land ownership patterns and land distribution still remain 
important issues in such states as South Africa and Zimbabwe.16 Other colonial 
practices also have lasting legacies. Colonial labour practices, including the use of 
indentured labour and slave labour, particularly in such areas as West Africa, have 
had lasting social consequences, especially when tied to systems of colonial labour 
preferences, where certain local populations were encouraged to exploit members of 
other local groups, such as in the Congo where some tribes participated in the 
enslavement of other tribes in the colonial system.
11 Tharoor notes that these problems can lead the new states to develop a sense o f unity through created 
national myths that are ‘unconvincing’ and artificial. Tharoor, ‘The Messy Afterlife of Colonialism’.
12 Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1994), p. 12.
13 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa’, World Bank Working 
Paper (August 2000). Available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/ papers/incidence 1.pdf.
14 Gurr and Harff discuss some of these points in, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, pp. 16-17.
15 Crawford Young makes this argument about the African colonial state in particular. See Crawford 
Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1994).
16.See International Crisis Group, Blood and Soil: Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, Africa Report No. 85 (17 September 2004), especially pp. 21-29 (Zimbabwe) and 
pp. 135-137 (South Africa).
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Colonial migration and settlement policies. Colonial policies of divide et 
impera encouraged the systematic use of one group against another to keep both in 
check. This was done through a variety of means, including transfers of whole 
populations to another area (for example in Russia) or colonial labour policies that 
transferred skilled or semi-skilled workers from one part of the empire to another to 
work in particular economic sectors. For example, the British empire used Asians 
from the subcontinent as labour in Fiji and migrated Muslims and Hindus from the 
subcontinent to work in parts of Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. 
Unfortunately, many of these immigrants have not assimilated or even integrated into
17the indigenous social structure, creating a potential issue of conflict.
Systems o f preferences. The colonial system of distribution of resources and 
preferences also had an impact on the subsequent development of post-colonial states. 
In general, colonial states used an unequal distribution of resources and the creation 
of group preferences between subjugated groups as a means of control. These systems 
of preferences can endure, creating long-term difficulties in new states as resource 
competition occurs between groups. As Charles Tilly indicates, such competition 
happens across states and national groups, creating durable inequalities which act to
1 ftthe advantage of some groups. In a resource-poor or ‘statist’ environment where the 
economic ‘pie’ is either stagnant or not expanding as quickly as needed to provide job 
opportunities to a growing population, such competition will increase, especially 
among the educated for scarce government positions, so any competitive ‘edge’, such 
as perceived group loyalty, is coveted.
These practices of preference and competition undermined local economies 
and used non-indigenous groups in a strategic manner against indigenous peoples, 
leading to permanent occupational, social, and class stratification along lines of group 
identity, pitting various colonial peoples against each other.19 These systems of 
preferences also have led to long-term resentments and grievances between groups 
long after the demise of the colonial state. As Thanoor notes about post-colonial Sri 
Lanka (former British Ceylon), ‘Sinhalese resentment of privileges enjoyed by the
17 Gurr and Harff.
18 Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press,
1998).
19 Gurr and Harff, p. 15-16.
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Tamils in the British colonial era in Sri Lanka prompted the discriminatory policies 
after independence that in turn [has] fueled the current Tamil revolt.’
Such socially divisive colonial policies which assisted the colonisers in 
asserting and maintaining control over vast territories and diverse peoples have 
generated a significant number of historical grievances that can form the basis of 
social discontent and conflict in post-colonial states. As Gurr and Harff note, the use 
of such economic stratification causes a present-day conflict faultline, commenting 
that colonial ‘policies] of using immigrants and minorities to staff colonial 
bureaucracies often gave them privileged status in the host country and also provoked 
discriminatory measures against their descendants in the postindependence period.’21 
Motivated sociology. In addition to direct colonial polices that have led to 
social division in these states, colonialism also had indirect results, such as an
intellectual legacy of what Thanoor calls ‘careless anthropology’ and ‘motivated
00sociology’. For example, the Belgian creation of the classification between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi peoples, initially based on differences in wealth between the two 
groups is an example of anthropology created whole cloth to serve a colonial purpose, 
while the British creation of ‘martial races’, such as the Gurkas, represents a form of
O'!
sociology motivated by colonial needs to police the empire.
Multiple colonisation. Some states have a history of multiple forms of 
colonisation. These states’ legacies include a different history of colonisation and 
varying experiences among subjugated groups. These mixed colonial histories can 
themselves create problems and cleavages in post-colonial states. For example, 
conflict in some states, such as the secessionist movement in part of Somalia, could 
be attributed to colonial legacy of partition, in this case between the Italians and the 
British 24 Finally, the extent of the colonial state’s brutality during colonisation needs 
consideration. Some historians argue that the history of colonisation in Africa has 
been comparatively brutal, especially in the former Belgian colonies, such as the 
Congo.25
20 Tharoor.
21 Gurr and Harff, p. 17.
21 Ibid.
23 Cynthia Enloe discusses the creation of martial races and their role in state security in post-colonial 
states in Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 23-49.
24 Tharoor.
25 Young.
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5.3 The Structure of the Present—Political factors
‘Partial democracies—particularly in lower-income countries where 
the quality o f life remains poor—are associated with elevated risks o f 
failure. ’
—State Failure Task Force26
The State Failure Task Force examined 18 different political variables for conflict 
potential. Of these, it found that 11 were significant. These include: separatist 
activity; discrimination or separatist activity; parliamentary responsibility; regime 
type; regime duration; leader’s years in office; Freedom House political rights index; 
Freedom House civil rights index; Amnesty International political terror scale; 
neighboring countries in major armed conflict; and membership in regional 
organizations. However, not all factors were equally important. SFTF found that 
regime type is the single most important predictor of conflict: ‘[o]f the variables 
examined in our analyses, regime type has the most powerful association with the risk 
of state failure’ 27 That is, that the structure of the political institutions within a state 
has the most significant bearing on that state’s internal stability and risk of conflict.
SFTF examined three types of regime: full democracies, partial democracies, 
and autocracies.28 Interestingly, democracies were not found to be the most stable; 
state failure for full democracies was approximately ten per cent higher than for 
autocracies; however, the results were roughly equivalent for both regime types.29 
SFTF’s most significant finding was that the risk of state failure was seven times as 
high for partial democracies which have a mix of democratic and autocratic 
institutions as for other regime types. In particular, the highest risk of failure was 
found in states that had a powerful executive and ‘a relatively fractious or ineffective 
legislature’.30 Partial democracies seem particularly unstable since these regimes 
combine some democratic institutions or practices, such as elections and a multiparty 
system, with those that counter democracy, such as restrictive voting rules or a non­
26 SFTF Phase II report, p. 67.
27 SFTF Phase III report, p. 14.
28 SFTF defines these regime types as follows: ‘Democratic regimes have competitive political 
participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies 
have a mix o f democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic 
ones’, p. 12.
29 SFTF Phase III report, p. 14.
30 Ibid., p. 14.
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independent judiciary. However, such political regimes often last fewer than five 
years.
SFTF adds that there are four lessons from the high rate of state failure in 
partially democratic regimes. First, the transition from non-democratic governance to 
a stable democracy is filled with pitfalls and missteps. Few democratic states make 
the transition without reversals and the process is a gradual one. Second, there are no 
gains in political stability to be made by simply installing democratic or partially 
democratic regimes. Third, elections do not ensure that a stable democracy is being 
formed; indeed, parliamentary and presidential elections can be strongly associated 
with instability. Finally, the potential to backslide to autocracy exists within partial
- j  1
democracies, so democratic institutions and practices cannot be taken for granted.
The SFTF’s conclusions on the relationship between the risk of conflict and 
regime type is supported by the vast empirical literature on ‘democratic peace’ 
theory, which holds that democracies are less likely to go to war than non­
democracies (since they do not go to war with other democratic states), democracies 
are less likely to engage in serious disputes just short of war than other states, and 
even if they do go to war democracies are also more likely to win the wars that they 
do fight than non-democracies (a fact which can dissuade challengers).32 However, 
some scholars dispute the timeless concept of the ‘democratic peace’, either as an 
historical artefact of the Cold War or as a result of flawed research design.33
31 Ibid., p. 15.
32 For an example of the vast democratic peace literature, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), and Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic 
Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). On 
democracies winning their wars due to public consent and leadership accountability, see Dan Reiter 
and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
33 Despite the significant empirical support for democratic peace theory, some researchers have argued 
that it is incorrect. For an argument that the democratic peace is mainly an artefact of the Cold War, 
see Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999). For an argument that democratic peace theory is based on flawed research 
design, see E. A. Henderson, Democracy and War: The End o f  an Illusion (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2002).
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5.4 The Structure of the Present—Economic factors
‘Material living standards have an undeniable effect on the risks o f 
state failure. ’
—State Failure Task Force34
Scholars have pointed to a variety of structural economic factors that can lead to 
groups contending over control of a state or pushing to create a new state. These 
include: durable categorical inequalities within a state; state spending and 
redistribution policies; remittances and diasporas; and international trade openness.
Durable categorical inequalities. Charles Tilly argues that categorical 
inequalities—those based on gender, ethnicity, language, or other identity markers— 
can operate as an organisational network in the market that provides various 
opportunities and benefits for its members. Such benefits can include direct access to 
economic resources, control of the decisionmaking sphere of the economy, access to 
raw materials, control of financial institutions, control of state contracts, or access to 
top jobs. It can also include indirect access to resource-generating educational 
opportunities or the acquisition of vocational skills. According to Tilly, such 
categorical inequalities are often durable across long periods of time since they accrue 
significant economic advantages to members. Tilly further comments that this type of 
inequality
results from the institution of a general, powerful, problem-solving 
organizational form in a location that commands substantial rewards and/or 
punishments; it is pernicious to the extent that it causes harm to the excluded 
and produces a net underuse of potentially life-enhancing talent.35
For example, in the labour market Tilly notes nine aspects of categorical 
inequalities. They create differences in job qualifications, employer discrimination, 
differences in job preferences, bounding, ranking, linking, a categorical designation 
of jobs, segregation of networks, and differential distribution of categories among 
firms and nonfirm worksites. These categorical inequalities work in four instances: 
elite exploitation of labour-demanding resources, non-elite hoarding of opportunities,
34 SFTF Phase II report, p. 67.
35 Charles Tilly, ‘Durable Inequality’, edited notes from the Irene Flecknoe Ross Lectures at the 
University of California, Lecture 4: Forms of Inequality (October-November 1995). Hereafter, Tilly, 
Lecture 4.
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diffusion of organizational models, and elaboration of valued social relations around 
existing divisions.36
Categorical inequality works in two key ways for elites. First, it extracts the 
benefits of efforts by subordinate populations and it distributes ‘solidarity-generating 
benefits’ to elite members, a group which Mancur Olson once called ‘distributional 
coalitions’, or ‘organizations for collective action within societies [...] 
overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution of income and wealth 
rather than to the production of additional output’.37 Second, when members of a 
categorically-bounded network get access to a valuable resource, members regularly 
hoard their access and struggle to maintain control. Immigrant networks that channel 
members to work in certain industries or trades are an example of this phenomenon.
In the case of states, the rewards for creating categorical inequalities through 
statehood are high. As Tilly notes, elites in states derive a host of benefits from 
political autonomy and sovereignty, generating the potential for conflict: ‘the 
frequency of genocide and politicide have increased dramatically in the world as a 
whole since World War II, precisely as the possibilities and advantages of a putative
38nation’s controlling its own state and excluding others from its benefits have risen’.
State spending and redistribution. Some scholars note that government 
spending can be a factor in conflict, as it reflects resource allocation between various 
groups or regions within a state. In a study of spending on US public goods, scholars 
observe that the share of spending on public goods is inversely related to ethnic 
fragmentation in a particular region, suggesting that an heterogeneity of preferences 
generates lower government spending in certain regions. Others note that 
redistribution policies in states can lead to conflicts. For example, some economists 
argue that when income distributions vary across regions in a state and the efficiency 
gains for the state from unification are small, there is an incentive to secede from the 
existing state, while if all factors of production are perfectly mobile within a state 
then all incentives for secession disappear.40 Other scholars argue that statist policies
36 Ibid.
37 Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline o f Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social 
Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), p 44.
38 Tilly, Lecture 4.
39 Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly, ‘Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions’, The 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics (Vol. 114, No. 4,1999), pp. 1243-1284.
40 Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland, ‘The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis’, The 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics (Vol. 112, No. 4,1997), pp. 1057-1090.
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and attitudes create conflict in highly redistributive states. Specifically, statist 
policies, lack of property ownership, highly redistributive tax policies, and lack of 
entrepreneurship within a state are potential markers for conflict.41
Remittances and diasporas. Some scholars note that it is important to consider 
the role of remittances as a hidden export for many states. Remittances not only 
subsidise the state, they also provide a separate source of income for various groups 
in a society who then do not necessarily have to rely on the productive capacity of the 
state to provide them with employment, a pension, or other means of financial 
support. The scale of remittances worldwide is substantial, especially considering the 
total size of GDP in many small and low income states. Remittances averaged an 
estimated at $70-$75 billion per year in the early 1990s, which is a ‘large proportion 
of world financial flows, second in value only to oil among aggregate international 
trade and financial transactions’ 42 By 2000, migrants’ remittances totaled $100 
billion, which represents a large proportion of world financial flows and is 
substantially more than global official development assistance. Indeed, diaspora 
resources may be the hidden finance engine of the developing world, considering that 
60 percent of global remittances are thought to have gone to developing countries in 
2000.43 For example, in Albania, remittances were worth $330 million by 1993, more 
that two times the country’s official export earnings. Remittances rose to $400 
million by 1995. In that case, Albania’s number one export was its people.44 
However, there are problems in estimating global flows of remittances, especially 
since artificial exchange rates in developing countries and difficulty in estimating 
foreign workers abroad can underestimate remittances. For example, in Ghana, while 
the Ghanese government, IMF, and World Bank estimated that remittances in the 
early 1980s totaled about $1 million per year, more accurate figures for that time 
were 300-500 times that amount, or about $300-$500 million annually 45
International trade openness. Various scholars have argue that economic 
freedom is a key indicator of stability in states, and that lack of it is a marker for 
conflict. In its report, the State Failure Task Force notes that its empirical results
41 Stephen Schwartz, ‘Beyond “Ancient Hatreds”: What Really Happened to Yugoslavia’, Policy 
Review (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1999).
42 Nicholas Van Hear, ‘Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development, and Conflict’, Migration 
Policy Institute (1 June 2003), p. 59.
43 Van Hear.
44 Gurr and Harff, p. 217.
45 Ibid, pp. 167-168.
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indicate that ‘[i]nvolvement in international trade, as measured by trade openness, is 
associated with a lower risk of state failure in virtually all states and all contexts.’46 
Others find similar relationships between economic freedom and conflict. Using the 
conflicts listed in the Kosimo database and data scores from the Economic Freedom 
of the World Index (EFWI), John Tures demonstrates that economic freedom, even 
when controlled for level of economic development, has an impact on conflict 
reduction. More economically free states have fewer conflicts, while those that are 
partly free or unfree engage in more conflicts 47 Tures’ findings echo the democratic 
peace argument—that politically free states have fewer conflicts.
5.5 The Shadow of the Future—Demographic change
‘The stork is the bird o f war. ’
—Winston Churchill48
Another potential risk factor for conflict is demographic change. When considering 
the long-term future of a group’s influence, position, status, access to state power and 
resources, or even mere survival within the state, predicted demographic changes can 
factor significantly in calculations. The SFTF found that demographic variables had 
some associations with risks of state failure. For example, population size and 
population density had an impact on conflict risk, as did a youth bulge, labour force 
as a percentage of population, and urbanization. For example, in the case on Rwanda, 
some commentators have suggested that overpopulation and resulting resource 
competition may have been important factors in the 1994 genocide 49 In the SFTF 
global model, ethnic fractionalisation was a significant demographic marker for 
increased conflict risk, while in the African model, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
and discrimination were significant markers.50
46 SFTF Phase II report, p. 66.
47 The EFWI includes information on the size of a state’s government, price stability, trade openness, 
the quality of legal institutions, and other variables. John A. Tures, ‘Economic Freedom and Conflict 
Reduction: Evidence from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s’, The Cato Journal (Vol. 22, No. 3,2003).
48 Unverifiable and popularly attributed quote.
49 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York, NY: Viking, 2005). 
In a similar vein, see the views of fertility expert John Guillebaud, “‘The Stork is the Bird of War’: 
Reflections on the Rwandan Genocide”, Bohdi News (No. 26, June 2004), p. 4. For an alternative view 
on Rwanda, arguing that overpopulation was not an issue, see Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems 
and the Culture o f Capitalism (Boston. MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1999).
50 SFTF Phase III report, pp. 18 (population size and density); 17 (global model); 24 (ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation); and 22 (discrimination).
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Other scholars are beginning to examine the impact that demographic change 
has on the politics of conflict, especially since demographics can be the root of 
contentious politics. As Milica Bookman notes, population size has taken on a new 
political meaning as nations and groups within multinational states struggle for 
power, causing potential instability within states.51 She writes:
[c]urrently the size of a total population is less relevant than the absolute and 
relative size of a particular ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic group. Indeed, 
an inter-ethnic war of numbers is taking place in numerous locations. The goal 
of this war of numbers is to increase the economic and political power of an 
ethnic group relative to other groups, and the method by which this is 
achieved entails the increase in size of one population relative to others. Most 
ethnic groups in multinational states across the globe are engaged in this 
activity in varying degrees, thus clearly manipulating population numbers in 
their struggle for power. They have similar goals and differ only in the form 
and intensity of the struggle.52
Yet such power struggles, while seemingly between ethnic or national groups, 
have little to do with Romantic notions of identity per se and much to do with 
garnering benefits for members of successful groups. The struggle for increasing 
demographic power within a state can reap substantial political rewards. Greater 
population size can award groups with greater political representation in legislative 
bodies, increased political legitimacy, and is likely to guarantee equal protection or 
even preferential treatment in the state administration and courts. As Bookman 
comments, the available economic rewards to greater population size are also worth 
the struggle. These include: access to scarce resources, input into economic
r 1!
policymaking, and allocation of economic favours and patronage.
Considering the high stakes for the groups involved, the idea that population 
and demographic shifts should be considered a security variable is gaining credence 
among scholars and policymakers.54 There are various reasons why demographic 
shifts are now being considered important. For example, demographic trends can 
change the nature of conflict, introduce new instruments of conflict, alter sources of 
military power, modify a state’s internal security dynamic, cause refugee flows, or
51 Milica Z. Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering and the Struggle for Power’, Journal o f  
International Affairs (Vol. 56, No 1,2002), p. 25.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 See Brian Nichiporuk, The Security Dynamics o f Demographic Factors, Report No. MR-1088- 
WFHF/RF/DLPF/A (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2000).
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even cause a state to lose legitimacy.55 Periods of demographic transition are thus 
conflict-prone, as one study notes: ‘countries in the late phases of demographic 
transition were less likely to experience outbreaks of civil conflicts than those still in 
the transition’s early or middle phases’.56
However, demographic shifts do not inevitably either lead to or prevent 
conflict; rather they mix with other factors to create a potential source of conflict or 
stability, as demographic changes work in tandem with other variables to either 
ameliorate or exacerbate existing security problems. Indeed, demographic factors are 
part of a complex series of causal variables behind violent conflicts. Other factors that 
affect state failure include economic development (based on such indicators as GNP 
or infant mortality), regime type and government leadership, a state’s past colonial 
experience, its terrain, or its openness to trade.57 In particular, demographic shifts that
CO
change the relative power of groups within a state are conflict-prone. This may be 
because population shifts can create sociological pressure for change in ranked 
societies, especially when ethnicity or nationality is tied to class in some way; that is, 
if national origin or other categorical inequality has a strong effect on economic 
opportunities.59 As Jack Goldstone observes, there are four types of population 
change that are more likely to contribute to the onset of violence within a state. These 
include: rapidly expanding agrarian populations, urbanisation, youth bulges, and 
migration across borders. We will discuss each of these factors below.
Agrarian expansion. One demographic risk factor is an expanding agrarian 
population. Indeed, demographic changes that put pressure on scarce resources can 
create the opportunity for conflict. For example, states with a low availability of 
arable land for farming and a low availability of renewable fresh water per capita 
were 1.5 times more likely to experience civil conflict.60 Issues such as water scarcity 
can aggravate group tensions, as in the Middle East; however, land shortages may be
55 Ibid.
56 Richard P Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 
2003), p. 12. Hereafter Cincotta et al.
57 Jack Goldstone, ‘Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent 
Conflict’, Journal o f International Affairs (Vol. 56, No. 1, 2002), pp. 12.
58 Cincotta et a l,  pp. 12-13.
59 Donald L. Horowitz discusses the ranked and unranked structure of societies and economic sources 
of ethnic conflict in Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press, 1985), pp. 21-36 (ranked and unranked societies and conflict) and pp. 105-140 
(economic interests, ethnicity, and conflict).
60Cincotta et al., p. 13.
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more conflict-prone than water scarcity.61 Another potential conflict risk is faced by 
states with high concentrations of landholding or landless peasants. States that have a 
growing agrarian population that needs more arable land face difficulties if most land 
is owned by large landowners or developers, especially if peasants are then forced to 
cultivate more marginal land, creating a potential conflict with landholders and 
political elites, as with the Zapatista rebellion in the Chiapas region of Mexico.62 In 
particular, rural income insecurity can exacerbate political tensions between groups if 
agricultural expansion has been used as a social safety valve.63
Youth bulge. A demographic youth bulge within a state, especially one 
comprising over 40 per cent of the population, can signal possible brewing conflict if 
there is a ‘persistent mismatch between population and employment prospects’.64 
This problem may be especially acute in cases where there are a significant number of 
youths who are overeducated for the jobs available and who have a limited ability to 
access government or other elite positions within the state. Under conditions of 
economic stagnation and shrinking job opportunities—which results in under­
employment, low wages, and social discontent—a youth bulge (especially one of 
frustrated young men) can lead to violence.65 For example, in the former Soviet 
Union a large expansion of technical and higher education coupled with a restriction 
on entry to desirable employment due to party requirements lead to widespread youth 
dissatisfaction in the face of a stagnant economy. This was one mobilising factor 
working against the continuation of the regime.66 While some studies have shown that 
youth bulges can increase the severity of conflicts, not all experts agree on the effects 
of youth bulges on conflict. For example, Urdal argues that youth bulges are not 
associated with civil wars, but instead are problematic in transitional regimes.
Urbanisation. Rapid urbanisation is another demographic shift that signals 
potential conflict, especially if the growth of urbanisation is more than four per cent 
per year, which doubles the potential of conflict.67 However, the rate of urbanisation 
alone is not necessarily the critical factor. The real issue is how rapidly formerly 
agrarian or peasant populations can be absorbed and employed within an urban
61 Ibid., p. 55-60.
62 Goldstone, p. 10.
63 Cincotta et al., p. 58-59.
64 Goldstone, p. 10.
65 Cincotta et al., p. 44-45.
66 Goldstone, p. 15.
67 Cincotta et a l,  p. 13.
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centre. If an industrialising economy is able to employ a large rural population 
looking for jobs, then conflict can be avoided. If not, then urbanisation can lead to 
conflict: the risk of political crisis nearly doubles in countries with above-average
/JO
levels of urbanization but below-average levels of per capita income. Urbanisation 
increases resource pressures on states and societies: ‘floodfing] job markets, 
exacerbating] inter-ethnic competition, challeng[ing] the adequacy of existing 
services and infrastructure, and depleting] city budgets’.69 Another reason why 
urbanisation can lead to conflict is the concentration of interested groups, such as 
workers, students, professionals, and the middle class, who can organise and mobilise 
opposition effectively. Finally, urban areas are likely to be more multicultural or 
multiethnic, thus the competition for political and economic resources in urban 
centres is more intense than in rural areas.
Migration across borders. Migration across borders can create the potential 
for conflict. As Goldstone comments:
when one distinct ethnic group migrates into an area that is considered a 
homeland by another ethnic group and challenges the dominance of the latter, 
then conflicts are likely to arise. If these conflicts escalate into contests for 
political control of the region, then ethnic war and even genocide often 
results.70
Other types of migration, such as internal colonialism, can create difficulties. For 
example, Han Chinese settlement throughout various parts of non-Han majority areas 
of China, the expansion of Europeans into Native American Indian territory, the 
Bantu migration, and forced migration in the former USSR with the large scale 
immigration of Russians to non-Russian areas, all have lead to conflict.71
5.6 Method of Analysis—Exploring agency through exit, voice, 
and loyalty
While the factors we discussed—colonial legacy, political regime type, economic 
structure, and demographic change—can prime the pump of conflict, it is not the state 
structures themselves but the reaction of groups or individuals to these structures, or
68 Goldstone.
69 Cincotta et al. ,50-51.
70 Goldstone, p. 15.
71 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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changes in these structures, that can foster the conditions for conflict, particularly if 
the state is facing unfavourable or deteriorating conditions. What happens to 
institutions—such as states, firms or other organisations—when their performance 
deteriorates or they are otherwise unable to satisfy the needs and goals of their 
constituents or customers? In his classic work Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to 
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, political economist Albert Hirschman 
argues that there are fundamentally two responses open to constituents or customers
nothat act to limit and reverse an organisation’s deterioration: exit and voice. A variety 
of political scientists have applied Hirschman’s framework to examine such diverse 
topics as migration policy in Cuba, the collapse of the East German regime, and 
institutional decline in the Russian military. We will endeavour to apply this 
framework to aspects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the next chapter.
Simply put, exit is the option to leave an institution (to switch suppliers, to 
move out of an area, or even to secede from a state), while voice is the option to 
exercise a vocal dissent. These two options are mediated by loyalty, the willingness of 
interested constituents to remain with the deteriorating institution and to continue to 
work to improve it and ultimately to save it. Loyalty is what cements individuals and 
groups to an institution and prevents defection while remedies are sought to stem its 
decline. Institutions that allow constituents to use both options are likely to be more 
stable and enduring, while those that have the ability to repress both voice and exit, 
such as totalitarian states, ‘will largely deprive themselves of both recuperation 
mechanisms’, and are ultimately likely to face unrecoverable deterioration or 
collapse.74
The varying degrees with which constituents or customers choose one option 
over the other or implement some combined strategy are the focus of Hirschman’s 
thesis. Rather than stressing any particular option, we will examine Hirschman’s 
concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty and how they interplay to develop a framework
72 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). Note that psychologists often cite a third 
choice: neglect (or apathy). Neglect is the option of staying within the organisation, but ignoring the 
deterioration and saying nothing. Thus it is a choice of non-action; neither exit nor voice is activated.
73 See Josep M. Colomer, ‘Exit, Voice, and Hostility in Cuba’, International Migration Review 
(Summer 2000); Steven Pfaff and Hyojoung Kim, ‘Exit-Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An 
Analysis of Emigration and Protest in the East German Revolution’, American Journal o f Sociology, 
(Vol. 109, No. 2,2003), pp. 401-44; Kimberley Marten Zisk, ‘Institutional Decline in the Russian 
Military: Exit, Voice and Corruption’, Columbia University PONARS Policy Memo 67 (September
1999).
74 Hirschman, p. 4
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within which we will analyse the four structural risk factors that we outlined 
previously in this chapter. We will use this framework of analysis in the next chapter 
to develop a rationalist structural perspective on the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
which we compare to the predominant Romantic perspective discussed in previous 
chapters.
5.7 The Role of Exit and Voice in Stemming Institutional 
Deterioration
Hirschman’s concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty mimic the interplay between politics 
and economics within organisations, including states. Hirschman also notes that these 
options reflect scholarly biases within the social sciences. While economists have a 
bias for exit and against voice, political scientists favour voice (usually within the
nc
context of democratic dissent) over exit as the critical option in an institution. For 
economists, exit is a market force, whereas voice is a non-market force; exit is an 
economic option while voice is a political option and therefore economists stress the 
economic option of exit.76 Thus for economists examining declining organisations, 
exit is the key method to effectuate change and customers are either loyal (choosing 
not to exit) or traitorous (choosing to exit). An economist’s article of faith is that the 
more elastic demand is—that is, the faster and easier the exit option can be used—the 
better the market and economic system under consideration. The exit option, or what 
Americans term ‘voting with your feet’, is so important in the workings of a market 
economy and US democracy that Hirschman dubs it the ‘ultimate nature of the 
American experience’.77
Alternatively, for political scientists, voice is the key option. Indeed, political 
scientists can see the opposite phenomenon (voice) as an article of faith—that the best 
functioning organisations require maximum voice with little or no options for exit. 
Often known as ‘interest articulation’, voice includes various types of actions to 
express dissatisfaction and affect change, such as petitions, protests, or appeals to 
authority. Therefore, political scientists either ignore or overlook the exit option open 
to constituents and instead focus on other political options, such as public
7S Ibid, pp. 16-17.
16 Ib id ,p . 19.
11 Ib id ,p . 106.
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acquiescence to authority or constituent apathy and indifference towards particular
78institutions.
As Hirschman stresses, social institutions are, in the parlance of business 
economists, ‘satisficers’, not ‘optimisers’. That is, organisations like states and firms 
do not provide the conditions for a social optimum; rather they seek mainly to 
provide ‘satisfactory’ results for a very broad group.79 However, this lack of 
optimisation can lead to complacency and a decline in an organisation’s performance, 
creating dissatisfaction among some groups. When faced with deterioration, some 
groups choose to exit, while others choose to express dissent (voice).
Exit is often the clearest option to express dissatisfaction. Voice is an 
alternative to exit; it is not a subordinate choice, but rather some groups can prefer 
voice as a substitute for exit under certain conditions, for example, in cases where exit 
is difficult or impossible, such as with families, churches, or states. Such social and 
political institutions mimic monopolies in economics, where exit options are limited. 
Under such circumstances, voice acts as a residual of exit, offering individuals and 
groups a way of reacting if the exit option is either unavailable or very costly. 
However, most institutions are not pure ‘monopolies’, either in the economic or the 
social sense; instead most institutions are mixed, so there is an interaction between 
the options of voice and exit.81
Hirschman posits that the level of voice within an institution feeds on inelastic 
demand from its constituents; that is, it is based on the lack of opportunity for 
constituents to exit the institution. Thus, the role of voice should increase as 
opportunities for exit decline; with a lack of choice or an ability to exit, the 
opportunity and desire for constituents or customers to voice their dissent or 
dissatisfaction should increase. For example, in less developed states, where there are 
fewer consumer choices and therefore exit is constrained, there are louder complaints 
or even protests about the quality of goods, choices, or prices, because there is no exit
78 Ibid., p. 31.
79 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
80 A third choice which Hirschman does not outline is neglect. Additionally, others have pointed to 
non-exit, non-voice options that ultimately undermine an institution while keeping exit at bay, such as 
corruption. Corruption is a method of diverting an organisation’s resources for the use of certain 
groups, often because voice is ineffective and exit is not really an option. Corruption is seen as a form 
of ‘compensation’ for lack of voice and an inability to exit. See for example, Marten Zisk, 
‘Institutional Decline in the Russian Military: Exit, Voice and Corruption’.
81 Hirschman, pp. 33-36.
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from the system. In essence, basic economic issues become more quickly politicised 
where a consumer’s lack of silent exit is impossible.
While economistic or market thinking is oriented towards the exit option— 
such as selling shares or dumping investments as a signal of dissatisfaction—political 
thinking is oriented towards staving off the exit option, by making an organisation 
more responsive and accountable to its members through the use of voice. Indeed, 
most organisations take steps to make their services more responsive to members and 
fend off dissatisfaction and possible defection. For example, some use 
decentralisation as a mechanism to improve voice and retain their members’ loyalty; 
in a more decentralised organisation individual members can have more input and 
influence than under a centralised organisation.
Voice can be particularly important in protecting an organisation against 
deterioration in the quality of the products or services it provides, and it is especially 
important in fending off decline in various quality of life services, such as essential 
services provided by the state like schooling, transport, or healthcare. In particular, 
most consumers and constituents use voice when a high-quality product deteriorates. 
However, since constituents and consumers judge quality subjectively, any 
deterioration in the quality of an organisation affects those who rely upon it 
differently. Often the most sensitive customers or constituents who find quality 
deterioration hardest to deal with are the first to exit, leaving behind those who are 
least active, least knowledgeable, or least reliable to stay loyal to the organisation. 
Unfortunately, those left behind are generally the least capable of generating 
meaningful change within an organisation.
However, not all organisations seek to restrict members’ exit; some actively 
encourage exit as a means of discouraging or limiting dissent. Effectively, they trade 
off exit for voice.84 For example, politically many Latin Americans states have 
encouraged political opponents to become exiles, such as in Columbia where
82 Ibid, pp. 34-35.
Ibid, pp. 47-53.
84 In some quarters this is thought of as the ‘safety valve’ theory of history, where the dissatisfied are 
allowed to leave as a means of releasing the pressure for change within an institution. In 1893 
Frederick Jackson Turner was perhaps the first historian to posit the benefits to American social (or 
institutional) stability of allowing the disgruntled and dispossessed to leave for greener pastures. A 
variety of other historians have elaborated on Turner’s point. See Frederick Jackson Turner, The 
Frontier in American History (collection of republished essays, 1920). Available online at 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/TURNER/ See also David Montgomery, ‘The Significance of the 
Frontier in American Historiography’, web article http://members.aol.com/profdavidmont/tumer.htm
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dissidents, opponents, and other ‘troublemakers’ were rewarded with monetary 
incentives for exile, thus creating an ‘ever-beckoning opportunity for exit’ in the 
region which served to limit the effects of dissent and restricted both the possibilities
O f
for large-scale conflict and institutional reform.
5.8 The Logic of Loyalty in Institutions
Loyalty is often thought of as an emotional or irrational attachment: ‘Loyalty is the 
virtue, state, or quality of being faithful to one’s commitments, duties, relations, 
associations, or values. It is fidelity to [...] anyone or anything to which one’s heart 
can become attached or devoted’. However, for Hirschman loyalty is profoundly
o*7
rational: loyalist behaviour ‘retains an enormous dose of reasoned calculation’. In 
fact, Hirschman argues that loyalty in some governmental situations is actually 
opportunism rationalised as public-spirit mindedness.88
Loyalty has the function of preventing deterioration in an organisation from 
being cumulative and putting the organisation on the path to improvement, allowing it 
to recuperate. The idea of loyalty has two rational components of calculation. 
Members are likely to voice their grievances in an attempt to improve the 
organisation rather than head for the exit if: 1) they are willing to trade off the 
certainty of exit with the uncertainty that things will improve in the deteriorated 
organisation, and 2) they have a high estimate of their ability to influence the 
organisation.89 Loyalty has various benefits for members. A loyal member can expect 
to have his dissent taken seriously and acted upon in the organisation. Indeed, the 
threat of exit is part of his bargaining power and increases the overall effectiveness of 
his dissent. Without the threat or possibility of exit, an organisation can neglect, 
ignore, or otherwise marginalise dissent to its own detriment.
Those members of an organisation lacking a concept of loyalty to it often have 
low expectations of their influence over it. In the absence of loyalty, exit can 
sometimes be considered costless (economically for the consumer, or politically for
85 Hirschman, pp. 60-61.
86 Milton R. Konvitz, ‘Loyalty’, Dictionary o f the History ofIdeas: Studies o f Selected Pivotal Ideas, 
Vol. 3, ed. Philip P Wiener (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), p. 109.
87 Hirschman, p. 79.
™ Ibid., p. 116.
89 Ibid., p. 77.
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the constituent); lack of loyalty can limit the perceived costs of exit.90 Additionally, 
non-loyal members can sometimes pursue other options to exit, such as neglect 
(apathy), in which case they do not exit, but also do not dissent, staying silent about 
an organisation’s difficulties. Others can choose to boycott the organisation, which is 
effectively a form of temporary exit from the institution, and is suitable mainly for 
those who may feel that while their dissent is ineffective, they also cannot or will not 
exit, but can temporarily do without the benefits that the organisation provides.91
In order to encourage loyalty, institutions may either encourage voice or they 
can erect specific barriers to exit, which can be highly functional, depending on the 
situation. Since the exit option is generally easier to use than the voice option— 
members often prefer the ‘neatness of exit over the messiness and heartbreak of 
voice’, as leaving is often preferable to an ongoing, tedious dissent that ultimately 
requires compromise—high barriers or penalties to exit can be appropriate when the 
effective use of dissent requires inventiveness and exit is not effective and resolves 
little.92 In organisations where there is a high penalty for exit, members can repress 
their awareness of the organisation’s deterioration, which from the organisation’s 
standpoint has the beneficial effect of suppressing the idea of exit and encouraging at 
least temporary loyalty, but it also potentially represses dissent to the organisation’s 
detriment.
Thus, rather than creating a situation where exit does not occur, institutions 
where the cost of exit is punitively high face the potential for a secret or secretive 
exit, where members do exit but simply omit their open dissent and threats to exit. 
This lack of willingness to voice dissent out of fear of punishment means that the 
organisation delays or forgoes the potentially beneficial action of voice until it may 
be too late to act to stem institutional deterioration.93 In addition to suppressing exit to 
encourage loyalty, some institutions try to repress dissent. For example, both 
totalitarian and one-party systems allow neither voice nor exit. This makes them less 
viable in the long-run since they are unable to recuperate from deterioration because 
the two main methods of rescuing them from institutional decline, exit and voice, are
90 Ibid., p. 82.
91 Ibid, p. 82-86.
92 Ibid, p. 107.
93 Ibid., pp. 93-98.
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only activated ‘when deterioration has reached so advanced a stage that recovery is 
no longer either possible or desirable’.94
This can be particularly deleterious in the case of states and the provision of 
public goods, since members find that it is impossible to have complete exit from an 
organisation, for example from governmental services such as a state school system. 
While individuals may be free to choose non-state schools, the state’s overall skills 
base and economy is still dependent on the performance and public goods that the 
state school system provides. Only a true exit, that is an exit from the community or 
the state, can allow members to avoid the deterioration in quality in public goods.95
5.9 Towards an Alternative Framework—Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to outline four structural factors that some political 
scientists consider important markers for conflict risk. Effectively, these take into 
account the past, present, and perceived future of a state: the legacy of the past 
(colonial history), present structures or conditions (political and economic factors), 
and the shadow of the future (demographic change). We gleaned these risk factors 
mainly from the results of the State Failure Task Force, but also from the work of 
various social scientists. Each of these factors may have some role to play in creating 
potential structures for conflict.
A state’s colonial history can bequeath several difficult legacies to new states 
through the creation of new state boundaries, exploitative colonial economic 
practices, colonial migration and settlement policies, or a discriminatory system of 
preferences. Additionally, colonisers may also introduce ‘motivated sociology’ as a 
method of social control. Finally, a history of multiple colonisations can exacerbate 
these problems. A state’s current political structure can also present a conflict risk, 
especially for transitional states. While democracies and autocracies may be fairly 
stable, partly democratic regimes are more significantly at risk of conflict. 
Additionally, a state’s economic structures can prime the pump for conflict in various 
ways. Some of these include the existence of durable categorical inequalities between 
groups, state spending and redistribution policies, the effects that remittances and 
diasporas have, as well as a state’s lack of openness to international trade (or a lack of
94 Ibid.,?. 121.
95Ibid.,??. 98-101.
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economic freedom more broadly). Finally, the shadow of upcoming demographic 
changes and a demographic transition can sometimes create potential conflict risks. 
Factors such as agrarian expansion, rapid urbanisation, a youth bulge, migration 
across borders, or significant population shifts can be markers for conflict.
In addition to these four structural factors, which can generate the potential for 
conflict, we have briefly outlined a method to analyse how agents may react to a 
change in these structures in order to create conflict: Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty 
framework. Hirschman’s framework is especially applicable under specific 
conditions—when an institution or organisation is deteriorating and at risk of decline 
or collapse. He argues that members have various strategies for dealing with 
institutional deterioration, either exit or voice, which are mediated by the member’s 
loyalty to the organisation. Loyalty itself is significantly based on a rational 
calculation, not only on the likelihood that the organisation is likely to improve, but 
also the member’s understanding of his influence within the organisation.
In the next chapter, we examine how the four structural factors we discussed, 
when considered within the exit-voice-loyalty framework of analysis, can provide an 
alternative structural perspective on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. We compare 
this perspective to the Romantic perspective which emphasises the role of 
irrationality, pessimism, nostalgia, relativism, and nature in the collapse of the 
Yugoslav state.
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Chapter 6. Slouching Towards Barbarism?: Comparing 
Romantic and Structural Perspectives on the Disintegration 
of Yugoslavia
‘The twentieth century began and ended with conflict in the Balkans. A decade ago, 
international peacekeepers were held hostage in Bosnia, and the [ifntemational 
[cfommunity was held hostage by a lack o f consensus for action. The Balkans were 
our top foreign policy priority-just as Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism are 
today.A
—R. Nicholas Bums
Although the war in Iraq leads current headlines, a decade ago the news was filled 
with stories of the conflict in Yugoslavia. In 1991 Yugoslavia, the improbable 
survivor, succumbed to the most violent conflict on European soil since World War 
II. Bom in the aftermath of World War I and formed from the borderlands of two 
failed empires, Yugoslavia had survived a royalist dictatorship; a Nazi invasion and a 
devastating civil war between Ustashe, Chetniks, and partisans during World War II; 
the formation of a socialist federation under the charismatic leadership of Josip Broz 
Tito; Tito’s break with Stalin; and the ‘Croatian Spring’, a rebellion against the 
central state in 1971.2 Improbably, by the 1980s the regions that made up Yugoslavia 
had gone from some of the most underdeveloped in Europe in the 1940s, to being 
perhaps the most economically advanced and politically liberal in Eastern Europe, 
with Western levels of education and technical expertise. Additionally, Yugoslavia 
found itself in the international limelight as a founding member of the non-aligned 
movement, balancing between East and West.3
Yet despite economic progress during the earlier years of the socialist state, by 
the time of Tito’s death in 1980 Yugoslavia was facing a severe economic crisis. The 
deteriorating economic situation during the 1980s—including more than 30 per cent 
inflation, the highest foreign indebtedness of any European state per capita, growing
1 R. Nicholas Bums, ‘Ten Years After Dayton: Winning the Peace in The Balkans’, speech at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC (19 May 2005). Bums is US Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs.
2 A variety of pre-break up histories trace the development of the Yugoslav state, including Stevan K. 
Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia and its Problems, 1918-1988 (London: C. Hurst & 
Co., 1988), and Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 1978).
3 For a discussion of Tito’s break with Stalin and his efforts to play off both Moscow and Washington, 
see Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997).
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unemployment, insolvency, and strikes—was coupled with a leadership crisis and 
political stalemate between the republics.4 Just over a decade after Tito’s death, the 
state he forged disintegrated into conflict.
As a conflict, the disintegration of Yugoslavia embodied many of the issues 
we have identified with the Romantic mood that dominated the post-Cold War: anti­
rationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on the dark side of human 
nature. While previously conflicts would have been understood in political terms, 
such as a bid for power or control over resources, Yugoslavia’s break up became 
most immediately understood in cultural terms, as a war between cultures. As such, 
Yugoslavia became a key case study of the post-Cold War.
In this chapter we explore how the Romantic mood of the post-Cold War era 
coloured interpretations of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Then we examine the 
Romantic themes of irrationalism, pessimism, relativism, nostalgia, and the focus on 
nature. We group these themes in two sections. First, we discuss the role that 
irrationality, relativism (through a focus on culture), and nature (particularly the 
essential ‘nature’ o f ‘Balkan man’) played in fomenting stereotyped images and 
metaphors of the region, which then were used as a popular substitute for analysis in 
the Yugoslav conflicts. This type of analysis reflects the use of the fundamental 
attribution error; that is, the use of dispositional traits to explain potentially situational 
factors. Second, we consider the role that pessimism and nostalgia play in either the 
coverage or analysis of the Yugoslav conflicts mainly in the West.
Finally, we compare the metaphors and analogies that the Romantic Zeitgeist 
generates about the Yugoslav conflict with the alternative structural framework we 
developed in the previous chapter. Within this section we will not include in-depth 
discussions of the history of Yugoslavia or its constituent republics or provinces,5 or
4 On the economic crisis, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), especially Chapter 8. On the leadership crisis and 
political problems o f the presidium and party post-Tito, see Chapter 10.
5 There have been many works both on die Balkans, Yugoslavia, and its republics published recently 
that cover this ground. See for example, John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a 
Country, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John Allcock, Explaining 
Yugoslavia (London: Hurst & Company, 2000); Jasminka UdoviCki and James Ridgeway, eds., Bum 
this House: The Making and Unmaking o f Yugoslavia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997); 
Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Ivo 
Goldstein, Croatia: A History (London: Hurst & Company, 1999); Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, 
Myth, and the Destruction o f Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Miranda 
Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History o f Kosovo (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1998); Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York, NY: New York University Press,
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an extensive chronology of events that resulted in its disintegration into conflict;6 
there are already many books and articles which amply discuss these subjects. We 
will also not examine the conduct of the war in Yugoslavia; again, this is a vast 
territory that has been well covered by others.7 Additionally, we will not investigate
Q
the influence of international diplomacy in its demise. Instead, what we aim to offer 
is a more narrow exploration into how several structural factors can come into play 
within a decision either to voice dissent but remain within Yugoslavia or to exit from 
it under conditions of the perceived deterioration of the state.9 We discuss aspects of 
Yugoslavia’s imperial history, its political and economic structures, and demography 
for the conflict markers we identified in Chapter 5. We then briefly evaluate these 
factors for how they can be interpreted within an exit-voice-loyalty framework. We 
conclude by arguing that a structural perspective significantly questions the validity 
of the popular Romantic interpretation of Yugoslavia’s demise.
1996); and Noel Malcom, Kosovo: A Short History (New York, NY: New York University Press, 
1998).
6 For a small sampling of this literature, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and 
Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); Branka Maga§, The 
Destruction o f Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (London: Verso: 1993); Mihailo Cmobmja, 
The Yugoslav Drama, Second Edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Laura Silber and Allan Little, The 
Death o f Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books/BBC Books, 1995); Lenard Cohen, Broken Bonds: 
Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1995); Misha Glenny, The Fall o f Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992); and Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, eds., The Tragedy o f  
Yugoslavia: The Failure o f  Democratic Transformation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992); and 
Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration o f Yugoslavia from the Death o f Tito to the Fall 
o f Milosevic, Fourth Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).
7 Among many, see David RiefF, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure o f the West (London:
Vintage Books, 1995) and Roy Gutman, Witness to Genocide (New York, NY: Lisa Drew Books, 
1993).
8 On international diplomacy and Yugoslavia, see James Gow, Triumph o f the Lack o f Will: 
International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst & Company, 1997); Mark Almond, 
Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Mandarin, 1994); and Marc Weller, ‘The 
International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, American 
Journal o f  International Law (Vol. 86, No. 3,1992).
9 Some would perhaps consider this a straight cost-benefit analysis; however, we do not use this 
terminology. For a discussion of cost-benefit analyses in the decision to secede, see Viva Ona Bartkus, 
The Dynamic o f Secession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
213
Chapter 6
6.1 Where the Wild Things Are—Irrationality, relativism, nature
‘[The Balkans are] one o f those ill-fated portions o f the earth which, 
though placed in immediate contact with civilization, have remained 
perpetually barbarian
—Thomas Arnold10
Considering that Arnold, an Englishman who was headmaster at the famous Rugby 
School, made this comment in the mid-nineteenth century, it is obvious that the 
‘Balkan’ region, however defined, has long held negative associations in the mind’s 
eye of the West. Such associations have often played along the intertwined Romantic 
themes of anti-rationalism, relativism, and nature; specifically, that the region’s ills 
are fundamentally due to the culture and essential human nature of Homo balcanicus, 
who is closer to ‘natural’ man in his primitive and irrational state.
Indeed, scholars such as Bozidar Jezemik and Maria Todorova have outlined 
some of these common Western perceptions and stereotypes of the area which have 
been present since at least the seventeenth century. These common perceptions of 
irrationality and primitiveness have included images of the Balkans as a part of ‘Wild 
Europe’, an area that is both geographically proximate and thus near, yet culturally 
exotic and thus far away, perhaps more a part of Asia than of Europe, or the point 
where the West ends and the East begins.11 As Todorova comments, ‘the Balkans 
have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and 
self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West” have been 
constructed’.12
Of course negative Western civilisational judgements have not only been 
passed on the Balkans; for centuries Eastern Europeans in general were said not to 
suffer from a surfeit of civilisation. As Larry Wolff argues, for Western Europeans
Eastern Europe was located not at the antipode of civilization, not down in the 
depths of barbarism, but rather on the developmental scale that measured the 
distance between [the] civilization [of Europe] and [the] barbarism [of 
Asia....] Eastern Europe was essentially in between, and by the nineteenth
10 From Thomas Arnold’s History o f Rome (1838-43), quoted in Bozidar Jezemik, Wild Europe: The 
Balkans in the Gaze o f Western Travellers (London: Saqi Books / The Bosnian Institute, 2004), p. 25.
11 Jezemik, p. 29.
12 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 188.
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century these polar oppositions [between Asian and European] acquired the 
force of fixed formulas.13
Hence the Balkans are marginal and peripheral, not quite as exotic as the ‘real’ East 
but close enough to be near the true ‘nature’ of primitive man before civilisation 
intruded on or reigned in his ‘nature’.
In addition to primitiveness, another common image invoked to describe the 
Balkans has been that of barbaric, irrational violence, which always seems to be 
bubbling beneath the surface. For centuries, various commentators and travellers to 
the area have reinforced this violent image through the use of such terms as ‘ruthless’, 
‘cannibalistic’, or ‘barbarous’ in association with the Balkans.14 In the past century, 
the Balkan Wars, waged from 1912-1913 and which finished off the Ottoman ‘sick 
man of Europe’, reinforced this image of a region harbouring deeply irrational, 
violent impulses and perpetually at the edge of civilisation. For example, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace’s ‘Report on the International Commission to 
Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars’ (1914) highlighted the 
savage ‘passions’ ruling the Balkans, noting the ‘death, blood and crime crying 
everywhere for vengeance’ and ‘the Te Deums rising from churches whose very 
possession was disputed by rival fanaticisms’.15
These cultural stereotypes gained new life at the end of the Cold War with the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Although the term ‘Balkans’, which specifically 
applies to a mountain range in Bulgaria, has generally been applied to all states on 
what has become known as the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990s it became primarily 
associated with one state: Yugoslavia, which with its disintegration in 1991 became 
the inheritor of traditional Western images and views about Balkan primitiveness, 
barbarism, and irrationality. While Todorova warns of the dangers of applying a 
regional signifier such as ‘Balkan’ on just Yugoslavia—and thus artificially 
extending the conflict into a regional problem—many experts do indeed use the term 
‘Balkan’ as shorthand for ‘Yugoslavia’. Thus, we see books such as Balkan Tragedy: 
Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, Balkan Babel, or Habits o f the Balkan
13 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map o f Civilization on the Mind o f the Enlightenment 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 13.
14 Jezemik, pp. 40-41.
15 Carnegie Endowment, The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect 
with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan (Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 11 of the original 1914 report.
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Heart, all of which pertain to the disintegration of and resulting conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia.
While perhaps unintentional, the use of such simple shorthand allows a certain 
type of analogical reasoning and suggestive metaphors to be introduced into any 
analysis about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for by operation of analogy, if 
Yugoslavia—^Balkan, and if Balkan—^ primitive, irrational, barbaric, then simple logic 
yields the formula Yugoslavia—►primitive, irrational, barbaric. The analogy allows the 
analyst to apply a series of ‘fixed formulas’ and creates an instantly recognisable 
framework within which to understand the conflicts as simply the continuation of the 
historical past. Furthermore, it suggests a type of judgement. These formulas are used 
even by astute and expert observers in international relations. For example, US 
statesman George Kennan, in a preface to the re-publication of the Carnegie 
Endowment’s 1914 report on the Balkan Wars, refers to the ‘distracted Balkan 
region’ with its ‘excited peoples’.16 Peace negotiator Lord David Owen notes that 
there is ‘a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to solve disputes by taking up 
arms’.17
Tom Gallagher observes that in EU states representations of the Balkans, and 
more specifically the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, have been based on prejudice 
about the region. Specifically, Western Europeans view the Balkans through the 
politics of ethnicity and the economics of dependence, in other words, as the poor 
cousins of Western Europeans.18 Like Robert Kaplan, they have an aversion to poor 
people and this aesthetic is converted into an ethic: wealth signals a variety of 
blessings, such as democracy and respect for human rights, while poverty suggests an 
authoritarian bent and a lack of respect for basic liberties. This elision between ethic 
and aesthetic for rich and poor regions is not limited to the Balkans. Negative cultural 
stereotypes are associated with other poor regions of Europe as well, for example, 
with southern Italy.19 However, the term ‘Balkans’ has garnered perhaps the most 
pejorative regional connotation of all. As Gallagher comments, ‘“Balkanisation” is 
now one of the most negative paradigms in international relations’.20
16 Carnegie Endowment, p. 14.
17 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Gollancz, 1996), p. 3.
18 Tom Gallagher, Outcast Europe. The Balkans, 1789-1989: From the Ottomans to Milosevic 
(London: Routledge, 2001).
19 See John Dickie, Darkest Italy: The Nation and Stereotypes o f  the Mezzogiomo, 1860-1900 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).
20 Gallagher, p. 2.
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In the United States, the media and policymaking communities often have 
formed their representations of Yugoslavia based on stereotypical images of the 
violent nature of the people of the Balkans generally, and of Yugoslavs specifically. 
Coverage of the Yugoslav wars has often included graphic, yet context-less, images 
of violence and atrocities, which cement the region’s reputation for irrational, 
meaningless violence. As John Allcock argues, ‘More than anything else, atrocity 
stories have served to buttress the image of the fundamental alterity of the South 
Slavs.’21
One common interpretation of the wars in Yugoslavia is that they have been 
largely about the ‘clash of civilisations’: an intractable and historical religious war 
between Muslims and Christians.22 In his in-depth study of the US media’s 
perspectives on the war in Yugoslavia, James Sadkovich maintains that the media’s 
stereotypical representations include portrayals of Yugoslavs as vicious and atavistic 
tribes culturally prone to hatred, tragically caught within a centuries-old conflict that 
is unreasonable and intractable; that is, a ‘history of hatred’ underlies their conflicts. 
Sadkovich notes that these views have been widespread throughout the policymaking 
community, since the media do not present original perspectives; rather they 
generally ‘recast reality in ways congruent with the attitudes of those who control the 
political and economic levers of the country’ and ‘cooperat[e] with those in power’.23 
In general, stereotypes of Yugoslavia have not been unusual or marginal views of the 
country or its people, but a mainstream or Establishment view of reality that fits 
closely with those of respected and educated middle class professionals. In a 
significant way, this view of reality stresses ‘the apartness of the Balkans from the 
European civilization’ 24
The ‘history of hatred’ concept as a cause for contemporary war in Yugoslavia 
has particular Romantic resonance, as it follows the time-honoured biblical concepts 
of original sin, of the transmission of sin by birth, and of blood atonement, echoed in 
St. Paul’s epistle to the Hebrews: ‘And almost all things are by the law purged with 
blood; and without shedding of blood is no remission.’25 It implies that all parties
21 Allcock, p. 395.
22 James Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
1998), p. 133.
23 Sadkovich, pp. 1 and 3.
24 Ivo Banac’s comment on Western attitudes towards the war in Yugoslavia, as quoted in Todorova, p. 
185.
25 Hebrews 9:22, New Testament, King James Version.
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have an historical ‘original sin’ that is transmitted from one generation to the next, 
from one historical grievance to the next, and that the atonement of those sins is only 
by blood, a form of purification by violence or war. This concept underlies the 
Romantic notion of collective guilt that resides within the nation.26 It is also 
particularly pernicious, since the transmission of sin, guilt, and atonement continues 
without a rational end. Hence such conflicts could never really be said to end in any 
meaningful way.
While the popular media and policymaking communities may perhaps be 
forgiven their stereotypes of the region and the causes of conflict in it since they 
generally reflect the lowest-common-denominator form of conventional wisdom on 
any given subject, some experts even fall into the trap of repeating these tired 
prejudices. For example, Dusko Doder takes up the popular theme that the conflicts in
onYugoslavia represent a ‘history of hatred’. Sociologist Stjepan MeStrovic offers 
anthropological and sociological ideal types as an explanation for the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia, discussing ‘Marian’ versus ‘Dinaric’ aspects of various Yugoslav 
national groups.28 This representation has much to do with the perceived dichotomy 
between town and country (urbanites versus agrarians) that has been a staple of 
sociology in the region, where urbanites represent civilisation, while agrarian or 
mountain-folk represent barbarianism or primitive culture.29
These dispositionally-based arguments and emotionally-charged images of 
war follow a time-worn Romantic perspective that argues that violence is highly 
irrational, as it is more about honour and emotion than for calculated effect, a la 
Ignatieff s Warrior’s Honor?0 While for some individual soldiers that may be true, 
large-scale violence usually has at its heart an important dose of calculation, the
26 George P. Fletcher, Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age o f  Terrorism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 139-147.
27 Du§ko Doder, ‘Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds’, Foreign Policy (Vol. 91, Summer 1993).
28 Stjepan MeStrovic with Slaven Letica and Miroslav Goreta, Habits o f the Balkan Heart: Social 
Character and the Fall o f  Communism. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1993). For a 
critique of this view, see Clifford S. Poirot, Jr., ‘The Return to Barbarism’, Journal o f  Economic Issues 
(Vol. 31, No. 1,1997).
29 Xavier Bougarel, ‘Yugoslav Wars: The “Revenge of the Countryside” between Sociological Reality 
and Nationalist Myth’, East European Quarterly (Vol. 33, No. 2, 1999), p. 157. Available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?docid=lGl:55165345&refid=ency_botnm
30 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modem Conscience (London: Chatto 
& Windus, 1998).
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supposed irrational excesses of so-called ‘ethnic war’ notwithstanding. The futility 
of ending irrational wars based on immutable traits led on to the inevitable Romantic 
response: relativism. Since the observer can do nothing—since the sin of violence is 
within them—no outside factor can change the course of events. Thus relativism 
between all parties in the conflict became the stock media story, standing in for 
‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’. The relativistic pox-on-all-their-houses response to the 
war also served as a ready-made excuse for non-intervention.33
These representations share Kaplan’s and Huntington’s visions of 
civilisational clash, which focus on primordial identity, collective history, and 
deposits of memory as key sites for conflict. They also have much in common with 
the Western Orientalist tradition, and the images and stereotypes that Westerners 
generated and propagated about the Orient, especially the Middle East. Indeed, there 
is a form of ‘nested orientalism’ (where various cultures or more or less ‘oriental’ and 
hence more or less irrational and barbaric) in the Western understanding of the 
Balkans which is reflected in its interpretations of the conflicts in Yugoslavia.34
6.2 Deep, Dark Winter of Death—Pessimism and nostalgia
‘The stars have set. And o f all seasons the lands south o f my new 
country know but a single one—the deep, dark winter o f death. ’
—Ales Debeljak35
In speaking of Yugoslavia, Debeljak pointedly chooses a title which echoes 
Nietzsche’s The Twilight o f the Idols: Or How One Philosophises with a Hammer 
(1889), a refutation of rationalism or any form of foundationalism which is a species 
of Romantic despair. While Debeljak’s reference could be seen as an affirmation of 
the Apollonian urge to order, the tone of his book bespeaks a darker interpretation: 
that of Nietzsche’s exaltation of the Dionysian impulse, of joy in destruction, 
disorder, and irrationality, and of the mastery of the irrational through the sheer force
31 John Mueller, ‘The Banality of “Ethnic Conflict”: Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, paper presented at the 
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, DC (31 August-3 September 
2000).
32 On relativism in the media over the war in Bosnia, see Sadkovich.
33 For examples of this among Western statesmen and the media, see Almond; and Brendan Simms, 
Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction o f Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001).
34 Milica Bilic-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, Slavic Review (Vol. 
54, No. 4,1995), pp. 917-931.
35 AleS Debeljak, Twilight o f  the Idols: Recollections o f a Lost Yugoslavia, trans. Michael Biggins 
(Fredonia, NY: White Pine Press, 1994), p. 55.
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of will. As we have discussed, it is within this context that many commentators see 
Yugoslavia: destruction and disorder, irrationality, the force of will of dictators, a 
place forever in the grip of the deep, dark winter of death. This assessment lends itself 
to a Romantic atmosphere of both pessimism and nostalgia: pessimism both about the 
destruction of Yugoslavia and any hope of a future for the peoples of ex-Yugoslavia 
and a sense of nostalgia either for the deep past or for the former state itself.
A quick examination of the library bookshelves on the topic of Yugoslavia 
fills the observer with pessimism. Even many academic titles about the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia are replete with a sense of foreboding. For example, Yugoslavia is 
alternatively a ‘drama’, a ‘tragedy’, a ‘slaughterhouse’, or where ‘the nations rage’. 
Cover photos depict images of war with exhausted soldiers or crying children; tom 
flags symbolising the tearing apart of a state; burnt out bridges; or destroyed 
buildings. Others offer biblical allusions, such as a reproduction of a picture of the 
cringing, pitiable figure of Job by Ivan Mestrovic, ironically so because Mestrovic is 
perhaps best known for his sculptures of strong, resilient peasants.38 These are just the 
first impressions we receive when we cursorily glance at the titles and covers of 
books discussing Yugoslavia.
More substantively, many writings about the conflicts in former Yugoslavia 
underscore a sense of pessimism not only about its demise, but suggest that the 
prospects for the future of its successor states are bleak. Obviously, conflicts often 
generate a sense of pessimism or resignation. However, pessimism about the potential 
for rebuilding the area was a recurring theme. In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
some expressed pessimism about the prospects for democracy, basic liberties like free 
speech, or the development of a free market economy.39 For some commentators, the 
underlying pessimism directed the mood in a nostalgic direction. Nostalgia about 
Yugoslavia has at least two distinct forms, one from the right and one from the left, 
each of which can be considered a sort of teleology. Right-wing nostalgia reminisces
36 See Cmobmja (drama), Woodward (tragedy), Rieff (slaughterhouse), and Christopher Catherwood, 
Why the Nations Rage: Killing in the Name o f God (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
37 Cmobmja (exhausted soldiers), Lampe (tom flags), Woodward (broken bridge), and MagaS 
(destroyed building).
38 Allcock.
39 For an example of these sentiments, see Marvin Stone, ‘No “Peace Dividend” for the Balkan Press’, 
Nieman Reports (Summer 1996). See also Zarko Puhovski, ‘Yugoslav origins o f the post-Yugoslav 
situation and the bleak prospects for civil society’, in Yugoslavia, the Former and the Future: 
Reflections by Scholars from the Region, eds. Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 121-138.
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about the deep past, with a misty focus on national culture and identity. Left-wing 
nostalgia eulogises the glories of the socialist state and its passing.
On the right, there is little nostalgia about the death of communist Yugoslavia 
per se; instead there exists a certain wistfulness about the role of culture, religion, and 
identity in the lives of men, which mark the past indelibly and shape the future. It 
examines religion and cultural identity as the key source of the incompatibility 
between the peoples of Yugoslavia.40 This form of nostalgia is a backward-looking 
one centring on the bonds of deep community. Its wistfulness extends to looking 
backward to history to explain both the present and the future. The past is firmly 
prologue. Conservative nostalgia plumbs the deep past, offering discourses on the 
importance of religion as a marker for identity, or on a sense of the ‘corruption’ of the 
people from their true national natures 41
Interestingly, there are two competing Romantic notions of identity among 
South Slavs: first, the notion of national identity; second, the notion of a pan-South 
Slav identity 42 Conservatives fundamentally question the notion of a state for all 
South Slavs, arguing the impossibility of Yugoslavia itself. As such, they refute the 
grander pretensions of various forms of Romantic collective unity between the South 
Slavs such as Yugoslavism, the Illyrian movement, and other shallower forms of pan- 
Slavic unity, emphasising instead more traditional, parochial, and deep nationalist 
forms of community.43 Conservative works may reject the notion that there were 
‘seasons’ of Yugoslavism and pan-South Slav notions of unity that waxed and waned 
among the nationalities, emphasising instead the desire for independent existence. 
Some also extol the benefits of empire, holding up Austria-Hungary as a model of 
good governance. However, this gloss on Habsburg rule is an anachronism, as at the 
time South Slav subjects of the empire were eager for an alternative form of rule 
through in majority South Slavic polity; they did not necessarily demand their own 
national states.44
40 For a critical look at religion as a source for conflict in Yugoslavia, see Gerard F. Powers, ‘Religion, 
Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia’, Journal o f International 
Affairs (Vol. 50, No. 1,1996).
41 Robert Kaplan’s work exemplifies this strain of thinking. See Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts'. A 
Journey Through History (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994).
42 See Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1984).
43 Huntington’s comments on Yugoslavia in Clash o f  Civilizations can be read in this vein.
44 See Banac.
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For the left, the mood of nostalgia is wrapped up more in a melancholic 
longing for the failed state of Yugoslavia itself, often expressed in the future sense of 
a ‘what-could-have-been’-style utopia had not various forces intervened to make it 
disintegrate, or personal reminiscences of the ‘good’ state.45 This nostalgia 
encompasses several arguments, including that Yugoslavia was uniquely tom by the 
opportunism of ethnic entrepreneurs who preyed on the weakness of the state; that 
dismemberment followed cack-handed attempts at external intervention; and that 
imperialistic overtures by cmde American zealots were the primary cause of state 
failure 46 Some leftist works blame the West’s sins of omission for Yugoslavia’s 
failure, such as the lack of Western financial backing for the state, for example, by the 
IMF’s lack of willingness to prop up Yugoslavia’s faltering economy after 1983, 
when the international community became seriously concerned about debt levels in 
less developed countries 47
Left-wing nostalgia mainly proffers an argument for the preservation of 
Yugoslavia as it was, albeit with some reforms 48 Unfortunately, some of these 
positions refuse to examine the harsh realities not only of the economic failure of 
Yugoslavia’s system of worker self-management, but also of the social and political 
breakdown of the state, relying instead either on nostalgic visions of the past or on 
external factors (such as the refusal to continue to prop up Yugoslavia economically) 
as the main causes of state failure 49 While infusions of Western cash might have 
ameliorated some of the excesses of state failure, it is probable that such actions 
would have postponed the state’s disintegration rather than avoided it altogether. 
Additionally, some proponents of socialist Yugoslavia can have a general 
unwillingness to deal with the lack of democracy and human rights in the state, and
45 For examples of this see, Dejan Djokic, ‘A farewell to Yugoslavia’, Open Democracy (10 April 
2002). Available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/325.pdf See also Paul 
Mojzes, ‘Yugo going and gone’, The Christian Century (8 March 2003).
46 On cack-handed interventionism, see Svetozar Stojanovic, ‘The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
the Failures of the International Community’, Free Inquiry (Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 1993). On US 
imperial ambitions and Yugoslavia, see Karen Talbot, ‘The Real Reasons for War in Yugoslavia: 
Backing up Globalization with Military Might’, Social Justice (Vol. 27, No. 4, 2000).
47 See, for example, Criton Zaokos, ‘IMF’s shock therapy is true culprit in former Yugoslavia’, Insight 
on the News (14 June 1993).
48 Although this nostalgia can be seen most readily in hard-left works, some academic works, such as 
Allcock’s and Lampe’s, have a tinge of nostalgia about the potential for the socialist state to reform.
49 See, for example, Sean Gervasi, ‘Why is NATO in Yugoslavia?’ paper presented to the Conference 
on the Enlargement of NATO in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, Prague, Czech Republic (13- 
14 January 1996).
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the unpopularity of Yugoslavia as it was among its population, indeed the 
unpopularity of the state with its largest national group, the Serbs.50
To some extent, Yugoslavia as it was (or ‘really existing socialism’, as some 
call it) may have been more popular as an abstract construct than as a real state. Some 
of Tito’s supporters in the West were captured by the promise of multinationalism, 
multiculturalism, and by the concept of the socialist ‘third way’ of worker self­
management which appeals to the Romantic left with its ideals of independent and 
autonomous workers collectives that put a human face on the oppressive collectivism 
of the Soviet command and control model of the economy. However, such popular 
Western notions of Titoism, or Yugoslavism, sat uncomfortably with the everyday 
realities of people’s lives, such as the repression of political dissent and lack of 
democracy and human rights.51
Both forms of nostalgia can be seen as teleological since they impose a goal 
on the path of history; one which is seen as ‘reactive’ while the other is seen as 
‘progressive’, but both of which are deemed inevitable. One sees the future as the 
storehouse of past experiences, the other as a blank slate upon which the past has no 
place. In one, the creation of Yugoslavia is impossible, in the other its demise is 
impossible. Both telescope their selective histories from different periods, one from a 
deep ‘primordial’ past when identity was formed mainly by religion, and the other 
after 1946 as the creation of brotherhood and unity, a non-Soviet alternative to 
socialism. Both use history as a weapon to make their points, one emphasising 
periods of conflict, the other periods of cooperation. One argues the primacy of 
religious or cultural difference, the other the primacy of linguistic sameness. One is 
nostalgic about the deep identity forged by religion and culture, the other is nostalgic 
about the fleeting identity forged by Yugoslav communist ideology and socialism. 
One is about disciplining and punishing the main stalwarts of a unified Yugoslavia, 
represented by the Serbs (through the creation of newly independent states), the other 
is about disciplining and punishing what Engels terms the ‘non-historic peoples’, 
represented by the Croats (through a unified Yugoslavia).
50 Some commentators argue that the case of Yugoslavia involved the secession of the central republic, 
Serbia, first. For arguments along this line, see Silber and Little; see also, Daniele Conversi, ‘Central 
Secession: Towards a New Analytical Concept? The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, Journal o f Ethnic 
and Migration Studies (Vol. 26, No. 2, 2000).
51 For a highly critical view of Yugoslavia, see Nora Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the 
West since 1939 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).
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6.3 The Centre Will Not Hold—Structural factors and 
disintegration
In contrast to this Romantic interpretation of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, we 
will examine the four structural factors we defined in Chapter 5—colonial history, 
political factors, economic factors, and demographic change—through an exit-voice- 
loyalty framework. This analysis is not meant to be comprehensive or definitive. 
Rather, it is meant to suggest how a variety of rational factors could point to a 
situation of potential conflict. We then compare this view with the Romantic 
perspective, which focuses on dispositional factors, we discussed earlier.
(a) Conflicting Inheritance—Yugoslavia and imperial history
‘Unless an empire is destroyed through revolution, much o f its social 
structure is reproduced in the post-imperial context’
—Karen Barkey52
As we outlined in chapter 5, a state’s colonial or imperial legacy can have an 
important impact on the structure of its institutions long throughout the 
postcolonial/postimperial period. Thus significant historical continuities can exist that 
are not necessarily based on culture, but rather on varying patterns of institutional or 
economic development.53 For Yugoslavia, there were two postimperial states—a 
kingdom and a socialist federation—whose structures were complicated by the fact 
that they were successors to more than one imperial legacy: the Ottoman and 
Habsburg empires. As Karen Barkey notes,
The collapse of an empire leaves several legacies for the political entities that 
develop in its aftermath. Among these are social and economic structures, 
state institutions of a certain nature and strength, a particular set of elites, 
demographics, and an overall political cultural legacy. Unless an empire is 
destroyed through revolution, much of its social structure is reproduced in the 
post-imperial context.[...] the Ottoman and Habsburg, provide excellent 
examples of this continuity.54
52 Karen Barkey, ‘Thinking about Consequences of Empire’, in After Empire: Multiethnic Societies 
and Nation-Building the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires, eds. Karen 
Barkey and Mark Von Hagen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 101.
53 Allcock, p. 5.
54 Barkey, p. 101.
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As Barkey argues, empires leave institutions of administration and control that 
survive in successor states as well as continuity among imperial elites. Additionally, 
empires leave behind demographic and ethnic legacies that can lead to population 
exchanges, forced migrations, or land transfers to create strong ethnic majorities 
across defined territories in new states.55 Importantly, the strength of institutions in 
these newly created states often depends on the position that the territory of the new 
state played within the empire: core and periphery states have different imperial 
legacies. While core states are more likely to make a successful transition to 
independence with the creation of civic institutions, a legacy of domination creates 
problems for institutions in peripheral states, where institutions are often weaker, 
shallower, and non-indigenous.56 Thus, in new states where civic institutions are 
weak or shallow, centralising elites have a better chance at controlling the apparatus 
of the state, especially if they are supported by a strong ideology to bolster and 
mobilise national support for the state.57
Legacies o f the Ottoman empire. Although the Ottoman empire went through 
various periods of reform and modernisation during its three-hundred year history, 
economically, socially, and militarily the Ottoman empire at heart remained a 
medieval state with a despotic system of government and discriminatory religious and 
economic practices until its disintegration. Rule was exercised by grand viziers and a 
system of corruption and bribery permeated the administration, while the Islamic 
clergy and powerful Janissary military class held a corrupting influence and power. 
The pashas and governors who administered the provinces and vassal states 
purchased their posts and recovered their investments by extorting the local 
population and heavily taxing their subjects. Further, while the state preached a 
general toleration of non-Muslims, it practiced discriminatory fiscal and tax policies 
towards its non-Muslim subjects. Thus the long-term institutional practices of the 
Ottoman empire left a variety of economic, political, and social legacies that 
influenced the areas of Yugoslavia which had been under an extended period of 
Ottoman rule: the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and
CO
Macedonia as well as the province of Kosovo.
55 Ibid.,pp. 101-103.
56 Ibid., p. 104-106.
57 Ibid., p. 104.
58 Note that these territories all had different periods of Ottoman rule. For example, Serbia came under 
Ottoman rule in 1459, became a tributary vassal state in 1817, gained full autonomy in 1856, and won
225
Chapter 6
Throughout the Balkans, the Ottoman empire established a fairly uniform 
agrarian social structure that was without a strong landed aristocracy and which was 
based on an independent peasantry living on the family farm; the Ottomans saw their 
primary social function as support of the peasantry.59 Thus the empire left behind ‘a 
production system rooted in agriculture by the peasant for the peasant’ that focused 
on family and community self-sufficiency in agriculture which hindered the 
development of full-fledged market economies in Ottoman lands.60
As Caglar Keyder notes, legally all Ottoman lands belonged to the sultan. The 
Ottoman system frowned upon the accumulation of wealth in private hands since its 
chief concern was to guarantee the continuation of its revenue stream which was 
collected through a land tax. Thus ambitious landlords would always remain uneasy 
in a climate where their acquisitions could be easily reversed by a change in policy or 
a change in leadership, a fact which limited capitalist accumulation. However, within 
the empire’s European territories, commercialisation and monetisation created 
opportunities for various groups to create alternative poles of power: new merchant 
groups, urban dwellers, and an educated middle class accumulated economic power 
which was later used to bring to life national movements that would challenge 
Ottoman authority.61
Although the Ottoman empire made various attempts at centralisation and 
reform, by the nineteenth century the central state had difficulties completely 
imposing its economic system especially in the empire’s European territories, 
creating uneven development, where landlords who managed to develop a degree of 
autonomy from the state were able to reinforce their independence through access to 
trading networks in Central Europe. The wealth these non-Muslim Balkan provinces 
were able to generate created a newly educated middle classes while their proximity 
to Western and Central Europe spurred their political development and nationalist 
aspirations. Furthermore, the Ottoman central state’s slow and tentative pace of
independence in 1878. Bosnia and Herzegovina came under Ottoman rule in 1463, were lost to the 
Austrian crown in 1878, and then annexed to Austria-Hungary in 1908.
59 Maria Todorova, ‘The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans’, in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint 
on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1996), pp. 60-61.
60 Barkey, p. 101.
61 Caglar Keyder, ‘The Ottoman Empire’, in eds. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg 
Empires (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 32.
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reforms and its internal resistance to change meant that brewing opposition to the 
empire would be drawn along the nationalist push for independence.62
One key political legacy of the Ottoman empire was a comparatively strong 
centralised and bureaucratic state. As Barkey comments, the Ottoman state left 
behind a complex legacy:
On the one hand, the long tradition of a strong central state devoid of 
representative institutions has hindered the development of democracy in 
many post-Ottoman nations. On the other hand, the Ottoman empire left 
behind a complicated political cultural legacy, as seen in the complex 
relationship between Islam and the state. The Ottoman empire was an Islamic 
empire, yet it allowed for a certain separation between state and religion.63
The empire tried to recentralise the ‘the heartland of the empire, namely 
Anatolia and the Balkans’ during the first half of the nineteenth century which began 
a process of bureaucratic modernisation that would bring the governance of the 
Ottoman state closer to the state model of Europe. However, the modernization 
efforts of the Ottoman state elicited different responses among the various groups 
under Ottoman rule.64
Legacies o f the Habsburg empire. Like the Ottoman empire, the Habsburg 
empire was significantly economically underdeveloped compared to the rest of 
Western Europe, and differential levels of internal economic diversity and 
development plagued the empire.65 Indeed, the fact that various parts of the empire 
were economically out of phase with each other exacerbated internal tensions.66 
However, unlike the Ottoman empire, the structural legacy of the Habsburg empire 
was different and more varied. Economically, the Hapsburg empire had a weak and 
dependent peasantry alongside a powerful aristocracy with tight economic and 
political control over the peasantry. Farmers were a weak social class, dominated by 
the nobility or a growing merchant and industrial class. However, while their social 
structures differed from the Ottoman empire, the successor states of the Habsburg
62 Keyder, pp. 33-34.
63 Barkey, p. 102.
64 Keyer, p. 32.
65 Allcock, pp. 28 and 53. Allcock discusses some aspects of Ottoman and Habsburg history 
throughout his first chapter. John Lampe also notes that the ‘fragmented borderlands’ that became 
Yugoslavia suffered from uneven development. Lampe, pp. 20-33.
66 Gyorgy Ranki, ‘On the Development of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’, in Economic 
Development in the Habsburg Monarchy, ed. John Komlos (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1983), p. 51.
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empire did share the similar economic legacy of a large peasantry and economically
f \ Iunderdeveloped towns, which stymied economic growth in the post-imperial period. 
Although the Habsburg lands were generally more prosperous than those of the 
Ottomans, like the Ottoman empire, the Habsburg empire suffered from uneven 
economic development. Rapid and uneven economic growth strengthened the hand of
social and nationalist movements against the centralising and the centripetal forces in
68the empire by weakening the bond between Vienna and the Habsburg periphery.
However, it is perhaps in its political legacy that the Habsburg empire differs 
most from the Ottoman empire. Unlike the Ottoman entity, the Habsburg empire 
never developed a strong, centralised bureaucratic state comparable in strength and 
reach. Instead, the Habsburg state competed for power with feudal institutions, such 
as the church or nobility. By 1867, when the dual monarchy came into being, a form 
of decentralisation was institutionalised in the Habsburg regions.69
Solomon Wank argues that the Compromise of 1867 which the Emperor 
Francis Joseph signed with the Hungarian oligarchy in order to secure Magyar loyalty 
to the empire was in essence a rearguard action to stem nationalism and an attempt at 
reform to appease it, noting ‘The compromise gave the empire a deceptive stability 
for fifty years, but at the price of alienating most of the Slavs, with the exception of 
the Poles’.70 Effectively, the Compromise ensured that the Habsburg state would 
retain a German imperial dynasty with a germanising imperial presence. However, by 
1867 the Compromise had weakened this ideal. Rather than ruling for all 
nationalities, the Compromise implied that the Habsburgs ruled in the name of the 
Germans and Hungarians rather than in the entire empire.71
The dual monarchy was viewed with suspicion and distrust by its Slavic 
subjects. Although the Compromise sought to stem Magyar nationalism, and to bind 
the core Magyar nation more firmly to the central state, the empire lost the loyalty of 
its peripheral Slavic regions. For example, in Croatia anti-dynastic sentiment was rife, 
along with the sentiment that the empire was anti-Slav, and that the emperor was
67 Barkey, pp. 101-102.
68 Solomon Wank, ‘The Habsburg Empire’, in eds. Karen Barkey and Mark Von Hagen, After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building the Soviet Union and Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg 
Empires (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 48.
69 Z.A.B Zeman, Twilight o f the Habsburgs: The Collapse o f the Austro-Hungarian Empire (London: 
Library of the 20th Century, 1971), p. 33.
70 Wank, p. 50.
71 Ibid., p. 51.
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German with a German understanding. Ultimately the policy was self-defeating as 
Slavic lands clamoured ever more loudly for national autonomy and equality of 
treatment.72 Thus the empire was deeply unstable beneath the surface after 1867. Its 
surface stability was not due to any sort of loyalty that its subjects to the empire, but 
rather the willingness of the empire to brutal suppress revolt through military means. 
However, despite the state’s willingness to use force against its subjects, the Slavic 
nationalities such as the Croats, Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes consistently sought to 
press their interests and gain recognition on the international stage, seeking 
independent representation at the international level, for example at the Second 
International, at international sports events, and in professional, scientific, and 
academic organisations.73 Thus these nationalities rejected the empire’s centralising 
tendencies and instead called for looser ties with the centre, including federalisation 
and national autonomy. With all of these countervailing tendencies, the Habsburg 
empire was, in the words of R.J.W. Evans, ‘a complex and subtly balanced organism, 
not a “state” but a mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterogeneous 
elements’.74 As a result, compared to the Ottoman empire, there was a much weaker 
statist tradition in the successor regions to the Habsburg empire.
Boundaries. These colonial legacies bequeathed a variety of challenges to 
both Yugoslav successor states which they never successfully overcame. First, as 
multicultural and multinational empires, both the Ottoman and the Habsburg systems 
of government created imperial boundaries which did not necessarily reflect 
population boundaries.75 Rather these were boundaries created by various wars and 
their subsequent treaty settlements, reflecting imperial priorities and historical 
compromises rather than national or ethnic boundaries. These boundaries later served 
to define, to a large extent, the borders of their postimperial states and which are not 
completely uncontested even after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.76
Migration and settlement policies. Second, colonial migration and settlement 
policies generated intercommunal difficulties that remained with the postimperial
72 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
73 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
74 Evans quoted in ibid., p. 50.
75 Although it is fair to say that state boundaries and population boundaries are rarely completely 
complementary.
76 For example, complaints about border issues remain, particularly with regards to the Serbs. For an 
example of their arguments, particularly with reference to the Badinter Arbitration Commission, see 
Peter Radan, ‘Yugoslavia’s Internal Borders as International Borders: A Question of Appropriateness’, 
East European Quarterly (June 1999).
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state. These policies include such tactics as settlement of non-native populations for 
the purposes of securing the state. For example, the migration and settlement of the 
Serbs in the Habsburg military frontier (the Militargrenze, or krajina) that is now part 
of Croatia was part of a strategy to secure the empire against foreign or Ottoman 
invasion.77 The area had a special status under the empire, including separate social 
structures. For example, the krajina had no feudal obligations and families living in 
the region preserved the zadruga, the extended family headed by a patriarch who was
no
under service obligations to the crown. However, the empire also used method of 
ensuring Croatian quiescence as these units could be used to quell any potential 
Croatian rebellions.
The empire used this ‘divide and conquer’ strategy with other nationalities as 
well. For example, Croatian units were sent to quash the Hungarian uprising against 
the empire in 1848.79 Thus the colonial policy of migration and settlement, as well as 
the strategic use of one nationality to police another to prevent rebellion against the 
imperial centre created long-term tensions between groups. For example, Istvan Deak 
notes that the Habsburg empire experienced significant alliance shifting among 
national groups for political advantage and to check and balance power, while 
Nachum Gross argues that the empire played off not only nationalities, but classes 
and economic interests to stay in power.80
Systems o f preferences. Third, imperial systems of preferences created the 
basis for historical cleavages between local populations. For example, the Ottoman 
empire offered inducements for assimilation and conversion to Islam. Indeed, huge 
numbers of peasants in Bosnia converted to Islam, an event that did not occur in any 
other Ottoman country.81 Thus, unlike the colonial practice active migration and 
large-scale settlement of another population on conquered territory, the Ottomans 
effectively tried to convert the sitting population. Most peasants converted for 
economic reasons—to escape feudal duties and tax burdens as well as to gain greater
77 Lampe, pp. 30-31.
78 Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History o f the Habsburg Officer Corps, 
1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 26.
79 Zeman, p. 26. Zeman notes that 200,000 Russian troops were used as well against the Hungarian 
rebellion in 1848.
80 Nachum Gross, ‘Austria-Hungary in the World Economy’, in Economic Development in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, ed. John Komlos (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 25; 
Deak, Beyond Nationalism, p. 50.
81 Avdo Sudeska, Bosnjaci u Osmanskoj Drzavi [trans.: Bosnians in the Ottoman State] (Sarajevo: 
Biblioteka Arabeska, 1995), p. 10.
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freedom within the empire. Other financial compensation to those who converted to 
Islam included rights to land ownership, changing the long-term landholding and 
development pattern of the lands under Ottoman control.83 In addition to financial 
advantages, conversion had social advantages, including prestige and opportunities to 
join the Ottoman ‘nomenklatura’.84
Multiple colonisations. Finally, a history of multiple colonisation complicated 
Yugoslav unity by developing competing sets of expectations in the postimperial 
republics of Yugoslavia. This was especially true with regards to expectations about 
the proper structure of the postimperial state and its relationship to subsidiary units. 
Ottoman rule was more highly centralised and created expectations about the role of a 
strong central state, while Habsburg rule was predicated on greater local self-
Of
government and autonomy, eschewing a strong central state. These differing 
interpretations of the role of the state created opposing political affinities toward 
centralisation that could not be reconciled. The centralising tendencies of both 
royalist Yugoslavia and socialist Yugoslavia faced significant challenges from the 
republics that were part of the Habsburg lands, who had experienced a higher degree 
of political autonomy under Habsburg rule.
As Stevan Pawlovitch argues, the Yugoslav state and Yugoslavism always 
had different meanings for its two largest groups, the Serbs and the Croats based on 
their differing imperial experiences:
In Serbia, which had emancipated itself from Ottoman rule, Yugoslavism was 
seen as a way of uniting all the dispersed Serbs into one unit built around 
Serbia. This could come about only after the empires had been destroyed, and 
on the understanding that all South Slavs would come together in the same 
independent state. A different conception was to be found in Habsburg-ruled 
Croatia, where it was realized that Croats had to combine with other South 
Slavs in the empire in order to gain more weight. That would be a union 
within a reorganized Habsburg monarchy.86
*2 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
83 Milica Z. Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering and the Struggle for Power’, Journal o f  
International Affairs, (Vol. 56, No 1,2002). Hereafter, ‘Demographic Engineering’.
84 Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahasi petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 
1670-1730 (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2004), pp. 193-198.
85 Barkey.
86 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, ‘Who is “Balkanizing” Whom? The Misunderstandings between the Debris 
of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West’, Daedalus (Vol. 123, March 1994).
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For example, other than the two core states of the Habsburg empire, Croatia’s
O '7
position within Austria-Hungary was that of the most privileged nationality. After 
the 1869 Nagodba, or compromise agreement between Hungary and Croatia, Croatia
go
gained increasing administrative authority and autonomy. During the unification of 
Yugoslavia after 1918, Croats clung to various aspects of the autonomy that they had 
gained under the Austro-Hungarian empire and protested against the new state’s 
centralising tendencies over a variety of issues, including currency conversion, the 
assessment of land taxes, the re-imposition of corporal punishment on peasants 
(which was banned under Austria-Hungary in 1867), and draft-animal registration,
OQ
which provoked a serious revolt against the new central bureaucracy. Thus the 
Yugoslav republics’ understandings and expectations of the proper role of the state— 
especially the state’s level of centralisation and control—were highly coloured by 
their imperial experiences and became highly contested.
(b) Incomplete Transition—Yugoslavia and political factors
As we discussed in Chapter 5, perhaps the single most important political marker for 
potential conflict is regime type. In particular, partial democracies and democratising 
states have the highest potential for conflict of all regime types since their political 
systems contain conflicting democratic and autocratic tendencies which are 
fundamentally unstable and subject to political reversals, coups, and revolutions. 
Yugoslavia was one such state, by 1990 containing republics and provinces with 
differential levels of democratisation within a federal system that was partially 
democratising: effectively the system was one of partial democracies existing within 
a partial democracy. This system had some hallmarks of democracy, such as 
movement towards free elections in some of the republics, while maintaining 
autocratic features, such as a non-independent judiciary or a muzzled press.90
After the death of Tito in 1980, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
(LCY) still held a monopoly on political power throughout the federal system and the
87 Robert A. Kaon, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Return in the Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1848-1918, ‘Vol. 1: Empire and Nationalities’ (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1950), p. 233.
88 Ibid.
89 Banac, pp. 214-225 and 248-249.
90 For example, by 1990, Slovenia and Croatia had held free elections. However, the judiciary and 
press remained non-independent.
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republics. The party monopolised the selection and appointment of all cadres, 
including those in the federal power structure, the agricultural communes, and in 
industry. However, there was widespread latent opposition to the party’s monopoly 
on power that the party formally silenced.91 However, partly due to deteriorating 
economic circumstances from the middle of the 1980s, Yugoslavia experienced a 
trend towards political pluralisation which influenced the political process and eroded 
the power of the communist party. In addition to overt political movements, civil 
institutions such as scientific and artistic associations clamoured for greater political 
space.92 Many of these organisations vociferously lobbied for the end of the 
communist hold on power; a variety of strikes, protests, demonstrations were held
Q-2
throughout Yugoslavia in the late 1980s to that effect. These protests underscored 
the party’s waning authority and influence throughout Yugoslavia.
However, pluralisation was not uniform across republics. In 1989, both the 
Slovene and Croatian communist parties came to accept pluralisation as part of the 
political scene and began several fundamental institutional changes to the operation 
of the political system in these republics. These changes included the legitimisation of 
opposition parties and the movement towards democratic elections. Although the 
communist party in these republics struggled to preserve the status quo and their 
privileged status within the political system, by the spring of 1990 both Slovenia and 
Croatia had held free multi-party elections which swept the communists from power.
The communist parties in these republics lost their mass electoral bases, and 
many former communist party members joined new parties, highlighting the weak 
ideological attraction of the party. As Vladimir Goati notes, ‘For many in the 
[communist] party apparatus, their party function served largely as a convenient way 
to live well without working or investing any personal capital.’94 However, the 
newly-election opposition party leaderships did not necessarily share true 
‘democratic’ tendencies, and purged those who opposed them, as the communists had
91 Marko Veselica, ‘The Croatian National Question: Yugoslavia’s Achilles Heel’, trans. M.M. 
Me§trovi<5 (London: United Publishers, 1980), p. 24. MagaS’ book also discusses the latent opposition 
to the party throughout the 1990s.
92 On the cultural aspects of resistance to communism in Yugoslavia, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Social 
Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning o f the Great Transformation (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1991).
93 Vladimir Goati, ‘The Challenge of Post-Communism’, in The Tragedy o f Yugoslavia: The Failure o f  
Democratic Transformation, eds. Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
1993), pp. 4-6.
94 Ibid, pp. 7-12. The quote is on p. 12.
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done previously.95 Thus while these republics did have free multi-party elections, 
their democratisation was incomplete and they maintained authoritarian tendencies 
with respect to other branches of government, the economy, and the press.
At the same time, other republics resisted democratisation. Serbia, with some 
support from the other republics, strongly opposed the multi-party elections in 
Slovenia and Croatia, and resisted a change to a multi-party system in Serbia itself. In 
December 1990 the Serbian communist party relented and also held multi-party 
elections. However, unlike in the other two republics, Serbian opposition parties had 
little access to the media and called for a boycott of the election. They dropped their 
boycott and lost soundly; the communists (renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia) won 
77 per cent of assembly seats. Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
also held multi-party elections in November and December 1990. In Macedonia and 
Montenegro, the communist parties did well. In Montenegro, they won a 66 per cent 
majority in the assembly; in Macedonia, they formed a coalition with the Macedonian 
nationalists. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the party effectively eliminated.96
Thus the other republics of Yugoslavia were also partial democracies. While 
they held multi-party elections, these were not necessarily free or fair. The 
communists held a firm grip on political power in both Serbia and Montenegro, and 
were still significant political players in Macedonia. All republican institutions still 
had varying authoritarian tendencies, without an independent judiciary or a free press.
At the same time that the republics were partial democracies, the federal 
system itself could be seen as a form of partial democracy. After Tito’s death, the 
system was headed by an eight-man presidency, with each republic and province 
(Vojvodina and Kosovo) given a voice within it. (The communist party presidency 
had a ninth member, a representative of the JNA). Each republican or provincial 
representative remained responsible to his republican or provincial assembly. The 
representatives were all formally equal and the presidency rotated among them. The 
rotating presidium was created in order to foster consensual government—no single 
republic could dominate the federal system. In effect, it was a means of assuring some
95 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
96 Jim Seroka, ‘Variation in the Evolution of Yugoslav Communist Parties’, in eds. Seroka and 
Pavlovic, pp. 82-85.
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democratic voice for the smaller republics albeit within the context of one-party 
control of the system. However, the consensual nature of the system failed in 1991.97
This system of partial republican democracies within a partial federal 
democracy suggested the potential for significant instability and conflict within the 
state.
(c) Dolce Far Niente—Yugoslavia and economic factors
‘[T]here was no country like Yugoslavia, in which one could live so 
well while working so little. ’
—Zarko Puhovski98
Economist Marko Veselica once said, ‘The problem of the relationship between the 
nations and republics in Yugoslavia is primarily a question of their economic 
relationship’.99 As we discussed in Chapter 5, there are several economic markers that 
suggest the potential for conflict. These include: 1) conflicting state spending and 
redistribution priorities, 2) the hidden financial subsidies that remittances represent to 
the state, and 3) differential integration into the world economy between the 
Yugoslav republics.
State spending and redistribution. The question of economic development and 
internal resource allocation plagued Yugoslavia from its inception as a kingdom and 
continued under socialist Yugoslavia. Royal Yugoslavia saw discord over differential 
tax policies between republics; socialist Yugoslavia saw protests among the more 
developed republics against what they saw as ‘excessive’ transfers of capital 
investment to the underdeveloped republics.100
Since socialist Yugoslavia was from its inception conceptualised as a 
multinational state, the republics adopted strategies that may have been more 
appropriate to sovereign states than to a federal state system; the Yugoslav system 
was filled with redundancies and inefficiencies because each republic wanted to 
pursue its own form of economic development.101 During the takeoff stage of
97 Maga§.
98 Puhovski, p. 128.
99 Veselica, p. 5.
100 On this issue in royalist Yugoslavia, see Banac. On this issue in the 1960s and 1970s, see Veselica, 
p. 5, and Rusinow. For the 1980s to 1991, see Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 
1961-1991, especially Chapters 8 and 10; and Ramet, Balkan Babel.
101 Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995). See also, Pedro Ramet, Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview
235
Chapter 6
1
industrialisation in the 1960s Yugoslavia grew substantially. However, this rapid
growth was replaced by stagnation and lost opportunities, as the federal state was
burdened with centralised distribution and the financing of the underdeveloped
republics. For example, by 1980 about 2.5 per cent of Yugoslav national income was
redistributed to underdeveloped regions, encouraging ‘chronic dependency’ in
inefficient industries. This system of redistribution was prone to what Veselica terms
an ‘ingrained parasitism’ that generates conflicts over the division of income between
the republics and the federal state, as well as over each republic’s fair share of 
10^development income. Thus instead of investing in those areas that had the greatest 
potential for economic growth, political priorities determined economic ones, further 
undermining economic growth, ingraining economic dependencies, and stoking inter­
republican resentment.
One significant problem was that the republics received funds from the federal 
sector without supervision or accountability for the results. Thus they could choose 
their development priorities without regard for their return on investment. These 
transfers of economic assistance generated huge imbalances and perverse economic 
incentives, especially since some republics received more in aid than their entire 
GDP. For example, Montenegro received approximately four times the amount in 
federal development transfers than it produced in its own economy.104 By the late 
1980s, economic redistribution to the poorer and more underdeveloped republics had 
become a mainstay of Slovenian, and to a somewhat lesser extent Croatian, 
opposition to the centralised state, and calls for a confederalist alternative.105
Remittances as a hidden export. Another factor that is a potential marker for 
conflict is expatriate remittances. Remittances are now second only to foreign direct 
investment as a source of external funding for states.106 Remittances reflect a hidden 
export asset to the state as well as a form of indirect financing, especially in states
Press, 1985), Chapter 8, for a discussion of some of the political considerations in economic 
development in Yugoslavia.
102 For a discussion of Yugoslav economic growth in that period, see Rusinow, especially Chapters 4 
and 5.
103 Veselica, p. 25.
104 Ibid.
105 Ramet notes, per Steven Burg, that in the early 1980s there were fundamentally three Yugoslav 
Central Committee leadership ‘tendency groupings’ that were significantly based on economic 
affinities: confederalists (Slovenes, Croats, and those from Vojvodina); ideological conservatives 
(military and those from the underdeveloped regions); and liberal reformers (mainly economists and 
those from the Belgrade party organization). See Ramet, Yugoslavia in the 1980s, p. 156.
106 World Bank, ‘Worker’s Remittances’, Global Development Finance (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2003).
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with fixed official exchange rates. They also provide greater financial independence 
from the state to those groups (and republics) receiving remittance payments. Indeed, 
despite its relatively small population Yugoslavia became one of the major labour- 
exporting countries in the world. Due to the slow development of Croatia’s economy 
in the 1970s, the republic was not able to provide adequate employment for its 
workforce, and a high rate of emigration from the republic followed.
With high emigration came a high rate of remittances. From 1977-1989 
average remittances for Yugoslavia were worth $US 1.7 billion per year, hitting a 
peak worth of about $US 2.4 billion in 1981, based on a migrant population of over
550,000 abroad, or an average of $US 3,090 worth of remittances per worker.107 This 
represents more than the average wage of Yugoslav workers at the time. Even in the 
1990s, Croatia was one of the world’s top 15 recipients of per capita remittances.108 
By the 1980s, Yugoslavia saw significant Kosovar Albanian emigration to the West 
and remittance payments back to Kosovo.
These remittance payments created a hidden financing engine both for the 
territories concerned (Croatia and Kosovo) as well as for the federal state, as fixed 
foreign exchange rates were set fairly low by the state central bank.109 This amounted 
to enormous transfer of undocumented income to the state that acted as a hidden 
export. Additionally, the remittance income that Croatia and Kosovo received 
allowed both to be less dependent on the overall Yugoslav economy.
Differential trade openness. Trade openness and integration into the world 
economy are indicators of stability in states, while lack of trade and lack of economic 
freedom suggest instability. The republics of Yugoslavia had a differential rate of 
integration into the global economy and thus each region had separate dependencies 
on the federal state. For example, high income agricultural areas like Vojvodina had 
significant trade dependencies on national (Yugoslav) markets and a low dependency 
on extra-regional markets, whereas high income industrialised areas like Slovenia had 
significant exports, a higher integration with the world economy, and a lower
107 Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Robert de Rezende Rocha, ‘Determinants of Expatriate Workers’ 
Remittances in North Africa and Europe’, World Bank Working Papers, WPS 1038 (November 1992), 
table 1, p. 16.
108 Peter Gammeltoft, ‘Remittances and other Financial Flows to Developing Countries’, CDR 
Working Paper 02.11 (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, August 2002), table 3, p. 13.
109 Veselica, p. 27.
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dependence on regional or national markets.110 These differences in dependence on 
global trade created differing priorities and tensions between the regions.
Additionally, trade and integration in the global economy—especially 
imports—also caused problems for the federal state. Individual republics were 
allowed to run deficits in order to import capital goods at artificially subsidised 
foreign exchange rates which encouraged the waste of resources and added to inter­
republican tensions since these policies did not provide incentives for those who 
generated wealth and instead encouraged the importation of goods on items that could 
be sold profitably internally. The importation of foreign licenses and patents at 
artificially low prices killed off internal innovation and created a large balance of 
payments problem. By 1980, Yugoslavia’s trade deficit stood at about $US 6.5 
billion, and by 1988 it had accumulated a further $US 20 billion in debt—the highest 
per capita foreign debt in Europe—requiring repayments at high interest with hard 
currency earnings.111 As Goati argues, these difficult economic pressures created a
119zero-sum game for the republics.
All of these difficulties suggested that by the 1980s, Yugoslavia was in deep 
economic crisis. Indeed, Yugoslavia stopped publishing details of the country’s 
current account due to its poor economic performance.
(d) Fearing the Future—Yugoslavia and demographic change
As we outlined in Chapter 5, demographic factors may play a role in conflict. Such 
factors as agrarian expansion, urbanisation, youth bulges, or migration across borders 
may be markers for future conflict as demography shifts the relative balance of 
numerical power between groups. Additionally, long-term trends such as natality 
rates can have an effect on perceptions of the viability of group power as groups see 
their potential role within the state changing as a result of demographic shifts. In 
terms of conflict markers, by the 1980s Yugoslavia saw several demographic shifts:
1) rapid urbanisation, 2) youth bulges among the Muslim (especially Kosovar 
Albanian) population and high natality rates among Kosovars, and 3) significant
110 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Political Economy o f Discontinuous Development: Regional 
Disparities and Inter-Regional Conflict (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 161.
111 Veselica, p. 27. See also Library of Congress, Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: 
Federal Research Division, December 1990). Available at http://www.country-data.com/cgi- 
bin/query/r-14752.html
112 Goati, p. 19.
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migration across borders out of Yugoslavia and to Western Europe or North America, 
especially by Croats and Albanians in search of economic opportunities abroad.
Urbanisation. A variety of scholars have commented on the rural-urban divide
11^in Yugoslavia and its divisive effects. First, Yugoslavia experienced rapid 
urbanisation from 1948-1981. In the span of a generation, Yugoslavia went from a 
largely rural population to a largely urban one, thanks to rapid industrialisation and 
economic development during that period. In the aftermath of World War II, 
Yugoslavia’s agrarian population stood at 73 per cent. By 1981, that figure stood at 
27 per cent; indeed, the urban population increased by 80 per cent between 1953 and 
1971.114 Thus approximately two-thirds of previously agrarian households had moved 
to the cities in just over 20 years. This form of rapid modernisation created significant 
social dislocation, and dislocated and marginalised groups new to urban areas 
developed ethnic group solidarities and in-group preferences which Xavier Bougarel 
argues were used either ‘to take over parts of the state apparatus (e.g., Krajina’s Serbs 
in the Croatian police), to facilitate their migration abroad (Herzegovinian Croats in 
North America and Sandjak’s Muslims in Germany), or to control different activities 
linked with organized crime’.115
Youth bulge and differential natality rates. Second, by the 1980s, while most 
Yugoslav nationalities were experiencing a ‘baby bust’ and falling natality rates, the 
Muslim populations of Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo, experienced a youth bulge 
and rising birth rates, which Milica Bookman calls a ‘passive pronatalist policy’ that 
has existed for decades among the Albanians of Kosovo and FYROM, resulting in the 
highest population growth rates in Europe. In comparison with other Yugoslavs, by 
1990 Kosovar Albanians were increasing at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. In 
comparison, the numbers of Croats were increasing at a rate of 0.4 percent. The 
birthrate among Kosovars was 30.4 (per 1,000 population) compared to 15.3 (per
1,000 population) in the rest of Yugoslavia. By 1990, the Serbian birth rate dropped 
to 11.4 percent, while that of the Croats stood at 12.5 percent, Muslims at 18.4 
percent, and Kosovar Albanians at 28.8 percent. Thus, by 1990 the Muslim
113 See, for example, Allcock, especially Chapter 12; Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody 
Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995); and 
Mueller, ‘The Banality of Ethnic Conflict’. Mueller underscores the rural-urban divide in the 
generation o f conflict in Yugoslavia.
114 Statistics from Bougarel, ‘Yugoslav Wars’, and Library of Congress, Yugoslavia: A Country Study.
115 Bougarel.
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populations of Yugoslavia had at least a 50 per cent higher natality rate than the two 
largest constituent national groups of Yugoslavia.116
Emigration. Third, from the 1970s onward, Yugoslavia saw significant 
emigration from Croats to the West, many to work abroad as guest workers. By 1980, 
one economist estimated that more than 50 per cent of all Yugoslav economic 
migrants were Croats from Croatia, and most migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 1  n
were also Croats. This migration hid a significant unemployment and 
underemployment problem in Yugoslavia. It was estimated that if the approximately
500,000 Croats who lived in Western Europe would have returned to seek 
employment in Yugoslavia, about 40 per cent of Croatia’s population would have 
been unemployed.118 By the 1980s, Kosovar Albanians became the most numerous 
group to emigrate abroad and seek economic opportunities.
These shifting demographics created social tensions in Yugoslavia. As Milica 
Bookman argues, there is a positive link between economic power and relative 
population size within states across a variety of parameters including ethnic 
heterogeneity as well as type of political organisation and governance. Therefore, 
groups may compete to boost their numbers, as these then can be turned into demands 
for tangible benefits from the state. The various economic rewards to greater 
population size are impressive. They include: 1) access to scarce resources and access 
to the state; 2) input into policymaking and the ability to make demands that benefit 
the group; and 3) greater allocation of economic favours and patronage, including 
access to job opportunities, favourable workplace siting, access to educational 
opportunities and training slots.119 Population size important is also important in 
determining a group’s social and economic status within the state, so demography is 
politicised, since what is at stake includes a dominant group’s hold on power.
Bookman notes that groups may insist on three types of demands from the 
state as their numbers increase, which can reflect group size and implicate group 
loyalty to the state. These are: 1) cultural rights, such as insisting on native language 
schooling or rights to religious observance; 2) greater integration into the state 
decision-making process, such as demands for equal rights with the majority or the 
largest group; and 3) the right to autonomy, self-determination, or secession from the
116 Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering’.
117 Veselica, p. 6.
118 Ibid., p. 26.
119 Bookman, ‘Demographic Engineering’.
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state.120 These demands create pressures on powerful groups, who may then fear for 
their continuing future in the state and may seek to reinforce their hold on state 
power.
6.4 Traitors All?—An analysis of exit, voice, and loyalty in
Yugoslavia
‘A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot 
survive treason from within. ’
—Cicero121
Based on our examination of structural factors, we see that several conflict markers 
were present in Yugoslavia. These include a history of different multiple colonisation 
which bequeathed different institutional legacies to the republics; partial 
democratisation with residual authoritarian tendencies in all of the republics; 
republican tensions over state spending and distribution policies, hidden financing 
from expatriate remittances, and differential regional integration into the global 
economy; as well as a shifting demographic pattern. If we examine Yugoslavia from 
the perspective of Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework, we see that many of 
these structural factors suggest that each republic would have a different pattern of 
loyalty to the federal state, which suggests that there would be no uniform republican 
choice between exit and voice if the state deteriorated. We will examine each of these 
structural categories to see how they might bias the choice between exit and voice for 
the three largest and wealthiest republics: Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia.
Differing institutional legacy o f colonialism. The legacy of colonialism in 
Yugoslavia varied depending on whether the territory in question was part of the 
Habsburg or Ottoman lands. One key difference between the two empires was the 
strength of the central state and the autonomy of the territories under imperial rule. 
Lands under Ottoman rule experienced significantly more state central control than 
Habsburg areas; the Habsburg empire was centrally weaker and devolved 
significantly more authority to its subsidiary units.
Both Croatia and Slovenia experienced greater autonomy under colonial rule, 
thus their pattern of loyalty to a central state was weak, instead loyalty resided
120 Ibid.
121 Speech in the Roman Senate.
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primarily with the local authority. After Serbian independence from the Ottoman 
empire, the Serbs followed Ottoman institutional patterns in that they created a strong 
central state. Thus the Serbian locus of loyalty lay with central authority. After the 
creation of Yugoslavia, the three main republics had differing institutional 
expectations about the role of a central state, and had a differing pattern of loyalty to 
it based on their colonial experiences. These patterns of loyalty to a central state 
remained in the second Yugoslavia, suggesting that the republics would have 
differing responses to the deterioration of the central state: while the Serbs were 
likely to support the central state (at least at first) and choose voice (dissent), Croatia 
and Slovenia were more likely to choose the exit option.
Partial democratisation. Each republic and province experienced a different 
level of democratisation during the late 1980s suggesting a differing level of loyalty 
to the central state. The move towards pluralism throughout Yugoslavia in the 1980s 
suggests that the entire system was under considerable pressure and that the first line 
of defence to stem deterioration would be the voice option: great political pluralism. 
However pluralism was experienced differently in the republics. The Croatian and 
Slovenian communist parties collapsed to be replaced with ruling opposition parties 
who were less loyal to the central state. This suggests that these two republics were 
seeking a path of at least partial exit from the federal system. On the other hand, the 
success of communist rule in Serbia after elections suggested a continuing loyalty to a 
central state and the pursuit of the voice option (at least initially).
These patterns fit with ones seen in the 1970s. After the Croatian Spring of 
1971 which saw huge protests, strikes, and demonstrations in Croatia in favour of 
greater decentralisation of the federal state, 32,000 people were arrested, dismissed 
from their jobs, interrogated, or persecuted.122 Additionally, the federal state used 
other forms of punishment to quash political dissent. In 1980, the central state still 
held political trials; tortured political prisoners; denied dissidents employment, the 
right to travel, or the right to leave; and subjected them to continued police 
harassment. These tactics had a chilling effect on those opposed to the system of 
federal rule, denying the state the benefits of dissent in stemming institutional 
deterioration. Indeed, Croatia was known as ‘the silent republic’ from the 1970s 
onwards. It also rewarded those elements within the republic most loyal to the central
122 On the Croatian Spring, see Rusinow, especially Chapter 7; on the numbers arrested, etc., see 
Veselica, p. 12.
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state. In Croatia, it de-legitimated the voice option for the majority altogether, 
reinforcing its latent tendencies towards favouring exit.
Additionally, Tito’s Karadjoijevo coup against the liberals in the Serbian 
communist party in 1971—as a parallel purge of Serbs that occurred after the purge 
of Croats following the Croatian Spring—eliminated all progressive forces with the 
LCY ruling structure, denied internal dissent, and reinforced those sectors of the party 
most loyal to the central state.123 Instead of open dissent, the Yugoslav system 
legitimated exile (exit) for dissenters, as in Latin America. Those who were 
disgruntled with the political system or could not find employment within Yugoslavia 
did not necessarily dissent; they voted with their feet and left for the West. While in 
the short term this provided the state with a safety valve for the discontented and gave 
the state the economic benefit of remittances, in the long term it eroded the loyalty of 
many groups to the central state, as well as those republics receiving the most benefit 
from remittances who had an independent source of income. Those groups and 
republics that did not depend as heavily on the overall health of the Yugoslav 
economy—like Croatia—could rely on their own resources rather than seek to reform 
the state. This diminished the appeal of the voice option and instead reinforced the 
likelihood that these sectors of society would prefer the exit option.
Economic factors. Different priorities for federal spending, the role of 
remittances, and differences between the republics in their integration in the global 
economy meant that they had different patterns of loyalty to the central state. These 
varying loyalties suggested that they were more likely to choose one option over the 
other. For example, those republics that were contributing the most to the federal 
budget were likely to be less loyal to the central state as they were not reliant on 
continuing access to federal development funds for their economies. Thus Slovenia 
and Croatia had a lower loyalty to the state than republics like Montenegro which 
received significant development aid.
The role of remittances also had differential effects on the loyalty that the 
republics would have to the state. For example, high rates of emigration to the West 
and remittances from expatriate Croatians to Croatia (and later expatriate Kosovar 
Albanians to Kosovo) lowered the loyalty of these sectors of Yugoslav society as they
123 Ibid.
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had financial resources that were independent from the continuing economic success 
and development of the Yugoslav state.
Finally, varying levels of integration into the global economy changed the 
level of loyalty to the central state. Those regions that had a high level of integration 
and had successful export sectors, such as Slovenia, had a degree of financial 
independence from the state and thus less loyalty to a central state. These factors 
indicate that the exit option was more viable in those republics or provinces with a 
lesser reliance on the central state for financing.
Demographic shifts. Lastly, changing demographic patterns suggested that the 
existing patterns of loyalty to the central state could shift in the future as different 
groups increase and demand access to the state and its resources. Different republics 
(or groups within republics) would be expected to have a varying level of loyalty to 
the central state in the future as their influence increased or decreased with their 
numbers, and hence potential power status within the state. Urbanisation, differing 
natality rates, and emigration had an impact on loyalty to the state.
Invariably, urbanisation leads to the social dislocation of people accustomed 
to an agrarian life who find themselves living in an urban setting. This dislocation 
often leads them to seek solidarities among those similar to themselves, relying on 
kin or extended family networks rather than on formal state institutions, and thus 
place less loyalty in the central state. The high Muslim natality rate in Yugoslavia led 
to changing calculations about loyalty to a central state especially among the Serbs. 
High birth rates among Kosovars led them to demand greater access to the state. 
However, this threatened the long-term viability of the Serbs in Kosovo. This factor 
had a negative effect on Serbian loyalty to the central state in the long run, as they 
withdrew their loyalty to the state as they saw their position erode within it.
Finally, the effects of migration suggested differing patterns of loyalty to the 
state among those groups who had a high rate of migration to the West. Yugoslavia’s 
liberal emigration policy acted as a safety valve for dissidents and the unemployed, 
who were allowed to leave to seek employment elsewhere, mainly in the West. 
However, the price of this policy was a long-term loss of loyalty among those groups, 
as well as among their dependents who received remittances in Yugoslavia. Their 
economic independence from the state allowed them to look less to the state as the 
guarantor of their economic future and more to own resources, which made the exit 
option more viable. Some of these main points are summarised in the table below:
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Table 6.1: Structural Factors and Impact on Loyalty to the Central State
Croatia Serbia Slovenia
Colonial
institutional
expectations
- + -
Results of partial 
democratisation
- + -
State spending 
policies
- Neutral -
Effect of 
remittances
- Neutral Neutral
Integration into 
world economy
- + -
Urbanisation Neutral
Natality rates Neutral _ Neutral
Emigration Neutral Neutral
Key: (+) indicates factor increases loyalty to the central state
(-) indicates factor decreases loyalty to the central state
As we can see from this brief analysis, structural factors were likely to have a 
negative impact on both Slovenian and Croatian loyalties to a central state while 
several factors favoured continued Serbian loyalty to a federal system. This suggests 
that both Croatia and Slovenia would likely have chosen the exit option over voice, 
while Serbia would have favoured voice, at least in the beginning, in a bid to reform 
or restructure the central state. Our brief examination of the role of exit, voice, and 
loyalty on these structural factors shows the incompatibilities between the republics 
of Yugoslavia, the impact these differences seemed to have on their respective 
loyalties to the central state, and thus the likelihood that one option would be seen as 
preferable over another. Therefore, merely a brief consideration of these factors 
points to significant potential for situationally-based conflict regardless of specifically 
‘cultural* or ‘ethnic’ dispositions. In effect, each of these three republics was deeply
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dissatisfied with the central state and the federation as it existed in irreconcilable 
ways.124
6.5 Romantic Illusions—Conclusion
‘Against today’s journalistic commonplace about the Balkans as the 
madhouse o f thriving nationalism one must point out again and again 
that the moves o f every political agent in ex-Yugoslavia, reprehensible 
though they may be, are totally rational within the goals they want to 
attain. The only exception, the only truly irrational factor in it, is the 
West babbling about archaic ethnic passions. ’
—Slavoj Zizek125
‘Analysis o f the Balkan wars o f this decade has for too long been 
characterized by simplistic generalizations and sweeping judgments 
about the character and mentality o f entire peoples, generalizations 
that would hardly be accepted anywhere else in the world. ’
—Sergio Vieira de Mello126
If we compare and contrast Romantic and structural interpretations of the conflict in 
Yugoslavia, we see that Romantic Zeitgeist significantly privileges dispositional 
factors that are presumed to exist in the various Yugoslav nationalities. Many of these 
character traits are simply repetitions of negative stereotypes about the ‘nature’ of the 
Balkans that Westerners have shared for centuries. These stereotypes include 
Romantic images of a ‘Wild Europe’ filled with barbaric and atavistic tribes who 
behave based on irrational and often violent impulses. Other aspects of the Romantic 
mood in operation in interpretations of the Yugoslav conflict include a sense of 
pessimism about the region; a nostalgia either for the deep past or for the Yugoslav 
state; and expressions of relativism—both cultural (as a motivating factor for conflict) 
and moral (as a response to the perceived immutable barbarity of the ‘tribes’.
Near the beginning of the war in Yugoslavia, Zizek reminded his Western 
audience that the war was rationally based; the real irrationality was the Western 
penchant for dispositional thinking about Yugoslavia. Zizek’s argument lost the day. 
Six years later, Vieira de Mello chided the West’s over its continuing ‘simplistic 
generalisations and sweeping judgements about character’ that verged on racism.
124 Cviic.
125 Slavoj Ziiek, ‘Ethnic Dance Macabre’, The Guardian, Manchester (28 August 1992).
126 Vieira de Mello quoted in International Herald Tribune (25 August 1998). Cited in Gallagher, p. 1. 
de Mello was UN chief spokesman on Kosovo, 1998-1999.
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Despite such cautions, these perspectives persist. Such interpretations rely on various 
Romantic strains of thinking about the world, including a belief that irrational forces 
fundamentally drive decisionmaking, that decisions are mainly based on one’s 
relativistic cultural attributes, and that such attributes themselves are based on a 
particular definable ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ that flows in the blood of a people. 
Inevitably these views are both pessimistic and nostalgic; pessimistic in the sense that 
they despair of ever ‘fixing’ the ‘atavistic tribes’ since their problems are in the 
blood, and nostalgic for some ideal time before the ‘irrationality’ of their parochial 
disputes.
The assertion of the primacy of irrational motivations in the Yugoslav wars 
often leads observers to confuse brutality with irrationality. In that sense conflict 
becomes almost a biological act, and those closest to the primitive state of man are 
most likely to engage in it. As Barbara Ehrenreich has argued, war has primal roots 
which seem closer to the surface in some societies, like Bosnia; these are interstingly
1 97absent in Western wars. In a similar vein, the Yugoslav wars become about the
17 $‘sacred’, about honour, about keeping face, as Michael Ignatieff has maintained. It 
is a short trip from these relativistic positions to arguing, as John Keegan has, that 
such ‘irrational’ wars, primitive wars, based on ethnic hatred are essentially 
apolitical.129 Or, as van Creveld would perhaps argue, they are non-trinitarian (non- 
Clausewitzian); in van Creveld’s view they are fought by people, rather than armies.
Significantly, Romantic views are often ascribed to other societies rather than 
our own—we recognise our own conflicts as interest-based, political, and rational. 
One of the problems underpinning these understandings may be the conventional 
moral reasoning that is applied to others in such situations. For example, if rationality 
is the ‘good’, and violence is the ‘bad’, then it must also be ‘irrational’ (which is also 
the ‘bad’). The utility of violence is lost in the rush to judge it; violence and 
irrationality become conflated. Significantly, such reasoning may lie in a dispositional 
understanding of conflict and may rely heavily upon the heuristic of surface 
commonalities (or mere appearance) and salience. Salience—or the prominence of 
one obvious characteristic—is the basis of the outsider’s judgement. Looking from 
the outside in with little prior understanding, salience leads the viewer to attribute
127 Barbara Ehrenreich, Blood Rites: Origins and History o f the Passions o f War (New York, NY: 
Metropolitan Books/ Henry Holt & Company, 1997).
128 Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor.
129 John Keegan, A History o f Warfare (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994).
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causality to the most dominant characteristic, often erroneously. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, differences in culture and ethnicity were prominent, and it was a short 
leap of logic to see these salient characteristics as the most causal. However, the 
salience of ethnic differences not only led observers to incorrect conclusions about 
the reasons for conflict—as various structural factors underscore—it also primed 
them towards prejudice and stereotyping.
However, if we compare dispositional judgements with a structural 
perspective which privileges situational factors (and disregards the salience of 
dispositional traits), we see that conflict markers—that is, certain variables present 
that may make a polity more prone to conflict—highlight rational incompatibilities 
between groups that serve as a basis for grievance, regardless of cultural dispositions 
or other issues of identity coming inexorably into play. If we then examine some of 
these factors within the structure of Hirschman’s exit-voice-loyalty framework, we 
see that these structures can either enhance or erode groups’ loyalties to the state, and 
thus make either voice or exit the preferable option under conditions of state decline. 
Thus a structural perspective—which examines issues from the perspective of 
participants—provides a corrective to the Romantic view.
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Chapter 7. Considering Phlebas—Romanticism and 
Declinism in International Relations
‘O you who turn the wheel and look to windward, /  Consider Phlebas, 
who was once handsome and tall as you. ’
—T.S. Eliot1
In the aftermath of World War I, Eliot penned his famous poem, ‘The Waste Land’.
In it, he depicts a modem nightmare: Western society as an arid, sterile Waste Land, a 
shell of its former self. Eliot’s world contains images that are by turns apocalyptic 
and fatalistically resigned, clearly pessimistic and declinist in nature. The underlying 
message is one of despair accompanied by wistfulness, a touch of nostalgia: the 
present world is a ruin, the best chance for redemption lies in the past. The work is a 
lament for the dying West, one which speaks to the uncertainties and pessimism of 
the 1990s and its Zeitgeist of Romanticism.
Yet with the US invasion of Iraq and America’s sometimes jingoistic, 
triumphalist rhetoric has the sense of decline been reversed? Is the Zeitgeist of 
Romanticism behind us? Although the Bush administration has certainly asserted its 
confidence in America’s ability to project power abroad in order to effectuate change, 
that optimism may be a veneer that hides much deeper social disquiet over the 
direction that the country is taking, both with respect to Iraq and more broadly at 
home. On the left, Iraq has been discussed as a ‘quagmire’.2 However, there is 
growing concern, even among Republicans, that US policy in Iraq is undermining US 
credibility and prestige in the world; there is growing friction in the Republican party 
ranks over Iraq. At a more grassroots level, groups like Republicans for Humility, 
with the motto ‘country before party’, have challenged the administration’s policies in 
Iraq.4
While party discord is one troubling issue for Bush, perhaps more problematic 
is that the American public has yet to be convinced of the long-term benefits of
1 T.S. Eliot, ‘The Waste Land’, IV. Death by Water, 320-321 (1922).
2 See, for example, Phyllis Bennis and Erik Leaver, ‘The Iraq Quagmire: The Mounting Costs of War 
and the Case for Bringing Home the Troops’, Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus 
(31 August 2005). Available at http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/quagmire/IraqQuagmire.pdf
3 Jill Lawrence, ‘Politicians across spectrum state their case on Iraq: Rumsfeld says the US must stay 
the course as lawmakers pitch own withdrawal plans’, USA Today (21 November 2005), p. 4A.
4 See their website at http://www.republicansforhumility.com/
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toppling Saddam Hussein. Public opinion polls underscore the growing sense of 
apprehension that Americans feel over America’s big adventure in Iraq. Americans 
have been coming to the view that the war with Iraq was a blunder, with 49-52 per 
cent saying that the war ‘was not worth fighting’ and 49-52 per cent saying that 
sending troops to Iraq was ‘a mistake’.5 More importantly, many Americans have 
concluded that there is no clear way forward: between 56-59 per cent did not believe 
that the administration had a plan for the future.6 Although Americans were more 
upbeat about the US making significant progress in restoring civil order and 
establishing democratic government in Iraq,7 they were divided about Iraq’s future 
stability, with only 50 per cent believing that Iraq will have a democratic government
Q
that will not be overthrown (47 per cent disagreed). As for America’s playing a 
positive role in the region, only 47 per cent believed that US actions would promote 
democracy in other Arab states (50 per cent disagreed).9
With a price tag of over $230 billion and counting, America’s ongoing 
stalemate in Iraq is unlikely to draw greater public support in future.10 Therefore, 
while the Bush administration has been extolling the virtues of its policies, the mood 
of the American public has been decidedly less triumphalist and more ambivalent. 
This is further reflected in the sense of decline that most Americans have expressed 
about their own society. The most popular rating of the Bush administration on a 
wide range of issues—health care, social security, the environment—is ‘poor’, 
including such crucial domestic leadership issues as disaster recovery from Hurricane 
Katrina.11
5 See Polling Report, NBC News/Wall Street Journal (9-12 December 2005), 49% ‘not worth it’; ABC 
News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 52% ‘not worth fighting’; Associated Press/Ipsos (13- 
15 December 2005), 49% ‘made a mistake in going to war in Iraq’; and CNN/USA Today/Gallup (16- 
18 December 2005), 52% ‘United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq’. In each case, the 
negative response was the most popular answer.
6 See Polling Report, CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (16-18 December 2005), 56% ‘no plan to achieve 
victory’; and ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005), 59% ‘no clear plan’.
7 See Polling Report, ABC News/Washington Post Poll (15-18 December 2005), 60% ‘making 
significant progress toward restoring civil order; and 65% ‘making significant progress in establishing 
a democratic government’.
8 See Polling Report, CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (16-18 December 2005).
9 See Polling Report, ABC News/Washington Post (15-18 December 2005).
10 Cost estimate provided by National Priorities Project, ‘Cost of War’. Available at 
http://nationalpriorities.org/index.php?option=com_wrapper&Itemid=182 The Center for American 
Progress estimates are slightly less, $220 billion. Available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ80VF&b=l 71440
11 John Kenneth White, ‘A Presidency on Life Support’, The Polling Report (10 October 2005).
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Therefore, Romanticism’s ‘moment’, although stronger in the 1990s, may not 
yet be spent. The sense of US domestic decline is still present. Globally, uncertainties 
brought on by the end of the Cold War have not yet been replaced with a perceptibly 
stable framework; American unipolarity—especially in its go-go neoconservative 
form—may be unstable since there is little US domestic consensus about the proper 
use of American power. The ongoing and costly American stalemate in Iraq is likely 
to restrain further imperial ambitions, not that a fickle American public has had any 
particular taste for empire, at least not for long. Therefore, the ‘architecture issue’ 
remains paramount and may be so for some time.
This declinist, pessimistic sensibility is a key mood, perhaps even ‘the’ key 
mood, of the Zeitgeist of Romanticism that came in the 1990s. An atmosphere of 
pessimism and decline can fuel religious fervour and emotionalism in the face of 
impending doom; drive nostalgic reappraisals of a mythical golden past; spur the 
replie-sur-soi mentality of cultural particularisms; and provoke disquieting questions 
about our ‘essential natures’. While the Romantic declinist mood has been present in 
Western culture since at least the nineteenth century, in the 1990s it bestrode the 
academic and policymaking communities like a colossus. As historian Arthur Herman 
points out, ‘while intellectuals have been [mistakenly] predicting the imminent 
collapse of Western civilisation for more than one hundred and fifty years, 
[declinism’s] influence has grown faster during that period than at any time in 
history’.12 Therefore, in this chapter, rather than recapping our arguments in previous 
chapters, we will offer some final reflections on Postmodern Romanticism and 
international relations, focusing especially on the pervasive mood of decline and 
tragedy that stalked the 1990s. In essence, we will finish this work where we initially 
began it in Chapter 1: with a short discursion on decline and declinism.
First, using part of Eliot’s ‘The Waste Land’ as a starting point, we will 
discuss how the pessimistic theme of decline, including the sense of tragedy within 
declinism—which is so pervasive in Romanticism—colours perceptions of 
international relations, particularly those about post-Cold War conflicts, including the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Second, we will offer some observations on the place 
and role of such declinist frameworks in international relations.
12 Arthur Herman, The Idea o f Decline in Western History (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1997), p.
1.
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7.1 Bones of Contention—Tragedy and conflict
‘A current under the sea /  Picked his bones in whispers ’
—T.S. Eliot13
In the fourth stave of ‘The Waste Land’—‘Death by Water’—Eliot tells the tale of 
Phlebas, a Phoenician sailor who has found his death by water, by drowning. The 
image seems to have been taken from Jessie Weston’s myth of the Fisher King, the 
king of the Waste Land, whose infirmity is a curse upon his land. In order to lift the 
curse and restore fertility to the land, a Romantic sacrifice must be made. Thus, old 
age, impotence, and sterility haunt the once-great kingdom. Only a worthy, youthful, 
and virile sacrifice can lift the curse or provide the blood atonement necessary to 
erase the King’s original sin. This is found in the body of Phlebas, the Phoenician 
sailor. Yet Phlebas dies; the currents ‘picked his bones in whispers’. He does not save 
the King; the land is not restored. His sacrifice is in vain.
Through the tale of the Fisher King, Eliot analogises the state of Western 
civilisation with that of the Fisher King’s Waste Land, a sterile land beset by a curse 
and the impotence of its leadership. He also plays on a biological and organic view of 
civilisation, where civilisation is part of a lifecycle: youth versus old age, fertility 
versus aridness and sterility, virility versus impotence. As with Phlebas, physical 
decay and death await the West; even a worthy sacrifice may not save our 
civilisation. Death and tragedy—Nietzsche’s ‘art of metaphysical comfort’—serve as 
the ultimate truth of life.
Yet is Phlebas purely a tragic figure? Our answer depends on whether we 
view him from a dispositional or a situational context. The conclusion that his act was 
tragic, and that Phlebas is therefore a tragic, pitiable, and fearful figure, can be most 
clearly seen in retrospect and only by the spectator. Fundamentally, the judgement 
that Phlebas is a tragic figure can be drawn mainly if we consider his act as deriving 
from his person (which we can argue is a Christian or modem view of tragedy), rather 
than from his situation (which is considered a Classical view of tragedy).14 In some
13 T.S. Eliot, ‘The Waste Land’, IV. Death by Water, 315-316 (1922).
14 Some scholars argue that a Classical view of tragedy arises mainly from the protagonist’s situation, 
in which he is caught up in an external evil, while the Christian (and often modem) view of tragedy 
involves the protagonist caught up in an evil of his own making, arising from his internal flaws. See 
Edward G. Ballard, ‘Sense of the Tragic’, in Dictionary o f the History o f Ideas: Studies o f Selected 
Pivotal Ideas, ed. Philip P Wiener (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974) Vol. 4, pp. 411-
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sense the tale of Phlebas is about how we attribute causes. For the modem spectator, a 
figure becomes tragic when we attribute causality to him primarily based on his 
character (dispositional factors) rather than to the environment or his circumstances 
(situational factors). Considering Phlebas is about recognising that error.
If we consider Phlebas’ predicament from the perspective of how we view 
conflict in international relations, we can see that Romantic (and often pessimistic) 
analyses of ‘exotic’ conflicts are often judgements about the unpleasant or at least 
different dispositional (cultural) factors of those involved in conflicts rather than 
analyses of their situations. At the same time, in our own Western conflicts, such as 
the war in Iraq, we recognise the situational factors that drive conflict and are less 
likely to attribute our motivations in conflict to cultural characteristics. Yet in the 
same way that Phlebas is not inherently tragic, conflict is not inherently tragic. 
Conflict viewed from the perspective of those involved is not necessarily futile, 
barbaric, or even tragic, but may be a deliberate act, or even a sacrifice for a group 
goal.
By emphasising the tragedy of conflict, which works on the spectator, rather 
than on the potential meaning of conflict for the actors, who often perceive that their 
actions are rational responses to their situation, we emphasise our standpoint as 
observers over theirs as participants. Additionally, the tragic perspective used as an 
observational standpoint instantly turns those engaged in conflict into either barbaric 
or pitiable figures, depending on whether they are aggressors (barbaric) or victims 
(pitiable). Acts that may seem tragic, meaningless, or barbaric to the spectator may be 
perfectly rational and meaningful to the actors themselves. These judgements—from 
tragedy, then to pity—may also leave the spectator with a sense of disgust: disgust at 
the actors and their situation, as long-term pity becomes inured to the seemingly 
unending and unresolved nature of the conflict and the repetitive images of suffering. 
Sometimes we refer to this sensibility politely as ‘compassion fatigue’, a sense of 
apathy or habitual indifference, but at its heart it betrays a harder core: disgust.15
When we consider the creation of metaphors and analogies used to analyse the 
conflict in former Yugoslavia and to make it more understandable to Western publics,
417. For a Christian interpretation of the poem, see Abby Reel, ‘A Wasteland for the Human and 
Divine: An Annotation of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, Part 4, “Death By Water’”, The American 
Poetry Web. Available at http://titan.iwu.edu/~wchapman/americanpoetryweb/ eliwasan.html
15 On the various stages of emotion that Western audiences and the media go through in reporting 
conflict, including the war in Yugoslavia, see Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media 
Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (New York, NY: Routledge, 19991), pp. 257-280 (Yugoslavia).
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we see the operation of a sense of tragedy from the perspective of the spectator. 
Therefore, we take the conflict for what it means for us, and not what it means for the 
actors, who become barbaric or pitiable, fearful, and potentially disgusting. The 
standpoint of tragedy, and the fear it generates, also serves to distance ‘us’ the 
spectators from ‘them’ the actors, insulating us from their perceived tragedy, 
preventing its spread from them to us, and preventing us from becoming pitiable 
ourselves. The contagion of their tragic misfortune is quarantined.
For the spectator/helmsmen, Phlebas thus remains a tragic cautionary tale of 
decline: we too can be brought low. Perhaps what is most interesting in this type of 
declinist reasoning is the unspoken reliance on the almost biblical concepts of 
contagion, pollution, and purification. Underlying all these concepts is a sense of fear. 
Again if we consider interpretations of conflict in international relations, pessimistic 
and declinist works rely on the idea of the fear of the spread of barbarism and the 
contagion of anarchy (invariably in the developing world) that have the potential to 
pollute or infect us, operating as a cautionary tale for the West.
For example, if we go back to the three authors we discussed in Chapter 3 as 
exemplars of the Romantic Zeitgeist in interpretations of conflict—Kaplan, 
Huntington, and van Creveld—we can argue that Kaplan’s perspective on Yugoslavia 
and other conflicts is a form of voyeuristic ogling at barbarism for the sake of 
introducing a morality tale for Westerners. In its telling, Kaplan betrays a sense of 
disgust—disgust at violence and the people caught up in it—based on a fear of 
contagion, a fear that we, too, in the West are not immune from these primitive forces 
and that we will be in turn corrupted and overwhelmed by them. Huntington’s clash 
of civilisations also has an undercurrent of fear of contamination, one in which a key 
role for core states is to dampen the contagion of extra-civilisational violence. For van 
Creveld, the spread of low-intensity conflict will corrupt and effectively end the 
modem, trinitarian state, reverting us to medieval times where ‘the lines between 
public and private, government and people, military and civilian, [...] become [...] 
blurred’.16
Romantic views seem to imply the operation of underlying theories of 
correspondences—a series of hidden but meaningful causal relationships—in these 
works. Theories of correspondences predate scientific thinking and are perhaps one of
16 Martin van Creveld, Transformation o f War (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991), p. 226.
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the first primitive modes of analysis. They are based on a form of sympathetic magic, 
which presumes both a ‘law of similarity’ and a ‘law of contamination’.
The law of similarity is a metaphysical belief that holds that like affects like, 
so similarities in surface appearance (or ‘mere appearance’) imply that there exist 
deeper similarities in substance. Thus, for example, in developing countries the 
surface appearance of disorderliness or physical poverty implies something deep and 
substantive, like barbarism or moral poverty. The law of similarity is akin to the 
Romantic trope of reading meanings into the landscape, where beauty and ugliness 
are manifestations of the power and majesty, or contrarily, the evil and brutality, of 
nature or humanity. Thus the aesthetic becomes ethic.
The law of contagion or contamination is a belief that holds that one can pass 
on—by infection, pollution, or contamination—traits to another by simple contact or
1 7proximity, and once infected, always infected. Thus, for example, those engaged m 
or caught up in conflict are not behaving rationally—instead they are ‘infected’ or 
‘polluted’ by irrational behaviours or motivations with violence. Their actions have 
the potential to ‘contaminate’ the world with anarchy and chaos. Most importantly 
perhaps, they are unredeemable: their contamination and pollution is permanent; once 
‘infected’ with violence, always infected. This reasoning underlies the biblical notion 
of the transmission of sins by birth as well as some Romantic concepts of collective 
guilt. In these conceptions sin (or responsibility) is transmutable; the punishment for 
it is collective; the atonement for it is only by blood.
These laws generate a sense not just of pity but also of disgust towards those 
contaminated by the pollutant (in this case, violent conflict). As William Miller 
argues, disgust ‘plays a motivating and confirming role in moral judgment [....] It 
ranks people and things in a kind of cosmic ordering’ and it ‘can convey a strong 
sense of aversion to something perceived as dangerous because of its powers to
I  Q
contaminate, infect, or pollute by proximity [or] contact’. The moral judgement 
such metaphors of unending chaos and anarchy convey is one of miasmic despair, of 
horror and disbelief at the depravity and barbarism of those engaged or caught up in 
conflict. The ‘cosmic ordering’ function of disgust then relegates them to the
17 Robert Todd Carroll, ‘Sympathetic Magic’, The Skeptic’s Dictionary: A Collection o f Strange 
Beliefs, Amusing Deceptions, and Dangerous Delusions (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, 2003). 
Also available at http://skepdic.com/sympathetic.html
18 William Ian Miller, The Anatomy o f  Disgust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.
2 .
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hierarchical status of sub-human; their fallen, diseased state a manifest sign of their 
unworthiness as human beings. They cease being men and become ‘wild things’, 
uncivilised brutes close to the rawness of primitive survival against ‘nature, red in 
tooth and claw’.19
These pre-scientific laws also replicate heuristic biases found in cognitive 
psychology. The law of similarity replicates the heuristic of surface commonalities, 
where judgements are unreliably based on ‘mere appearance’ alone. The law of 
contagion can produce the fundamental attribution error, since it assumes that certain 
immutable, inheritable traits are the root cause of problems. This view minimises the 
effect of circumstances on agents, denies them the possibility of rational action, and 
underestimates their potential for multifaceted and variable responses to situations.
Rather than being based on a rational logic, these theories of hidden 
correspondences are highly emotional, playing on some of the most basic 
psychological instincts, including fear. They mix easily with Romanticism which is 
both anti-rationalist and emotionalist. Romanticism is also tied to a spiritually 
Christian worldview (at least in the West), particularly the Christian view of tragedy 
as a moral failing or a sin within the individual or group rather than one which is 
based on the situation. Extending this Romantic (Christian) view of tragedy to 
conflict, we see that those engaged in conflict are responsible (sinful) because of their 
own failings (sins) and not worthy of assistance because they are ‘contaminated’ by 
violence. This tragic view creates a sense of helplessness on the part of the observer. 
If tragedy results from the sin of the participant, then the observer can do nothing. If 
conflict is not a matter of rational calculation and is based on dispositional factors, 
rather than the situation, then no solution can be found in politics; only the 
participants’ repentance provides the way out of the sin of violence. Hence rather than 
reliance on political action, we see a Romantic attachment to the idea of 
‘reconciliation’—a psychological and emotional response—as atonement for past 
conflicts.
Within international relations, the atmosphere of decline that enveloped the 
Romantic Zeitgeist prompted a focus on the dispositional aspects of conflict —the 
irrational, relativistic, nature of man—to the detriment of understanding situational 
factors, generating a sense of tragedy, pity, and fear. While sometimes dressed up in
19 The phrase is from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s poem ‘In Memoriam’ (1850).
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the jargon of ‘privileging agency’ (which has admittedly often been marginalised) 
over ‘mechanistic’ structuralist explanations, agency perspectives can themselves end 
up being little more than a series of Romantic discussions about ‘national characters’ 
and ‘mentalities’, with cultural interpretations that rely on biased historiography 
sliding carelessly into stereotyping. This can create precisely the sort of ‘mechanistic’ 
categories and analyses that are faulted in structuralist thinking—that humans are 
cogs in the wheel, only the rational ‘structural’ wheel has been replaced with the 
irrational ‘cultural’ or ‘identity’ wheel. Rather than offering deep insights, they 
become mere echoes of the pervading Zeitgeist of Romanticism.
These Romantic views persisted throughout the 1990s despite empirical 
evidence to the contrary. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 4, by the mid-1990s 
conflict rates had already begun dropping, and by 2000 were below Cold War levels. 
Further, the ‘contagion’ potential of ethnic conflict that Romantics had heralded had 
not come to pass. Although some scholars, like Ted Robert Gurr and John Mueller, 
did argue against simplified views of coming cultural or ethnic conflict, Romantic 
views captured the not only the popular imagination, but remained salient in 
policymaking and academic discussions. The question is: ‘why?’ Why were 
Romantic themes revisited despite the fact that they were empirically incorrect? We 
will offer a tentative answer in the next section.
7.2 Selling Gotterdammerung—Conclusion
‘Sell them their dreams. Sell them what they longed for and hopedfor 
and almost despaired o f having. *
—Radio announcement at American retail convention20
If the art of selling consumer goods is about selling dreams, then perhaps the art of 
selling policy pronouncements is about selling nightmares, especially in international 
relations. Although dreams can be sold during an optimistic age, in the anxious 1990s 
nightmares cornered the market. While proclamations of the ‘end of history’ through 
the triumph of free market democracy languished in the international relations deep
20 This announcement was reportedly made over the radio during a retail convention in Philadelphia in 
1923. See William Leach, Land o f Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise o f a New American Culture 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 298.
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discount bin, tales of a future Gdtterdammerung were flying off the shelves. Simply 
put, when it came to international relations, worst case scenarios sold in the 1990s.
Some of this was clearly due to the requirement on the part of those involved 
in policymaking to consider prudence and the precautionary principle when it came to
the highest matters of state. Therefore, Kaplan’s idea of ‘anxious foresight’ does not
0 1seem out of place when considering matters of war and peace. However, the 
Zeitgeist of Postmodern Romanticism went further in its pessimism than mere 
prudence or anxious foresight would suggest. Its deep pessimism and sense of tragedy 
generated an alarmist mythos about conflict that said more about the sense of 
uncertainty about the era than about the empirical realities of conflict. Indeed, Post- 
Cold War Romanticism in the West was perhaps based more on a sense of domestic 
decline that was then more broadly reflected in international relations.
As we have discussed, declinism is neither a right-wing nor a left-wing 
ideology; rather it is a mood, sensibility, or attitude toward events, perhaps even a 
psychological or biological orientation. It is the sensibility that we live in the worst of 
all possible worlds, in decline, at the end of civilisation, or even more prophetically 
during the ‘end times’. In some ways, declinists are disappointed idealists with a great 
sense of weariness and ennui who see their own age as inherently corrupt and tragic, 
have lost confidence in the future, and may search for redemption in another era as a 
means of temporal escape. Despite their diminished sense of the possibilities for the 
future, they can seek a new, pure redemptive order through the pursuit of virtue;22 for 
them, only virtue can reverse the present tragic tide of misfortune and social or 
civilisational decline to create a new Golden Age.23. However, the most hardened 
Romantics, who deny the possibility of revival or redemption and see their age as the 
continuing unfolding of a tragedy, may give in to a theology of despair and anxiously 
anticipate or even rejoice in a future Gdtterdammerung. The taste for what is 
considered Gothic, wild, macabre, and libertine, or the celebration of what is on the 
extreme margins—criminals, prostitutes, or exotic ‘Others’—follow from this mood 
of jaded cynicism that trails in the rejection of hope and the possibility of progress.
Views that propagated this sense of doom—that the West is indeed in terminal 
decline—share a more general Romantic sensibility that emphasises other related
21 Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York, NY:
Vintage Books, 2002).
22 Herman, p. 8.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
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themes such as anti-rationalism or emotionalism, relativism, nostalgia, and a focus on 
nature. The specifics of these themes changed from nineteenth century Romanticism 
to Postmodern Romanticism, but they have common threads. Historically, both seem 
to be based on a sense of traumatic upheaval, uncertainty, and rootlessness after 
major social, economic, or political transitions. For nineteenth-century Romantics, 
this was political revolution in France coupled with the vast displacement of people 
and conflict during the Napoleonic wars, the Industrial Revolution and the rise of 
capitalism in Britain, and the cultural revolution in Germany. For Postmodern 
Romantics, it was the collapse of the certainties of the bipolar system, including 
democratisation in formerly socialist states, economic globalisation, and the 
development of the homogenisation of culture, generally along American lines, that 
gives people a sense of displacement, insecurity, and loss of control. These 
uncertainties created the moment and conditions under which audiences became 
receptive to Romantic declinism.
What audiences are receptive to invariably ‘sells’, whether it is books or films 
for a popular audience, policy prescriptions for politicians, or course offerings for 
students. Based on some of the evidence that we have discussed, themes that reflected 
the Romantic Zeitgeist sold. Some of the areas that have been growth topics in 
international relations include considerations of ethics and morality in international 
relations, especially emotional or irrational approaches to understanding such issues 
as conflict and human rights; relativistic approaches with an emphasis on ethnic 
identity, culture, or gender; environmentalist perspectives that focus on nature; and 
perspectives that re-examine human nature and society.
Despite their empirical inaccuracy, Romantic themes caught the imagination 
of conflict studies and those who wrote about conflict. Persuasive Romantic analogies 
about brewing conflicts worldwide—and especially Yugoslavia—that emphasised the 
irrational, emotional, or relativistic (cultural) factors that drive conflict were 
influential especially in the US where the works of authors such as Kaplan, 
Huntington, and van Creveld were widely disseminated. These interpretations of 
conflict then created more fodder for pessimists, who recycled tragic images as the 
essential ‘truth of life’, creating a feedback loop that saw civilisational decline.
While cultural declinism sold, its fundamental appeal was to the weary, 
resigned, fearful, or cynical. As such, it was a pessimism of weakness. Nietzsche once 
called optimism an ‘effeminate doctrine’ and asked, ‘Is pessimism necessarily a sign
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of decline, decay, degeneration, weary and weak instincts’ or ‘[i]s there a pessimism 
of strength?’24 Examined from the viewpoint of the 1990s, the answer to the second 
question would be a resounding ‘no’.
24 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Attempt at a Self Criticism’, from The Birth o f Tragedy in. Basic Writings o f  
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Modem Library Classics, 2000), p. 17.
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(i) Methodology for Database Cleaning
In order to crate greater comparability between the datasets, especially about the 
timing of conflicts, we cleaned the data to: 1) focus on new conflicts (rather than 
ongoing or all conflicts); 2) standardise location of conflict, both by state and region;
3) standardise conflict dates and timing of conflicts; and 4) standardise coding of 
conflict issues. In order to achieve these goals, we performed the following tasks on 
the datasets.
Removed all old conflicts, even in new states. A new state can be involved in an 
ongoing conflict. We removed all old conflicts from consideration, even if this 
resulted in the creation of a new state. This eliminated Eritrea from consideration in 
both datasets since it was involved in an old, ongoing conflict with Ethiopia 
extending to at least the 1960s.
Standardised the location of each conflict. The databases treated the location of 
conflicts slightly differently in the cases of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
For example, the Kosimo dataset located the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the 
USSR, and then in Armenia and Azerbaijan. SIPRI located it in the Soviet Union and 
then in Azerbaijan. Since it is an autonomus province within Azerbaijan, we located it 
just in Azerbaijan for consistency. The result was that conflict in Armenia dropped 
out for Kosimo since it was no longer co-located. For Yugoslavia, Kosimo located 
the conflict in each republic. SEPRI located the conflicts first in Yugoslavia, then in 
each of the newly recognised states. We located the conflicts in the territory in 
which they occurred, regardless of the territory’s legal status. (In other words, we 
located the conflicts on the territory of the Yugoslav or Soviet republics before they 
were internationally recognised as sovereign states). This had the effect of moving the 
SIPRI start date for conflict in Croatia from 1992 to 1991. SIPRI lists the conflict in 
Croatia beginning with 1992, since this is the date of legal recognition of the Croatian 
state. However, it also lists the 1991 start date of the conflict in Croatia in the section 
on Yugoslavia, because Croatia was not yet recognised as a state in 1991. We moved
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the location of the conflict to Croatia and used the start date listed under Yugoslavia, 
which was 1991.
Created greater comparability in the dating schemes. Kosimo tends to date the 
start of a conflict at an earlier date than SIPRI. This may be because Kosimo’s 
standard definition for violent conflicts depends on whether or not a government uses 
regular troops, whereas SIPRI’s is based on casualties. It may be that the use of 
regular troops happens earlier in one year (which Kosimo codes as the start date), and 
then casualties mount to the point where SIPRI includes the conflict in the next. Or 
that Kosimo codes the intensity of the conflict for its most intense point (i.e. war), but 
codes the start date from its lowest point, which could have a similar effect. Note that 
we use the older SIPRI database codings, which code the intensity of each year of 
conflict separately from 0-3. With zero there is no violent conflict (<25 deaths per 
year); however, there is a conflict of values (an incompatibility) that is stated by one 
of the parties. SIPRI 1 (>25 deaths but not yet 1,000 for the conflict), 2(>25 but not 
yet 1,000 per year) and 3 (1,000 per year) have higher thresholds. Therefore, using 
the date that a conflict reaches the SIPRI 2+3 threshold as the starting date might 
have the effect of pushing its date forward. To try to take this into account, we 
included only conflicts that reached an intensity level of 2 or 3 at any point during the 
conflict, but we coded those conflicts from the first date in which violence was used 
(SIPRI 1). Thus the least violent conflicts were still excluded (conflicts only reaching 
SIPRI 1 intensity were excluded), but the starting point of a violent conflict was 
moved to the date the violence was first coded, rather than the date the violence was 
coded at a high intensity. This had the effect of moving the SIPRI start date of 
conflict in Georgia from 1992 to 1991, and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Azerbaijan) to 1990.
Accounted for other possible lags in coding the start date. Since even when 
dating schemes are made more comparable, scholars may still reasonably disagree on 
the starting dates of conflicts because of different criteria, it is possible that starting 
dates may be off for a short interval (+/-1 year). Therefore, we used a moving average 
take this into account.
Standardised regions for each conflict in database. Since regions may vary across 
databases, and since the part of the purpose of Chapter 4 was to examine the
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contribution of FSU and FY conflicts to conflict levels in the 1990s, we standardised 
the region of conflicts. The categories we used and the states in each region are 
defined as follows, which is based on the regional divisions used in the Kosimo 
database:
• Europe: all states in Western or Eastern Europe, except former FSU or 
FY states, plus Turkey and Cyprus
• FSU/FY: all states formerly part of the USSR or Yugoslavia
• Oceania: Australia, New Zealand, and all South Pacific islands 
(including the French DOM/TOM possessions and other types of 
dominions or territories of European states in the Pacific)
• Americas: all states in North, South or Central America and the 
Caribbean
• Middle East: all states in North Africa, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, all states 
on the Arabian peninsula, Iran, and Afghanistan
• Africa: all states in sub-Saharan Africa
• Asia: India, Pakistan, China, all states in Southeast Asia, the 
Indonesian archipelago, Japan, and the Philippines
These changes created greater comparability between the datasets, which were 
particularly important when the timing of conflict was considered. The results of the 
database cleaning are as follows:
Dataset Comparability
Databases and issue Before cleaning After cleaning
Kosimo-Singer&Small 
Independence, 1945-88
.54 .88
Kosimo-Singer&Small 
UN admission, 1946-88
.66 .89
Kosimo-SIPRI 
Independence, 1989-98
.67 .91
Kosimo-SIPRI 
UN admission, 1989-98
.66 .94
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Coding for Conflict Issues. The Kosimo database codes for multiple conflict issues. 
Each conflict may have multiple codings for issues. For example, a conflict can be 
both a national power struggle as well as an ideological conflict. The determination of 
conflict issues was based on information in the Kosimo database. In order to examine 
the effects of state creation on conflict, we created the category ‘state creation’ from a 
basket of issues that are related to the creation of new states. This basket included two 
categories: the Kosimo coding for a conflict over national independence or 
decolonisation and the Kosimo coding for ethnic, regional, or religious autonomy. 
Additionally, we coded four cases that Kosimo did not include separately where we 
reasonably thought the coding could apply:
1) Africa—secession of the Shaba (Zaire); Belgium’s intervention in
Zaire 1960
2) Asia—Indian partition (and the creation of Pakistan)
3) Europe—Cyprus conflict
4) FSU/FY—Croatia and Bosnia conflicts (coded only for 1989-1992
period); the Chechnya conflict was coded for the 1993-98 period, 
when the conflict grew in intensity (the SIPRI coding for the 
conflict is 1994)
A conflict was coded as being about state creation if any of the above Kosimo 
codes were included. Since we did not exclude conflicts with multiple codings for 
conflict issues, a conflict did not have to be exclusively about state creation in order 
to be included in the basket.
(ii) Base Rate Calculation
The base rate is a measure of relative frequency, which is simply an annualised rate 
over time that allows comparison. The base rate of conflict is calculated by counting 
the number of new conflicts that were started during a particular time period (usually 
a decade for our purposes) and dividing by the number of years. The base rate is 
calculated as follows:
Raw number of new conflicts
Base Rate = ----------------------------------------
Number of years
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To illustrate this, we will consider Asia, the region with the highest rates of conflict 
during the Cold War. From 1945-1949, Asia experienced 7 new non-World War II 
related conflicts. Since the time period considered, 1945-49, is 5 years long, we 
divide 7 by 5 to get 1.4. That means that the relative frequency of conflict in Asia 
during that decade was 1.4 new conflicts each year. Obviously, since conflicts occur 
only in whole numbers, this means that during each year of that period, on average, 
either one or two new conflicts would start. A similar calculation can be made for 
other decades.
1945-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-88 1989-92 1993-99
Number 
of new 
conflicts
7 4 6 8 2 0 1
Number 
of years
5 10 10 10 9 4 7
Base rate 1.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.22222 0 0.14286
As we can see, the relative frequency or base rate of conflict in Asia dropped 
significantly in the 1950s, to 0.4 new conflicts, or about one new conflict every 2.5 
years. In the 1980s, it fell to 0.22 new conflicts per year, or about one new conflict 
approximately every 4.5 years.
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(iii) List of States, Declarations of Independence and UN 
Admission Dates
State
Independence
declared: Independence from:
UN
admission
date
Afghanistan 1919 UK 1946
Albania 1912 Ottoman empire 1955
Algeria 1962 France 1962
Andorra 1278 1993
Angola 1975 Portugal 1976
Antigua and 
Barbuda 1981 UK 1981
Argentina 1816 Spain 1945
Armenia 1991 USSR 1992
Australia 1901 UK 1945
Austria 1156 Bavaria 1955
Azerbaijan 1991 USSR 1992
Bahamas 1973 UK 1973
Bahrain 1971 UK 1971
Bangladesh 1971 Pakistan 1974
Barbados 1966 UK 1966
Belarus 1991 USSR 1945
Belgium 1830 Netherlands 1945
Belize 1981 UK 1981
Benin 1960 France 1960
Bhutan 1949 India 1971
Bolivia 1825 Spain 1945
Bosnia 1992 Yugoslavia 1992
Botswana 1966 UK 1966
Brazil 1822 Portugal 1945
Brunei 1984 UK 1984
Bulgaria 1908 Ottoman empire 1955
Burkina Faso 1960 France 1960
Burundi 1962 Belgium 1962
Cambodia 1953 France 1955
Cameroon 1960 France 1960
Canada 1867 UK 1945
Cape Verde 1975 Portugal 1975
CAR 1960 France 1960
Chad 1960 France 1960
Chile 1810 Spain 1945
China 0 1945
Columbia 1810 Spain 1945
Comoros 1975 France 1975
Congo
(Brazzaville) 1960 France 1960
Congo (Zaire) 1960 Belgium 1960
Costa Rica 1821 Spain 1945
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State
Independence
declared: Independence from:
UN
admission
date
Cote d'Ivoire 1960 France 1960
Croatia 1991 Yugoslavia 1992
Cuba 1902 United States 1945
Cyprus 1960 UK 1960
Czech Republic 1993 Czechoslovakia 1993
Denmark 1000 1945
Djibouti 1977 France 1977
Dominica 1978 UK 1978
Dominican
Republic 1844 Haiti 1945
Ecuador 1822 Spain 1945
Egypt 1922 UK 1945
El Salvador 1821 Spain 1945
Equatorial
Guinea 1968 Spain 1968
Eritrea 1993 Ethiopia 1993
Estonia 1991 USSR 1991
Ethiopia 0 1945
Fiji 1970 UK 1970
Finland 1917 Russia 1955
France 486 1945
Gabon 1960 France 1960
Gambia 1965 UK 1965
Georgia 1991 USSR 1992
Germany 1871 1973
Ghana 1957 UK 1957
Greece 1829 Ottoman empire 1945
Grenada 1974 UK 1974
Guatemala 1821 Spain 1945
Guinea 1958 France 1958
Guinea-Bissau 1973 Portugal 1974
Guyana 1966 UK 1966
Haiti 1804 France 1945
Honduras 1821 Spain 1945
Hungary 1000 1945
Iceland 1944 Denmark 1946
India 1947 UK 1945
Indonesia 1945 Netherlands 1950
Iran 1945
Iraq 1932 UK 1945
Ireland 1921 UK 1955
Israel 1948 UK 1949
Italy 1861 1955
Jamaica 1962 UK 1962
Japan 0 1956
Jordan 1946 UK 1955
Kazakhstan 1991 USSR 1992
Kenya 1963 UK 1963
Kiribati 1979 UK 1999
Kuwait 1961 UK 1963
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State
Independence
declared: Independence from:
UN
admission
date
Kyrgyzstan 1991 USSR 1992
Laos 1949 France 1955
Latvia 1991 USSR 1991
Lebanon 1943 France 1945
Lesotho 1966 UK 1966
Liberia 1847 1945
Libya 1951 Italy 1955
Liechtenstein 1719 1990
Lithuania 1991 USSR 1991
Luxembourg 1839 Netherlands 1945
FYR Macedonia 1991 Yugoslavia 1993
Madagascar 1960 France 1960
Malawi 1964 UK 1964
Malaysia 1957 UK 1957
Maldives 1965 UK 1965
Mali 1960 France 1960
Malta 1964 UK 1964
Marshall Is. 1986 United States 1991
Mauritania 1960 France 1961
Mauritius 1968 UK 1968
Mexico 1810 Spain 1945
Micronesia 1986 United States 1991
Moldova 1991 USSR 1992
Monaco 1419 1993
Mongolia 1921 China 1961
Morocco 1956 France 1956
Mozambigue 1975 Portugal 1975
Myanmar 1948 UK 1948
Namibia 1990 South Africa 1990
Nauru 1968 UK, Austral., NZ 1999
Nepal 1768 1955
Netherlands 1579 Spain 1945
New Zealand 1907 UK 1945
Nicaragua 1821 Spain 1945
Niger 1960 France 1960
Nigeria 1960 UK 1960
N. Korea 1945 Japan 1991
Norway 1905 Sweden 1945
Oman 1650 Portugal 1971
Pakistan 1947 UK 1947
Palau 1994 United States 1994
Panama 1903 Columbia 1945
Papaua New 
Guinea 1975 Australia* 1975
Paraguay 1811 Spain 1945
Peru 1821 Spain 1945
Philippines 1946 United States 1945
Poland 1918 Russia 1945
Portugal 1140 1955
Qatar 1971 UK 1971
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State
Independence
declared: Independence from:
UN
admission
date
Romania 1881 Ottoman empire 1955
Russia 1991 USSR 1945
Rwanda 1962 Belgium 1962
St Kitts/Nevis 1979 UK 1979
St Vincent 
Grenadines 1979 UK 1980
Samoa 1962 New Zealand * 1976
San Marino 301 1992
Sao Tome 
Principe 1975 Portugal 1975
Saudi Arabia 1932 1945
Senegal 1960 France 1960
Serbia/Mont. 1992 Yugoslavia
Seychelles 1976 UK 1976
Sierra Leone 1961 UK 1961
Singapore 1965 Malaysia 1965
Slovakia 1993 Czechoslovakia 1993
Slovenia 1991 Yugoslavia 1992
Solomon Is. 1978 UK 1978
Somalia 1960 UK, Italy 1960
S. Africa 1910 UK 1945
S. Korea 1945 Japan 1991
Spain 1492 Moors 1955
Sri Lanka 1948 UK 1955
Sudan 1956 UK 1956
Suriname 1975 Netherlands 1975
Swaziland 1968 UK 1968
Sweden 1523 1946
Syria 1946 France 1945
Tajikistan 1991 USSR 1992
Thailand 1238 1946
Togo 1960 France 1960
Tonga 1970 UK 1999
Trinidad/Tobago 1962 UK 1962
Tunesia 1956 France 1956
Turkey 1923 Ottoman empire 1945
Turkmenistan 1991 USSR 1992
Uganda 1962 UK 1962
Ukraine 1991 USSR 1945
UAE 1971 UK 1971
UK 1000 1945
Tanzania 1,961 UK 1961
United States 1776 England 1945
Uruguay 1825 Brazil 1945
Uzbekistan 1991 USSR 1992
Vanuatu 1980 France, UK 1981
Venezuela 1811 Spain 1945
Vietnam 1945 France 1977
N. Yemen 
(merged) 1918 Ottoman empire 1947
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State
Independence
declared: Independence from:
UN
adm ission
date
S. Yemen 
(merged) 1967 UK 1967
Yugoslavia 1918
Austria-Hungary, 
Ottoman empire 1945
Zambia 1964 UK 1964
Zimbabwe 1980 UK 1980
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